1Furthermore, one may not derive benefit from any of these sin offerings ab initio , but if one derived benefit from them, after the fact, he is not liable to bring a sin offering for misuse of consecrated items. And if the lost animal was found and discovered to be unfit before the owner achieved atonement for his sin with a different animal, it shall graze until it becomes blemished, and then it shall be sold. And he must bring another sin offering with the money received from the sale. And this animal renders a non-sacred animal exchanged for it a substitute, and one who derives benefit from this animal is liable for misusing it.
2GEMARA: Although there are five types of sin offerings that are sequestered and left to die, the mishna initially states: The offspring of a sin offering, and the substitute for a sin offering, and a sin offering whose owner has died shall be sequestered and left to die, and only then mentions the remaining two types, a sin offering that is more than one year old and a sin offering that was lost and then found after the owner achieved atonement through the sacrifice of another animal. The Gemara asks: What is the reason the mishna does not teach them all together? The Gemara responds: With regard to those sin offerings taught in the first clause, there is an absolute rule that applies equally in all circumstances. But with regard to the remaining types taught in the latter clause, there is no absolute rule, as these sin offerings are left to die only if the owner has already achieved atonement with another animal.
3The Gemara asks: This mishna also appears in tractate Me’ila (10b). Why do I need the tanna to teach this mishna in tractate Me’ila and why do I need him to teach it in tractate Temura ? The Gemara responds: Here, in Temura , the mishna taught the halakhot pertaining to substitution, which is the central theme of tractate Temura . And since it taught the halakhot pertaining to substitution, it also taught the relevant halakhot pertaining to misuse of consecrated property. And similarly, since it taught in tractate Me’ila the halakhot pertaining to misuse of consecrated property, which is the subject of tractate Me’ila , it also taught the relevant halakhot pertaining to substitution.
4§ Reish Lakish says: With regard to a sin offering whose first year from birth has passed, one considers it as though it is standing in a cemetery, where a priest cannot enter in order to retrieve it and sacrifice it, and it is left to graze until it develops a blemish, after which it is sold and the money received in its sale is used to purchase another animal for a sin offering. Since Reish Lakish makes no distinction between an owner who already achieved atonement with another animal and one who did not, it seems that according to Reish Lakish, this is the halakha in all cases of a sin offering whose first year from birth has passed.
5The Gemara objects: We learned in the mishna: With regard to a sin offering whose first year from birth has passed and a sin offering that was lost and when it was found it was blemished, if it was after the owner achieved atonement through the sacrifice of another animal as a sin offering, the blemished animal is left to die. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish.
6The Gemara explains that Reish Lakish could say to you: When the mishna teaches in the first clause that the animal is sequestered and left to die, it is referring only to the case where it was lost and when it was found it was blemished. In that situation, if it was after the owner achieved atonement through the sacrifice of another animal as a sin offering, the blemished animal shall be left to die. By contrast, a sin offering whose first year from birth has passed is indeed left to graze until it develops a blemish.
7The Gemara objects: If so, say the latter clause: If the lost animal was found and discovered to be unfit before the owner achieved atonement for his sin with a different animal, it shall graze until it becomes blemished. Now, if the mishna is referring specifically to an animal that was lost and found when it was blemished, why is this statement necessary? Doesn’t it already stand blemished?
8Rabba said in response that this is what the tanna is saying: In a case where it was lost and subsequently found when it had a temporary blemish, then if it was after the owner achieved atonement with another sin offering, the blemished animal shall be left to die. But if this was before the owner achieved atonement with another sin offering, it shall graze until it becomes blemished with a permanent blemish, and then it shall be sold.
9Rava says: There are two refutations of Rabba’s statement: One refutation is that if it is so, that the mishna is referring to an animal that was lost and then found when it had a temporary blemish, then instead of stating: It shall graze until it becomes blemished, the mishna should have taught: One observes the animal to see whether the temporary blemish becomes permanent. And furthermore, according to this interpretation of the mishna, when it mentions the case of a sin offering whose first year from birth has passed, with regard to what halakha is that case taught?
10Rather, Rava said a different explanation of the mishna so that it does not contradict the statement of Reish Lakish: This is what the mishna is teaching: With regard to a sin offering whose first year from birth has passed and was lost, or one that was lost and when it was found it was blemished, which means that in each case, there are two disqualifying factors, the halakha is as follows: If the first animal is found after the owner achieved atonement with another sin offering, the animal shall be left to die. If it is found before the owner achieved atonement with another sin offering, it shall graze until it becomes blemished and then it shall be sold. Reish Lakish, by contrast, is referring to a situation where the sin offering was not lost. In such a case there is only one disqualifying factor, and therefore the animal is left to graze regardless of whether or not the owner achieved atonement with another animal.
11Rava continues: And it was necessary for the mishna to teach: If it was lost, with regard to a sin offering that was found to be blemished, and also to teach that clause with regard to a sin offering whose first year has passed. In other words, it was necessary for the mishna to teach that in each of these cases losing the animal means that it must be sequestered and left to die if the owner already achieved atonement with another animal. As if it had taught this halakha only with regard to a sin offering whose first year has passed, I would say: It is only there that the fact that it was lost is effective in requiring that the animal must be left to die, because it is not fit for its original purpose, as an animal more than one year old is inherently unfit for a sin offering. But with regard to a blemished animal, which would have been fit for sacrifice if not for its blemish, I might say that the fact that it was lost is not effective in causing the animal to be left to die.
12And similarly, if the mishna had taught the halakha only with regard to a blemished animal, I would say: It is only there that the fact that it was lost is effective in requiring that the animal must be left to die, because a blemished animal is not fit for sacrifice at all. But with regard to a sin offering whose first year has passed, which is fit for sacrifice as a different offering, I might say that the fact that it was lost is not effective in causing the animal to be left to die. Consequently, it was necessary for the mishna to teach the halakha with regard to both cases.
13The Gemara asks: And did Rava actually say this, that an animal whose first year has passed and was then lost is left to die? But didn’t Rava say: A sin offering lost at night is not called lost? In other words, if the offering is lost at a time that it is not fit for sacrifice, the animal is not considered lost. Consequently, provided that the owner finds the sin offering before morning, it is left to graze and not to die, even if the owner designated another animal in its stead. By the same logic, as a sin offering whose first year has passed is not fit for sacrifice as a sin offering, it should not be considered lost even if the owner cannot locate it. Therefore, it should not be left to die.
14The Gemara responds: The case of a sin offering lost at night is not comparable to that of a sin offering lost after its first year has passed. When a sin offering is lost at night, it is not fit at all, neither for itself, i.e., to be sacrificed, nor for its value, to be sold and the proceeds used to purchase another offering. But with regard to this sin offering that was lost after its first year has passed, granted that it is not fit for itself, but it is fit for its value.
15The Gemara presents another challenge to the opinion of Rava: We learned in a mishna ( Yoma 62a): On Yom Kippur, a pair of goats are brought to the Temple, and lots are drawn to determine which goat is to be sent to Azazel as the scapegoat, and which goat is sacrificed as a sin offering. If after the lots were drawn for both goats, the scapegoat died, another pair of goats is brought and lots are drawn for the second pair. In such a case, there are two goats that were selected as the sin offering, i.e., the remaining goat from the first pair and the goat selected from the second. One of them is sacrificed and the second goat shall graze until it becomes blemished, at which point it will be sold, and the money received from its sale will be allocated for communal gift offerings. This is because a communal sin offering is not left to die. One may infer from the mishna that under similar circumstances, the sin offering of an individual is left to die.
16The Gemara continues: And as the mishna does not specify which of the two goats is sacrificed as the sin offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The goat from the second pair is sacrificed, since living animals are rejected. That is, animals that were consecrated for a specific purpose but were not fit to be used for that purpose at the proper time are permanently disqualified as a sacrifice. Accordingly, as the first goat was unfit for sacrifice when the first scapegoat died, it is permanently disqualified from the altar. And therefore, when the High Priest achieves atonement on behalf of the Jewish people, he achieves atonement with the second goat of the second pair [ zug ].
17The Gemara concludes: And the other goat, i.e., the first goat selected as the sin offering, is like a sin offering whose first year has passed, in that both are disqualified due to an external factor. And the Gemara infers that the reason the first goat is not left to die is that it is a communal sin offering; but if it was the sin offering of an individual, it would be left to die. Evidently, a sin offering whose first year has passed is left to die even if it was not lost.
18The Gemara responds: Rava could say to you: The case of sin offerings that were rejected is discrete and the case of sin offerings that were lost is discrete, i.e., the two cases cannot be compared. What is the reason for this? In the case of lost sin offerings, the owner’s mind is on them, as he thinks that perhaps they will be found and will be fit for sacrifice. Therefore, they are not left to die simply because they are lost. But in the case of sin offerings that have been rejected, they do not become fit ever again, and therefore the owner’s mind is not on them.