תלמוד בבלי

1MISHNA: Everyone takes vows of valuation and is thereby obligated to donate to the Temple treasury the value fixed by the Torah (see Leviticus 27:3–7) for the age and sex of the person valuated. And similarly, everyone is valuated, and therefore one who vowed to donate his fixed value is obligated to pay. Likewise, everyone vows to donate to the Temple treasury the assessment of a person, based on his market value to be sold as a slave, and is thereby obligated to pay; and everyone is the object of a vow if others vowed to donate his assessment. This includes priests, Levites and Israelites, women, and Canaanite slaves.

2A tumtum , whose sexual organs are concealed, and a hermaphrodite [ androginos ], vow, and are the object of a vow, and take vows of valuation, but they are not valuated. Consequently, if one says, with regard to a tumtum : The valuation of so-and-so is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury, he is not obligated to pay anything, as only a definite male or a definite female are valuated.

3A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are the object of a vow and are valuated, but neither vow to donate the assessment of a person nor take a vow of valuation, because they lack the presumed mental competence to make a commitment.

4GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is added by the mishna’s statement: Everyone [ hakol ] takes vows of valuation? When a principle is stated in a mishna, it serves to include a particular case that it does not mention explicitly in its halakha . Which case is included by the broad statement here? The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches it to add a discriminating minor on the brink of adulthood [ mufla samukh le’ish ], i.e., during the year before a minor reaches majority.

5The Gemara similarly asks: What is added by the statement: And everyone is valuated? The Gemara answers: The mishna serves to add a repulsive man and one afflicted with boils, who have no market value.

6The Gemara explains why this addition is necessary: It might enter your mind to say that as it is written in the verse: “A vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2), which juxtaposes one who is valuated to one who is the object of a vow, anyone who is included in the category of assessments, i.e., if he vows to pay his assessment he must pay it to the Temple, is also included in the category of valuations. But anyone who is not included in the category of assessments is not included in the category of valuations. Since these people, a repulsive man and one afflicted with boils, are not subject to assessment, as they have no market value, perhaps they are also not subject to valuation.

7Therefore, the mishna teaches us that these too are subject to valuation, as the same verse also states: “Persons [ nefashot ],” indicating anyone who has any amount of life [ nefesh ] is subject to valuation.

8The Gemara further asks: What is added by the mishna’s statement: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person? The Gemara answers: Actually, this statement is not necessary, but it is mentioned because the continuation: And everyone is the object of a vow, was necessary.

9The Gemara inquires: What, then, is added by the clause: And everyone is the object of a vow? If one were to suggest that this serves to add a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, that cannot be correct, as they are explicitly taught in the mishna itself. And if one were to suggest that it serves to add a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, they too are explicitly taught in the mishna.

10And if you say that this clause serves to add the halakha that a child who is less than a month old, who is not subject to valuation, is nevertheless subject to assessment, this too is explicitly taught in a mishna (5a). And if one were to say that it serves to add a gentile, that is also explicitly taught in a mishna (5b). The Gemara answers: Actually, the phrase: And everyone is the object of a vow, is mentioned in the mishna in order to add a child who is less than a month old, and the mishna teaches this halakha in general terms and then explains it in detail later.

11§ The Gemara inquires about similar general expressions that appear in other mishnayot . What is added by the mishna ( Menaḥot 93a): Everyone who brings an offering places hands on the head of the animal? The Gemara answers: This clause serves to add that an heir places hands on the offering of the deceased, and the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that an heir does not place his hands on an offering he inherited.

12The Gemara asks: What is added by the ruling of the mishna ( Temura 2a): Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal? The Gemara answers: Here too, the mishna serves to add that an heir substitutes a non-sacred animal for his father’s consecrated animal, i.e., the non-sacred animal also becomes sanctified. And this mishna is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as he maintains that an heir cannot substitute a non-sacred animal for the consecrated animal he inherited.

13The Gemara cites the source for these two opinions of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita : An heir places hands on his father’s offering, and an heir can effect substitution for an offering inherited from his father. Rabbi Yehuda says: An heir does not place hands and an heir cannot effect substitution.

14The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda? With regard to placing of hands, he expounds the term: “His offering” (Leviticus 3:2), as teaching that one places his hands only on his own offering, but not on his father’s offering. And with regard to the ruling that an heir cannot effect substitution, Rabbi Yehuda derives the halakha of the initial stage of consecration, i.e., substitution, in which a previously non-sacred animal is consecrated, from the final stage of consecration, the act of placing hands, which is performed upon an already-consecrated animal immediately before it is slaughtered: Just as with regard to the final stage of consecration, an heir does not place hands, so too, with regard to the initial stage of consecration, an heir cannot effect substitution.

1but he maintains that the exclusion of a gentile and the exclusion of the offering of another person from the requirement of placing hands are derived from the same one mention of “his offering” in the verse. This leaves two mentions of “his offering” for Rabbi Yehuda. One he expounds to teach that he places hands on “his offering,” but not on his father’s offering that he inherited, and the other mention remains to include all the owners of a jointly owned offering in the requirement of placing hands.

2The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yehuda, what does he do with the use of the doubled form in this verse: “If he shall substitute [ hamer yamir ]”? The Gemara answers: He requires it to include a woman among those who can effect substitution. As it is taught in a baraita : Since the entire matter of substitution is stated in the Torah only in the masculine form, what is the reason that we ultimately come to include a woman? The verse states: “And if he shall substitute [ hamer yamir ],” using a doubled form.

3The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, from where do they learn that a woman can perform substitution? The Gemara answers: They derive it from the extra “and” in the phrase: “And if he shall substitute” (Leviticus 27:10). But Rabbi Yehuda does not expound the extra “and” in the term “and if” at all.

4§ The Gemara asks: What is added by the statement of the following baraita : Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of sukka ? The Gemara answers: This serves to add a minor who does not need his mother when he awakes in the middle of the night. As we learned in a mishna ( Sukka 28a): A minor who does not need his mother is obligated in the mitzva of sukka .

5The Gemara further asks: What is added by the ruling of the following baraita : Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of lulav ? The Gemara answers: This clause serves to add a minor who knows how to wave the lulav . As we learned in a mishna ( Sukka 42a): A minor who knows how to wave the lulav is obligated in the mitzva of lulav .

6The Gemara continues to ask similar questions: What is added by the statement of a baraita : Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes? The Gemara explains that this serves to add a minor who knows how to wrap himself in a garment. As it is taught in a baraita : A minor who knows how to wrap himself in a garment is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes.

7The Gemara asks: What is added by the ruling of a baraita : Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries? The Gemara answers that it serves to add a minor who knows how to preserve the sanctity of phylacteries by maintaining a state of bodily cleanliness. As it is taught in a baraita : With regard to a minor who knows how to preserve the sanctity of phylacteries in a state of cleanliness, his father purchases phylacteries for him.

8§ The Gemara further inquires: What is added by the statement of the mishna ( Ḥagiga 2a): Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of appearance, i.e., the obligation to appear in the Temple and to sacrifice an offering on the three pilgrimage Festivals. The Gemara answers: The mishna serves to add one who is a half-slave half-freeman, e.g., a Canaanite slave who was owned jointly, and only one of his owners freed him.

9The Gemara explains: And according to the opinion of Ravina, who said: One who is half-slave half-freeman is exempt from the mitzva of appearance in the Temple, that clause serves to add one who was lame on the first day of the Festival and was unable to travel, and was therefore exempt at the time, but who was healed on the second day of the Festival. This man is obligated to appear in the Temple before the end of the Festival.

10The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that all seven days of a Festival rectify one another, i.e., the obligation to appear applies equally to all days of the Festival, not just the first. Consequently, one who was exempt on the first day is nevertheless obligated on the second day. But according to the one who says that the main obligation is on the first day and that all the remaining days merely rectify the first day, a person who was lame on the first day of the Festival remains exempt throughout the rest of the Festival. If so, what does the statement of the mishna in Ḥagiga 2a serve to add?

11The Gemara answers: It serves to add one who is blind in one of his eyes, and teaches that he is obligated to appear in the Temple, whereas one who is entirely blind is exempt. The Gemara notes: And this ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna , Rabbi Yehuda.

12As it is taught in a baraita that Yoḥanan ben Dahavai says in the name of Rabbi Yehuda: One who is blind in one of his eyes is exempt from the mitzva of appearance, as it is stated: “Three times in the year all your males shall appear [ yera’eh ] before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17). According to the way in which the verse is written, without vocalization, it can be read as yireh , meaning: Shall see, instead of yera’eh , meaning: Shall appear. This teaches that in the same manner that one comes to see, so he comes to appear, i.e., to be seen: Just as the usual way to see is with both of one’s eyes, so too, the obligation to appear applies only to one who comes with the sight of both his eyes. This is one possible explanation for what is added by the general statement of the mishna in Ḥagiga 2a, according to Ravina.

13And if you wish, say instead: Actually, that statement serves to include one who is half-slave and half-freeman. And with regard to what was difficult for you according to the opinion of Ravina, that he exempts such a person from the obligation of appearance, it is not difficult: Here the ruling is in accordance with the initial version of the mishna, whereas there it is in accordance with the ultimate version of the mishna.

14As we learned in a mishna ( Pesaḥim 88a): One who is half-slave and half-freeman serves his master one day, as he is half a slave, and works for himself one day, since he is half free. This is the statement of Beit Hillel.

1what? The Gemara answers: They serve to add women, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. As Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Women are obligated in the mitzva of reading the Megilla, as they too were participants in that miracle.

2The Gemara asks: What is added by the ruling of the baraita : Everyone is obligated to form a zimmun and recite Grace after Meals as a group? The Gemara answers: The baraita serves to add women and slaves. As it is taught in a baraita : Women form a zimmun for themselves and slaves form a zimmun for themselves.

3The Gemara further inquires: What is added by the baraita : Everyone is included in a zimmun ? This serves to add a minor who knows to Whom one recites a blessing. As Rav Naḥman says: A minor who knows to Whom one recites a blessing is included in a zimmun .

4§ The Gemara asks: What is added by the clause in the mishna ( Zavim 2:1): Everyone becomes impure by means of a gonorrhea-like discharge [ ziva ]? This serves to add that even a day-old baby who has such a discharge becomes impure. As it is taught in a baraita : It would have been sufficient for the verse to state: A man. Why does the verse state: “When any man has an issue out of his flesh, his issue is impure” (Leviticus 15:2)? This serves to include a day-old baby who has such a discharge, to teach that even he becomes impure as one who experiences ziva . This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

5Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says that this amplification is not necessary, as the verse states: “And of them that have an issue, whether it be a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33). “A male” includes anyone who is male, whether a small child or an adult; “a female” includes anyone who is female, whether a small child or an adult. If so, why does the verse state: “Any man”? The Torah spoke in the language of men, i.e., this is a normal way to phrase the sentence, and therefore one should not derive a halakha from the extra word.

6The Gemara asks: What is added by the baraita : Everyone becomes impure with impurity imparted by a corpse? The baraita teaches it to add a minor. The Gemara elaborates: It might enter your mind to say that since the verse states: “But the man that shall be impure and shall not purify himself” (Numbers 19:20), one should derive from here that a man, i.e., an adult, yes, he becomes impure, but a minor does not. Therefore, the verse teaches us in the context of purification with purification water from impurity imparted by a corpse: “And sprinkle it upon the tent, and upon all the vessels, and upon the persons that were there” (Numbers 19:18). This indicates that all persons who were there became impure, regardless of age.

7The Gemara asks: But if so, what does the term “the man” serve to exclude? The Gemara answers: It serves to exclude a minor from excision from the World-to-Come [ karet ], which is mentioned in that verse: “That soul shall be cut off from the midst of the assembly, because he has defiled the Sanctuary of the Lord” (Numbers 19:20). In other words, the term “the man” serves to teach that if a minor becomes impure and then enters the Temple, he is not liable to receive karet .

8The Gemara further asks: What is added by the ruling of the mishna ( Nega’im 3:1): Everyone becomes impure by means of leprous marks? The Gemara answers: This serves to add a minor. As it might enter your mind to say that since it is written in the verse: “He is a leprous man, he is impure” (Leviticus 13:44), this is teaching that a man, i.e., an adult, yes, he does become impure, but a minor does not. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that a minor becomes impure by means of leprous marks.

9The Gemara asks: But why not say that the halakha is indeed so, that a minor does not become impure by means of leprous marks? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “When a person shall have in the skin of his flesh” (Leviticus 13:2), to include all people, in any case, irrespective of age.

10The Gemara asks: But in that case, why do I need the term: “He is a leprous man” (Leviticus 13:44)? The Gemara answers: It comes for that which is taught in a baraita : From the phrase “he is a leprous man” I have derived only a leprous man. From where is it derived that leprous marks also render a woman impure? When the subsequent verse states: “And the leper in whom the affliction is” (Leviticus 13:45), there are two individuals indicated here, male and female, as this verse did not need to restate: “And the leper,” since the subject of this clause was clear from the previous verse.

11If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “A leprous man”? This is referring to the matter of the leper rending his clothes and letting his hair grow wild, which is stated in the verse below: “His clothes shall be rent, and the hair of his head shall go loose” (Leviticus 13:45). The verse therefore teaches that a man who is a leper lets his hair grow and rends his garments, but a woman who is a leper does not let her hair grow and does not rend her garments.

12The Gemara asks: What is added by the ruling of the baraita : Everyone may inspect leprous marks in order to declare them pure or impure, and the clause of another baraita : Everyone is fit to inspect leprous marks in order to declare them pure or impure. The Gemara answers: These statements serve to add a priest who is not expert in distinguishing between them, the different types of leprous marks, and in identifying their names.

13The Gemara asks: But didn’t the Master say that any priest who is not expert in distinguishing between them and in identifying their names is not authorized to inspect the leprous marks and make a decision with regard to them? Ravina said: This is not difficult. This statement, that the priest is fit, is referring to a situation where if they explain to him he understands; whereas that statement, that he is not fit, is referring to a case where even if they explain to him he still does not understand.

14§ The Gemara asks: What is added by the statement of the mishna ( Para 5:4): Everyone is fit to sanctify the ashes of the red heifer, i.e., to pour the water over them? The Gemara answers that according to Rabbi Yehuda the statement serves to add a minor, and according to the Rabbis, who disqualify a minor, it serves to add a woman. As we learned in a mishna ( Para 5:4): Everyone is fit to sanctify the ashes of the red heifer except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor. Rabbi Yehuda deems a minor fit, but deems a woman and a hermaphrodite, who has both male and female characteristics, unfit.

1The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches this clause to add slaves. If a slave wishes to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, he can force his master to either ascend with him, or to sell him to someone who will ascend, or to free him. The Gemara asks: And according to the one who teaches slaves explicitly in the mishna, what does this phrase serve to add? The Gemara answers that it serves to add the case of one who wishes to compel his family to move from a pleasant residence outside of Eretz Yisrael to a noxious residence in Eretz Yisrael.

2The Gemara adds that when that same mishna teaches, in its continuation: But all may not remove others from Eretz Yisrael, this serves to add the case of a slave who fled from outside of Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael. The master may not bring him back to outside of Eretz Yisrael.

3The Gemara discusses another statement of that same mishna: All can force their family to ascend to Jerusalem. This serves to add the halakha that one may compel his family to move from a pleasant residence outside of Jerusalem to a noxious residence in Jerusalem. The Gemara asks: What is added by the next clause of that mishna: And none can remove them from Jerusalem? The Gemara explains that this serves to add that one cannot compel his family to leave Jerusalem, even from a noxious residence in Jerusalem to a pleasant residence elsewhere in Eretz Yisrael.

4§ The Gemara discusses several other cases where a mishna or baraita states that everyone is obligated in a particular mitzva. A baraita teaches: Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of sukka , including priests, Levites, and Israelites. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? If these people are not obligated to perform the mitzva, then who is obligated to perform it?

5The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the halakha to mention that priests are obligated to fulfill this mitzva, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “In sukkot shall you reside seven days” (Leviticus 23:42), one can argue as follows: The Master said that this teaches: Reside seven days as you dwell in your permanent home: Just as in the case of dwelling, a man and his wife typically reside together, so too, the mitzva of sukka must be performed by a man and his wife residing together. And with regard to these priests, since they are occupied with the Temple service during the Festival and are not free to dwell in the sukka together with their wives, perhaps they should not be obligated in the mitzva of sukka .

6Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not so, as although priests are exempt at the time of the Temple service, when it is not the time of Temple service they are obligated, just as is the halakha with regard to travelers. As the Master said in a baraita : Travelers who are on the move during the day are exempt from the mitzva of sukka during the day but are obligated at night, as they are not traveling at that time.

7§ The Gemara cites a similar baraita : Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes, including priests, Levites, and Israelites. The Gemara asks again: Isn’t that obvious?

8The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the baraita to mention that priests are obligated to fulfill this mitzva, as it may enter your mind to say as follows: Since it is written: “You shall not wear diverse kinds, wool and linen together. You shall prepare yourself twisted cords upon the four corners of your covering” (Deuteronomy 22:11–12), it is only one who is not permitted to wear diverse kinds who is obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes. But with regard to these priests, since diverse kinds are permitted for them when they perform the Temple service, as the belt of the priestly vestments contains diverse kinds, they should not be obligated in the mitzva of ritual fringes.

9Therefore, the baraita teaches us that although priests are permitted to wear diverse kinds at the time when they perform the Temple service, when it is not the time of the Temple service they are not permitted to wear diverse kinds. Consequently, they are obligated in ritual fringes, as they do not have an absolute dispensation from the prohibition of diverse kinds.

10§ The Gemara cites another baraita : Everyone is obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries, including priests, Levites, and Israelites. The Gemara again asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers that it was necessary to say that priests are obligated to fulfill this mitzva, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “And you shall bind them for a sign upon your hand, and they shall be for frontlets between your eyes” (Deuteronomy 6:8), perhaps this juxtaposition teaches that anyone included in the mitzva of the phylacteries of the arm is also included in the mitzva of the phylacteries of the head.

11And in the case of these priests, since they are not included in the mitzva of the phylacteries of the arm, as it is written with regard to the priestly vestments: “He shall put upon his flesh” (Leviticus 6:3), which teaches that nothing may interpose between the priestly vestments and his flesh, and therefore he may not wear the phylacteries of the arm, which would interpose, perhaps one would say that priests should also not be obligated in the mitzva of the phylacteries of the head.

12Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the absence of one of the two types of phylacteries do not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva with the other. As we learned in a mishna ( Menaḥot 38a): Absence of the phylacteries of the arm does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the head, and likewise the absence of the phylacteries of the head does not prevent fulfillment of the mitzva of the phylacteries of the arm. If one has only one type, he dons it without the other. Consequently, the priests are obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries of the head during the time of their Temple service.

13The Gemara asks: And what is different about the phylacteries of the arm? You claim that priests are exempt from this obligation, as it is written with regard to the priestly vestments: “He shall put upon his flesh.” If so, they should also be exempt from donning the phylacteries of the head, as it is written with regard to the High Priest: “And you shall set the mitre upon his head” (Exodus 29:6). Since the phylacteries of the head would interpose between his head and the mitre, he should be exempt from the mitzva of the phylacteries of the head.

14The Gemara answers by citing a halakha that the Sages taught: The hair of the High Priest was visible between the frontplate and the mitre. The frontplate was set on the forehead, below the hairline, while the mitre was set above it. In that space there the High Priest would don his phylacteries. Consequently, the phylacteries did not interpose between the mitre and the High Priest’s head.

1and they may also redeem lands that they sold at any time, i.e., even right after selling the field, and are not bound by the halakhot of the Jubilee Year, one might say that they should also not be obligated to fulfill the mitzva of blowing the shofar on Rosh HaShana. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not the case. This is due to the fact that although priests are not included in the release of land, in any event they are included in the release of money and in the release of slaves in the Jubilee Year. Therefore, the priests are obligated in the sounding of the shofar on Rosh HaShana.

2§ The Gemara cites another similar baraita : Everyone is obligated in the reading of the Megilla including priests, Levites, and Israelites. The Gemara asks as before: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that they cancel their service in the Temple and come to hear the reading of the Megilla, and this is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says. As Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The priests at their Temple service, and the Levites on their platform in the Temple where they sang the daily psalm, and the Israelites at their non-priestly watches for the offerings of the community, all cancel their service and come to hear the reading of the Megilla.

3The Gemara cites yet another similar baraita : Everyone is obligated to form a zimmun and recite Grace after Meals, including priests, Levites, and Israelites. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the priests partake of sacrificial meat. It might enter your mind to say that since the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And they shall eat those things with which atonement was made” (Exodus 29:33), indicating that the owners of those offerings thereby achieve atonement, and therefore this consumption is an obligatory ritual act to bring about atonement, consequently, it is not considered a social meal requiring one to form a zimmun .

4Therefore, the baraita teaches us that since the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And you shall eat, and be satisfied, and bless the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 8:10), the obligation to recite Grace after Meals is contingent upon eating and being satisfied. Since there is eating and satisfaction in the case of priests partaking of the sacrificial meat, they are obligated to form a zimmun , despite the fact that the purpose of the meal is to bring about atonement.

5The Gemara cites another baraita : Everyone joins a zimmun : Priests, Levites, and Israelites. The Gemara asks again: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the priests are partaking of teruma , the portion of produce designated for priests, or sacrificial meat, and a non-priest is eating non-sacred food.

6In such a case, it might enter your mind to say that since if the non-priest wants to eat together with the priest he cannot eat with him from the teruma , as it is forbidden to him, one could say that he cannot join with the priests for a zimmun . Therefore, the baraita teaches us that he can join them, as although a non-priest cannot eat together with a priest from his teruma , nevertheless, a priest can eat together with a non-priest from his food. Consequently, they can join together to form a zimmun .

7§ The Gemara applies the same line of questioning to the mishna here: Everyone takes vows of valuation…priests, Levites, and Israelites. Isn’t that obvious? Rava said: This halakha is necessary only according to the opinion of ben Bukhri, who holds that priests are not obligated to contribute a yearly half-shekel to purchase the communal supplies. Therefore, one might have thought that they are not subject to the halakha of valuations, as the Gemara will explain. As we learned in a mishna ( Shekalim 1:4) that Rabbi Yehuda said that ben Bukhri testified before the Sages in Yavne: Any priest who contributes the half- shekel for communal offerings is not considered a sinner, despite the fact that he is not obligated to contribute.

8Rabbi Yehuda added that Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai said to ben Bukhri: That is not the case; rather, any priest who does not contribute his half- shekel is considered a sinner, as they are obligated in this mitzva like all other Jews. But with regard to the priests who do not contribute the half-shekel, in order to excuse themselves from the mitzva they interpret this verse to their own advantage: “And every meal offering of the priest shall be wholly made to smoke; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:16).

9Those priests claim as follows: Since the omer offering, the measure of barley brought as a communal offering on the sixteenth of Nisan, and the two loaves, i.e., the public offering of two loaves from the new wheat, brought on the festival of Shavuot , and the shewbread placed on the Table in the Sanctuary each Shabbat, which are all meal offerings, are ours, i.e., if we would contribute half-shekels we would have partial ownership of these communal offerings, as they are purchased with the half-shekels, how then can they be eaten? They would be regarded as priests’ meal offerings, which must be wholly burnt, in accordance with the aforementioned verse.

10The Gemara clarifies: But according to the opinion of ben Bukhri, as well, why is a priest who contributes a half-shekel not considered a sinner? Since he is not obligated to bring the half-shekel ab initio , when he brings the half-shekel he is also a sinner, since he is causing the bringing of a non-sacred item into the Temple courtyard. The Gemara answers that the priest brings and transfers the half-shekel as a consecrated gift to the community, so it is considered part of the communal funds.

11The Gemara explains the relevance of ben Bukhri’s opinion to the question of the priests’ status with respect to valuations. According to ben Bukhri, who exempts the priests from contributing the half-shekel, it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “And all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25), perhaps this juxtaposition teaches that anyone who is included in the obligation to contribute half- shekels is included in the halakha of valuations. But with regard to these priests, since they are not included in the obligation to contribute half- shekels, they are also not included in the halakha of valuations. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that even according to the opinion of ben Bukhri, priests are included in the halakha of valuations.

12Abaye said to Rava: One could not have thought that this phrase: “And all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25), might be coming to exempt the priests, as it comes to teach something else, namely that all valuations that you assess should not be less than the value of a sela coin. In other words, a poor person, who gives according to his means rather than the amount prescribed in the Torah, does not fulfill his obligation unless he gives at least a shekel, which is a sela coin.

13Rather, Abaye said: It was necessary for the mishna to teach that priests are included in the halakha of valuation, as it might enter your mind to say: Since it is written with regard to a firstborn: “And their redemption money, from a month old you shall redeem them, shall be, according to your valuation, five shekels of silver” (Numbers 18:16), one might have said that anyone included in the mitzva of redemption of the firstborn son is included in the halakha of valuations; but with regard to these priests, since they are not included in the mitzva of redemption of the firstborn son, they are also not included in the halakha of valuations. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that priests are also included in the halakha of valuations.

14Rava said to Abaye: If that is so, that one can expound the term “according to your valuation” in this manner, one could expound similarly with regard to the ram of the guilt offering brought by one who robs and then takes a false oath. As it is written with regard to that offering: “And he shall bring his guilt offering to the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flock, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 5:25). One can argue that so too, anyone who is included in the halakha of valuations is included in the ram of the guilt offering. Therefore, a tumtum or a hermaphrodite, who are not included in the halakha of valuations, as stated in the mishna, should also not be included in the ram of the guilt offering. But that is not so, as there is no opinion that exempts them from this offering.

1I have derived only that this halakha applies in a case of a man who valuated another, whether a man or a woman, as the section begins: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Leviticus 27:2). From where is it derived that the halakha of valuations also applies to a woman who valuated a man, or a woman who valuated a woman? The Gemara answers: The same verse states: “Vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation,” to include women.

2Alternatively, the word “persons” serves to add a repulsive man and one afflicted with boils. If one valuates such a person, he is obligated to give the set amount according to age and sex.

3This derivation is necessary as one might have thought that since the verse states: “A vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2), it is juxtaposing a person who is valuated and one who is the object of a vow. Therefore, anyone who is included in the category of assessments, i.e., one who is obligated to pay his assessment to the Temple if he takes such a vow, is also included in the category of valuations. If he vows to pay his valuation, he must pay. But anyone who is not included in the category of assessments is not included in the category of valuations. Having no market value, these people are not subject to assessment, and are consequently also not subject to valuation. The verse, therefore, states: “Persons [ nefashot ],” teaching that anyone who has any amount of life [ nefesh ] is subject to valuation.

4A baraita teaches that the apparently superfluous phrase: “Then your valuation shall be” (Leviticus 27:3), serves to include a tumtum and a hermaphrodite in the halakha of assessments, despite the fact that they are not included in the halakha of valuations. If one assesses a tumtum or a hermaphrodite, he is obligated to give that assessment. The baraita explains that one might have thought that since the verse states: “A vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation,” anyone who is included in the category of valuations is also included in the category of assessments, but anyone who is not included in the category of valuations is also not included in the category of assessments. Therefore, the verse states: “Then your valuation shall be,” to include a tumtum and a hermaphrodite in the halakha of assessment.

5The baraita continues: This halakha , that a tumtum and a hermaphrodite are not included in valuation, is derived from the term: “The male” (Leviticus 27:3). The definite article teaches that this halakha applies specifically to a male, and not to a tumtum or a hermaphrodite. One might have thought that a tumtum and a hermaphrodite should not be valuated by the valuation of a man, but they should be valuated by the valuation of a woman. Therefore, the verse states: “Then your valuation shall be for the male…and if it be a female” (Leviticus 27:3–4). This teaches that valuation applies only to a definite male or a definite female, but not to a tumtum or a hermaphrodite, who are categorized as neither male nor female.

6§ The Master said above in the beginning of the baraita that the verse: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2), serves to include an unspecified valuation. The Gemara asks: What is an unspecified valuation?

7The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita : One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate an unspecified valuation, without specifying any particular person, gives the amount of the smallest of the valuations. And how much is the smallest of the valuations? It is three shekels, which is the valuation of a female who is younger than five years old (Leviticus 27:6).

8The baraita asks: And why not say that one who does not specify a person should give fifty shekels, which is the largest of the valuations, that of a male between the ages of twenty and sixty (Leviticus 27:3)? The baraita answers: This ruling is based on the principle that if you grasped a lot you did not grasp anything, but if you grasped a little, you grasped something. In other words, if one can derive two sums from the verses, one should choose the smaller number, as it is included within the larger number and is therefore considered certain.

9The baraita asks: And why not say that smallest of the valuations is one shekel, as it is written: “And all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25)? The baraita answers: That verse is written with regard to affordability. If one vows to donate the valuation of a person to the Temple treasury but does not have sufficient funds to fulfill his vow, he must pay at least a shekel.

10The Gemara asks: But since the payment of three shekels can be derived from the principle of grasping the lesser amount, why do I need the verse “according to your valuation”? Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: The verse is required to teach that unlike other valuations, where a person who cannot afford the set amount can fulfill his obligation with one shekel, in the case of an unspecified valuation even a poor person’s obligation is not determined by affordability, and he must give at least three shekels. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers: It is because it is considered as though he explicitly vowed that he is obligated to pay three shekels. The principle of affordability applies only to the valuations fixed by the Torah.

11There are those who say that Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says the opposite: The term “according to your valuation” actually teaches that even an unspecified valuation is determined based on affordability, and a poor person fulfills his obligation by giving one shekel. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Why would one think that this case differs from any other valuation? The Gemara answers that the verse is necessary lest you say that one who obligates himself in an unspecified valuation is considered as though he articulated that he is obligated to pay three shekels, and may not pay less. Therefore, this verse teaches us that an unspecified valuation is also subject to affordability, like other valuations.

12§ It is further stated in the baraita cited above: Alternatively, the term “according to your valuation” teaches that one gives the valuation of his entire self and does not give the valuation of the value of limbs. If one vows that he will give the valuation of a limb, he is not obligated to give anything. The Gemara asks: But you have already derived from this term: “According to your valuation,” the halakha of an unspecified valuation. How can you then derive another halakha from the same source? The Gemara answers: Read into this term two sources, as it could have merely written: “Valuation,” and instead it wrote: “According to your valuation.”

13The baraita adds: One might have thought that I should exclude even the valuation of an item upon which the soul is dependent, without which one will die, e.g., the head. Therefore, the verse states: “Persons [ nefashot ],” which teaches that if one valuated a limb upon which the soul [ nefesh ] is dependent, he is obligated to give the valuation of his entire self. In addition, we derive from “persons” that one is obligated to pay only the valuation of a live person, and not the valuation of the dead.

14The Gemara asks: But you have already derived from this term: “Persons [ nefashot ],” that one who valuates a limb upon which the soul [ nefesh ] is dependent is obligated to give the valuation of his entire self. The Gemara answers: Read into the verse two derivations, as it could have merely written: Person, and instead it wrote: Persons.

1The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, one might have thought that all of the animal will be a burnt offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And if it is an animal of those that they bring as an offering to the Lord, anything of it that one gives to the Lord, it shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:9). The verse indicates that the part of it that one gives will be sacred, but not all of the animal will be sacred.

2A non-sacred animal with a consecrated limb may not be sacrificed. Accordingly, one might have thought that the consecrated limb may be redeemed and thereby transferred to non-sacred status. Therefore the verse states: “Shall be,” meaning: It shall be as it is, i.e., the limb remains consecrated. How is this possible, i.e., what should one do in this case? The animal should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings, i.e., to an individual who will sacrifice the entire animal as a burnt offering, and the payment received for the animal will be non-sacred, except for the payment received in exchange for that limb of it that was consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

3Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived that in the case of one who says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, all of the animal becomes a burnt offering? The verse states: “All that any man give of such to the Lord shall be holy” (Leviticus 27:9). The term “shall be” serves to include all of the animal, indicating that it all becomes sacred.

4And even according to the one, Rabbi Meir, who says that if one states: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, not all of the animal is a burnt offering, that statement applies only if one consecrated an item that its life does not depend on, e.g., its leg. But if he consecrated an item that its life depends on, such as its head, the entire animal is consecrated. This presents a difficulty for Rava, who holds that the baraita that discusses consecration of the head is referring to items consecrated in order to purchase offerings for the altar. Why, then, isn’t the entire animal consecrated?

5Rava responds: Rather, both baraitot are referring to items consecrated for the altar, and even so it is not difficult. This baraita , which indicates that if one consecrated the head the entire animal is consecrated, is referring to inherent sanctity, i.e., where he consecrated the head for the purpose of sacrificing it on the altar. That baraita , which teaches that if he consecrated the head it alone is consecrated, is referring to sanctity that inheres in its value, that is, where he consecrated the head for the sake of purchasing offerings.

6Abaye responded: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said that if one consecrated a male animal for its value, it is sanctified with inherent sanctity and it is itself sacrificed? This undermines the distinction that Rava is attempting to draw between inherent sanctity and sanctity that inheres in value.

7Rava responds: It is not difficult. This statement, that an animal that was consecrated for its value attains inherent sanctity, applies only in a case where he consecrated the entire animal. There, in the baraita discussing the consecration of the head, it is referring to a situation where he consecrated only one limb. In such a case, the animal does not attain inherent sanctity.

8Abaye replied: Actually, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where one consecrated only one limb. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one consecrated a limb for its value in order to bring an offering with the proceeds, what is the halakha as to whether or not the entire animal is consecrated? If your interpretation of the baraita is correct, Rabba can resolve his question based on the baraita and conclude definitively that the entire animal is not sanctified for the altar.

9Rava responded: We raised this dilemma and entertained the possibility that the entire animal might be sanctified to the altar only in a case where the animal is unblemished, and is therefore fit to be used as an offering. But here, the baraita is referring to a blemished animal, similar to the parallel case of the donkey, which is unfit to be sacrificed. Since the animal in question is unfit for the altar, it is clear that the entire animal is not sanctified.

10Abaye responded: In fact, we also raised a dilemma with regard to a case where the animal is blemished and unfit to be sacrificed. As Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha ? Is he obligated in his entire value or not? A person is certainly not fit to be an offering, and yet Rabba does not resolve his question based on the baraita . Rava answered: We only raised this dilemma before hearing this baraita . Now that we have heard this baraita , we no longer raise this dilemma, as we concluded from the baraita that the entirety of the animal is not consecrated.

11§ The Gemara returns to the aforementioned matter itself. Rabba raised a dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate the value of my head to purchase offerings to be sacrificed on the altar, what is the halakha ? Is it assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and since he consecrated a vital organ he is obligated in his entire value? Or perhaps it is not assessed by the significance of the body part in question, and only the head is consecrated.

12The Gemara explains the underlying issue: It can be argued that we have not found a case of assessments that is not assessed by the significance of the body part that was specified. Therefore, if one obligated himself in the value of a vital organ he should have to pay the entity’s entire value. Or perhaps he should be obligated only in the value of the head, as we have not found a case of an animal that is sacrificed on the altar that is assessed by the significance of the body part in question, i.e., that if one consecrates the value of one vital organ the entire animal is consecrated. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand [ teiku ] unresolved.

13Rava raised a further dilemma: If one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation for the altar, rather than for Temple maintenance, as is usually the case, what is the halakha ? Is this case determined based on affordability if he is poor, like regular valuations? Or perhaps it is not determined based on affordability, and he is obligated in the full valuation even if he is poor.

14The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: One can argue that we have not found a case of valuations that is not determined based on affordability. Therefore, the principle of affordability should apply even when one vows for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar. Or perhaps this case should not be determined based on affordability, as we have not found an item that is consecrated for the purpose of sacrificing offerings on the altar that is redeemed in a manner other than according to its value. The Gemara again concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

1The Gemara asks: And as Rav stated his halakha in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that one who valuates a child less than a month old must pay his assessment, for what reason was it necessary for Rav to state his ruling? Isn’t this obvious?

2The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to state this halakha , lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Meir obligates him to pay the assessment there, in the case of the child, is that he decrees one must pay if the child is less than a month old, due to concern that otherwise people might mistakenly refrain from paying the valuation of a child who is a month old. But here, in the case of one who valuates a utensil, where there is no cause for such an error and therefore no need to decree, one might say that Rabbi Meir would not obligate him to pay. Therefore, Rav teaches us that since the reason of Rabbi Meir is that a person does not make his statement of consecration for naught, there is no difference between here, the case of a child, and there, with regard to a utensil. Rather, the halakha is the same in both cases.

3The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabba bar Yosef says that Rav says, and some say that Rav Yeiva bar Yosei says that Rav says: One who consecrates the animal of another must give its assessment. In accordance with whom? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that one does not issue a statement of consecration for naught. Since he knows that he cannot consecrate that which is not his, he meant to obligate himself in the animal’s assessment.

4The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rav already say it once? As Rav Giddel says that Rav says: One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of a utensil, must give its assessment. The Gemara answers: Rav found it necessary to issue both statements, lest you say that this halakha applies only there, with regard to a utensil, as a person knows that a utensil has no valuation, i.e., that the term: Valuation, is not relevant to a utensil, and therefore it must be that he decided to donate money and says this expression as a reference to its monetary value, using the term: Valuation, imprecisely.

5But in the case where one obligated himself in the valuation of another’s animal, which is subject to consecration, albeit not by him, there is room to say that this is what he is saying to himself: Were I to say to the owner that I want to buy it, he would sell it to me. Therefore, let it be consecrated from now, and I will sacrifice it once I purchase it from him. His intent is to consecrate the animal itself in order to sacrifice it. But since he did not say to himself that he would give its assessment, his statement is meaningless, as one cannot consecrate property that does not belong to him. Therefore, Rav teaches us that this is not the case. Rather, his statement should be interpreted in such a manner that he is obligated to give the assessment of the animal to the Temple treasury.

6Rav Ashi says: And Rav’s ruling applies only in a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury. But if he says: This animal is consecrated, he is not obligated to pay its assessment. This formulation clearly indicates that he intended to consecrate this animal, which he cannot do, as it does not yet belong to him.

7MISHNA: With regard to a gentile, Rabbi Meir says: He is valuated in a case where a Jew says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the fixed value of this gentile. But a gentile does not take a vow of valuation to donate his fixed value or the value of others. Rabbi Yehuda says: He takes a vow of valuation, but is not valuated. And both this tanna , Rabbi Meir, and that tanna , Rabbi Yehuda, agree that gentiles vow to donate the assessment of another and are the object of vows, whereby one donates the assessment of a gentile.

8GEMARA: The Sages taught the following in a baraita that deals with the reasoning for the rulings of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. It is written in the beginning of the passage in the Torah delineating valuations: “Speak to the children of Israel” (Leviticus 27:2). This teaches that “the children of Israel” can take a vow of valuation, but gentiles cannot take a vow of valuation.

9One might have thought that this means that gentiles cannot be the object of a valuation either. Therefore, the verse states the inclusive expression: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2), to teach that in this regard, every “man,” even a gentile, is included in halakhot of valuations. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

10Rabbi Meir says in explanation of his opinion: Since one verse, “a man,” includes gentiles, and another verse, “the children of Israel,” excludes gentiles, for what reason do I say that a gentile can be the object of a valuation but cannot take a vow of valuation, rather than the reverse?

11It is due to the fact that the verse included more people in the category of those who are the object of a valuation than in the category of those who take a vow of valuation. As the mishna teaches (2a): A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor are the object of a vow and are valuated, but they can neither vow to donate the assessment of a person nor take a vow of valuation.

12Rabbi Yehuda says that the verses should be interpreted in the reverse manner: “The children of Israel,” can be the object of a valuation but gentiles cannot be the object of a valuation. One might have thought that gentiles cannot take a vow of valuation either. Therefore, the verse states the inclusive expression: “A man” (Leviticus 27:2), to teach that in this regard, every “man,” even a gentile, is included in the halakha of valuations.

13Rabbi Yehuda says: Since one verse, “a man,” includes gentiles, and another verse, “the children of Israel,” excludes gentiles, for what reason do I say that a gentile can take a vow of a valuation but cannot be the object of a valuation? It is due to the fact that the verse included more people in the category of those who take a vow of valuation than in the category of those who are the object of a valuation. As the mishna teaches (2a): A tumtum and a hermaphrodite vow, are the object of a vow, and take vows of valuation, but they are not valuated.

14Rava says: Rabbi Meir’s halakha is reasonable, but his explanation is not reasonable. Conversely, Rabbi Yehuda’s explanation is reasonable, but his halakha is not reasonable.

1§ The Gemara notes that there is an apparent contradiction with regard to the issue of whether or not a gentile may donate for the purpose of Temple maintenance. It was taught in one baraita : In the case of a gentile who pledged a gift for Temple maintenance, one accepts it from him. And it is taught in another baraita : One does not accept it from him.

2Rabbi Ila says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is not difficult. This baraita , which teaches that the donation is not accepted, is stated with regard to the beginning of the building of the Temple. The donation is refused in order that the Jews not rely upon on the donations of gentiles. That baraita , which states that the donation is accepted, is stated with regard to the end of the building of the Temple, i.e., after it is already built.

3As Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to donations of gentiles for Temple maintenance: With regard to the beginning of the building of the Temple, one may not accept even water and salt from them. With regard to the end of the building of the Temple, one may not accept a defined item, i.e., if it will be clear that this was donated by a gentile. But one may accept their gift of an item that is not defined. The Gemara asks: What is considered to be a defined item? Rav Yosef says: For example, the cubit- wide spiked plates placed on the roof of the Sanctuary, which were designed to eliminate the ravens.

4Rav Yosef raises an objection to the ruling of the baraita as interpreted by Rabbi Yoḥanan, that with regard to the beginning of the building of the Temple nothing is accepted from gentiles. Nehemiah requested from the king of Persia: “And a letter to Asaph the keeper of the king’s park, that he may give me timber to make beams for the gates of the castle that pertains to the house” (Nehemiah 2:8). Here Nehemiah clearly asked for material from gentiles. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Actions taken by the government are different, as the government does not retract its decisions. As Shmuel says: If the government says: I will uproot mountains, it will uproot mountains and not retract what it said.

5§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: With regard to a gentile who separated teruma from his pile of grain, one examines him to determine his intent. If he separated it with the intent that it be like the teruma of Jews, it should be given to a priest. If not, it requires interment, as we are concerned that perhaps his heart was directed toward Heaven, i.e., his intent was to consecrate it to the Temple and he did not want it to be given to a priest. Since there is uncertainty with regard to his intent, nothing can be done with that produce.

6The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita : In the case of a gentile who donated a cross beam and brought it to a synagogue, and the name of God is written on it, one examines him to determine his intent. If he says: I separated it with the intent that it be like the donations of Jews, the name should be cut off [ yagod ] and interred, and one uses the remainder for a synagogue. And if not, the entire beam requires interment, as we are concerned that perhaps his heart was directed toward Heaven, i.e., his intent was to consecrate it to the Temple, and therefore it may not be used.

7The Gemara analyzes this baraita : The reason that the beam requires interment is that the name of God is written on it, from which it may be inferred that if God’s name is not written on it, it does not require interment. Why, then, did Rav Yehuda say that if a gentile separated teruma it requires interment?

8The Gemara answers: Even though the name of God is not written on the beam, the same halakha is true, and the beam requires interment, due to the concern that he might have intended to consecrate it. And as for why the baraita specifically discusses the case where God’s name was written on the beam, this teaches us that if his intention was for it to be used in a synagogue, then even though God’s name is written on it, nevertheless the rest of the beam is not prohibited. Rather, the name should be cut off and interred, and one may use the remainder for a synagogue. The reason is that if God’s name is written on an item, only the place where it is written is sanctified, but that part of the item that is not in its place is not sanctified.

9As we learned in a baraita : If one of the names of God was written on the handles of vessels or on legs of a bed, one must cut off the name and inter it, and the remainder is permitted.

10§ Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Abbahu says: One who says: I am contributing this sela to charity, is permitted to change its purpose, i.e., to use the money himself and later replace it. The Gemara comments: It was initially understood from this that if one wants to change its purpose for his own benefit, yes, this is permitted, as he originally had this stipulation in mind. But it is not permitted to lend it to another. Yet it was stated that Rav Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is permitted to change its purpose whether for himself or for another.

11Rabbi Zeira says: They taught this halakha , that one may change the purpose of the coin, only in a case where he said: It is incumbent upon me to donate a sela to charity. But if he said: This sela is for charity, then he is required to give the sela to charity as is, and he may not use it and replace it.

12Rava objects to this: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable. In a case where one said: This sela is for charity, it makes sense to allow him to use it, so that he should bear financial responsibility for its loss from that point onward. But if he said: It is incumbent upon me to donate a sela to charity, he should not be allowed to use the sela , as in any event he must donate a sela . Rather, as there is a reason in either situation to permit its use, there is no difference between the cases, and in both cases he may use the sela .

13The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: A vow is charity, but consecrated property is not charity. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? After all, neither a vow nor consecrated property is charity.

14Rather, is it not correct that this is what the baraita is saying: Charity is like a vow to consecrate property, in that it is subject to the prohibition of: You shall not delay, which is derived from the verse: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay to pay it” (Deuteronomy 23:22). But nevertheless it is not like consecrated property, as in the case of consecrated property it is prohibited to use it, while in the case of charity it is permitted to use it. Since with regard to the option of using the money the baraita does not distinguish between a case where one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate a sela to charity, and a case where he says: This sela is for charity, it evidently supports the opinion of Rava.

1The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rabbi Yannai, who was a charity collector, borrowed money belonging to charity and repaid. The Gemara answers: The case of Rabbi Yannai is different; it is beneficial to the poor that he be allowed to borrow and repay, as the longer he leaves the charity fund empty, the more he impels people to give charity, and he thereby brings more money to the poor.

2The Sages taught a baraita that deals with a similar matter: In the case of a Jew who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba thought to say that there is no difference whether he wishes to change for a voluntary matter or for a matter involving a mitzva, as in both cases it is prohibited. Rav Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When the Sages taught the baraita , they taught only that it is prohibited when he changes it for a voluntary matter, but it is permitted to change it for a matter involving a mitzva.

3This halakha is derived from the fact that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a gentile who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, if it is before its owner’s name has been forgotten, i.e., people still remember that he donated the item, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Once its owner’s name has been forgotten, it is permitted to change it.

4The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what purpose is it stated that one may not change it before the owner’s name was forgotten? If we say that it is prohibited to change it for a voluntary matter, why does the baraita specifically mention a gentile? It is prohibited to change it in this manner even if it was donated by a Jew.

5Rather, the baraita must be dealing with a change for a matter involving a mitzva, and therefore it is prohibited only if the donor is a gentile and his name has not yet been forgotten. And the reason for this halakha is that it is specifically a gentile who would protest and scream: Where is the candelabrum that I donated? But in the case of a Jew, who would not protest and scream if they used his donation for a different mitzva, one may well change it.

6The Gemara relates that Sha’azrak, an Arab [ tayya’a ] merchant, donated a candelabrum to Rav Yehuda’s synagogue. Raḥava changed its purpose before Sha’azrak’s name was forgotten as the donor, and Rava became angry at Raḥava for not waiting. Some say the opposite: Rava changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at Rava. And some say that the attendants of Pumbedita, the charity collectors, changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at them, and Rabba became angry at them as well.

7The Gemara explains: The one who changed its purpose holds that it was permitted to change it, as it was not common for Sha’azrak to be in the city and it was unlikely that he would protest the change. And the one who became angry holds that even so, they should not have changed it, as sometimes he happens to come there.

8MISHNA: One who is moribund and one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court is neither the object of a vow nor valuated. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya says: He is not the object of a vow, because he has no market value; but he is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed by the Torah based on age and sex. Rabbi Yosei says: One with that status vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation.

9GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, it makes sense that one who is moribund is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value. And it also stands to reason that he is not valuated, as he is not subject to setting, i.e., standing, and therefore is not subject to valuation. The verse states: “Then he shall be set before the priest, and the priest shall value him” (Leviticus 27:8). This teaches that anyone who cannot stand, such as one who is dying, is not included in the halakha of valuation. But with regard to one who is taken to be executed, granted, he is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value, since no one would purchase him. But with regard to the mishna’s statement that he is not valuated, why not?

10The Gemara answers that the reason is as it is taught in a baraita : From where is it derived that in the case of one who is being taken to be executed and who said: My valuation is upon me to donate to the Temple, that he did not say anything, and the valuation is not collected from his estate? The verse states: “Anything dedicated [ ḥerem ], that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29). This teaches that with regard to one who is worthy of excommunication [ ḥerem ], i.e., condemned to death, one cannot redeem him, i.e., pay his valuation. One might have thought that this applies even before his verdict is issued, i.e., that this halakha applies even if one issued this statement before being sentenced to death. Therefore, the verse states: “Of men,” and not all men, i.e., only some men destined to be executed have no valuation, and not all of them.

11The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya, who says in the mishna that even a person taken to be executed is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed, what does he do with the phrase “anything dedicated”?

12The Gemara answers that he requires it for that which is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: Since we found with regard to those executed at the hand of Heaven that they give money and their sins are atoned, as it is stated in the case of the owner of a forewarned ox that killed a person: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death. If there be laid upon him a ransom, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him” (Exodus 21:29–30), one might have thought that even with regard to those liable to receive the death penalty at the hands of man it is so, that one can pay in lieu of execution. Therefore, the verse states: “Anything dedicated that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29).

13I have derived only that one cannot give payment in lieu of execution with regard to severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., blasphemy or cursing one’s father, for which no atonement is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation. From where is it derived that the same applies to less severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., violating Shabbat or killing, for which atonement of an offering or exile is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation? The verse states: “Anything dedicated,” to include all prohibitions punishable by court-administered execution.

14§ The mishna teaches, with regard to one who is taken to be executed, that Rabbi Yosei says: Such a person vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation. The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna say that such a person does not vow to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury and take vows of valuation, such that Rabbi Yosei could be understood as disputing his opinion? The first tanna merely said that such an individual is not subject to vows and valuations. What is the difference between their opinions?

1The Gemara asks: If so, can one conclude by inference that the first tanna holds that one who is being taken to be executed can be brought back to stand before the court for judgment? This is clearly erroneous, as the court is not permitted to delay his execution.

2Rav Yosef says: Everyone agrees that his execution may not be delayed. Rather, they disagree as to whether or not one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs. The first tanna holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs, and therefore the injured party can collect from the heirs after the execution. But Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs, and therefore the heirs are exempt from payment for the injury.

3Rabba said: Actually, everyone agrees that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs; and here the tanna’im disagree with regard to whether a loan that is written in the Torah, e.g., one’s obligation to pay if he causes damage, is considered as though it is written in a document. The first tanna holds that a loan that is written in the Torah is considered as though it is written in a document, and may be collected from the heirs. And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that it is not considered as though it is written in a document, and therefore it may not be collected.

4The Gemara raises an objection against the opinion that one cannot collect a loan that is written in the Torah from the heirs, from a baraita ( Tosefta , Bava Kamma 6:2): If one was digging a pit in the public thoroughfare, and an ox fell on the digger of the pit and killed him, the owner of the ox is exempt from paying damages, as the digger of the pit should not have dug the pit. Moreover, if the ox died as a result of the fall, the heirs of the owner of the pit are liable to pay the value of the ox to its owner. This shows that an obligation that is written in the Torah, such as compensation for damage, is collected from heirs.

5Rabbi Ila said that Rav said: The baraita is dealing with a case where the digger of the pit stood trial for the damage before he died, and once judgment is rendered by a court the resulting financial obligation is comparable to a written loan, not one that is written in the Torah. The Gemara raises an objection: But it is taught in the baraita that the ox killed him. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The baraita does not mean that the ox literally killed him, rather, that it rendered him as one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [ tereifa ], and there was enough time before his death to sentence him to pay damages.

6The Gemara raises an objection: But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say that Ḥagga teaches a slightly different version of the baraita , that if the digger of the pit died from the impact of the ox, and the ox effectively buried him in the ground at the bottom of the pit, his heirs have to pay damages to the owner of the ox? In this scenario, how could it be possible for the digger to stand trial? The Gemara answers: The halakha in the baraita , that the owner of the ox collects from the heirs of the digger, is dealing with a case where judges sat at the opening of the pit and rendered the digger liable to pay damages before he died.

7§ The Sages taught another baraita on the same topic: With regard to one taken to be executed, they sprinkle for his sake on the altar from the blood of his sin offering and from the blood of his guilt offering, which he brought earlier. But if he sinned at that time, obligating him to bring a sin offering or a guilt offering, the court does not attend to his obligation, and his execution is not delayed so that he can sacrifice the offering. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? Rav Yosef said: It is because the court may not afflict him by forcing him to wait for his judgment, his execution, until the offering is sacrificed.

8Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If so, if the offering is not sacrificed in order to avoid afflicting the sentenced by delaying his execution, then this should apply even in the first clause as well, where he had already brought the offering. Why does the court delay his execution until the blood is sprinkled? Rav Yosef answered: The first clause is referring to a case where his offering was already slaughtered at that time, and all that remained to be done was the sprinkling of the blood. Delaying the execution for such a short time is not a problem.

9The Gemara asks: But then in a case where he set aside his offering but it was not yet slaughtered, what is the halakha ? Is it true that they do not delay his execution in order to sacrifice the offering? If so, instead of teaching a new case and stating: But if he sinned at that time and thereby became obligated to sacrifice a sin offering or a guilt offering, the court does not attend to his obligation, let the baraita distinguish and teach a distinction within the case of where he already brought the offering itself: In what case is this statement, that the blood is sprinkled, said? When his offering was already slaughtered at that time. But if his offering was not yet slaughtered, his execution is not delayed.

10The Gemara answers: That is indeed what he is saying: In what case is this statement said? When his offering was already slaughtered at that time. But if his offering was not yet slaughtered, it is considered as though he sinned at that time, and therefore the court does not attend to his obligation.

11MISHNA: In the case of a pregnant woman who is taken by the court to be executed, the court does not wait to execute her until she gives birth. Rather, she is killed immediately. But with regard to a woman taken to be executed who sat on the travailing chair [ hamashber ] in the throes of labor, the court waits to execute her until she gives birth. In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. But in the case of an animal that was killed through court-imposed execution, e.g., for goring a person, deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited.

12GEMARA: Isn’t it obvious that the court executes the pregnant woman rather than waiting? After all, it is part of her body. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the mishna to teach this, as it might enter your mind to say that since it is written: “And if men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that her offspring depart…he shall be fined, as the woman’s husband shall place upon him” (Exodus 21:22), the fetus is considered to be the property of the husband. If so, the court should wait until she gives birth before executing her, and not cause him to lose the fetus. Consequently, the mishna teaches us that the court does not take this factor into account.

13The Gemara asks: But why not say that indeed the court should delay her execution until she gives birth? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The verse states: “If a man be found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall also both of them die, the man that lay with the woman, and the woman” (Deuteronomy 22:22). The amplifying term “both of them” serves to add her fetus, teaching that it dies together with her.

14The Gemara asks: But this phrase is required for the following halakha : Neither of the two adulterers mentioned in the verse is punished until both of them are equal, i.e., they have both reached majority. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. The Gemara answers: When you say that the child also dies, it is derived from the word “also,” whereas the halakha that they must be equal is learned from the term “both of them.”

1It is merely cutting flesh, and there is no reason why it should be prohibited. Rabba said: No, the halakha concerning cutting open her abdomen is necessary only to teach that it is permitted to bring a knife by way of the public thoroughfare for that purpose, despite the fact that this constitutes a prohibited labor by Torah law.

2The Gemara asks: And what does this teach us? Does it teach that even in a case of uncertainty we desecrate Shabbat for the chance of saving a life? But we already learned this in a mishna ( Yoma 83a): With regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty as to whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there, and there is also uncertainty as to whether he is still alive or whether he is dead, and finally there is uncertainty as to whether the person under the debris is a gentile or a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him on Shabbat.

3The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach that one may bring a knife in the case of a woman, lest you say that it is specifically there that one may desecrate Shabbat, as the person who was buried under the rockslide had a presumptive status of being alive and therefore he is assumed to still be alive. But here, where the child had no prior presumptive status of being alive, as he was not yet born, you might say that one may not desecrate Shabbat in order to save his life. Therefore, it is necessary for Shmuel to teach us that even here one may desecrate Shabbat for the possibility of saving the fetus’s life.

4§ The mishna taught: In the case of a woman who was killed through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. The Gemara asks: But why is it permitted? After all, a corpse and its hair are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Rav said that this is referring to a case where she says before she dies: Give my hair to my daughter. The Gemara asks: Is the prohibition contingent on the deceased’s wishes? Were she to say: Give my hand to my daughter, would we give the hand to her?

5Rather, Rav said: This is not referring to the actual hair of the deceased, but to a wig [ pe’a nokhrit ], which is not part of the deceased’s body. The Gemara infers from Rav’s statement that the reason it is permitted is that she said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered part of her body, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from it.

6The Gemara explains why this implication is problematic: But didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raise this as a dilemma? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina raised a dilemma: With regard to the hair of righteous women in a city whose residents were incited to idolatry and, therefore, all of their property must be burned, what is the halakha ? Is it considered their property and burned, or part of their body and not burned?

7And Rava said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, was not referring to actual hair, but rather he raised his dilemma with regard to a wig. This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, as his ruling indicates that a wig should be considered part of a woman’s body unless she stipulated otherwise. The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raised his dilemma as to whether a wig is considered part of the body, he was referring specifically to a case where the wig was hanging on a peg. The dilemma is whether it is considered part of her clothing, which, like her body, is not burned, or whether it is considered like any other property of hers, since she was not wearing it at the time.

8On the other hand, here Rav is referring to a wig that is actually attached to her. In such a case, one may correctly infer that the reason that it is permitted is that the deceased said to give her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. But if she did not say to give her wig to her daughter, it is considered to be part of her body and is prohibited.

9This claim, that the mishna is dealing with a wig rather than natural hair, is difficult for Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak. He explains the difficulty: The mishna teaches the issue of the prohibition of the woman’s hair as being similar to the other prohibition it mentions, that of the animal. Just as there, in the case of the animal, it is referring to deriving benefit from its body, so too here, it must be referring to benefit from her body itself, not from a wig.

10Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The mishna is referring to natural hair, and there is a distinction between the hair of an animal and that of a woman. In the case of this woman, it is her death that causes her to be forbidden. Therefore, the hair, which does not undergo any change when she dies, remains permitted. But in the case of that animal, the verdict causes it to be forbidden, even before it is killed. It is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal as soon as the verdict is issued. Therefore, the hair that is attached to the animal is forbidden as well.

11Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and Levi also teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak. The Gemara elaborates: Levi teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav: In the case of a woman who was being taken to be killed and who said: Give my hair to my daughter, one gives it to the daughter. If she died without instructing that it be given to her daughter, one does not give it to the daughter, because it is forbidden to derive benefit from a corpse.

12The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that this is the reason her hair is prohibited? The Gemara explains that this is referring not to the hair itself, but rather to a wig, and the baraita is teaching that it is forbidden to derive benefit even from the adornments of the deceased, such as a wig.

13The Gemara further explains: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, as follows: Whereas in the case of a woman who died, one may derive benefit from her hair, with regard to an animal that was put to death, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it. And what is the difference between this case and that one? In this case it is her death that causes her to be forbidden, but in that case the verdict causes the animal to be forbidden.

14MISHNA: One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a sela , nor can one be charged more than fifty sela . How so? If one gave one sela and became wealthy, he is not required to give anything more, as he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave less than a sela and became wealthy, he is required to give fifty sela , as he has not fulfilled his obligation.