Babylonian Talmud in English

1we assess him once and he donates twice the value of that single assessment, or perhaps since he vowed sequentially we assess him twice?

2And if you say in that case that since he vowed sequentially we assess him twice, if he says at the same time: My assessment is twice incumbent upon me, what is the halakha ? Do we say that here certainly he vowed at the same time, and therefore we assess him once, or perhaps since he says the word: Twice, it is considered as though he vowed sequentially and therefore he must be assessed twice?

3Finally, if you say that since he says the word: Twice, it is considered as though he vowed sequentially and he must be assessed twice, if a court of ten assessed him on its own, i.e., not for the purpose of assessing a vow, what is the halakha ? Do we say that he has already been assessed on his own and now stands before us, and therefore there is no need for another assessment, or perhaps we require an assessment to be performed with intent for the sake of consecration to the Temple treasury.

4The Gemara suggests: Resolve at least one of these dilemmas, as we learned in the mishna below: In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and then dies, his heirs need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead, and his assessment at the time of his vow is unknown.

5The Gemara explains the resolution: And if it enters your mind that in a case where a court of ten assessed him on its own it is a valid assessment with regard to his vow, why does the mishna state that his heirs do not have to donate to the Temple treasury? Isn’t he considered as standing assessed from the outset, as is there a person who is not worth at least four zuz ? This proves that an assessment is required to be performed with intent for the sake of consecration to the Temple treasury.

6The Gemara rejects this resolution: In a case where a court of ten assessed him on its own before he took his vow, he has entered into an assessment, i.e., an assessment has actually been performed. By contrast, in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and then dies, he has not entered into an assessment, i.e., no actual assessment has been conducted at all.

7MISHNA: There are halakhot that are more stringent with regard to valuations than with regard to vows of assessment. How so? In the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and then dies, his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and then dies, his heirs need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead.

8One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my forearm, or: The valuation of my leg, has not said anything, as there are valuations in the Torah only for a complete person. But if one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of my head, or: The valuation of my liver, he gives the valuation of his entire self. This is the principle: One who valuates an item upon which the soul is dependent, i.e., without which one will die, gives the valuation of his entire self.

9One who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my valuation, gives half of his valuation. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of half of me, gives the valuation of his entire self. Likewise, one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate half of my assessment, gives half of his assessment; one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of half of me, gives the assessment of his entire self. This is the principle: One who takes a vow with regard to an item upon which the soul is dependent gives the assessment of his entire self.

10With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the valuation of so-and-so, and both the one who vowed and the object of the vow die, the heirs of the one who vowed must give the valuation of the object of the vow to the Temple treasury. With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of so-and-so, and the one who vowed dies, his heirs must give his assessment to the Temple treasury. If the object of the vow dies, the heirs of the one who vowed need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead.

11GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita : There are halakhot that are more stringent with regard to vows of assessment than with regard to valuations, as vows of assessment take effect with regard to a domesticated animal, an undomesticated animal, and a bird. If one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate the assessment of this bird, he must donate that assessment. This is not the case with regard to valuations, as they do not take effect with regard to animals and birds. And another halakha that is more stringent with regard to vows of assessment than with regard to valuations is that the destitute who take vows of assessment are not assessed based on affordability. This is not the case with regard to valuations, which are assessed based on whether the one who vows can afford to pay what they vowed.

12There is a halakha that is more stringent with regard to valuations than with regard to vows of assessment. How so? In the case of one who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and dies, his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. But one who says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my assessment, and dies, his heirs need not give his assessment to the Temple treasury, as there is no monetary value for the dead.

13The baraita taught with regard to a person who said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, and dies, that his heirs must give his valuation to the Temple treasury. The Gemara suggests one can conclude from this ruling that one collects a loan by oral agreement from the heirs, as no promissory note was written with regard to this obligation. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Here the heirs’ obligation to pay the valuation of the deceased is different, i.e., it is not the same as a loan by oral agreement, as a valuation is considered a loan, i.e., debt, written in the Torah, in accordance with the deceased’s age and sex at the time of the vow.

14The Gemara objects: If so, can one conclude from the baraita that a loan that is written in the Torah, i.e., any financial obligation that applies by Torah law, is considered as though it were written in a document? The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Here we are dealing with a case where he stood in judgment before he died, and the court obligated him to donate his valuation. The court’s ruling is considered like a financial obligation written in a document, and therefore the heirs are required to pay his valuation.

1This is necessary lest you say: Although the one who took the vow stood in judgment before he died and the court obligated him, since the object of his vow was not assessed before he died, the property of the one who vowed is not liened to the debt, and consequently the heirs are not obligated to pay. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that the property of the one who took the vow was liened, since he stood in judgment while he was still alive, and the assessment of the object of the vow is considered to be a mere disclosure of the matter, which can be performed after the death of the one who vowed.

2MISHNA: In the case of one who says: This bull is consecrated as a burnt offering, or: This house is consecrated as an offering, and the bull died or the house collapsed, he is exempt from paying his commitment. But in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to give this house as an offering, if the bull died or the house collapsed, he is obligated to pay its value.

3GEMARA: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav says: The Sages taught in the mishna only that one who said: It is incumbent upon me to give the monetary value of this bull as a burnt offering, is obligated to pay its value if it dies. But if he said: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, since he said: This, thereby referring specifically to that animal, and then the bull died, he does not bear financial responsibility for its loss. And as for his statement: It is incumbent upon me, he did not intend to accept financial responsibility for the loss of the bull. Rather, he meant to say: It is incumbent upon me to bring this bull as an offering to the Temple.

4The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita ( Tosefta 3:11): With regard to one who says: This bull is consecrated as a burnt offering, the bull is consecrated property and one who benefits from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. If the bull dies or is stolen, he does not bear financial responsibility for its loss. If one says: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, the bull is consecrated property, and one who benefits from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. If the bull dies or is stolen, he bears financial responsibility for its loss, despite the fact that he did not vow to give the monetary value of the bull.

5The Gemara answers: Is the baraita stronger than the mishna, with regard to which we established that it is referring to a case where he says: The monetary value of the bull? Here too, in the case of the baraita , he says: It is incumbent upon me to give the monetary value of this bull as a burnt offering.

6The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause of the baraita is referring to a case where he says: Monetary value of, it may be inferred that the first clause of the baraita is referring to a case where he does not say monetary value. As it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita ( Tosefta 3:12): With regard to one who said: It is incumbent upon me to give the monetary value of this bull as a burnt offering, the bull is non-sacred property and one who benefits from it is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. If the bull dies or is stolen, he does not bear financial responsibility for its loss. But if he sold the bull and received money for the sale, he does bear financial responsibility for that money, since he accepted financial responsibility for the monetary value of the bull in his vow.

7The Gemara explains: The first clause and the latter clause of the baraita are both referring to one who says: Monetary value of, in his vow. The difference between them is that the first clause is dealing with one who says: Let the bull be consecrated for its monetary value, and therefore the bull is consecrated and he bears financial responsibility for its value. But the latter clause is referring to one who says: When this bull shall be sold, the money received from the sale shall be consecrated for use as a burnt offering.

8The Gemara asks: Can this possibly be the case of the latter clause of the baraita ? But a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world, and therefore one cannot consecrate the money he will receive in the future from the sale of the bull. Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world.

9Some say a slightly different version of this discussion, that Rav Pappa said to Abaye, and some say Rami bar Ḥama said to Rav Ḥisda: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? Abaye said to him: Rather, in accordance with who else’s opinion could this baraita be? Certainly it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

10And some teach this discussion with regard to this baraita ( Tosefta , Bava Metzia 8:30): In the case of one who rents a house to another and the house became ritually impure with leprosy, even though a priest confirmed the house as impure, condemning it to be dismantled, as long as the house is still standing its owner may say to the renter: That which is yours is before you, and the owner is not required to compensate the renter. Nevertheless, in accordance with the halakha of a house afflicted with leprosy, once the priest has dismantled the house the owner is obligated to provide a new house for the renter.

1If the one living in it, i.e., the renter, consecrates the house, he pays the rent to the Temple treasury. The Gemara express surprise at this last statement of the baraita : If the one living in the house consecrates it? How can the renter consecrate it? The Merciful One states: “When a man shall sanctify his house to be sacred” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived that just as one’s house is in his possession, so too, anything that one consecrates must be in his possession. If so, the renter cannot consecrate the house, as he is not its owner. The Gemara answers that this is what the baraita is saying: If the one renting out the house consecrates it, the one living in it pays the rent to the Temple treasury.

2The Gemara asks: If the one renting out the house consecrates it, how is it possible for the renter to live in it? Since the house is consecrated property he is standing liable for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property by living there. And furthermore, why must he pay the rent to the Temple treasury? Since he misused consecrated property the payment of the rent immediately leaves the state of consecration and becomes non-sacred.

3The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the one renting out the house says: When the payment of the rent will come to me, the money shall be consecrated. The Gemara asks: But how is it possible for the one renting out the house to consecrate money he will receive in the future? After all, a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world.

4Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world. Some say that Rav Pappa said to Abaye, and some say that Rav Mari bar Ḥama said to Rav Ḥisda: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? He said to him: Rather, in accordance with who else’s opinion could this baraita be? Certainly it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

5MISHNA: With regard to those obligated to pay valuations, the court repossesses their property to pay their debt to the Temple treasury. With regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings and guilt offerings, the court does not repossess their property; since one is obligated to bring them for atonement he would not delay bringing them. But with regard to those obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings, the court repossesses their property;since these offerings are not obligatory for atonement, one might delay bringing them.

6Although one obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3), nevertheless the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so. And likewise, you say the same with regard to women’s bills of divorce. Although one divorces his wife only of his own volition, in any case where the Sages obligated a husband to divorce his wife the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so.

7GEMARA: Rav Pappa says: Sometimes with regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings the court does repossess their property, and likewise there are occasions involving those obligated to bring burnt offerings where the court does not repossess their property.

8Rav Pappa elaborates: With regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings, the court repossesses their property in the case of the sin offering of a nazirite, since the Master says ( Nazir 45a): If a nazirite shaved after the sacrifice of one of the three nazirite offerings, either the burnt offering, the peace offering, or the sin offering, he has fulfilled his obligation of shaving. And if the blood of one of these offerings was sprinkled on his behalf, the nazirite is permitted to drink wine and to become ritually impure from a corpse. Therefore, there is a concern that a nazirite who has already sacrificed his burnt offering or peace offering might be negligent with regard to his sin offering and not bring it, and therefore the court repossesses his property in this particular case.

9With regard to those obligated to bring burnt offerings, the court does not repossess their property in the case of a burnt offering of a woman after childbirth. There is no concern that she might delay bringing her burnt offering, as she is required to bring this offering before partaking of sacrificial food.

10The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the ruling that a woman after childbirth is required to bring her burnt offering before she can sacrifice her sin offering? Is it that the verse mentions her burnt offering before it mentions her sin offering, as it is written: “And when the days of her purification are fulfilled…she shall bring a lamb of the first year for a burnt offering, and a young pigeon, or a turtle-dove, for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:6)? But doesn’t Rava say: The verse mentions her burnt offering before her sin offering only with regard to the reading of the verse, but not with regard to the order of the offerings? If so, there should be a concern that she might first sacrifice her sin offering and delay bringing her burnt offering.

11Rather, the court does not repossess the property of those obligated to bring burnt offerings in the case of the burnt offering of a leper, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beroka, says: Just as failure to sacrifice his sin offering and his guilt offering prevents the leper from achieving full ritual purity, so too, failure to sacrifice his burnt offering has the same effect and prevents him from achieving full ritual purity. Therefore, the court does not repossess his property, as there is no concern he might delay bringing his burnt offering.

12§ The mishna teaches: Although one obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3), nevertheless, one coerces him until he says: I want to do so. Similarly, the Sages taught in a baraita : It is written with regard to a burnt offering: “He shall sacrifice it” (Leviticus 1:3), which teaches that one coerces him to bring his burnt offering. One might have thought he brings the offering against his will; therefore, the verse states: “Of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3). How can these texts be reconciled? The court coerces him until he says: I want to do so.

13Shmuel says: A burnt offering requires the consent of the one receiving atonement, as it is stated: “Of his volition.” The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? Didn’t we already learn in the mishna: Although he does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition”?

14The Gemara answers: No, the statement of Shmuel is necessary with regard to a case where another person separated, i.e., designated, a burnt offering on his behalf. Lest you say: When we require the consent of the one receiving atonement, that is only in a case where an animal from his property is separated as his burnt offering, e.g., the court repossesses his property for the sake of his burnt offering. But we do not need his consent if an animal from the property of another is separated as his burnt offering. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that the consent of the one receiving atonement is required even in a case where an animal from the property of another was separated as an offering. The reason is that sometimes he is not amenable to achieving atonement with an item that does not belong to him, and in such a case he will not achieve atonement.

1if he does so with the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering he has fulfilled his obligation, but if he does so without the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering he has not fulfilled his obligation.

2With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring the burnt offering or the peace offering of so-and-so, whether he does so with the latter’s consent or without his consent, the one obligated to bring the offering has fulfilled his obligation. This apparently contradicts the statement of Shmuel, who said the bringing of a burnt offering requires the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering.

3Shmuel could have said to you: When that baraita is taught, and states that one fulfills his obligation for his burnt offering without his consent, it is referring to the time of atonement, i.e., the sacrifice. At that stage, his consent is not necessary, as he already consented at the time of separating the animal as an offering. When I said the consent of the one receiving atonement is required, I was speaking of the time of separating the animal as an offering.

4And Shmuel disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: The Sages distinguish between the consent required for a sin offering or a guilt offering and the consent required for a burnt offering or a peace offering only in that a sin offering and a guilt offering require the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering at the time the other person separates the animal for an offering on his behalf, and a burnt offering and a peace offering do not require his consent at the time of separating the animal. But with regard to both this pair of offerings and that pair of offerings at the time of atonement, the requisite consent is the same for all offerings: If the offering was sacrificed with his consent he has fulfilled his obligation; if it was not sacrificed with his consent he has not fulfilled his obligation.

5The Gemara raises an objection to the opinions of both Shmuel and Ulla from a baraita : One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring the sin offering or the guilt offering or the burnt offering or the peace offering of so-and-so, if he does this with the consent of the one who is obligated to bring the offering, then that individual has fulfilled his obligation. If he does so without the consent of the one who is obligated to bring the offering, that person has not fulfilled his obligation. This baraita is difficult for the opinion of Shmuel, who holds that one who brings a burnt offering on behalf of another does not require consent at the time of atonement, and it is also difficult according to the opinion of Ulla, who maintains that one who brings a burnt offering on behalf of another does not need consent when the animal is set aside as an offering.

6The Gemara answers: Shmuel establishes the baraita , which requires consent, as referring to the time of separating the animal, and Ulla establishes the baraita as dealing with the required consent at the time of atonement. Rav Pappa says, in summary: The baraitot are not difficult, as they do not contradict each other. This one is referring to consent at the time of atonement, and that one is referring to consent at the time of separating the animal.

7And Rav Pappa adds that the baraitot also are not difficult for the opinions of the amora’im . Shmuel establishes the first baraita , which does not require consent for a burnt offering and a peace offering, as referring to the time of atonement, and the last baraita , which requires consent for those offerings, as speaking of the time of separating the animal. Ulla establishes the baraitot in the reverse manner: The first baraita , which does not require consent for a burnt offering and a peace offering, is dealing with the time of separating the animal, whereas the second baraita is referring to the time of atonement. But the amora’im themselves, Shmuel and Ulla, certainly disagree with each other. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this summary of the opinions of Shmuel and Ulla obvious?

8The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa’s summary is necessary, lest you say: What is the meaning of that which Shmuel says, that the consent of the one obligated to bring the offering is required at the time of separating the animal? Shmuel means that consent is required not only at the stage of atonement but even at the time of separating the animal. And even though according to this interpretation the first baraita , which says that consent is not required for a burnt offering and for a peace offering, would be a refutation of the opinion of Shmuel, that difficulty would not deter him from holding such an opinion. Therefore, Rav Pappa teaches us that the baraitot do not contradict the opinions of Shmuel and Ulla, which indicates that Shmuel holds that consent is required only when the animal is separated, but not at the time of atonement.

9§ The mishna teaches: And likewise, you say the same with regard to women’s bills of divorce. Although one can divorce his wife only of his own volition, in any case where the Sages obligated a husband to divorce his wife, the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so. Rav Sheshet says: Concerning one who delivered a declaration preemptively invalidating a bill of divorce by announcing before giving the bill of divorce that he is not doing so of his own free will, his declaration is a valid declaration that cancels the bill of divorce. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious?

10The Gemara answers: No, the statement of Rav Sheshet is necessary in a case where they coerced him to give a bill of divorce and he declared that he was not giving it of his own free will, but later he agreed to give the bill of divorce of his own volition without explicitly retracting his original declaration that he was coerced. Lest you say: Merely by giving the bill of divorce he has canceled his earlier declaration that he was coerced, Rav Sheshet therefore teaches us that his original declaration that he was coerced is still in effect and the bill of divorce is canceled.

11The Gemara explains how Rav Sheshet derives his conclusion from the mishna. The reason is that if it were so, i.e., if his original declaration is canceled even without an explicit retraction, let the mishna teach: The court coerces him until he gives the bill of divorce of his own volition. What is the significance of the clause: The court coerces him until he says: I want to do so? This indicates that the court coerces him until he explicitly cancels his original declaration.

12MISHNA: One proclaims, i.e., publicly announces, the appraisal of the property inherited by minor orphans, which is being sold to repay their father’s debt, for thirty days, in order to receive the maximal price. And one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property that is being sold by the Temple treasury for sixty days, and one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening.

13GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about those times that one proclaims the appraisal of the property specifically in the morning and in the evening? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: One proclaims during the time that workers leave to work in the fields and during the time that workers enter the city after completing their workday. Rav Yehuda elaborates: One proclaims during the time that workers leave to work in the fields, so that if there is a person who is amenable to purchasing the property, he may say to the workers: Go and examine the property for me. And one proclaims during the time that workers enter the city so that that individual will be reminded that he said to the workers that they should inspect the property, and he will go and ask them for their opinion of it.

14The Gemara notes: That explanation is also taught in a baraita : One proclaims the appraisal of the property inherited by minor orphans for thirty days, and one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property for sixty days. And one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening, during the time that workers leave to work in the fields and during the time that workers enter the city after completing their workday.

1With regard to the duration of time for the proclamation, the Sages taught: One proclaims the appraisal of the property inherited by minor orphans for thirty days, and one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property for sixty days. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One proclaims the appraisal of the property of orphans for sixty days, and one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property for ninety days. And the Rabbis say: Both this and that are proclaimed for sixty days. Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says: The halakha is that one proclaims the appraisal of the property of orphans for sixty days.

2The Gemara relates that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin was sitting and saying this halakha stated by Rav Ḥisda in the name of Avimi. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin: Did you say that the proclamation is for sixty days or did you say that it is for thirty days? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him: It is for sixty days. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak continued: Is this the halakha with regard to the property of orphans or with regard to consecrated property? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him: It applies to the property of orphans.

3Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak persisted: Do you rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir or in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him: I rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak raised a difficulty: But Rabbi Meir says that the appraisal of the property of orphans is proclaimed for thirty days.

4Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him that Rav Ḥisda said like this: I absorbed many blows [ kulfei ] from Avimi due to that halakha , i.e., Avimi would disparage me when I questioned his statement that according to Rabbi Meir one proclaims the appraisal of the property of orphans for sixty days, which is contradicted by the baraita . Avimi explained to Rav Ḥisda that if the court comes to proclaim the sale on consecutive days, then it is proclaimed for thirty days, in accordance with the baraita .

5But if it is proclaimed only on Monday and on Thursday, when the markets are open, villagers gather in the city, and the courts sit in judgment, then it is proclaimed over the course of sixty days. And even though if Master counts the number of days on which there is actually a proclamation, there are only eighteen days, far fewer than the thirty of the consecutive days, since the matter extends over the course of sixty days, people will hear about the sale.

6§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav Asi says: The court attends to the property of minor orphans, to sell it in order to pay a debt, only if the debt was accruing interest that consumes the property of the orphans, since if they delay payment of the debt, it will grow dramatically. In other cases the court delays payment until the orphans reach majority. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The court attends to their property either to pay a debt recorded in a promissory note that contains interest or to pay a wife’s marriage contract, due to the standing obligation of the orphans to provide sustenance for their father’s widow from his estate as long as she has not received payment of her marriage contract. It is therefore beneficial to the orphans that she should collect her marriage contract immediately.

7The Gemara asks: And Rav Asi, what is the reason that he did not state that the court attends to their property for the purpose of paying the marriage contract of a wife? The Gemara responds: There is no financial loss to the orphans in such a case, because the Sages established for the late husband that as long as she receives sustenance from his estate, the orphans are entitled to her earnings. The Gemara asks: And the other, Rabbi Yoḥanan, in light of this fact why does he rule that the court attends to their property? The Gemara responds: Sometimes her earnings do not provide enough to reimburse the money spent on her sustenance.

8The Gemara continues: We learned in the mishna that one proclaims the appraisal of the property inherited by orphans for thirty days and the appraisal of consecrated property for sixty days, and one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening. The Gemara asks: What case are we dealing with in the mishna? If we say that we are dealing with a gentile creditor, will he comply with the ruling of the Jewish court that payment be delayed for thirty days? Rather, it is obvious that we are dealing with a Jewish creditor. Now, if the mishna is dealing with a situation where the interest consumes the orphans’ property, do we leave a Jew to collect interest? But rather, it must be referring to a case where the interest does not consume the orphans’ property, and nevertheless the mishna teaches that the court attends to the property of orphans even when no interest accrues on the loan. This apparently contradicts the opinions of Rav Asi and Rabbi Yoḥanan.

9Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan the mishna is not difficult, as he can establish it as referring to payment of the marriage contract of a wife. But according to the opinion of Rav Asi, that the court does not attend to the property of orphans in such a case, the mishna poses a difficulty. The Gemara responds: Rav Asi could say to you: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, does it work out well that the mishna requires thirty days of proclamation before the sale of the property? Do we leave aside the sustenance that the orphans certainly lose to the wife for the duration of the thirty days and take, i.e., implement, the proclamation, with regard to which we do not know if they will gain from it or if they will not gain, as it is uncertain that an offer matching the appraisal of the court will be made?

10The Gemara rejects this argument: This is not difficult, as Rabbi Yoḥanan can explain that the mishna is referring to a widow who claims her marriage contract in court. And this is in accordance with a ruling that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: A widow who claims payment of her marriage contract in court no longer receives sustenance from the estate of her husband.

11The Gemara asks: If so, then we should not attend to her request to collect payment of her marriage contract at all. Rather, the court should delay payment until the orphans reach majority, as they incur no loss by delaying the payment. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: That is not appropriate; rather, since we attend to her initially, when she claims the payment of her marriage contract in court, we attend to her in the end as well, in order to collect payment from the orphans, despite the fact that the orphans will not lose money if they do not pay immediately.

12The Gemara returns to its initial question: In any case, the mishna poses a difficulty for the opinion of Rav Asi, who maintains that the court attends to the property of orphans only in order to collect the payment of a loan that accrues interest, not for the payment of a marriage contract. If the mishna is dealing with a gentile creditor, he will not wait thirty days to collect payment, and if it is referring to a Jewish creditor, he is prohibited from charging interest in the first place. The Gemara responds: Actually, the mishna is referring to a gentile creditor, in the specific case of one who accepted upon himself to adjudicate in accordance with Jewish law. He therefore agrees to delay collection for thirty days.

13The Gemara asks: If so, let him also not take interest, as it is prohibited to do so according to Jewish law. The Gemara responds: The mishna is dealing with a case where he accepted Jewish law upon himself for this matter, to delay collection for thirty days, but he did not accept it upon himself for that matter, not to collect interest.

14The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a difficulty for the opinions of Rav Asi and Rav Yoḥanan from a mishna ( Gittin 48b): A court can collect a father’s debt from the property of orphans only from land of the lowest quality. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with in this mishna? If we say that the mishna is referring to a gentile creditor, will he comply and accept inferior-quality land as payment? Rather, it is obvious that we are dealing with a Jewish creditor. Now, if the mishna is referring to a case where the interest consumes the orphans’ property, do we leave him to collect interest? Rather, it must be dealing with a case where the interest does not consume the orphans’ property, and yet it is taught in the mishna that the court attends to the property of orphans even when no interest accrues on the loan.

1The Gemara attempts to determine the correct reason why the court does not attend to the property of minor orphans: We learned in the mishna that one proclaims the appraisal of the property of minor orphans that is being sold for thirty days, and one proclaims the appraisal of consecrated property for sixty days, and one proclaims it in the morning and in the evening. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with here? If we say that the mishna is dealing with a gentile creditor who is unwilling to wait until the orphans reach majority, will he comply with the court’s directive that the appraisal of the property be proclaimed for thirty days before it is sold? Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is dealing with a Jewish creditor.

2The Gemara concludes its proof: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, who says that the court does not attend to the property of minor orphans due to a concern that their father might have left bundles of coins with the creditor, he can establish the mishna as referring to a case where the one obligated to pay, i.e., the father, admits before his death that he has not paid. In such a case, the court does not wait to collect payment until the orphans reach majority. But according to the opinion of Rav Pappa, that the court does not attend to the property of minor orphans because they are not obligated in the mitzva to repay a loan, the mishna poses a difficulty.

3The Gemara explains that Rav Pappa could say to you: If you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the court sells the property of the orphans in order to collect payment for a marriage contract, which the court does for the sake of favor, i.e., in order that the wife will own property and be desirable for marriage. And if you wish, say instead that the mishna is dealing with a gentile creditor who accepted upon himself to adjudicate in accordance with Jewish law. He therefore agrees to delay collection for thirty days.

4The Gemara objects: If he accepted Jewish law upon himself, then let him wait for the orphans until they reach majority before demanding payment of the loan. The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to a case where he accepted Jewish law upon himself for this matter, to delay collection for thirty days, but he did not accept it upon himself for that matter, to wait until they reach majority.

5The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita : When one proclaims the appraisal of the property of orphans, he announces that the property is being sold in order to give the proceeds to a wife as payment of her marriage contract, or in order to give a creditor payment of his debt. The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with in the baraita ? If we say that the baraita is referring to a gentile creditor who is unwilling to wait until the orphans reach majority, will he comply with the court’s directive that the appraisal of the property is proclaimed for thirty days before it is sold? Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is referring to a Jewish creditor.

6The Gemara continues: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, he can establish the mishna as referring to a case where the one obligated to pay admits before his death that he has not paid. But according to the opinion of Rav Pappa, granted, the court collects payment of a marriage contract for the sake of favor; but the fact that they sell the property in order to pay a creditor poses a difficulty.

7The Gemara responds: Actually, the baraita is dealing with a gentile creditor, and is it referring to a case where he accepted upon himself to adjudicate in accordance with Jewish law. He therefore agrees to delay collection for thirty days. The Gemara objects: If he accepted Jewish law upon himself, then let him wait for the orphans until they reach majority before demanding payment of the loan. The Gemara again explains: The baraita is dealing with a case where he accepted Jewish law upon himself for this matter, to delay collection for thirty days, but he did not accept it upon himself for that matter, to wait until they reach majority.

8Rava says: The court does not collect payment from the property of minor orphans due to the concern that there might be a receipt, i.e., perhaps their father repaid the loan and received a receipt attesting to his payment and the orphans are unaware of its existence. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: But are we concerned for the existence of a receipt? Didn’t we learn in a mishna ( Ketubot 87a): A woman who collects the payment of her marriage contract from the property of her husband when not in his presence, e.g., if her husband is overseas, may collect only by means of an oath that she has not yet received payment.

9And Rabbi Aḥa Sar HaBira says: An incident came before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa in Antioch, and he issued a ruling and said: They taught this halakha , that she may collect the payment of her marriage contract in her husband’s absence, only with regard to the wife’s marriage contract, for the sake of favor. But a creditor does not have the right to collect the debt that is owed to him in the debtor’s absence. And Rabba says that Rav Naḥman says: Even a creditor may collect a payment by means of an oath in the debtor’s absence.

10Rav Huna explains the difficulty: And if you are concerned for the existence of a receipt, then in that case there as well, where the obligated party is overseas, let us be concerned that he has in fact paid the debt and received a receipt. Rava said to him: In that case there, one is not concerned about the existence of a receipt, in accordance with the reason that we say: It is in order that there should not be a situation where every person will take the money of another and go and reside in a country overseas, to prevent the creditor from collecting the money from his property.

11§ Rava says: The halakha is that the court does not attend to the property of minor orphans in order to pay the debts owed by their father. But if their father said before his death: Give so-and-so the payment of my debt, the court attends to their property. Specifically, if the father said: Give this field to so-and-so, or: Give this one hundred dinars to so-and-so, then the court attends to their property to collect payment, and the court does not install a steward [ apotropos ] to negotiate with the creditor on their behalf. If he said: Give a field to so-and-so, i.e., an unspecified field, or: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so, i.e., unspecified dinars, then the court attends to the property of the orphans and they install a steward to act on their behalf, to ensure that the best fields remain in their possession.

12By contrast, the Sages of Neharde’a say: In all of these cases where the father told his children before his death to give an item, the court attends to the property of the orphans and they install a steward to act on their behalf, except for a situation where a field is found in their possession with regard to which witnesses have testified that it is not their father’s, but is in fact stolen. In such a case, the stolen field is seized and returned to its owner without recourse to a steward, as we do not presume that witnesses are liars.

13Rav Ashi says: Therefore, we do not attend to the property of minor orphans in order to repay a standard loan, as Rava says: The halakha is that the court does not attend to their property. And if we attend to their property, e.g., in a case where the father told his children to repay the debt, we install a steward to act on behalf of the orphans, as the Sages of Neharde’a say: In all of the cases, the court attends to the property of minor orphans and installs a steward, except for a situation where a field is found in their possession that is not the father’s, as we do not presume that witnesses are liars.

1MISHNA: In the case of one who consecrates his property and there was the outstanding debt of the marriage contract of his wife, for whose repayment one’s property is liened, Rabbi Eliezer says: When he divorces her, he shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him. This is to prevent collusion, by which he divorces her, she collects payment from the consecrated property, and he then remarries her. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He need not do so. On a similar note, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Even in the case of the guarantor of a woman for her marriage contract, and her husband was divorcing her and could not pay the debt, the husband shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him, lest he and his wife engage in collusion [ kinunya ] and collect payment from the property of that guarantor, and then the husband will remarry his wife.

2GEMARA: The mishna teaches that there is a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to a case where one consecrates his property and then divorces his wife. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara explains: Rabbi Eliezer holds that a person would engage in collusion against even the Temple treasury, and for this reason he divorces his wife. The required vow serves to prevent such a possibility. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds that a person would not engage in collusion against the Temple treasury.

3The Gemara asks: But if so, consider that which Rav Huna says: If a person on his deathbed consecrated all of his property and said: So-and-so has one hundred dinars that I owe him in my possession, his statement is deemed credible, as there is a presumption that a person does not engage in collusion against the Temple treasury. Let us say that Rav Huna stated this halakha with regard to a matter that is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im .

4The Gemara responds: No, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree whether or not one colludes against the Temple treasury only with regard to a healthy person. But with regard to a person on his deathbed, everyone agrees that such a person does not engage in collusion against the Temple treasury. What is the reason? Since he will soon die, he does not stand to gain anything from his statement, and a person sins only for his own benefit, not for the benefit of others.

5Some say that in the case of a healthy person, everyone agrees on the question of whether or not a person would engage in collusion against the Temple treasury, i.e., they agree that one must be concerned that a person may engage in collusion. And here, they disagree with regard to a vow administered in public, e.g., a vow administered by the court. One Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, holds that such a vow has the option of nullification. Consequently, there is no use in requiring the husband to take a vow even in public, as a halakhic authority can later dissolve it. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that such a vow does not have the option of nullification. Therefore, the court administers a vow in public to prevent collusion.

6And if you wish, say instead: Everyone agrees that a vow administered in public has the option of nullification. And here, they disagree with regard to a vow administered based on the consent of the public, i.e., when the court says to the husband: You are taking a vow that benefit from your wife is forbidden to you based on our consent. According to Rabbi Eliezer, there is no option of nullification for such a vow, and therefore it is effective in preventing collusion, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that even such a vow can be nullified and is therefore ineffective in preventing collusion.

7The Gemara asks: But if so, consider that which Ameimar says: A vow that was taken in public has the option of nullification; if it was taken based on the consent of the public it does not have the option of nullification. Let us say that Ameimar stated this halakha with regard to a matter that is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im . And furthermore, Rabbi Yehoshua says in the mishna that the husband need not take a vow. If his reason is that such a vow is ineffective, he should have stated: It is ineffective.

8Rather, here they disagree with regard to one’s ability to request the dissolution of a vow involving consecrated property. Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may not request the dissolution of a vow involving consecrated property. Accordingly, there is a concern that the husband might collude with his wife by divorcing her in order to extract the consecrated property from the Temple treasury, as he has no other means of releasing the property. In contrast, Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that such a vow may be dissolved and therefore there is no reason for the husband to collude with his wife.

9The Gemara adds: And it is likewise taught in a baraita : In the case of one who consecrates his property and there was the outstanding debt of the marriage contract of his wife upon it, Rabbi Eliezer says: When he divorces her, he shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him, to prevent collusion. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He need not do so. And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: This statement of Rabbi Eliezer is the same as the statement of Beit Shammai, and this statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is the same as the statement of Beit Hillel.

10As Beit Shammai say: Consecration that one performed in error is effective as consecration. Consequently, one cannot request the dissolution of his consecration due to circumstances that unfolded on the grounds that he did not mean to make a vow. And Beit Hillel say: Consecration that one performed in error is not consecration, and one may therefore request the dissolution of his consecration.

11§ The mishna teaches: On a similar note, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that even in the case of a guarantor for a woman for her marriage contract, he vows that benefit from her is forbidden to him, lest he and his wife engage in collusion. The Gemara relates that Moshe bar Atzrei was the guarantor for the marriage contract of his daughter-in-law, and Rav Huna, his son, was a Torah scholar and was hard-pressed for money. Abaye said: Is there no one who will advise Rav Huna that he should divorce his wife, and she should claim her marriage contract from his father, the guarantor of the marriage contract, and that he should then return and remarry her, and in this manner they will obtain money?

12Rava said to Abaye: But we learned in the mishna that in such a case he shall vow that benefit from her is forbidden to him. If so, Rav Huna cannot remarry her. And the Gemara explains that Abaye would argue: Is that to say that anyone who divorces, divorces in court? Let Rav Huna divorce his wife outside the court, so that he will not be forced to take a vow and he will therefore be allowed to remarry her. The Gemara relates that ultimately it was revealed that Rav Huna was a priest, which means that if he had divorced his wife he would have been prohibited from remarrying her. Abaye said of this revelation: This is an example of the saying that poverty follows the poor, i.e., it is difficult to remove a poor person from a state of poverty.

13The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say this? Doesn’t Abaye say: Who is a wily, wicked person? This is one who advises another to sell property that he received from someone who stipulated that the property should pass to a second beneficiary upon the death of the first. And this is in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who maintains that the sale is valid and the second beneficiary may not remove the property from the possession of the buyer. If Abaye considers this individual as wicked for advising one to act against the intentions of a benefactor, how could he suggest that Rav Huna should extract money from the guarantor in the above case?

14The Gemara answers: When one is a guarantor for his son it is different, as he would forgive his son for acting in this manner, as the son will in any case inherit his property. And furthermore, when this is performed for the benefit of a Torah scholar it is different, as it is proper to assist him so that he may continue studying Torah.

1The Gemara responds: Moshe bar Atzrei was a guarantor who accepted unconditional responsibility [ kablan ] for the payment of the marriage contract. The Gemara objects: This works out well according to the one who says that with regard to a kablan , even though the debtor has no property at the time of the loan, nevertheless the kablan is responsible for payment. But according to the one who says that if the debtor has property then the kablan is responsible, but if he does not have property then the kablan does not agree to become responsible for the payment, what can be said? Since Rav Huna owned no property, how could payment of the marriage contract be collected from Moshe bar Atzrei?

2The Gemara responds: If you wish, say that Rav Huna had property at the time that his father accepted upon himself to be a guarantor, and it became blighted. And if you wish, say instead that a father, with regard to his son, accepts responsibility upon himself even if his son owns no property.

3The Gemara cites the aforementioned dispute in detail. As it was stated: Everyone agrees that an ordinary guarantor of a marriage contract does not resolve to become responsible for paying the marriage contract. Everyone also agrees that a kablan for a creditor is responsible for paying the debtor’s debt. By contrast, with regard to an ordinary guarantor of a debt owed to a creditor and a kablan for the payment of a marriage contract, the Sages disagree. There is one Sage who says: If the debtor or the husband has property then the guarantor becomes responsible, but if he does not have property then he does not become responsible. And there is another Sage who says: Even though the debtor or the husband does not have property, the guarantor becomes responsible for payment of the obligation.

4And the halakha in all of these cases is: Even though the principal does not have property of his own, the guarantor still becomes responsible for paying the obligation, except for the case of an ordinary guarantor of a marriage contract, with regard to which, even though the husband has property of his own when he draws up the marriage contract, the guarantor does not resolve to become responsible. What is the reason? He performs a mitzva, i.e., he agrees to be a guarantor only so that the woman will consent to the marriage but he does not actually resolve to become responsible. And furthermore, the woman did not lose anything in exchange for which the guarantor would have accepted responsibility, as the husband did not borrow money from her.

5§ The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who sold his property and later when he divorced his wife he had no property with which to pay the marriage contract. The wife therefore sought to collect payment from the buyers. Rav Yosef, son of Rava, sent the case before Rav Pappa: When a wife’s marriage contract is paid by a guarantor, we learned in the mishna that the husband vows that benefit from her is forbidden to him. Similarly, when she collects her marriage contract from consecrated property, we learned in the mishna that the husband takes such a vow. What is the halakha when she collects payment from a buyer? Rav Pappa said to him: Should the tanna have continued reckoning cases like a peddler, who announces all his wares? Obviously, the halakha is the same in the case of a buyer, as the identical reasoning applies despite the fact that the tanna neglected to mention this case.

6The Sages of Neharde’a say: That which we learned in the mishna we learned, and that which we did not learn in the mishna we did not learn, i.e., the husband does not need to make the vow when the payment of the marriage contract is collected from buyers. Rav Mesharshiyya said: What is the reasoning of the Sages of Neharde’a? Granted, when the payment of the marriage contract is collected from consecrated property the husband must make the vow due to the importance of maintaining the profit of the Temple treasury. In the case of a guarantor as well, the husband must make the vow, as the guarantor performed a mitzva and the woman did not lose anything, i.e., the guarantor received nothing from the wife, and he nevertheless accepted responsibility for the payment of the marriage contract. The husband therefore vows in order that others should not be discouraged from performing this mitzva.

7But in the case of a buyer, since he knows that each and every married man has upon him the potential obligation to pay a marriage contract, why should he go and purchase a field from the husband when there is a lien on it due to the marriage contract? Since it is he who caused himself to lose out, it is unreasonable to prevent the husband from remarrying his wife merely for the benefit of the buyer.

8MISHNA: In the case of one who consecrates his property and there was an outstanding debt of the marriage contract of his wife and of a creditor, the woman may not collect the payment of her marriage contract from the Temple treasury, nor may the creditor collect his debt. Rather, the one who redeems the property redeems it for a cheap price in order to give the woman her marriage contract payment and the creditor his debt. For example, if one consecrated property worth nine thousand dinars and his debt was ten thousand dinars, leaving no property for redemption, the creditor lends an additional dinar to the debtor and the debtor redeems the property with that dinar, in order to give the woman her marriage contract payment and the creditor his debt.

9GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to state that the one who redeems, redeems, i.e., why isn’t the property given directly to the creditor without redemption? The Gemara answers: This is due to the explanation of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu says: The property is redeemed so that people will not say that consecrated property exits to non-sacred status without redemption.

10The mishna teaches that if one consecrated property worth nine thousand dinars and his debt was ten thousand dinars, the creditor lends an additional dinar to the debtor for him to redeem the property. The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If his debt corresponded to the value of his consecrated property, then the debtor redeems the property in the manner prescribed in the mishna.

11But if the value of the consecrated property is not enough to cover the debt, he does not redeem the property in this manner. Instead, it must be redeemed in accordance with its value. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis, up to what amount may the property be redeemed in the manner described in the mishna? Rav Huna bar Yehuda says that Rav Sheshet says: The consecrated property must be worth at least half of the debt. If the property is worth less, it may be redeemed only in accordance with its monetary value.

12MISHNA: Although the Sages said (21a): With regard to those obligated to pay valuations, the court repossesses their property to pay their debt to the Temple treasury; nevertheless, the treasurer gives him permission to keep food sufficient for thirty days, and garments sufficient for twelve months, and a bed made with linens, and his sandals, and his phylacteries. The treasurer leaves these items for him, but he does not leave items for his wife or for his children.

13If the one obligated to pay was a craftsman, the treasurer gives him permission to keep two tools of his craft of each and every type, e.g., for a carpenter, the treasurer gives him permission to keep two adzes [ matzadin ] and two saws. Rabbi Eliezer says: If he was a farmer, the treasurer gives him permission to keep his pair of oxen with which he plows the field. If he was a donkey driver, the treasurer gives him permission to keep his donkey.

14If one had many tools of one type and few tools of one other type, e.g., three adzes and one saw, he may not say to the treasurer to sell one tool of the type of which he has many and to purchase for him one tool of the type of which he has few. Rather, the treasurer gives him two tools of the type of which he has many and he retains whatever he has of the type of which he has few. In contrast to one whose property is repossessed to pay valuations, from one who consecrates all his property, the treasurer takes his phylacteries, as they are included in the category of all his property.

1“But if he be too poor for your valuation” (Leviticus 27:8). The word “he” [ hu ] is interpreted as a variation of havaya , existence or sustenance. In this manner the verse can be read as an instruction to the treasurer: Sustain him from that which he is obligated to pay for your valuation.

2The mishna teaches that food and garments are left for him, but not for his wife or his children. The Gemara asks: What is the reason? The verse states: “If he be too poor for your valuation,” which indicates that he must be sustained from your valuation, but his wife and his children are not sustained from your valuation.

3The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says that if he was a farmer, the treasurer gives him his pair of oxen; if he was a donkey driver, the treasurer gives him his donkey. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why do they rule that these animals are repossessed? The Gemara responds: According to the Rabbis, these animals are not tools of his craft; rather, they are his property.

4The mishna teaches that if one had many tools of one type that he was allowed to keep and few tools of one other type, e.g., three adzes and one saw, the treasurer does not sell tools of the type of which there are many in order to purchase for him tools of the type of which he has few. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious? Just as it was sufficient for him until now to work with one saw, now too a single saw should be sufficient for him.

5The Gemara explains that the ruling is necessary lest you say that until now, when he was capable of lending one of his many adzes, if he required an additional saw someone would lend one to him, whereas now that his property has been repossessed there is no one who will lend such a tool to him, when he has nothing to offer in exchange. Consequently, the treasurer should not leave him with only one saw, but he should sell some of his adzes in order to purchase an additional saw. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that there is no concern that he might not be able to borrow a tool.

6§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one who consecrates all his property, the treasurer takes his phylacteries. The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who sold his property. He came before Rav Yeimar, who said to the members of the court: Remove his phylacteries from his head and his arm and give them to the buyer, as they are included in his property. The Gemara asks: What is this incident teaching us? It is an explicit ruling of the mishna: With regard to one who consecrates all his property, the treasurer takes his phylacteries.

7The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that it is only there, when one consecrates his property, that the halakha is that his phylacteries are taken, as he thinks to himself: I am performing a mitzva, and therefore he intended for his phylacteries to be included. But with regard to a sale, a person would not sell an item used for a mitzva that he performs with his body without explicitly stating so. The Gemara therefore teaches us by means of the above incident that phylacteries are included in the property of such a sale.

8MISHNA: Both in the case of one who consecrates his property and the case of one who valuates himself, when the Temple treasurer repossesses his property he has the right to repossess neither the garment of his wife nor the garment of his children, nor the dyed garments that he dyed for their sake, even if they have yet to wear them, nor the new sandals that he purchased for their sake.

9Although the merchants said: Slaves are sold in their garments for profit, as if a fine garment worth thirty dinars would be purchased for him, his sale price appreciates by one hundred dinars; and likewise with regard to a cow, if one waits to sell it until the market [ la’itlis ] day, when demand is high, its sale price appreciates; and likewise with regard to a pearl, if one brings it to sell it in the city, where demand is high, its sale price appreciates; nevertheless, one does not make such a calculation in this case. Rather, the Temple treasury has the right to collect the item based only on its current location and its price at the present time.

10GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna that the Temple treasury has the right to collect the item based only on its current location and its present time, the Sages taught in a baraita : The verse states, with regard to the redemption of a consecrated item: “And he shall give your valuation as of that day” (Leviticus 27:23). The phrase “as of that day” indicates that he should not delay the sale of a pearl for the light ones, i.e., for poor people, in order that they should take it to the city to sell it. Rather, it is appraised according to its present location. The verse continues: “As a holy thing unto the Lord,” which teaches that unspecified vows of consecration, e.g., when one states: My property is consecrated, are given for Temple maintenance, rather than to the priests.

11MISHNA: One may neither consecrate an ancestral field, i.e., a field that he inherited, less than two years before the Jubilee Year, nor may one redeem such a field less than one year after the Jubilee Year. When redeeming an ancestral field that has been consecrated, the sum paid to redeem the field is calculated based on the number of years remaining until the Jubilee Year. When performing this calculation, one does not count months of a partial year in order to lower the price to be paid to the Temple treasury; rather, he pays for the entire year. But the Temple treasury may count months in order to raise the price of redemption, as will be explained.

12GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one may not consecrate an ancestral field less than two years before the Jubilee Year. And with regard to this, the Gemara raises a contradiction from the following baraita : One may consecrate an ancestral field both before the Jubilee Year and after the Jubilee Year. But during the Jubilee Year itself, one may not consecrate it, and if he nevertheless did consecrate it, it is not consecrated. Although consecration of an ancestral field is ineffective during the Jubilee Year, it is clear that such a field may be consecrated at any time prior to the start of the year.

13In response, Rav and Shmuel both say: The mishna means that one may not consecrate an ancestral field for it to be redeemed with a deduction, i.e., such that the redemption price will be reduced to reflect the number of years remaining until the Jubilee Year, less than two years before the Jubilee Year. If such a field is consecrated less than two years before the Jubilee, it is redeemed according to its full valuation, as though it had been consecrated and redeemed immediately after the Jubilee. And since one may not consecrate an ancestral field for it to be redeemed with a deduction less than two years before the Jubilee, the mishna teaches that a person should be concerned about his property, and should therefore not consecrate an ancestral field less than two years before the Jubilee.

14§ It was stated: With regard to one who consecrates his field during the Jubilee Year itself, Rav says: It is consecrated, and if he wishes to redeem it he gives the full valuation of fifty sela , i.e., fifty silver biblical shekels, per unit of area required for sowing one kor of seed [ beit kor ], and Shmuel says: It is not consecrated at all, and therefore it is not redeemed for any sum.

1And Rav holds: Even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, no a fortiori inference may be drawn, as ultimately, does the field return to the owner during the Jubilee Year? It does not, but rather it leaves the possession of the Temple treasury and is given to the priests. Therefore, there is no basis for an a fortiori inference, as a field consecrated before the Jubilee Year does not return to the owner during the Jubilee Year, and the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High.

2The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav that consecration of a field during the Jubilee Year is effective and that the field must be redeemed for the full price of fifty sela per beit kor ? As the verse states: “If he sanctifies his field from the Jubilee Year, according to your valuation it shall stand” (Leviticus 27:17). The verse indicates that a field is redeemed according to the valuation mentioned in the preceding verse, i.e., fifty sela per beit kor , and the Jubilee Year itself is included in this halakha , as the verse describes a period that begins “from the Jubilee Year,” which can be understood as including the Jubilee Year itself.

3The Gemara asks: And how does Shmuel refute this claim? The Gemara explains that Shmuel would respond: Is it written in the verse: If he sanctifies his field during the Jubilee Year? No, instead: “From the Jubilee Year,” is written, indicating that the verse is referring to consecration beginning from the year that is after the Jubilee Year.

4The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rav, this is the meaning of that which is written in the verse: “If he sanctifies his field from the Jubilee Year, according to your valuation it shall stand. But if he sanctifies his field after the Jubilee, then the priest shall reckon for him the money according to the years that remain until the Jubilee Year, and a deduction shall be made from your valuation” (Leviticus 27:17–18). According to Rav’s interpretation, the second verse is referring to the year immediately following the Jubilee Year. But according to Shmuel, who maintains that the first verse is dealing with the year following the Jubilee Year, to what is the verse referring when it speaks of the year “after the Jubilee”? The Gemara responds: It is referring to the year after the year after the Jubilee Year.

5The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav from the aforementioned baraita : One may consecrate an ancestral field both before the Jubilee Year and after the Jubilee Year. But during the Jubilee Year itself, one may not consecrate it, and if he nevertheless did consecrate it, that field is not consecrated. The Gemara explains: Rav could say to you: The baraita means that it is not consecrated in order to be redeemed with a deduction. But nevertheless it is consecrated, and one gives the full price of fifty sela per beit kor for its redemption.

6The Gemara objects: One can conclude by inference from this response that according to Rav, when the baraita states that a field may be consecrated before the Jubilee Year, it means that it is consecrated to be redeemed with a deduction. But wasn’t it stated that Rav and Shmuel both say that one may not consecrate an ancestral field to be redeemed with a deduction less than two years before the Jubilee Year, but rather it is redeemed according to the total valuation of the field? If so, Rav could not have responded as suggested above.

7Rather, Rav could say to you: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that whenever the verse employs an expression such as: From the first day, the first day itself is not included. Accordingly, when the verse states: “If he sanctifies his field from the Jubilee Year,” the Jubilee Year is not included. But I stated my ruling that a field may be consecrated during the Jubilee Year in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who says: The verse states: “Whoever eats leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day, that soul shall be cut off from Israel” (Exodus 12:15). It states: “From the first day,” and the first day is included, and it continues: “Until the seventh day,” and the seventh day is also included. Here too, the verse states: “If he sanctifies his field from the Jubilee Year,” and the Jubilee Year is included.

8The mishna (25a) teaches that when one redeems an ancestral field, he gives a sela and a pundeyon , which is equivalent to one forty-eighth of a sela , per beit kor for each year remaining until the Jubilee Year. This amount is close to one forty-ninth of the total valuation of fifty sela , and there are no tannaitic disputes with regard to this mishna. The Gemara therefore asks: If Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that one may consecrate an ancestral field during the Jubilee Year, what is the purpose of the additional pundeyon that one gives for each remaining year until the Jubilee? If the Jubilee Year itself is included in the calculation, the total price of fifty sela should be divided evenly, i.e., one sela should be paid for each remaining year of the fifty years.

9And if you would say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not require the addition of a pundeyon for each remaining year, that is difficult: But didn’t we learn in a baraita : If one consecrated the field two or three years before the Jubilee Year, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that he gives a sela and a pundeyon per year? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that the fiftieth year is counted both for this cycle and for that one, i.e., he maintains that the Jubilee Year is also considered the first year of the next cycle. Accordingly, there are actually only forty-nine years in a Jubilee cycle, and the total valuation of a field is therefore divided into forty-nine parts, which comes out to a sela and a pundeyon for each year.

10The Gemara objects: According to Shmuel, who maintains that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that an ancestral field may not be consecrated during the Jubilee Year, let him say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and hold that the fiftieth year is not counted as the first year of the following cycle. Because if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then he should require one to pay a sela and two pundeyon , i.e., one forty-eighth of the total valuation of a field, per year, as there are only forty-eight years during which one may consecrate a field. The Gemara explains: This is indeed the case. Perforce, according to Shmuel, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

11The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Shmuel from the mishna: Nor may one redeem an ancestral field that was consecrated less than one year after the Jubilee Year. Granted, according to Shmuel, who says that one may not consecrate an ancestral field during the Jubilee Year itself, and therefore if a field was consecrated during the Jubilee Year it requires no redemption at all, the mishna is teaching that one may not redeem a field less than one year after the Jubilee, i.e., until the year after the Jubilee, as it cannot be consecrated until then. But according to Rav, who maintains that a field may be consecrated and redeemed during the Jubilee Year itself, what does the mishna mean when it states that one may not redeem a field less than one year after the Jubilee?

12The Gemara responds: Do you maintain that the mishna is referring to the actual year after the Jubilee Year? This is not the case; rather, to what is the phrase: After the Jubilee Year, actually referring?

1It is referring to any year in the middle of the Jubilee cycle. The mishna’s statement should be read as follows: After the Jubilee Year, one may not redeem a field for less than the price of a year, meaning that as long as a year has not been completed, he does not deduct it from the price of redemption. For example, if there are five and a half years remaining until the Jubilee Year, he must give six sela and six pundeyon for its redemption, not five and a half of each of a sela and a pundeyon .

2The Gemara asks: What is the tanna teaching us? Is he saying that one does not count months in order to lower the price to be paid to the Temple treasury? Such an interpretation is untenable, as that halakha is taught explicitly in the following line of the mishna: One does not count months in order to lower the price to be paid to the Temple treasury. The Gemara answers: The tanna is not attempting to teach a separate halakha here. Rather, he employs the style known as: What is the reason, and the mishna is to be read as follows: What is the reason that one may not redeem a field after the Jubilee Year with less than the price of a complete year? It is because one does not count months in order to lower the price to be paid to the Temple treasury.

3§ The mishna teaches: One does not count months in order to lower the price to be paid to the Temple treasury, but the Temple treasury may count months in order to raise the price of redemption. With regard to this statement, the Sages taught in a baraita : From where is it derived that one does not count months in order to lower the price to be paid to the Temple treasury? The verse states: “Then the priest shall reckon for him the money according to the years that remain until the Jubilee Year, and a deduction shall be made from your valuation” (Leviticus 27:18). This teaches that you are to calculate years, but you are not to count months.

4Furthermore, from where is it derived that if you, i.e., the priest representing the Temple treasury, want to consider months as a year so that it will be considered as though a complete year has passed, you may do so? And what are the circumstances in which the priest would want to do this? For example, in a case where one consecrated the field in the middle of the forty-eighth year and wishes to redeem it. In such a case, if the months that have passed are calculated as a complete year, then the halakha with regard to the redemption of a field in the year preceding the Jubilee Year is in effect, and the field must be redeemed according to its full valuation of fifty sela per beit kor , rather than the redemption price of two sela and two pundeyon per beit kor that would apply if the calculation were based on two years remaining until the Jubilee.

5From where is this halakha derived? The verse states: “Then the priest shall reckon for him,” which indicates that the priest reckons for him in any case, i.e., the calculation is to be performed according to his discretion.

6MISHNA: In the case of one who consecrates his ancestral field during a period when the Jubilee Year is observed and wishes to redeem it, he gives the Temple treasury fifty sela , a talmudic measure referred to in the Bible as silver shekels, for an area required for sowing a ḥomer , a measure known in talmudic terminology as one kor , of barley seed (see Leviticus 27:16). If there were crevices [ neka’im ] ten handbreadths deep in the field, or if there were boulders ten handbreadths high, then when calculating the redemption price those areas are not measured with the rest of the field. But if the depth of the crevices, or the height of the boulders, was less than that amount, they are measured with the rest of the field.

7If he consecrated the field two or three years before the Jubilee Year and wishes to redeem it, he gives the Temple treasury a sela and a pundeyon , a pundeyon being one forty-eighth of a sela , per year remaining until the Jubilee Year. And if he said: I will give the payment for each year during that year, one does not listen to him; rather, he must give the entire sum in one payment. This is the halakha both with regard to a case where the owner redeems the field and a case where any other person redeems the field. What then is the difference between redemption by the owner and redemption by any other person? It is only that the owner gives an extra one-fifth in addition to the payment, and any other person who redeems the field does not give the additional one-fifth.

8GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita : The phrase: “The sowing of a ḥomer of barley shall be valued at fifty shekels of silver” (Leviticus 27:16), is referring to an area required for sowing one kor , thirty se’a , of barley seed, and not an area that yields one kor of barley crop, which is significantly smaller. This area is measured according to a field sowed by hand and not sowed by oxen. Since oxen sow the field by pulling a planter, which spreads the seeds at a higher density, the area containing one kor sown by oxen is smaller than the area of one kor sown by hand. Levi taught in a baraita : The area is not measured according to the sowing of a particularly dense layer of seeds, nor a sparse layer, but rather in accordance with an average amount of seeds.

9§ The mishna teaches that if there were crevices ten handbreadths deep in the field, they are not measured with the rest of the field. The Gemara suggests: And let them be consecrated by themselves, as they are fit for sowing, and therefore they should require redemption at the same rate as the rest of the field. Accordingly, one could simply measure the field together with the crevices, and the measurement will be equal to the sum total of the sizes of the field and any crevices.

10And if you would say that the mishna is referring to crevices that together take up only a small area, and since they do not measure a beit kor they are not consecrated, that cannot be correct: But isn’t it taught in a baraita : The verse states: “And if a man shall sanctify for the Lord part of his ancestral field” (Leviticus 27:16). Why must the verse state: “Field”? Since it is stated in the same verse: “Your valuation shall be according to its sowing; the sowing of a ḥomer of barley shall be valued at fifty shekels of silver,” one might say: I have derived only that this is the halakha when he consecrated a field like this, i.e., one measuring at least a beit kor . From where is it derived to include fields that are fit for sowing only a half -kor or half of a half- kor , a se’a or a half- se’a [ vetarkav ], or even half of a half- se’a ? The verse states: “Field,” indicating that one may consecrate a field in any case, regardless of size.

11Mar Ukva bar Ḥama said: Here, the mishna is referring to crevices that are full of water, which are not fit for sowing. Accordingly, they are not measured with the field, as the verse states that the valuation is in accordance with the areas fit for sowing barley seeds. The language is also precise, as the tanna teaches the halakha with regard to crevices similar to the way he teaches that of boulders, which are also not fit for sowing, as it states: If there were crevices ten handbreadths deep or boulders ten handbreadths high. Conclude from this that the mishna is referring to crevices unfit for sowing.

12The Gemara asks: If so, then when the difference in height between the field and the crevices or boulders is less than ten handbreadths, they should also not be measured with the field. Why does the mishna indicate that they are measured with the field in this case? The Gemara responds: These crevices less than ten handbreadths deep are called cracks of the ground, and these boulders less than ten handbreadths tall are called spines of the ground. As there is no great disparity in surface level between them and the field itself, they are deemed part of the field and are therefore measured with it, despite the fact that they are unfit for sowing.

13§ The mishna teaches that if he consecrated the field two or three years before the Jubilee Year and wishes to redeem it, he gives the Temple treasury a sela and a pundeyon per year. In this regard, the Sages taught a baraita that deals with the verse: “But if he sanctifies his field after the Jubilee, then the priest shall reckon for him the money according to the years that remain until the Jubilee Year, and a deduction shall be made from your valuation” (Leviticus 27:18).

14The baraita states that the apparently superfluous phrase “And a deduction shall be made from your valuation” teaches that even the years that passed from the consecration of the field are deducted, and not only the years that passed before it was consecrated. That is, if the Temple treasury benefited from the field’s produce for a year or two, or if the Temple treasury did not benefit from it but the field nevertheless remained before it, i.e., in the possession of the Temple treasury, he gives a sela and a pundeyon for each remaining year until the Jubilee Year.

1GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one consecrated his ancestral field and his son redeemed it from the Temple treasury, the field returns to the original owner when the Jubilee arrives. By contrast, if another person redeemed it, the field is transferred to the priests during the Jubilee Year. With regard to this matter, the Sages taught a baraita analyzing the verse: “And if he will not redeem the field, or if he sold the field to another man, it shall not be redeemed anymore. But the field, when it goes out in the Jubilee, shall be holy for the Lord, as a dedicated field; his ancestral possession shall be for the priest” (Leviticus 27:20–21).

2The phrase “and if he will not redeem the field” is referring to a case where the owner did not redeem it and it remained in the possession of the Temple treasury, and the phrase “or if he sold the field” is referring to a situation where the Temple treasurer sold it to another person. The verse indicates that in both of these instances, possession of the field goes to the priests.

3The baraita continues: “To another man,” indicates that the field is transferred to the priests during the Jubilee Year only if it had been sold to another, and not to the son of the one who consecrated it. The baraita asks: Do you say that the verse is referring to another and not to his son? Or perhaps the verse means only that it was sold to another and not to his brother? The baraita rejects this suggestion: When it says: “Man,” the brother is stated, i.e., he is included in the category of a man. How do I realize the meaning of: “Another man”? It must mean: Another, but not his son.

4The baraita asks: And what did you see to include the son in the same category as the father, and to exclude the brother? The baraita answers: I include the son, as he stands in place of his father with regard to designating a Hebrew maidservant as a wife for himself, in a case where the father purchased the Hebrew maidservant and designates her as a wife for his son, which he cannot do for his brother. And he also stands in place of his father with regard to a Hebrew slave, as when one inherits a Hebrew slave from his father, the slave is obligated to serve the son and does not go free, whereas if the deceased’s brother inherits the servant, he goes free.

5The baraita objects: On the contrary, I should include the brother, as he stands in his brother’s place with regard to levirate marriage, which a son does not. The baraita rejects this suggestion: Is there ever a case of levirate marriage other than a case where there is no son? In a case where there is a son there is no levirate marriage. This indicates that with regard to levirate marriage as well, a son stands in place of the deceased more than a brother of the deceased.

6The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to answer the question in this way? Let one derive the halakha that the son stands in place of the father, and the brother does not, from the simple fact that here, in support of extending the father’s status to the son, there are two justifications, i.e., the halakha of designation of the Hebrew maidservant and the halakha of the Hebrew slave, and there, in support of extending it to the brother, there is only one justification, i.e., the halakha of levirate marriage?

7The Gemara responds: That answer is invalid because the halakha that a son, but not a brother, stands in place of his father with regard to a Hebrew slave is not written explicitly in the Torah, but the tanna also derives it from this same refutation, namely: Is there ever a case of levirate marriage other than a case where there is no son. Without this refutation there would not be more justifications in support of extending the father’s status to the son rather than to the brother. Accordingly, this last refutation is the basis for the conclusion.

8§ Rabba bar Avuh raises a dilemma: If a daughter redeemed the ancestral field that her father consecrated, what is the halakha ? Does she thereby preserve possession of the field for her father at the Jubilee Year, like a son? Rabba bar Avuh explains the two sides of the dilemma: Perhaps the halakha is that since with regard to levirate marriage, a son and a daughter are like one another, as both exempt their father’s widow from the obligation of levirate marriage, the daughter preserves possession of the field for her father. Or perhaps the halakha is that since with regard to inheritance, when there is a son, a daughter is considered like another person, as she does not inherit a share of her father’s estate, she does not preserve possession of the field for her father.

9The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Anyone who is considered like another person when there is a son does not preserve possession of the field for the owner. And with regard to this, i.e., a daughter, as well, when there is a son, she is considered like another person.

10Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If a woman consecrated her ancestral field, which of her heirs can redeem the field and thereby preserve possession of the field for her during the Jubilee Year? Can her husband preserve it for her, as he inherits from her if she dies during his lifetime? Or perhaps her son can preserve if for her, as if the son inherits from his mother, when she was not married at the time of her death, he takes in inheritance the property due to her as he does the property she possessed? There is a halakha that if someone dies and his heir is a woman who is already deceased, her son inherits that property, not her late husband. No resolution is offered, and therefore the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

11§ Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: If one consecrated his ancestral field less than two years before the Jubilee Year and did not redeem it, what is the halakha with regard to whether or not it is to be removed from his possession during the Jubilee and given to the priests?

12Rav Ḥisda said to him: What is your reasoning? Is it that since the verse states: “And a deduction shall be made from your valuation” (Leviticus 27:18), which indicates that the field is redeemed with a deduction according to the years remaining until the Jubilee Year, and the verse also states: “But the field, when it goes out in the Jubilee, shall be holy for the Lord…his ancestral possession shall be for the priest” (Leviticus 27:21), this indicates that if the field is fit for deduction, then yes, when it is not redeemed by the owner it is given to the priests at the Jubilee Year, but with regard to a field that is not fit for deduction, i.e., one consecrated less than two years before the Jubilee Year, which must be redeemed according to its full valuation (24a), no, it is not given to the priests but rather is returned to the owner?

13Rav Ḥisda responds: On the contrary, the verse states: “And if he will not redeem the field, or if he sold the field to another man, it shall not be redeemed anymore. But the field, when it goes out in the Jubilee, shall be holy for the Lord…his ancestral possession shall be for the priest” (Leviticus 27:20–21). This indicates that any field that could have been redeemed but was not redeemed becomes the possession of the priests. And this field, which was consecrated less than two years before the Jubilee Year, is also fit for redemption. Therefore, if it was not redeemed it is given to the priests.

14§ The mishna teaches: If one of the priests redeemed the field and when the Jubilee Year arrived it was in his possession, he may not say: Since it is removed from the possession of the one who redeemed it and given to the priests during the Jubilee Year, and since it is already in my possession, it is mine. Rather, the field is removed from his possession and is divided among all of his brethren, the priests. With regard to this halakha , the Sages taught in a baraita : Why must the verse state: “But the field, when it goes out in the Jubilee, shall be holy for the Lord… his ancestral possession shall be for the priest” (Leviticus 27:21)?