Arakhin 21a

הִקְדִּישׁוֹ הַדָּר בּוֹ — מַעֲלֶה שָׂכָר לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ. הִקְדִּישׁוֹ הַדָּר בּוֹ? הֵיכִי מָצֵי מַקְדֵּישׁ לֵהּ? ״אִישׁ כִּי יַקְדִּישׁ בֵּיתוֹ קֹדֶשׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, מָה בֵּיתוֹ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ — אַף כֹּל בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ! הָכִי קָאָמַר: הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מַשְׂכִּיר — הַדָּר בּוֹ מַעֲלֶה שָׂכָר לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ.

If the one living in it, i.e., the renter, consecrates the house, he pays the rent to the Temple treasury. The Gemara express surprise at this last statement of the baraita : If the one living in the house consecrates it? How can the renter consecrate it? The Merciful One states: “When a man shall sanctify his house to be sacred” (Leviticus 27:14), from which it is derived that just as one’s house is in his possession, so too, anything that one consecrates must be in his possession. If so, the renter cannot consecrate the house, as he is not its owner. The Gemara answers that this is what the baraita is saying: If the one renting out the house consecrates it, the one living in it pays the rent to the Temple treasury.

הִקְדִּישׁוֹ מַשְׂכִּיר, הֵיכִי דָּיַיר בֵּיהּ? בִּמְעִילָה קָאֵי! וְתוּ מַעֲלֶה שָׂכָר לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ? כֵּיוָן דִּמְעַל בֵּיהּ, נָפֵיק לֵיהּ שָׂכָר לְחוּלִּין!

The Gemara asks: If the one renting out the house consecrates it, how is it possible for the renter to live in it? Since the house is consecrated property he is standing liable for the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property by living there. And furthermore, why must he pay the rent to the Temple treasury? Since he misused consecrated property the payment of the rent immediately leaves the state of consecration and becomes non-sacred.

דְּאָמַר: ״לִכְשֶׁיָּבֹא שְׂכָרוֹ יִקְדַּשׁ״, וְהָא אֵין אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם!

The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the one renting out the house says: When the payment of the rent will come to me, the money shall be consecrated. The Gemara asks: But how is it possible for the one renting out the house to consecrate money he will receive in the future? After all, a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב מָרִי בַּר חָמָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא: כְּמַאן? כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר: אָדָם מַקְדִּישׁ דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא בָּא לָעוֹלָם? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְאֶלָּא כְּמַאן?!

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world. Some say that Rav Pappa said to Abaye, and some say that Rav Mari bar Ḥama said to Rav Ḥisda: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita ? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world? He said to him: Rather, in accordance with who else’s opinion could this baraita be? Certainly it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

מַתְנִי׳ חַיָּיבֵי עֲרָכִין — מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן, חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת — אֵין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן, חַיָּיבֵי עוֹלוֹת וּשְׁלָמִים — מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן.

MISHNA: With regard to those obligated to pay valuations, the court repossesses their property to pay their debt to the Temple treasury. With regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings and guilt offerings, the court does not repossess their property; since one is obligated to bring them for atonement he would not delay bringing them. But with regard to those obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings, the court repossesses their property;since these offerings are not obligatory for atonement, one might delay bringing them.

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּתְרַצֶּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנוֹ״, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״. וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים, כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״.

Although one obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3), nevertheless the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so. And likewise, you say the same with regard to women’s bills of divorce. Although one divorces his wife only of his own volition, in any case where the Sages obligated a husband to divorce his wife the court coerces him until he says: I want to do so.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: פְּעָמִים שֶׁחַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן, חַיָּיבֵי עוֹלוֹת אֵין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן.

GEMARA: Rav Pappa says: Sometimes with regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings the court does repossess their property, and likewise there are occasions involving those obligated to bring burnt offerings where the court does not repossess their property.

חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן בְּחַטַּאת נָזִיר, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר מָר: ״אִם גִּילַּח עַל אֶחָד מִשְּׁלׇשְׁתָּן יָצָא, וְאִם נִזְרַק עָלָיו אֶחָד מִן הַדָּמִים הוּתַּר הַנָּזִיר לִשְׁתּוֹת יַיִן וְלִיטַמֵּא לְמֵתִים״ — פָּשַׁע בַּהּ וְלָא מַיְיתֵי.

Rav Pappa elaborates: With regard to those obligated to bring sin offerings, the court repossesses their property in the case of the sin offering of a nazirite, since the Master says ( Nazir 45a): If a nazirite shaved after the sacrifice of one of the three nazirite offerings, either the burnt offering, the peace offering, or the sin offering, he has fulfilled his obligation of shaving. And if the blood of one of these offerings was sprinkled on his behalf, the nazirite is permitted to drink wine and to become ritually impure from a corpse. Therefore, there is a concern that a nazirite who has already sacrificed his burnt offering or peace offering might be negligent with regard to his sin offering and not bring it, and therefore the court repossesses his property in this particular case.

חַיָּיבֵי עוֹלוֹת — אֵין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן בְּעוֹלַת יוֹלֶדֶת.

With regard to those obligated to bring burnt offerings, the court does not repossess their property in the case of a burnt offering of a woman after childbirth. There is no concern that she might delay bringing her burnt offering, as she is required to bring this offering before partaking of sacrificial food.

מַאי נִיהוּ דְּאַקְדְּמַיהּ קְרָא, וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: לְמִקְרָאָהּ הִקְדִּימָהּ הַכָּתוּב!

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the ruling that a woman after childbirth is required to bring her burnt offering before she can sacrifice her sin offering? Is it that the verse mentions her burnt offering before it mentions her sin offering, as it is written: “And when the days of her purification are fulfilled…she shall bring a lamb of the first year for a burnt offering, and a young pigeon, or a turtle-dove, for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:6)? But doesn’t Rava say: The verse mentions her burnt offering before her sin offering only with regard to the reading of the verse, but not with regard to the order of the offerings? If so, there should be a concern that she might first sacrifice her sin offering and delay bringing her burnt offering.

אֶלָּא בְּעוֹלַת מְצוֹרָע, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁחַטָּאתוֹ וַאֲשָׁמוֹ עֹיכַבְתּוֹ, כָּךְ עוֹלָתוֹ עֹיכַבְתּוֹ.

Rather, the court does not repossess the property of those obligated to bring burnt offerings in the case of the burnt offering of a leper, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beroka, says: Just as failure to sacrifice his sin offering and his guilt offering prevents the leper from achieving full ritual purity, so too, failure to sacrifice his burnt offering has the same effect and prevents him from achieving full ritual purity. Therefore, the court does not repossess his property, as there is no concern he might delay bringing his burnt offering.

וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּתְרַצֶּה, תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יַקְרִיב אוֹתוֹ״ — מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ, יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנוֹ״, הָא כֵּיצַד? כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״.

§ The mishna teaches: Although one obligated to bring burnt offerings and peace offerings does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3), nevertheless, one coerces him until he says: I want to do so. Similarly, the Sages taught in a baraita : It is written with regard to a burnt offering: “He shall sacrifice it” (Leviticus 1:3), which teaches that one coerces him to bring his burnt offering. One might have thought he brings the offering against his will; therefore, the verse states: “Of his volition” (Leviticus 1:3). How can these texts be reconciled? The court coerces him until he says: I want to do so.

אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: עוֹלָה צְרִיכָה דַּעַת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנוֹ״. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּתְרַצֶּה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנוֹ״!

Shmuel says: A burnt offering requires the consent of the one receiving atonement, as it is stated: “Of his volition.” The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us? Didn’t we already learn in the mishna: Although he does not achieve atonement until he brings the offering of his own volition, as it is stated: “He shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting of his volition”?

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּפָרֵישׁ לֵיהּ חַבְרֵיהּ. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כִּי בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת מִדִּידֵיהּ, אֲבָל מִדְּחַבְרֵיהּ לָא? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, זִימְנִין דְּלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּלִיכַּפַּר בְּמִידֵּי דְּלָא דִּידֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: No, the statement of Shmuel is necessary with regard to a case where another person separated, i.e., designated, a burnt offering on his behalf. Lest you say: When we require the consent of the one receiving atonement, that is only in a case where an animal from his property is separated as his burnt offering, e.g., the court repossesses his property for the sake of his burnt offering. But we do not need his consent if an animal from the property of another is separated as his burnt offering. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that the consent of the one receiving atonement is required even in a case where an animal from the property of another was separated as an offering. The reason is that sometimes he is not amenable to achieving atonement with an item that does not belong to him, and in such a case he will not achieve atonement.

מֵיתִיבִי: ״חַטָּאתוֹ וַאֲשָׁמוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי עָלַי״

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita : With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring the sin offering or the guilt offering of so-and-so,