Sanhedrin 23a

מַתְנִי׳ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה. זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שְׁנֵי דַיָּינִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד.

MISHNA: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three. They are chosen in the following manner: This litigant chooses one for himself and that litigant chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge for themselves.

זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּינוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּינוֹ שֶׁל זֶה – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְּסוּלִין. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין אוֹ מוּמְחִין מִפִּי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן.

This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as judges or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them.

זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא עֲלֵיהֶן רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְּסוּלִין, אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן.

This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When can one litigant disqualify the other’s witnesses? Only when he brings evidence about them that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from bearing witness for another reason. But if they are fit to serve as witnesses, he cannot disqualify them.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד״? בִּתְלָתָא סַגִּי!

GEMARA: The Gemara assumes that the statement: This litigant chooses one and that litigant chooses one and the two of them choose one more, means that each litigant chooses a court of three judges and the two courts together choose one more court, for a total of nine judges. The Gemara asks: For what purpose does this litigant choose one court for himself and that litigant choose one court for himself; isn’t it sufficient to judge the case with three judges?

הָכִי קָאָמַר: כְּשֶׁזֶּה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ בֵּית דִּין אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ בֵּית דִּין אֶחָד, שְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד.

The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: In a case where this litigant chooses one court for himself, i.e., he requests to be judged before three specific judges, and that litigant chooses one other court of three judges for himself, as he does not wish to be judged before the court that the first litigant requested, in this case, both of them choose one more court for themselves, i.e., they must reach a compromise and decide about the composition of the court that will judge them.

וַאֲפִילּוּ לֹוֶה מָצֵי מְעַכֵּב? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא מַלְוֶה, אֲבָל לֹוֶה כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ וְדָן בְּעִירוֹ.

The Gemara asks: And can even a debtor restrict the choice of the court? But doesn’t Rabbi Elazar say: The Sages taught that only a creditor can refuse a court chosen by the debtor, due to his desire to be judged by a prominent court, but that as for a debtor, they compel him to appear in the court that presides in his own city.

כִּדְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁבְּסוּרְיָא שָׁנוּ. הָכָא נָמֵי, בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁבְּסוּרְיָא שָׁנוּ. אֲבָל מוּמְחִין – לָא.

The Gemara answers: It is as Rabbi Yoḥanan says concerning a different matter, that the Sages taught that other matter with regard to the laymen’s courts [ be’arkaot ] in Syria. Here too, the Sages taught the halakha in the mishna with regard to the laymen’s courts in Syria, which allow even the debtor to refuse to be judged before the court chosen by the creditor, claiming that they are not worthy judges. But if the creditor chooses a court of experts, the debtor does not have the right to refuse to be judged before them.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא מוּמְחִין, כְּגוֹן בֵּי דִינָא דְּרַב הוּנָא וּדְרַב חִסְדָּא, דְּקָאָמַר לֵיהּ: מִי קָא מַטְרַחְנָא לָךְ?

Rav Pappa said: You may even say that the mishna is referring to courts of experts in the same city, such as the courts of Rav Huna and of Rav Ḥisda. As in that case, each litigant can say to the other: Am I burdening you by requesting that you be judged by a different court?

תְּנַן: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, שְׁנֵי דַיָּינִין בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כִּדְקָאָמְרִינַן בֵּית דִּין – בֵּית דִּין בָּתַר דְּפָסְלִי לְהוּ, אָזְלוּ וּבָרְרוּ לְהוּ בֵּי דִינָא אַחֲרִינֵי?

We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more for themselves. And if it enters your mind to interpret the mishna as we said before, that each litigant chose a court of three judges, this statement is difficult; after each court was disqualified by one of the litigants, shall the members of both courts go and choose another court for themselves?

וְעוֹד, מַאי ״זֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶחָד״?

And furthermore, for what reason would the mishna state that the standard procedure for choosing judges is that this litigant chooses one court for himself and that litigant chooses one court for himself, each disqualifying the court that the other chose?

אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: כְּשֶׁזֶּה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, שְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד.

Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: When this litigant chooses one judge for himself before whom he requests to be judged, and that litigant chooses one other judge for himself before whom he requests to be judged, the two litigants then choose one more judge for themselves, and the case is adjudicated by these three judges.

מַאי שְׁנָא דְּעָבְדִי הָכִי? אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא: מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁזֶּה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, וְזֶה בּוֹרֵר לוֹ דַּיָּין אֶחָד, וּשְׁנֵיהֶן בּוֹרְרִין לָהֶן עוֹד אֶחָד – יֵצֵא הַדִּין לַאֲמִיתּוֹ.

The Gemara asks: What is different about this procedure; i.e., that the selection of the judges is performed specifically in this manner? The Sages in the West, Eretz Yisrael, say in the name of Rabbi Zeira: As a result of the fact that this litigant chooses one judge for himself, and that litigant chooses one judge for himself, and the two litigants choose one more judge for themselves, the true judgment will emerge. Each litigant assumes that the judges he chose do not bear a grudge against him, and he will accept their ruling.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים כּוּ׳. נֵימָא בִּדְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב קָמִיפַּלְגִי?

§ The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The two judges that were chosen choose one more judge. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis disagree with regard to what Rav Yehuda says that Rav says.

דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי חוֹתֵם עִמָּהֶן. רַבִּי מֵאִיר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְרַבָּנַן אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב.

As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. One does not sign a document unless he recognizes that those signing with him are fit to bear witness. According to the Gemara’s suggestion, Rabbi Meir does not accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says. Therefore, the litigants can choose the third judge, as the first two judges will be amenable to signing the court order without knowing the third judge. And the Rabbis accept that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and the judges would not sign the court order without themselves knowing the third judge.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְדַעַת הַדַּיָּינִין – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּבָעֵינַן. כִּי פְּלִיגִי – דַּעַת בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין: רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר דַּעַת בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין נָמֵי בָּעֵינַן, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי דַּעַת הַדַּיָּינִין בָּעֵינַן, דַּעַת בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין לָא בָּעֵינַן.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone accepts that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says; and everyone agrees with the premise that we need the consent of the first two judges for the appointment of the third. Rather, when they disagree, it is about whether the consent of the litigants is necessary. Rabbi Meir holds that we need the consent of the litigants as well, and the Rabbis hold that although we need the consent of the other two judges, we do not need the consent of the litigants.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר כּוּ׳. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: כָּךְ הָיוּ נְקִיֵּי הַדַּעַת שֶׁבִּירוּשָׁלַיִם עוֹשִׂין – לֹא הָיוּ חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי חוֹתֵם עִמָּהֶן, וְלֹא הָיוּ יוֹשְׁבִין בְּדִין אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי יוֹשֵׁב עִמָּהֶן, וְלֹא הָיוּ נִכְנָסִין בִּסְעוּדָה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן יוֹדְעִין מִי מֵסֵב עִמָּהֶן.

Returning to the matter itself, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they know who is signing with them. That is also taught in a baraita : This is what the scrupulous people of Jerusalem would do: They would not sign a document unless they knew who was signing with them, and they would not sit in judgment unless they knew who was sitting with them, and they would not join a meal unless they knew who was reclining, i.e., eating, with them.

זֶה פּוֹסֵל דַּיָּינוֹ כּוּ׳. כֹּל כְּמִינֵּיהּ דְּפָסֵיל דַּיָּינֵי?

§ The mishna teaches: This litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the judge chosen by this litigant. The Gemara asks: Is it in his power to disqualify judges?

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁבְּסוּרְיָא שָׁנוּ, אֲבָל מוּמְחִים – לֹא.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The Sages taught this matter with regard to the laymen’s courts in Syria. In those courts, each litigant can refuse to be judged by the judge the other litigant chose. But this halakha is not stated with regard to a court of expert judges.

הָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים, אֵימָתַי? בִּזְמַן שֶׁמֵּבִיא רְאָיָה שֶׁהֵן קְרוֹבִין אוֹ פְּסוּלִין. אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין, אוֹ מוּמְחִין מִפִּי בֵּית דִּין – אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן, מִכְּלָל דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר מוּמְחִין נָמֵי קָאָמַר!

The Gemara challenges: From the fact that the mishna teaches in the latter clause: And the Rabbis say: When can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? When he brings evidence that they are related to one of the litigants or to each other, or that they are disqualified from serving as judges for another reason; but if they are fit to serve as judges, or are experts ordained by the court, he cannot disqualify them. By inference, Rabbi Meir is also speaking of a court of experts when he says that one can refuse to be judged.

הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֲבָל אִם הָיוּ כְּשֵׁרִין, נַעֲשׂוּ כְּמוּמְחִין מִפִּי בֵּית דִּין, וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְפוֹסְלָן.

The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: But if they are fit to serve as judges they are treated like experts ordained by the court, and he cannot disqualify them.

תָּא שְׁמַע: אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁפּוֹסֵל דַּיָּין שֶׁמּוּמְחֶה לְרַבִּים.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita that contradicts this interpretation: The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: It is not within a litigant’s power to disqualify a judge who is accepted as an expert for the public. Apparently, Rabbi Meir disagrees with the Rabbis with regard to an expert judge.

אֵימָא: לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁפּוֹסֵל דַּיָּין שֶׁהִמְחוּהוּ רַבִּים עֲלֵיהֶם.

The Gemara answers: Say that the baraita should be emended as follows: It is not within a litigant’s power to disqualify a judge whom the public accepted upon themselves as an expert judge for their matters, just as the halakha is concerning the laymen’s courts in Syria.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: לְעוֹלָם פּוֹסֵל וְהוֹלֵךְ, עַד שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו בֵּית דִּין שֶׁמּוּמְחֶה לְרַבִּים. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

That interpretation is also taught in a baraita , which teaches: A litigant can continuously disqualify the judges chosen by the other litigant forever, until the latter accepts to be judged by a court that is accepted as an expert court for the public; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Clearly, Rabbi Meir concedes that one cannot refuse to have the case judged by an expert court.

וְהָא עֵדִים כְּמוּמְחִין דָּמֵי? וְאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: זֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה, וְזֶה פּוֹסֵל עֵדָיו שֶׁל זֶה.

The Gemara asks: But aren’t witnesses like experts, in that their standing is independent of their being accepted by the litigants? And yet Rabbi Meir says: This litigant can disqualify the witnesses of that litigant and that litigant can disqualify the witnesses of this litigant.

הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: פֶּה קָדוֹשׁ יֹאמַר דָּבָר זֶה? תְּנִי: ״עֵדוֹ״.

The Gemara answers: It was stated with regard to that statement of Rabbi Meir that Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

עֵדוֹ לְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לְמָמוֹן, רַחֲמָנָא פַּסְלֵיהּ! אִי לִשְׁבוּעָה, הֵימוֹנֵי מְהֵימַן כְּבֵי תְּרֵי!

The Gemara asks: For what purpose does his single witness testify? If we say it is to testify about monetary matters, the Merciful One already disqualifies him, as by Torah law the testimony of only one witness is not accepted. If it is to render the defendant liable to take an oath that he does not owe the money being claimed, in this regard the testimony of one witness is deemed credible like two witnesses; the Torah states that if one witness supports the claim of the claimant, the defendant is required to take an oath that he does not owe the money.

לְעוֹלָם לְמָמוֹן. לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּקַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ כְּבֵי תְרֵי.

The Gemara answers: Actually, the purpose of the testimony is to testify about monetary matters; and no, one should not raise that challenge, as this ruling is necessary only in a case where the litigant initially accepted upon himself the single witness as equivalent to two witnesses. Afterward, he retracted his agreement to accept the single witness’s testimony as if it were that of two witnesses. Rabbi Meir rules that his retraction is valid, and the testimony is not accepted.

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: דְּמָצֵי הָדַר בֵּיהּ? תְּנֵינָא: אָמַר לוֹ ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אַבָּא״, ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אָבִיךָ״, ״נֶאֱמָנִין עָלַי שְׁלֹשָׁה רוֹעֵי בָּקָר״ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ.

The Gemara asks: What is this teaching us, that one can retract this kind of agreement? We learn this in the following mishna (24a): If one of the litigants says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha , are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are legally disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says that the one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say that he cannot retract it, and must accept their verdict.