1GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is evident from the mishna that Rabbi Meir holds that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists. The Gemara counters: Although he does not generally hold that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, with regard to a more inclusive prohibition and an expanded prohibition, he holds that the second prohibition does take effect where a prohibition already exists. Under certain circumstances a second prohibition takes effect, and under other circumstances it does not. When the second prohibition is an expanded or inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.
2Therefore, in the case in the mishna of a ritually impure person who ate leftover forbidden fat from an offering, one who was initially pure was prohibited from eating the food only due to the prohibition of forbidden fat. Once the person became impure, since he became prohibited from eating even pure pieces of sacrificial meat, an additional prohibition is also added to the forbidden fat. The prohibition against an impure person eating sacrificial meat is considered an inclusive prohibition, and therefore it takes effect even though the prohibition against eating forbidden fat already applied.
3And likewise, the forbidden fat was initially forbidden only in consumption. When he consecrated the animal, it became prohibited to derive benefit from it in any manner. Therefore, since the prohibition against deriving any form of benefit was added to it, it was also added with regard to eating the forbidden fat. Consequently, the prohibition against misusing consecrated property, which is an expanded prohibition, applies even to one who eats the forbidden fat.
4And still, the consecrated forbidden fat is prohibited only to an ordinary person, but it is permitted to the Most High, i.e., the altar. When it becomes leftover, since a prohibition was added with regard to the Most High, as it is now prohibited to sacrifice it upon the altar, the expanded prohibition of leftover sacrificial meat is added with regard to an ordinary person as well. If Yom Kippur, during which the person is prohibited from eating anything, takes effect with regard to it, since a prohibition was added with regard to eating non-sacred food, a prohibition is also added with regard to food that had been consecrated to the Most High. The prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur is an inclusive prohibition, and therefore it takes effect even with regard to eating leftover sacrificial meat.
5The Gemara objects: And let the mishna teach: There is a case where one can perform a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food and be liable to bring five sin offerings, rather than four, and interpret it as a case where he ate an olive-bulk from an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [ piggul ]. The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to a case of one animal, but is not referring to a case of two animals, and you do not find a case where the prohibitions of leftover sacrificial meat [ notar ] and piggul apply to one animal. From the moment an offering is rendered piggul it may not be sacrificed or eaten, and therefore it is not subject to the prohibition of notar .
6The Gemara asks: Why is it not possible for the prohibitions of notar and piggul to apply to the same animal? You find it in a case where one brought upon the altar a limb from an offering that was piggul , as from that time its piggul status has been abrogated, and it becomes notar once the time that it may be sacrificed has passed.
7And this is as Ulla says: In the case of a handful of a meal offering that is piggul that one brought upon the altar, its piggul status has been abrogated and it becomes leftover. Consequently, he is liable with regard to the limb that was offered for violating the prohibition of notar , and is liable with regard to the rest of the animal for violating the prohibition of piggul . The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to one limb, but it is not referring to two limbs, and you do not find notar and piggul with regard to one limb.
8The Gemara asks: Why is there no such case? You find it in a situation where one brought a limb from a piggul offering upon the altar, and he placed half of it upon the altar and half of it outside of the altar. In such a case, with regard to that portion of the limb which he placed upon the altar, its piggul status has been abrogated and it becomes notar . And this is as Ulla says: In the case of a handful of a meal offering that is piggul that one brought upon the altar, its piggul status has been abrogated and it becomes notar . By contrast, the part of the limb that was not placed upon the altar retains its status as piggul .
9The Sage answering the question said to the questioner: No, the status of piggul cannot be abrogated from part of a limb. Rather, if the majority of the limb is on the altar, then throw it on the altar, i.e., the entire limb has the status of being on the altar. If the majority of the limb is outside the altar, throw it outside, i.e., it is considered as though the limb was not placed on the altar at all.
10The Gemara objects: If so, one can resolve the dilemma that Rami bar Ḥama raised: Does one follow the majority with regard to limbs or not? According to the previous interpretation of the mishna, one does follow the majority with regard to limbs. The Gemara explains: Rather, the reason that the mishna did not mention the prohibition of piggul is that it is referring to the consumption of one olive-bulk of forbidden fat, and is not referring to two olive-bulks. Even if parts of one limb can have the status of piggul and other parts can be leftover sacrificial meat, one single olive-bulk cannot have both statuses.
11The Gemara asks: And is the mishna not referring to a case of more than one olive-bulk? But isn’t it taught that one is liable to bring a sin offering for eating on Yom Kippur, and on Yom Kippur it is only eating the volume of a large date that obligates one to bring a sin offering, and the volume of a large date contains the volume of two olives?
12Rabbi Zeira said: It is referring to a case where he eats a kidney with the fat attached to it. He is liable to bring three of the sin offerings enumerated in the mishna for eating the olive-bulk of fat, and the additional amount of kidney he eats brings his total consumption to the volume of a large date, so that he is liable for eating on Yom Kippur. Rav Pappa said: It is referring to a case where he ate an olive-bulk of the fat and completed the volume of a large date with dates.
13Rav Adda bar Aḥa teaches that the mishna is stating that one can be liable to bring five sin offerings for one act of eating, not just four, and he interprets it to be referring to a case where one ate an olive-bulk of piggul from another animal together with the olive-bulk of forbidden fat, and he does not answer in accordance with these answers that we answered in the name of Rav Pappa and Rabbi Zeira.
14The Gemara objects: And let the mishna teach that one can be liable to bring six sin offerings, and interpret it as referring to a case where he consumed an olive-bulk of blood in addition to the other two olive-bulks. The Gemara explains: The mishna is referring to one act of eating, but is not referring to two acts of eating, and the Sages calculated that one’s throat does not hold more than two olive-bulks at once.
15§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Meir says: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out from the private domain into the public domain while eating it, he would be liable to bring a sin offering for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat. The Gemara objects: And let the mishna teach: If he carried it out he is liable, as the mishna is referring to one who ate on Yom Kippur, which is also a day when labor is prohibited. What is the reason that it teaches: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out he is liable? Why mention Shabbat at all? Rafram said: That is to say that the joining of courtyards in order to permit carrying, and the general prohibition against carrying from one domain to another, apply with regard to Shabbat, but the joining of courtyards and the prohibition against carrying do not apply with regard to Yom Kippur.
16The Gemara asks: From where is this conclusion derived? Perhaps the joining of courtyards and the prohibition against carrying do apply to Yom Kippur, and this is what the mishna is teaching: If it was Shabbat and he carried it out from one domain to another he is liable due to the prohibition against carrying on Shabbat and also due to the prohibition against carrying on Yom Kippur.
17Rather, if the statement of Rafram was stated, it was stated with regard to this case, as it is taught in a baraita : The verse states with regard to the scapegoat of Yom Kippur: “And he shall send it away with an appointed man into the wilderness” (Leviticus 16:21). The word “man” is mentioned in order to render a non-priest fit for this task. The term “appointed” indicates that the scapegoat is always sent away at the appropriate time, even when the appointed man is in a state of ritual impurity, and even when Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat. In addition, the word “appointed” is referring to one who was designated for the task the day before.
18The baraita taught that the word “appointed” indicates that the scapegoat is sent away even on Shabbat, and in this context Rafram says: That is to say that the joining of courtyards and the prohibition against carrying apply with regard to Shabbat, but the joining of courtyards and the prohibition against carrying do not apply with regard to Yom Kippur.
19The Gemara objects to Rafram’s inference: From where does he cite proof for this inference? The case of the scapegoat is different, as its validity on Yom Kippur is in this manner. Even if the prohibition against carrying does apply on Yom Kippur, the Torah explicitly commanded that the scapegoat be sent away on that day, and therefore it is permitted. Rather, the statement cited in the name of Rafram is an error [ beruta ], and it was not actually stated in the study hall.
20MISHNA: There is a case where one can engage in a single act of intercourse and be liable to bring six sin offerings for it. How so? It is possible for one who engages in intercourse with his daughter to be liable due to having violated the prohibitions of engaging in intercourse with his daughter, his sister, the wife of his brother, the wife of his father’s brother, a married woman, and a menstruating woman.