Niddah 60a

הָרוֹאָה.

who is of age and already seeing a flow of menstrual blood, i.e., she has had a flow of menstrual blood.

מִמַּאי? דּוּמְיָא דְּנִדָּה: מָה נִדָּה דְּקָחָזְיָא, אַף נׇכְרִית דְּקָא חָזְיָא.

The Gemara explains: From where does Rav know that this is referring to a gentile woman who once experienced a flow of blood? He infers from the mishna that the gentile woman it mentions is similar to a menstruating woman: Just as a menstruating woman is one who sees, i.e., who has already experienced bleeding, so too, the mishna is referring to an adult gentile woman who already sees menstrual blood.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כִּי נָיֵים וְשָׁכֵיב רַב אַמְרַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא. דְּתַנְיָא: תּוֹלָה בְּנׇכְרִית. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: בְּנׇכְרִית הָרְאוּיָה לִרְאוֹת. וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא בִּרְאוּיָה לִרְאוֹת, אֲבָל רוֹאָה — לָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ.

Rav Sheshet says: I say that when Rav was dozing or sleeping he said that halakha , i.e., it is an error. As it is taught in a baraita : If a woman loaned her garment to a gentile and subsequently found a blood stain on it, she attributes the stain to the gentile woman. This tanna deems it permitted for her to attribute the blood to any gentile woman, regardless of her age or her likelihood of bleeding. Rabbi Meir disagrees and says: This applies specifically to a gentile woman who is fit to see menstrual blood. And the Gemara adds that even Rabbi Meir says only that the gentile woman must be fit to see menstrual blood, but he too agrees that it is not necessary for her to be seeing blood at that time. She does not have to have actually experienced bleeding at some point.

אָמַר רָבָא: וְתִסְבְּרַאּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְחוּמְרָא? רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְקוּלָּא!

Rava said in response to Rav Sheshet’s challenge: And how can you understand that Rabbi Meir is coming to be stringent? Rav Sheshet maintains that according to the first tanna of the baraita she can attribute the blood stain to any gentile, whereas Rabbi Meir rules stringently that she may attribute it only to a gentile who is fit to experience bleeding. This is incorrect, as Rabbi Meir is actually coming to be lenient. In other words, the first tanna is more stringent, as he deems it permitted for her to attribute the blood stain only to a gentile woman who had experienced a menstrual flow at least once. By contrast, Rabbi Meir rules that she may attribute the stain to a gentile woman who is old enough to experience bleeding, even if she has never experienced a menstrual flow.

דְּתַנְיָא: אֵינָהּ תּוֹלָה בְּנׇכְרִית, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: תּוֹלָה. וְאֶלָּא קַשְׁיָא הָךְ! תָּרֵיץ הָכִי: וְהִיא שֶׁרוֹאָה. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: בִּרְאוּיָה לִרְאוֹת, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָהּ רוֹאָה.

The Gemara provides the reason for Rava’s opinion. As it is taught in a baraita : A woman who loaned her garment to a gentile woman and subsequently finds a blood stain on it may not attribute the stain to the gentile woman. Rabbi Meir says that she may attribute the blood stain to the gentile woman. But if so, the first baraita , which states that according to the first tanna she may attribute the blood stain to any gentile woman, is difficult. You must answer like this: According to the first tanna she may attribute the blood to any gentile woman provided that she sees, i.e., that she once experienced bleeding. By contrast, Rabbi Meir says a more lenient opinion, that she may attribute it to the gentile woman provided that she is fit to see menstrual blood, and this is the halakha even though she has not actually seen menstrual blood yet.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: תּוֹלָה בְּשׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם, בַּשֵּׁנִי שֶׁלָּהּ.

§ The Sages taught a baraita with regard to a woman who loaned her garment to another woman who was a lesser zava : The lender may attribute the blood stain on the loaned garment to a woman who observes a clean day for each day she experiences a discharge, if the blood is found on her second day, i.e., the day after she had a discharge, despite the fact that she does not have a presumptive status of seeing blood. It is nevertheless considered that her uterus is open and the likelihood is that she will experience bleeding.

וּבְסוֹפֶרֶת שִׁבְעָה שֶׁלֹּא טָבְלָה, לְפִיכָךְ הִיא מְתוּקֶּנֶת וַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ מְקוּלְקֶלֶת, דִּבְרֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֵינָהּ תּוֹלָה, לְפִיכָךְ שְׁתֵּיהֶן מְקוּלְקָלוֹת.

And likewise, she may also attribute the blood stain if she loaned her garment to a woman counting seven clean days who did not immerse in a ritual bath, and who will now have to count another seven clean days. Therefore, the status of the one who loaned the garment is fixed, and the status of the other woman is ruined and she must begin her counting again; this is the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: She may not attribute the blood flow to either of these women. Therefore, the statuses of both the woman who loaned the garment and the one who borrowed it are ruined, in that both women are deemed impure.

וְשָׁוִין, שֶׁתּוֹלָה בְּשׁוֹמֶרֶת יוֹם כְּנֶגֶד יוֹם, בָּרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁלָּהּ.

The baraita continues: And both Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agree that a woman who lends her garment may attribute any blood stain found on it to a woman who observes a day for a day if it is on her first day of the discharge. In this case the status of the woman who borrowed the garment is no more ruined than it was already, as either way she can become pure on the following day.

וּבְיוֹשֶׁבֶת עַל דַּם טוֹהַר, וּבִבְתוּלָה שֶׁדָּמֶיהָ טְהוֹרִין.

And they also agree in a case where the woman who borrowed the garment was a woman after childbirth who is observing the period of the blood of purity. During these days, attributing the blood to her does not ruin her status, as any blood she emits is pure and does not affect her status. And similarly, the lender may attribute the blood stain to a virgin who engages in intercourse for the first time, as her blood is pure, as there is an assumption that it is hymenal bleeding rather than menstrual blood.

״לְפִיכָךְ״ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — לְמָה לִי? מִשּׁוּם דְּרַבִּי.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need the clause starting with: Therefore, mentioned by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? It is obvious that the status of only one woman is ruined, so what information does this observation add? The Gemara answers that this clause does not add any new information; rather, the baraita taught it because of the use of the similar clause beginning with: Therefore, stated by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in the latter part of the baraita .

״לְפִיכָךְ״ דְּרַבִּי — לְמָה לִי? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָהִיא דְּאִשְׁתְּכַח כֶּתֶם גַּבַּהּ — תִּתְקַלְקַל, אִידַּךְ — לֹא תִּתְקַלְקַל; קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara persists: But why do I need the clause starting with: Therefore, in the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? That too is apparently superfluous. The Gemara explains: It is necessary, lest you say that the status of the woman who has the blood stain found with her when she is wearing the garment, should be ruined, whereas the status of the other woman should not be ruined, as the garment was not with her when the blood stain was discovered. Therefore, the baraita teaches us the clause beginning with: Therefore, to stress that both women are impure.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: טָמֵא וְטָהוֹר שֶׁהָלְכוּ בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁבִילִין, אֶחָד טָהוֹר וְאֶחָד טָמֵא — בָּאנוּ לְמַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.

§ With regard to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rav Ḥisda says: In a case of two individuals, one of whom was ritually impure and the other of whom was pure, who walked on two paths, one of which was pure and the other one impure due to a corpse buried there, and neither remembers which path he took, and afterward they handled items of ritual purity, e.g., the portion of produce designated for the priest [ teruma ] or consecrated items, we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, if one of the two individuals was already impure it can be assumed that he was the one who walked along the ritually impure path, and the other individual remains pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi claims that there is no assumption that the one who was pure retains that state, as it is equally possible that he walked along the ritually impure path.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַדָּא: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ, הָכָא מַאי נָפְקָא לַן מִינַּהּ?

Rav Adda objects to this suggestion of Rav Ḥisda, claiming that one cannot compare the two cases. It is possible that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi states his halakha only there, with regard to a woman who observes a day for a day, as she can immerse in a ritual bath at any time, and therefore both women are like each other, i.e., both have a presumption of ritual purity. But here, in the case of the two individuals walking on two paths, what practical difference does it make to the one who was previously impure if he remains ritually impure? Since there is no change of status, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would agree in that case that it can be assumed that the individual who was previously impure was the one who walked on the impure path.

וְרַב חִסְדָּא, סוֹף סוֹף אִיהִי טְבִילָה בָּעֲיָא.

And the Gemara asks: How would Rav Ḥisda respond to this claim? Rav Ḥisda would answer that a woman who observes a day for a day is also not fully pure, as ultimately she requires immersion in a ritual bath to complete her purification, and yet Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi still rejects the attribution of the blood flow to her. Accordingly, the two cases are comparable and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would not assume that the individual who was already impure was the one who walked along the path that was impure.

אִיתְּמַר, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: טָמֵא וְטָהוֹר, וַאֲפִילּוּ טָהוֹר וְתָלוּי, שֶׁהָלְכוּ בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁבִילִין, אֶחָד טָמֵא וְאֶחָד טָהוֹר — תּוֹלֶה טָמֵא בְּתָלוּי וְטָהוֹר בְּטָהוֹר, לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

It was stated that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: In a case of two individuals, one of whom was ritually impure and the other of whom was pure, or even where one was pure and the other was impure due to uncertainty, who walked on two different paths, one of which was impure and the other one pure, and neither remembers which path he took, one may attribute by assuming that the impure path was the one traversed by the individual who was impure due to uncertainty, and the pure path was traversed by the one who was ritually pure. And everyone agrees with this ruling, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in this case. This statement is in accordance with Rav Adda’s objection, not in accordance with the suggestion of Rav Ḥisda.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מֵרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בַּר לֵיוַאי: מַהוּ לִתְלוֹת כֶּתֶם בְּכֶתֶם? אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי — לָא תִּבְּעֵי לָךְ.

§ Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai: What is the halakha with regard to attributing a blood stain to a woman who is already impure due to having seen a blood stain? Rabbi Yoḥanan clarifies his question: I am not raising this dilemma to you according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

הַשְׁתָּא, וּמָה הָתָם דְּקָא חָזְיָא מִגּוּפַהּ, אָמְרַתְּ אֵינָהּ תּוֹלָה, הָכָא דְּמֵעָלְמָא קָא אָתֵי — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?

Rabbi Yoḥanan explains why his dilemma does not apply according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Now, and if there, where one loaned her garment to a woman who observes a clean day for a day, which is a case where she sees a discharge from her body, and yet you said that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the other woman may not attribute the blood stain to her, then here, in the case of a woman who is impure merely due to having seen a blood stain, where her impurity came from a source external to her, is it not all the more so that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would not permit one to attribute the blood stain to her?

כִּי תִּבְּעֵי לָךְ אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הָתָם הוּא דְּקָא חָזְיָא מִגּוּפַהּ — תָּלְיָא, הָכָא דְּמֵעָלְמָא קָאָתֵי — לָא תָּלְיָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא.

Rather, when I raise this dilemma to you, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi Yoḥanan clarifies the dilemma: Perhaps it is only there, in the case where she loaned her garment to a woman who observes a day for a day, where she sees the discharge from her body, that the lender may attribute the blood stain to her, whereas here, where it is possible that the stain came from a source external to her, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would not permit the lender to attribute this new blood stain to her. Or perhaps it is no different, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would rule leniently in both cases.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין תּוֹלִין. מָה טַעַם? לְפִי שֶׁאֵין תּוֹלִין.

Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: She may not attribute this blood stain to a woman who was already impure due to having seen a blood stain, and both women are ritually impure. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai: What is the reason that she may not attribute the blood stain to her? Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai answered: It is because in this case one may not attribute the new blood stain to that other woman, as her previous stain might have come from an external cause.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: אֵין תּוֹלִין כֶּתֶם בְּכֶתֶם, הִשְׁאִילָה חֲלוּקָהּ לְנׇכְרִית אוֹ לְיוֹשֶׁבֶת עַל הַכֶּתֶם — הֲרֵי זוֹ תּוֹלָה בָּהּ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Yehuda bar Livai from the following baraita : A woman who loans her garment to another and subsequently finds a blood stain on it may not attribute the blood stain to a woman who was impure due to having previously seen a blood stain. But if she loaned her garment to a gentile woman or to a woman who was observing days of impurity due to having seen a blood stain, she may attribute the blood stain found on the garment to that other woman.

הָא גּוּפַהּ קַשְׁיָא: רֵישָׁא אָמְרַתְּ אֵין תּוֹלִין, סֵיפָא אָמְרַתְּ תּוֹלִין! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא — הָא רַבִּי, וְהָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל.

Before explaining the objection, the Gemara first analyzes the baraita . This baraita itself is difficult. In the first clause you said that a woman who loans her garment to another and subsequently finds a blood stain on it may not attribute the blood stain to a woman who was impure due to having previously seen a blood stain, whereas in the latter clause you said that she may attribute the blood stain to such a woman. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains this contradiction: This is not difficult. This first clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and that latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: הָא וְהָא רַבִּי — הָא בָּרִאשׁוֹן שֶׁלָּהּ, הָא בַּשֵּׁנִי שֶׁלָּהּ.

There are those who say an alternative resolution of the contradiction: Both this clause and that clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The difference is that this latter clause, where she may attribute the blood stain to the other woman, is referring to a case where the blood stain was found on that woman’s first day, when she had just found the blood stain and is impure for that day. Since she is in any case impure for that day, she is not adversely affected by having the new stain attributed to her. The case where the blood stain may not be attributed to the other woman is a case where the blood stain in question was found on her second day, i.e., the day after she found the blood stain, when she is not impure but merely requires immersion. The lender may not attribute the new blood stain to her, as that would render her ritually impure for an extra day.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָא וְהָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל — וְלָא קַשְׁיָא,

Rav Ashi said yet another resolution of the baraita : Both this first clause and that latter clause are in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and it is not difficult.