Sanhedrin 78b

עַל מִשְׁעַנְתּוֹ וְנִקָּה הַמַּכֶּה״. וְכִי תַּעֲלֶה עַל דַּעְתְּךָ שֶׁזֶּה מְהַלֵּךְ בַּשּׁוּק וְזֶה נֶהֱרָג? אֶלָּא זֶה שֶׁאֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה, וְהֵקֵל מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה, וּלְאַחַר כָּךְ הִכְבִּיד וָמֵת – שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר.

upon his staff, then he that struck him is absolved; only for his loss of livelihood shall he give and he shall heal him” (Exodus 21:19). The phrase: “Then he that struck him is absolved,” is superfluous; would it enter your mind to say that this individual whom he struck is walking in the marketplace, and that individual who struck him will be executed as a murderer? Rather, this is referring to a case where the doctors assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition eased somewhat from what it was and he walked in the marketplace, and thereafter his condition worsened and he died, and the verse is teaching that he is exempt.

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״וְנִקָּה הַמַּכֶּה״ מַאי דָּרְשִׁי בֵּיהּ? מְלַמֵּד שֶׁחוֹבְשִׁין אוֹתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Neḥemya and hold that he is liable in that case, what do they interpret from that phrase: “Then he that struck him is absolved”? The Gemara explains that according to the Rabbis, the verse teaches that they incarcerate him until the fate of the victim can be determined, and the phrase: “Then he that struck him is absolved,” means that he is freed from incarceration.

וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, חֲבִישָׁה מְנָא לֵיהּ? יָלֵיף מִמְּקוֹשֵׁשׁ.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Neḥemya, from where does he derive the halakha of incarceration? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the incident of the wood gatherer in the wilderness with regard to whom it is written: “And they placed him under guard” (Numbers 15:34).

וְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי לֵילְפוּ מִמְּקוֹשֵׁשׁ? מְקוֹשֵׁשׁ בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא, וּמֹשֶׁה לָא הֲוָה יָדַע קְטָלֵיהּ בְּמַאי. לְאַפּוֹקֵי הַאי, דְּלָא יָדְעִינַן אִי בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא אִי לָאו בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא.

The Gemara challenges: And the Rabbis too, let them derive the halakha of incarceration from the incident of the wood gatherer. The Gemara explains: With regard to the wood gatherer, he was incarcerated because it was known from the outset that he was liable to be killed, and Moses did not know with what form of capital punishment his death would be implemented. This is to the exclusion of this individual who struck another, with regard to whom we do not know if he is liable to be killed or if he is not liable to be killed. Therefore, one cannot derive the halakha in this case from the case of the wood gatherer.

וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה יָלֵיף מִמְּגַדֵּף, דְּלָא הֲוָה יָדַע אִי בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא, וְחַבְשׁוּהּ.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Neḥemya, from where does he derive the halakha ? He too should not be able to derive the halakha from the case of the wood gatherer. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Neḥemya derives the halakha with regard to one who strikes another from the incident of the blasphemer (see Leviticus 24:12), where Moses did not know if he was liable to be killed, and he nevertheless imprisoned the blasphemer.

וְרַבָּנַן: מְגַדֵּף – הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה הָיְתָה.

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why don’t they derive the halakha from the incident of the blasphemer? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis hold that the case of the blasphemer was a provisional edict.

כִּדְתַנְיָא: יוֹדֵעַ הָיָה מֹשֶׁה רַבֵּינוּ שֶׁהַמְקוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּמִיתָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מְחַלְּלֶיהָ מוֹת יוּמָת״, אֶלָּא לֹא הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ בְּאֵיזוֹ מִיתָה נֶהֱרָג, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי לֹא פֹרַשׁ וְגוֹ׳״. אֲבָל מְגַדֵּף לֹא נֶאֱמַר בּוֹ אֶלָּא ״לִפְרֹשׁ לָהֶם עַל פִּי ה׳״, שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה מֹשֶׁה יוֹדֵעַ אִם הוּא בֶּן מִיתָה כׇּל עִיקָּר אִם לָאו.

The difference between the uncertainty in the case of the wood gatherer and the uncertainty in the case of the blasphemer is as it is taught in a baraita : Moses our teacher knew that the wood gatherer was liable to be sentenced to death, as it is stated: “And you shall observe the Shabbat as it is sacred to you; one who desecrates it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). But he did not know with which death penalty he was to be killed, as it is stated: “And they placed him under guard, as it had not been declared what should be done to him” (Numbers 15:34). But concerning the blasphemer it is stated only: “And they placed him under guard that it might be declared to them according to the Lord” (Leviticus 24:12), as Moses did not know if the blasphemer was liable to be killed at all, or not.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיבִי תְּרֵי אוּמְדָּנֵי: חַד – אֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה וְחָיָה, וְחַד – אֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה וְהֵקֵל מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן, תְּרֵי אוּמְדָּנֵי לְמָה לִי?

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, that is the reason that two assessments are written. It is written in one verse: “And if men quarrel and one strikes the other with a stone or with his fist, and he did not die but is bedridden” (Exodus 21:18), indicating that after the initial blow the victim is assessed to determine whether or not he is expected to die. In the following verse it is written: “If he rises and walks outside upon his staff, then he that struck him is absolved” (Exodus 21:19), indicating that there is an additional assessment to determine whether or not he fully recovers. One verse is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and he recovered fully; and one verse is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition eased from what it was and he died thereafter. But according to the Rabbis, why do I need two assessments?

חַד אֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה וְחָיָה, וְחַד אֲמָדוּהוּ לְחַיִּים וָמֵת.

The Gemara answers: According to the Rabbis, one assessment is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death and he recovered fully, in which case the assailant is certainly not executed but pays compensation. And one assessment is where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to life and he died, in which case the assailant is also not executed but pays compensation.

וְרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה, אֲמָדוּהוּ לְחַיִּים וָמֵת – לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, שֶׁהֲרֵי יָצָא מִבֵּית דִּין זַכַּאי.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Neḥemya, from where does he derive these two halakhot ? The Gemara answers: He holds that in the case where they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to life, and he died, one does not need an explicit verse to exempt the assailant from execution, as he emerged from the court after the first hearing innocent when they predicted that the victim would live, and the court does not rescind its initial ruling and convict him.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמַּכֶּה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ, וַאֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה, וְחָיָה – פּוֹטְרִין אוֹתוֹ. אֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה וְהֵקֵל מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה – אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ אוֹמֶד שֵׁנִי לְמָמוֹן. וְאִם לְאַחַר כֵּן הִכְבִּיד וָמֵת – הַלֵּךְ אַחַר אוֹמֶד הָאֶמְצָעִי, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין אוֹמֶד אַחַר אוֹמֶד.

The Sages taught: In the case of one who strikes another and they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and he recovered fully, the court exempts the assailant. If they assessed his condition saying that it would lead to death and his condition eased from what it was, they assess the victim with a second assessment to determine the monetary restitution for damages. And if thereafter his medical condition worsened and he died, the halakha is: Follow the assessment that was assessed at the intermediate stage, which determined that the victim would live, and the assailant is not executed; this is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya. And the Rabbis say: There is no assessment after assessment. The death of the victim proves that the assessment at the intermediate stage was erroneous, and the assailant is executed.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: אֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה – אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ לְחַיִּים. לְחַיִּים – אֵין אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ לְמִיתָה. אֲמָדוּהוּ לְמִיתָה וְהֵקֵל מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה – אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ אוֹמֶד שֵׁנִי לְמָמוֹן, וְאִם לְאַחַר כֵּן הִכְבִּיד וָמֵת – מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק וָצַעַר לַיּוֹרְשִׁים.

It is taught in another baraita : If they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition improved, they assess his condition to determine whether it would lead to life. If they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to life, and his condition deteriorated, they do not then assess his condition to determine whether it would lead to death, but the assailant is exempted based on the initial determination. If they assessed his condition, saying that it would lead to death, and his condition eased from what it was, they assess the victim with a second assessment to determine the monetary restitution for damages, as the assailant is certainly liable to pay restitution for the injury that he caused. And if thereafter his medical condition worsened and he died, the assailant pays restitution to the heirs for injury and suffering that he caused.

מֵאֵימָתַי מְשַׁלֵּם? מִשָּׁעָה שֶׁהִכָּהוּ. וּסְתָמָא כְּרַבִּי נְחֶמְיָה.

The Gemara asks: From when is the initial assessment of the value of the victim performed to determine the sum of the damages that the assailant pays? It is the assessment of his value from the moment that the assailant struck him. The Gemara notes: And this unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya, as according to the opinion of the Rabbis, he is liable to be executed even if there was a temporary improvement in his condition before he died.

מַתְנִי׳ נִתְכַּוֵּין לַהֲרוֹג אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה, וְהָרַג אֶת הָאָדָם; לַנׇּכְרִי, וְהָרַג אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל; לַנְּפָלִים, וְהָרַג אֶת בֶּן קַיָּימָא – פָּטוּר.

MISHNA: If one intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person standing adjacent to it, or if he intended to kill a gentile, for whose murder he is not liable to be executed in court, and he killed a Jew, or if he intended to kill non-viable newborns, for whose murder one is not liable, and he killed a viable person, the assailant is exempt from execution, since his intent was to kill one for whose murder he is not liable.

נִתְכַּוֵּין לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל מׇתְנָיו, וְלֹא הָיָה בָּהּ כְּדֵי לַהֲמִיתוֹ עַל מׇתְנָיו, וְהָלְכָה לָהּ עַל לִבּוֹ, וְהָיָה בָּהּ כְּדֵי לַהֲמִיתוֹ עַל לִבּוֹ, וָמֵת – פָּטוּר. נִתְכַּוֵּין לְהַכּוֹתוֹ עַל לִבּוֹ

If one intended to strike another on his loins, and the blow was not powerful enough to kill him if it were to land on his loins, but instead the blow landed on his chest over the victim’s heart, and it was powerful enough to kill him when it landed on his chest over his heart, and the victim died as a result of the blow, the assailant is exempt from execution, as he did not intend to strike the victim a blow that would cause his death. If he intended to strike him on his chest over his heart