Bava Kamma 91a

אַלְמָא בָּעֵינַן אוּמְדָּנָא דְּבֵי דִינָא; וְהָא, כֵּיוָן דִּגְמַר דִּינֵיהּ לִקְטָלָא – לָא מְשַׁהֵינַן לֵיהּ לְאוּמְדָּנָא דְּבֵי דִינָא, וְלָא מְעַנֵּינַן לְדִינֵיהּ.

Rava continues the report in their name: Apparently, we require the evaluation of the court in order to render him liable to pay for the damage. And with regard to this ox that killed, once the verdict was given that it to be put to death, we do not delay the implementation of the verdict in order to wait for the evaluation of the court, and we do not delay its judgment. Therefore, the monetary case is not judged.

וְאָמֵינָא לְהוּ אֲנָא: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁבָּרַח.

And I, Rava, said to the Sages of the school of Rav: Even if you say that this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who does not require assessment by the court, one could explain that here we are dealing with a case where the owner of the ox fled, and the court cannot judge his case in his absence and cannot render him liable to pay for the damage caused by his ox.

אִי בָּרַח, כִּי לֹא דָּנוּהוּ דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – הֵיכִי דָּיְינִינַן לֵיהּ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בְּלֹא בְּעָלִים? דְּקַבֵּיל סָהֲדִי וּבָרַח.

The Gemara asks: If the baraita is discussing a case where the owner fled, then in the case where they did not yet judge it as a case of capital law, how does the court judge it as a case of monetary law without the owner of the ox being present? The Gemara answers: The baraita is discussing a case where the court accepted the testimony of the witnesses in the presence of the owner, and he subsequently fled.

סוֹף סוֹף, מֵהֵיכָא מִשְׁתַּלַּם – מֵרִידְיָא; אִי הָכִי, תָּם – נְדַיְינֵיהּ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בְּרֵישָׁא וְנִשְׁתַּלַּם מֵרִידְיָא, וַהֲדַר נְדַיְינֵיהּ דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת!

The Gemara asks: Ultimately, from where are the damages paid in a situation where the owner fled, as he is not here to pay the damages? The Gemara answers: They are paid from plowing. The ox is rented out to plow fields, and the fees generated are used to pay the damages. Afterward, the ox is judged for the killing as a case of capital law. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to an innocuous ox, why did the baraita rule that the court does not judge it as a case of monetary law? The court should judge it as a case of monetary law first, and the damages will be paid from fees generated from renting out the animal for plowing, and then the court should judge it as a case of capital law.

אָמַר רַב מָרִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת: רִידְיָיא – עֲלִיָּיה דְּמָרֵהּ הוּא.

Rav Mari, son of Rav Kahana, said in answer to this last question: That is to say that the money gained from plowing is considered like the superior-quality property of its owner. In other words, that money is like the rest of the owner’s estate, and is not considered to be part of the value of the ox itself. Since payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is taken only from the value of the ox itself, it follows that money received from renting out the ox to plow cannot be used to pay damages.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: יֵשׁ אוֹמֶד לִנְזָקִין, אוֹ אֵין אוֹמֶד לִנְזָקִין?

§ In connection with the ruling of the baraita that the court must assess whether the death can be attributed directly to the action of the assailant, the Gemara notes: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is there an evaluation performed with regard to damage as well, to determine whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, or is there no evaluation performed with regard to damage?

מִי אָמְרִינַן: לִקְטָלָא הוּא דְּאָמְדִינַן – בְּהָכִי נָפְקָא נְשָׁמָה, בְּהָכִי לָא נָפְקָא נְשָׁמָה; אֲבָל לִנְזָקִין – כֹּל דְּהוּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא?

Do we say that specifically in a case of killing is where we perform an evaluation? The assessment is to determine whether a soul departs with this assault and the assailant will be held liable or whether a soul doesn’t depart with this assault and the death is attributed to other factors. But in a case of damage, perhaps we say that he is liable for whatever caused the damage. Or perhaps there is no difference between the two, and with regard to damage as well, the court evaluates whether the act was sufficient to inflict that damage, and if it was not, he will be exempt.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מָה בּוֹר – שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית, עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים; אַף כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְהָמִית, עֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים. הָיוּ פְּחוּתִין מֵעֲשָׂרָה טְפָחִים, וְנָפַל לְתוֹכוֹ שׁוֹר אוֹ חֲמוֹר וָמֵת – פָּטוּר. הוּזַּק בּוֹ – חַיָּיב.

The Gemara says: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a mishna (50b) concerning the halakhot of a pit: Just as a pit that has sufficient depth to cause death when falling into it is at least ten handbreadths deep, so too, any other excavations that have sufficient depth to cause death may be no less than ten handbreadths. If any of the types of excavations were less than ten handbreadths deep, and an ox or a donkey fell into one of them and died, the digger of the excavation is exempt. But if it was injured in it but did not die he is liable to pay damages.

מַאי, לָאו מִמַּטָּה לְמַעְלָה קָא חָשֵׁיב – וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: מִטֶּפַח וְעַד עֲשָׂרָה – מִיתָה לֵיכָּא, נְזָקִין אִיכָּא? אַלְמָא לִנְזָקִין – כֹּל דְּהוּ, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אֵין אוֹמְדִין לִנְזָקִין!

What, is it not the case that the mishna is counting the handbreadths from below to above, and this is what it is saying: From one handbreadth deep until ten handbreadths deep, there is no liability for death but there is liability for damage? Apparently, with regard to damage he is liable for whatever caused the damage, even a fall into an excavation having the depth of one handbreadth. Learn from the mishna that the court does not perform an evaluation with regard to damage.

לֹא, מִמַּעְלָה לְמַטָּה קָא חָשֵׁיב; וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: עֲשָׂרָה – מִיתָה אִיכָּא; פָּחוֹת מֵעֲשָׂרָה פּוּרְתָּא – נְזָקִין אִיתָא, מִיתָה לֵיכָּא. וּלְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ יֵשׁ אוֹמֶד לִנְזָקִין, וְכֹל מִידֵּי וּמִידֵּי – כִּי הֵיכִי דְּמִיתַּזְקָה בֵּיהּ בָּעֵינַן.

The Gemara rejects this: No, the mishna is counting from above to below, and this is what it is saying: If the excavation is ten handbreadths deep then there is liability for death. If the excavation is slightly less than ten, there is liability for damage but there is no liability for death. And actually, I will say to you that there is an evaluation performed for damage, and for each and every circumstance, we require that there be conditions whereby the injured party could reasonably be damaged by whatever caused the damage.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הִכָּהוּ עַל עֵינוֹ וְסִימְּאוֹ, עַל אׇזְנוֹ וְחֵירְשׁוֹ – עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. כְּנֶגֶד עֵינוֹ – וְאֵינוֹ רוֹאֶה, כְּנֶגֶד אׇזְנוֹ – וְאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ, אֵין עֶבֶד יוֹצֵא בָּהֶן לְחֵירוּת. מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵינַן אוּמְדָּנָא – וּשְׁמַע מִינַּה:ּ יֵשׁ אוּמְדָּנָא לִנְזָקִין?

The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita ( Tosefta 9:26): If a slave owner struck his Canaanite slave on his eye and blinded him, or on his ear and deafened him, the slave is emancipated by means of these wounds. If he struck near his eye and as a result he does not see, or near his ear and he does not hear, the slave is not emancipated by means of these wounds. What is the reason that the slave is not emancipated? Isn’t it due to the fact that we require an evaluation of the damage, and in such a case the assumption is that the owner’s action did not suffice to cause the injury? And learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage.

לָא; מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן: הוּא דְּאַבְעֵית נַפְשֵׁיהּ. כִּדְתַנְיָא: הַמַּבְעִית אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ – פָּטוּר מִדִּינֵי אָדָם, וְחַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם. כֵּיצַד? תָּקַע בְּאׇזְנוֹ וְחֵירְשׁוֹ – פָּטוּר, אֲחָזוֹ וְתָקַע בְּאׇזְנוֹ וְחֵירְשׁוֹ – חַיָּיב.

The Gemara rejects this: No; the slave is not emancipated, because we say that it is possible that it was the slave who frightened himself, resulting in his blindness or deafness, but it was not the actual strike that caused it. An injury can result from being frightened, as it is taught in a baraita ( Tosefta 6:16): One who frightens another and thereby causes him injury is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. How so? If one shouted into another’s ear and deafened him, he is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. But if he held him and shouted into his ear and deafened him, he is liable according to human laws as well, as he physically took hold of him.

תָּא שְׁמַע: חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ, וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ מִיָּד. רִיפּוּי וָשֶׁבֶת – עַד שֶׁיִּתְרַפֵּא. אֲמָדוּהוּ, וְהָיָה מִתְנַוְנֶה וְהוֹלֵךְ – אֵין נוֹתְנִין לוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמוֹ שֶׁאֲמָדוּהוּ.

The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita ( Tosefta 9:3): With regard to the five types of indemnity that one who injures another must pay, the court evaluates the victim as to the value of the damage that he suffered, and the assailant gives this payment to him immediately. Payment for medical costs and loss of livelihood is evaluated from the moment of injury until he is healed. If the court evaluated that a certain sum would be needed to pay for his medical costs and loss of livelihood, and subsequently the victim’s condition began progressively deteriorating and the sum proved to be inadequate, they give him payment only as they had evaluated him.

אֲמָדוּהוּ וְהִבְרִיא – נוֹתְנִין לוֹ כׇּל מַה שֶּׁאֲמָדוּהוּ. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: יֵשׁ אוֹמֶד לִנְזָקִין! לְמֵימַד גַּבְרָא, כַּמָּה לִיקְּצַר מֵיהָא מַכָּה כַּמָּה לָא מִקְּצַר – לָא קָא מִבְּעֵי לַן, דְּוַדַּאי אָמְדִינַן. כִּי קָא מִבַּעְיָא לַן – לְמֵימַד חֶפְצָא, אִי עָבֵיד הַאי נִזְקָא אוֹ לָא. מַאי?

The baraita continues: If they evaluated him as requiring a certain sum for medical costs and loss of livelihood and he healed sooner than expected, they nevertheless give him the entire sum as they had evaluated him. Learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to evaluating an injured man to determine how long he will suffer from this injury and how long he will not suffer, we do not raise a dilemma, since it is obvious that we certainly evaluate this element. When we raise the dilemma of whether the court performs an evaluation or not, it is with regard to evaluating an item, i.e., determining if it is capable of causing this damage or if it is not capable of causing this damage. With regard to this issue, what is the halakha ?

תָּא שְׁמַע, שִׁמְעוֹן הַתִּימְנִי אוֹמֵר: מָה אֶגְרוֹף מְיוּחָד – שֶׁמָּסוּר לָעֵדָה וְלָעֵדִים, אַף כֹּל מְיוּחָד שֶׁמָּסוּר לָעֵדָה וְלָעֵדִים. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: יֵשׁ אוֹמֶד לִנְזָקִין! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from what was taught in a baraita ( Tosefta, Sanhedrin 12:3): Shimon HaTimni says: Just as a fist is unique in that it is submitted to the assembly of judges to assess its ability to injure and to the witnesses who attest that this was the fist used to strike, so too, a ruling can be issued in the case of any item that is submitted to the assembly of judges to identify its ability to injure and to the witnesses who attest that this was the item used to strike. Learn from the baraita that there is an evaluation performed with regard to damage. The Gemara affirms: Learn from the baraita that this is so.

אָמַר מָר: אֲמָדוּהוּ וְהִבְרִיא, נוֹתְנִין לוֹ כׇּל מַה שֶּׁאֲמָדוּהוּ. מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר רָבָא: הַאי מַאן דַּאֲמָדוּהוּ לְכוּלֵּי יוֹמָא, וְאִיתְּפַח לְפַלְגָא דְיוֹמָא וְקָא עָבֵיד עֲבִידְתָּא – יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ. דְּכוּלֵּי יוֹמָא מִן שְׁמַיָּא הוּא (דְּרַחֲמֵי) [דְּרַחִימוּ] עֲלֵיהּ.

The Master said above: If they evaluated him as requiring a certain sum for medical costs and loss of livelihood and he healed sooner than expected, they nevertheless give him the entire sum as they had evaluated him. This supports the opinion of Rava, as Rava said: With regard to this man whom they evaluated, concluding that he would not be able to perform labor for the entire day, and his wounds healed [ ve’itpaḥ ] at midday and he was performing labor, we give him compensation for the entire day. The injury was one that would generally cause a man to not be able to perform labor for an entire day, and it was from Heaven that they had compassion on him and healed him sooner. This does not affect the liability of the one who caused the damage.

רָקַק – וְהִגִּיעַ בּוֹ הָרוֹק, וְהֶעֱבִיר כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בּוֹ, אֲבָל בְּבִגְדוֹ – לָא. וְנִיהְוֵי כִּי בִיֵּישׁ בִּדְבָרִים!

§ The mishna teaches (90a): If he spat at him and his spittle reached him, or if he removed another’s cloak, he must give the injured party four hundred dinars. Rav Pappa says: They taught this halakha only in a case where the spittle reached him. But if the spittle landed on his clothing without touching him, he is not required to pay him. The Gemara asks: Why not? Let it be like one who humiliated another with words.

אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר אָבִין, זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת: בִּיְּישׁוֹ בִּדְבָרִים – פָּטוּר מִכְּלוּם.

The Gemara answers: In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Avin: That is to say that if he humiliated another with words alone, he is exempt from paying anything, although he will be held accountable by Heaven for his sin.

הַכֹּל לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ [וְכוּ׳]. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: תַּנָּא קַמָּא לְקוּלָּא קָאָמַר, אוֹ לְחוּמְרָא קָאָמַר? לְקוּלָּא קָאָמַר – דְּאִיכָּא עָנִי דְּלָא בָּעֵי לְמִשְׁקַל כּוּלֵּי הַאי, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְחוּמְרָא קָאָמַר – דְּאִיכָּא עָשִׁיר דְּבָעֵי לְמִיתַּב לֵיהּ טְפֵי?

The mishna teaches with regard to the assessment of payment for humiliation: It is all assessed in accordance with the honor of the one who was humiliated. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does the first tanna in the mishna say his opinion as a leniency, or does he say his opinion as a stringency? The Gemara explains the two possibilities: He says his opinion as a leniency, teaching that there is a poor person, who doesn’t need to take so much payment for humiliation, as detailed in the fixed sums of the mishna. Or perhaps he says his opinion as a stringency, teaching that there is a rich person whom the assailant needs to give him more than those fixed sums.

תָּא שְׁמַע, מִדְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אֲפִילּוּ עֲנִיִּים שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל – רוֹאִין אוֹתָן כְּאִילּוּ הֵן בְּנֵי חוֹרִין שֶׁיָּרְדוּ מִנִּכְסֵיהֶם, שֶׁהֵם בְּנֵי אַבְרָהָם יִצְחָק וְיַעֲקֹב; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, תַּנָּא קַמָּא לְקוּלָּא קָאָמַר! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from that which Rabbi Akiva says in the mishna: Even with regard to the poor of the Jewish people, they are viewed as though they were freemen who lost their property and were impoverished, and their humiliation is calculated according to this status, as they are the sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and are all of prominent lineage. Conclude from Rabbi Akiva’s statement that the first tanna says his opinion as a leniency, meaning that while the first tanna states the principle that payment for humiliation is in accordance with the honor of the one who was humiliated, and therefore a poor person will receive less than the fixed sums listed in the mishna, Rabbi Akiva responds that even a poor man is deserving of those fixed sums by virtue of his esteemed lineage. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is so.

וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד שֶׁפָּרַע רֹאשׁ הָאִשָּׁה [וְכוּ׳]. וּמִי יָהֲבִינַן זְמַן? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: אֵין נוֹתְנִין זְמַן לַחֲבָלוֹת!

§ The mishna relates: And an incident occurred involving one who uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace. The woman came before Rabbi Akiva to request that he assess payment for the humiliation that she suffered, and Rabbi Akiva obligated the assailant to give her four hundred dinars. The man said to Rabbi Akiva: My teacher, give me time to pay the penalty, and Rabbi Akiva gave him time. The Gemara asks: But do we give time for an assailant to pay compensation? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥanina say: The court does not give one time to provide payment for injuries, and he must pay compensation immediately.

כִּי לָא יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ זְמַן – לַחֲבָלָה, דְּחַסְּרֵיהּ מָמוֹנָא; אֲבָל לְבוֹשֶׁת, דְּלָא חַסְּרֵיהּ מָמוֹנָא – יָהֲבִינַן.

The Gemara answers: When we do not give him time to pay compensation it is specifically with regard to injury, as he caused a monetary loss by inflicting physical damage on the victim. But with regard to humiliation, where he did not cause him a monetary loss, we do give him time to pay compensation.

שְׁמָרָהּ עוֹמֶדֶת עַל פֶּתַח חֲצֵירָהּ וְכוּ׳. וְהָתַנְיָא, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: צָלַלְתָּ בְּמַיִם אַדִּירִים וְהֶעֱלִיתָ חֶרֶס בְּיָדְךָ, אָדָם רַשַּׁאי לַחְבֹּל בְּעַצְמוֹ!

The mishna relates that the man then waited for her until she was standing by the opening of her courtyard, and caused her to uncover her own head. Rabbi Akiva said that although she caused injury to herself, which is not permitted, this does not negate the man’s requirement to pay her compensation. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva said to him: You plunged into mighty waters and you raised nothing more than worthless earthenware in your hand, since it is permitted for a person to injure himself. This contradicts the mishna’s account of Rabbi Akiva’s opinion.

אָמַר רָבָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בַּחֲבָלָה, כָּאן בְּבוֹשֶׁת. וְהָא מַתְנִיתִין בְּבוֹשֶׁת הוּא,

The Gemara answers: Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, in the mishna, where it states that one may not injure himself, it is stated with regard to inflicting actual physical injury, while there, in the baraita , where it states that it is permitted for one to injure himself, it is stated with regard to causing humiliation to oneself. The Gemara asks: But the ruling of Rabbi Akiva in the mishna is stated with regard to causing humiliation,