MISHNAH: In which way “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? There were two brothers, one of them died, then a brother was born to them, and after that the second brother took his brother’s wife in levirate, and died. The first woman leaves as widow of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one because she is her co-wife. If he had “bespoken” her 25:5 ). Since it was felt that having sex without prior ceremony was unbecoming, there is a requirement (rabbinic for the Babli, possibly biblical for the Yerushalmi) to go through the formalities of qiddushin ; cf. Chapter 1, Note 63 . Qiddushin make a free woman a wife for the purposes of criminal law. But for the sister-in-law, the act is invalid by biblical standards (cf. Chapter 1, Note 94 ); the wife of the second brother does not become co-wife of the sister-in-law through the latter’s qiddushin by the standards of criminal law. Therefore, the act is not called qiddushin but מאמר “bespeaking”: she is reserved for the brother claiming her; all other brothers are excluded from levirate with her. “Bespeaking” is not preliminary marriage since it is voided not by a bill of divorce but by ḥalîṣah (but it needs a rabbinic bill of divorce). The other woman is not freed as co-wife but, rabbinically, one does not admit levirate since she is almost a co-wife. , the second performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate is always called זקוּקה, the fact of obligation זיקה. It does not seem reasonable to connect this meaning to biblical זקק “to refine, purify”; maybe the root is related to Arabic زقّ، زقق “to feed (a bird his young)”, that she is fodder for the levirate, or even Akkadic zāqiqum “ghost; necromancer”. {Jewish Berber tribes held that a brother who rejects levirate will be punished by the ghost of his dead brother.} for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not ? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.
“Her levir shall come upon her 25:5 . ”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking” . I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final if the levir changes his mind, in contrast to qiddushin which can be undone only by a bill of divorce. Tosephta 3:1 : “ Qiddushin are final, ‘bespeaking’ is not final”. The Babli, 54a , formulates: “Cohabitation is final, money or a document are not final.” Cohabitation is final even if in error or unintentional ( Mishnah 6:1 ); money or a document are not final even if given as qiddushin and not as “bespeaking”. ; the verse says “and act as levir towards her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.
Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.
Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman22:13 , “If a man takes a wife”. . Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.; Babli 52a , Tosephta 1:1 (the latter also has the formula for “bespeaking” by document). ”
Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate since she was not a full co-wife of the forbidden woman. . According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one, this is to some degree incestuous intercourse, he cannot acquire her in levirate, and a child from this union is a bastard. . In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all does not establish a relationship with any one of the brothers. In the Babli, 17b , this is the minority opinion ascribed to Rav Huna in the name of Rav. . Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him 4:8 , 4:16 ; Soṭah 2:5), rejected in the Babli, 17b . The position of R. Simeon is not explained but is clear: The relationship is possibly incestuous, the child is only possibly a bastard and cannot be forbidden by the court to marry inside the congregation. . He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.
MISHNAH: There were two brothers, one of them died and the second took his brother’s widow in levirate; afterwards a brother was born to them, and he died. The first woman leaves as wife of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one as her co-wife. If [the second brother] had bespoken [the widow of the first] when he died, the second performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he may take in levirate any one he wants or performs ḥalîṣah with any one he wants.
HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden, in the second he came and found her permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife 18:8 )? married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers 25:5 cancels the prohibition of Lev. 18:16 but no other prohibition from Lev. 18 ; the same conclusion in Babli, 20a . In the Babli, 20a , the impossible question is about a maternal halfsister married to a paternal halfbrother when the new baby was born. . Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow 21:7 ). If a Cohen was born when a certain woman who had been divorced had remarried and now was a widow, is she a widow or a divorcee for him? No answer is given since she is both a divorcee and a widow. ? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.
What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah means anything. . You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah . If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah , but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah . What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation with the first” means “even if” since for the rabbis ḥalîṣah of the first is legally impossible and therefore irrelevant. The relation with the second was certainly partially incestuous. . In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah 25:5 . . In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah for that aspect which was not acquired. In no case can she be permitted to stay with the third brother. .
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife 18:16 applies only to a brother who can marry the widow without doubt. If any condition of the levirate is not fully met, there can be no levirate and the co-wife is freed without ḥalîṣah. .
MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate 25:5 do not apply to her. . If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition or one of sanctity 21:1–14 . In these two cases, while marriage is sinful, the act of marriage is not void. , she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate 25:5 do not apply to the forbidden one; an example is given in the Halakhah. .
HALAKHAH: “They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said: When I was still there, we extracted fourteen cases from “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”, except his daughter. When we came up here, we heard what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: His daughter from a woman he raped was married to a paternal halfbrother; she a scribal error. also has a maternal sister from a different father married to a second brother who died childless. His daughter is forbidden to him but her sister, who is her sister-in-law, is permitted to him or is taken in levirate”. . That is, “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”.
It is obvious that if somebody had ḥalîṣah with a woman forbidden by a commandment or because of sanctity, the co-widow was freed must be valid. . When he had intercourse with her? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Joḥanan disagree; they say the co-widow was not freed the co-widow was not freed” (קרבן העדה). The Babli is no help; the Venice text (20b) asserts that R. Joḥanan and R. Eleazar disagree in the matter but it is unsure who said what (parallel the Yerushalmi, supporting קרבן העדה), but Tosaphot (fol. 5a, s. v. ואכתי) reads “Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Eleazar”, supporting פני משה. The people denying that the co-widow was freed must hold that this is a rabbinic ordinance since “commandments” and “sanctity” are treated together. The Babli, 20b/21a , treats only the prohibition of a widow to the High Priest which is simultaneously a prohibition and the transgression of a positive commandment (to marry a virgin) and therefore in a different category. . Rebbi Shammai switches the [names] of this tradition. The position of Rebbi Shammai is reasonable since everywhere Rebbi Eleazar seeks support from the great Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated for women forbidden by a commandment or because of sanctity, if he had ḥalîṣah or intercourse with her, the co-widow was freed.
MISHNAH: Commandment prohibition: Secondary prohibitions 18 , one more generation is forbidden by common law, a tradition ascribed to the “Sopherim”, the colleagues and successors of Ezra in reconstituting Judaism in Israel after the Babylonian exile. instituted by the Sopherim. Holiness prohibiton: A widow for the High Priest 21:14 . , a divorcee 21:7 . or one who had ḥalîṣah with divorce is rabbinic for the majority, possibly biblical for R. Simeon; cf. Note 17 . for a simple priest, a bastard 23:3 . or a Gibeoness21:2 ). They are called “given” for Joshua “gave” them as hewers of wood and drawers of water ( Jos. 9:27 ). to an Israel, a Jewish woman to a Gibeonite or a bastard25 . .
HALAKHAH: Commandment prohibition: Incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim; it is a biblical commandment to listen to the words of the Sopherim. And Holiness prohibition: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. “These are the commandments, 27:35. The last verse of Lev. includes all commandments contained in the book. This sentence is redundant here; it belongs to the argument of those who switch the attributions. ” all commandments are one. “ 21:8 ; this explains the expression “holiness prohibitions”. You should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” But some do switch: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, “you should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. And holiness prohibitions, incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim 19:2 , “you shall be holy”, is taken as general injunction to the religious leadership to institute “fences around the law” to which the secondary prohibitions belong. .
Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, why did Scripture put the incest chapter next to the holiness chapter 19 . ? To teach you that every one who shies away from incest is called “holy”. In this sense, the woman of Shunem said to her husband: “ 4:9 . The parallel is in Babli Berakhot 10b , mostly in the name of R. Yose ben Ḥanina. Lo, I know that he is a holy man of God”. Rebbi Jonah said, “he is holy”, but not his student. Rebbi Abin said, that he never looked at her. But the rabbis say that he he never had an involuntary emission. {The slave girl of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, I never saw a bad thing on my master’s garments.} It is written “Geḥazi drew near to push her away 4:27 . ”. What is לְהָדְפָהּ? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, he put his hand on her beauty spot, between her breasts.
How can one prove secondary prohibitions? Rebbi Ḥuna said: “These 18:27 , כִּי אֶת־כָּל־הַתּוֹעֵבוֹת הָאֵל “all these abominations”, these should have been written הָאֵלֶּה; the short form is taken as a hint of the root אל “power” (the meaning of the word commonly but wrongly translated as “God”). ”, the strong ones. This implies that there are weaker ones. The following are the secondary prohibitions 1, extended to contain most of the next paragraph. : His paternal grandmother and his maternal grandmother, his paternal grandfather’s wife and his maternal grandfathers wife, his grandson’s wife whether from son or daughter, the wife of his mother’s brother and the wife of his father’s maternal brother.
It was stated: Rebbi Ḥanin said, all of them have no limit except for the wife of his maternal grandfather. Bar Qappara said, all of them have a limit, since Bar Qappara added the mother of his maternal grandfather and the mother of his paternal grandfather 1. . Rav said, his son’s daughter-in-law is the limit. Why does he disagree? His son’s daughter-in-law comes under a different category. Rav said, his [grandson’s] issue from her is forbidden. 18:17 ). . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the reason of Rav is that all Jewish women are forbidden for Abraham and all Jewish men are forbidden for Sarah.
Rav said: In all cases where the female is forbidden by the Torah, the wife of the corresponding male is forbidden. The father’s sister is forbidden as female; the wife of the father’s brother, the corresponding male, is forbidden. 18:12 , 14 . It seems that Rav claims biblical status for his statement. . The mother’s sister is forbidden as female. 18:13 . The second case is a secondary prohibition. ; the wife of the mother’s brother, the corresponding male, is forbidden His son’s daughter is forbidden as female. 18:17 . ; the wife of his son’s son, the corresponding male, is forbidden His daughter’s daughter is forbidden as female. 18:17 . ; the wife of his daughter’s son, the corresponding male, is forbidden Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, there are another two. His mother is biblical. 18:7 . . His mother’s mother is secondary to her. They forbade his father’s mother because of his mother’s mother and grand father by the grandchildren, which gives them status of father and mother. The Yerushalmi disagrees and holds that there is never a fence for a fence of the law. In the next paragraph one proves the biblical prohibition of some so-called secondaries. . His son’s wife is biblical. 18:15 . . His son’s son’s wife is secondary to her. They forbade his daughter’s son’s wife because of his son’s son’s wife. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there are another two. His father’s wife is biblical. 18:8 . . His paternal grandfather’s wife is secondary to her. They forbade his maternal grandfather’s wife because of his paternal grandfather’s wife. His father’s paternal brother’s wife is biblical. 18:14 . It was stated in Halakhah 1:1 that “brother” means “paternal brother”. . His father’s maternal brother’s wife is secondary to her. They forbade his mother’s maternal halfbrother’s wife because of his father’s maternal brother’s wife.
Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse. 18:17 . “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter you should not take to uncover her genitals, they are relatives, this is taboo .” Take means “to marry”. : “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut a woman and her mother, it is taboo, in fire they should burn him and them, so that there be no taboo amongst you.” In contrast to v. 18:17 which speaks “downwards” of future generations, that verse speaks “upwards” of preceding generations. They are connected by the word taboo {Accadic zamū “to exclude from something, to refuse something to somebody”} which must “cut” the same way in both cases. The argument is refuted in Babli Sanhedrin 75a/b since it contradicts verses dealing with earlier generations which seem to insist that the kinds of sin and their punishments are not comparable. . Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter. 18:17 . “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover; her son’s daughter or her daughter’s daughter you should not take to uncover her genitals, they are relatives, this is taboo .” Take means “to marry”. , so upwards He gave the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother. What is this about? His father-in-law’s mother and his mother-in-law’s mother. Should not his father’s mother be like his father-in-law’s mother? Should not his mother’s mother be like his mother-in-law’s mother? They forbade his father’s father’s wife because of his father’s mother. They forbade his mother’s father’s wife because of his mother’s mother. Should not his son’s son’s wife be like his wife’s son’s daughter? Should not his daughter’s son’s wife be like his wife’s daughter’s daughter?
Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita contradict Rav? “A person’s stepson’s wife is permitted to him but the latter’s daughter is forbidden. 13 (15 ). ” Is his stepdaughter not forbidden to him? The stepson is the corresponding male but his wife is permitted!
Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: His father-in-law’s wife is forbidden because of the bad impression. If you want to say it is biblical, did not David marry Riṣpah bat Ayyah? As it was said. 12:8 . : “I gave you your master’s house and your master’s wives in your bosom.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Two stepchildren who grow up in the same house are forbidden to marry because of the bad impression. A case came before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu. He said, they should marry in a place where they are not known 9, Notes 34ff . .
There, we have stated Mishnah 3:5 . The Mishnah speaks of the grandfather’s grandson’s daughter’s daughter who was married to his brother. If that brother dies without issue, the widow is forbidden to her great-grandfather by a secondary prohibition. If the old man marries her in levirate instead of having ḥalîṣah as required, since the prohibition is rabbinic she is married and, if the son sleeps with her, Rebbi Yose the Tanna declares him guilty both for his granddaughter and his father’s wife, committing two sins in one act. : “Rebbi Yose says, if the grandfather transgressed and married her.” What did he transgress? He transgressed the words of the Sopherim. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abbahu, he asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Does this mean that secondary prohibitions have no limit? He said to him, did we learn “secondaries to secondaries”? No. Secondaries to the words of the Torah, and all of them because of his son’s daughter-in-law. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abbahu did not say so, but Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, did we not learn of eight secondaries, and here they are nine! But all of them because of his son’s daughter-in-law 21b . .
MISHNAH: Any [male] who has a brother anywhere makes his brother’s wife a candidate is always called זקוּקה, the fact of obligation זיקה. It does not seem reasonable to connect this meaning to biblical זקק “to refine, purify”; maybe the root is related to Arabic زقّ، زقق “to feed (a bird his young)”, that she is fodder for the levirate, or even Akkadic zāqiqum “ghost; necromancer”. {Jewish Berber tribes held that a brother who rejects levirate will be punished by the ghost of his dead brother.} for levirate and he is his brother in every respect, except if he were from a slave woman becomes a full Jew. Therefore, she is not in the same category as a non-Jewish woman. or a non-Jew.
MISHNAH: Any person who has a child anywhere frees [the child’s] father’s wife from levirate; [the child] would be guilty for wounding or cursing [the father]. 21:15 , 17 . ; he is his child in every respect except if he were from a slave woman becomes a full Jew. Therefore, she is not in the same category as a non-Jewish woman. or a non-Jew.
HALAKHAH: “Any person who has a child anywhere”, etc. Rebbi Avin asked: “His child in every respect”, even for being fruitful and multiplying? Is there no difference between a Gentile who came to a Jewish woman and she gave birth and a Jew who came to a Gentile woman and she gave birth, Chapter 1, Note 116 ), the child has only two since legally it has no father. ? “When she became Jewish and gave birth it is a first-born for inheritance but not a first-born for the Cohen. 8:1 . If the Gentile first has a child as a Gentile, then converts and marries the father of her child, the next child, if male, will be the father’s firstborn (since he is no relative of the other child) but does not have to be redeemed ( Ex . 34:20 ) since he is not the first child of the mother. ”
A Gentile came to a Gentile woman and she gave birth. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Gentiles have family relationships. 2:24 : “Therefore, a man abandons his father and his mother and clings to his wife so they will be one flesh” is interpreted to mean that, by the laws of Creation, incest between parents and children, adultery (with a wife not his own) and possibly homosexuality are forbidden. The question is whether a court can enforce the incest prohibition between father and daughter. If there is no recognized legal relationship, that cannot be enforced. R. Joḥanan holds that any court on earth, even a Jewish one, can punish incest between Gentile father and daughter. R. Simeon ben Laqish disagrees. In the Babli, 62a , the parallel discussion is on a completely different topic, whether the firstborn of a proselyte who converted together with his father is entitled to the customary double portion of the inheritance. R. Joḥanan answers in the affermative, R. Simeon ben Laqish in the negative. . Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Gentiles have no family relationships. But is it not written. 39:1 . : “At that time, Merodakh-Baladan, son of Baladan, king of Babylon, sent letters and a gift to Ḥizqiah.” Since he honored his elder 96a reports that Baladan was incapacitated and Merodakh added his father’s name to his own so that all acts of his regency should also be in his father’s name. , he was honored with a family relationship. But is it not written 15:18 . The text is contaminated with 2Chr . 16:2 . : “At that time, king Asa sent to Ben-Hadad, son of Tabrimon, son of Ḥezayon, king of Damascus, as follows.” Destroyer son of a destroyer. As you say. 9:24 . In Targum Šeni 3:1, the family tree of Haman is given up to his ancestor Esaw. It is not clear there whether “Hamedata the Agagite” is intended as a name or a title. In the latter case, Haman’s father’s name was Seraḥ. : “For Haman ben Hamedata was”. Was he the son of Hamedata? That means, oppressor son of an oppressor. So here also, destroyer son of a destroyer. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, so did Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish answer Rebbi Joḥanan, but is there not written. 9:10 . In v. 2 , Ṣiba is called “ ‘ebed of the House of Saul”. Since in v. 9 he is called “esquire of Saul”, it seems that ‘ebed represents the usage of the time the book was finally edited, the later kingdom of Judah, when ‘ebed was the recognized title of officials directly responsible to the king. : “Ṣiba had sixteen sons and twenty slaves.” Do slaves have family relationships? It is to enumerate those who served Mephiboshet together.
A slave woman: “The woman and her children shall belong to her owner.. 18:4 , speaking of the Jewish indentured servant who has to serve for six years. If the children he had during that time with a slave woman were his, they would have to be freed with him at the end of his servitude. ” A Gentile woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Sineon ben Ioḥai, it is written. 7:3–4 . Since only the masculine is used, “he will divert”, but not the feminine, it is concluded that the verse speaks only about the Gentile husband. Therefore, the child of the Jewish husband and the Gentile wife is not the husband’s child. The parallel to this paragraph is in the Babli 23a . : “You shall not conclude marriage with them”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from after Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son.
3:14 ; Gen. rabba 7(3 ); Eccl. rabba 7:26 ; Bemidbar rabba, Tanḥuma , both Pesiqtot , to Ḥuqqat ( Parah ). Jacob from Kefar Naboraia went to Tyre. They came to ask him, may one circumcise the son of a Gentile woman on the Sabbath? He wanted to permit it from the verse. 1:18 , which determines the clan by patrilinear descent. The principle is expressed in Mishnah Qiddušin 3:12 : “If there is a possibility of marriage without sin, the child follows its father”, even if the parents are not married. : “They determined their genealogies for their families according to their fathers’ houses.” Rebbi Ḥaggai heard it and said, he shall come. They brought him in order to be whipped. He said to him, for what reason do you whip me? He said, from what is written 10:3 : “Now we shall make a covenant for our God to expel all these [foreign] women and what was born to them, as counseled by the Lord, by those who fear the commandments of our God; it should be done according to the Torah”. As usual, the main point is the part not quoted. : “Now we shall make a covenant for our God”. He said, you want to whip me based on tradition? He said, “and it should be done according to the Torah.” He said to him, from which teaching? He said, from that which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them”. And it is written: “For he will divert your son from after Me.” Your son from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your son from a Gentile woman is not called your son but her son. He said to him, whip your whipping, because it is good to impress.
MISHNAH: If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters. If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate had received qiddushin from the deceased, the other one is free to marry his brother. If she did not get qiddushin , then the levirate is valid. . If both married without asking, one. does not remove [the women] from them.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters.” Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah ” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate.” Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”
MISHNAH: If two [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters and neither of them knows to which one he gave his, each one of them gives two bills of divorce. If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate with his brother since she either is his sister-in-law or an unrelated person. . If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them. .
HALAKHAH: “If two [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters,” etc. It was stated: These rules apply both for Israel and for Cohanim is treated like divorce, one should assume that both sisters are forbidden to priests. But since this treatment is only a rabbinic enhancement of the priest’s status, it is not applied to cases of doubt. . That is, if ḥalîṣah was performed first and the levirate afterwards. But to perform levirate first is forbidden; maybe his brother will die and it will turn out that he cohabited with the sister of his sister-in-law. Rav Ḥisda said, that means that having relations with the sister of his sister-in-law does not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood. Rebbi Yose bar Abba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: He who cohabited with the sister of a woman for whom he had performed ḥalîṣah did not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood.
“If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah ” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate. Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”
MISHNAH: If each [of the deceased] had two brothers, one brother of each [of the deceased] performs ḥalîṣah with one [of the sisters] and the other brother takes the other [sister] in levirate of his brother was correct, then the other brother marries an unrelated widow. If it was incorrect then he enters a valid levirate marriage. . If two [brothers] both performed ḥalîṣah , the other two should not [both] marry in levirate but one of them performs ḥalîṣah and the other one may take in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.
HALAKHAH: “If each [of the deceased] had two brothers”. That is, for Israel, but for Cohanim they are forbidden and the second are Cohanim then one of the second pair certainly will marry a woman freed by ḥalîṣah , who is considered a rabbinic divorcee. The Babli, 24a , seems to extend the permission given to Cohanim ( Note 159 ) even to this case since for each single person there is only a 50/50 chance that he married a woman with a legally valid ḥalîṣah . .
MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired. If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him. If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman and she was forcibly divorced from [her husband], even if he married her he must divorce her 5:1 ). .
HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said. 25:6 : “The firstborn she will bear shall rise in the name of his dead brother.” This seems to imply that the child should be called X son of Y, where Y is not the biological father but the dead first husband. The Babli, 24a , discusses the same verse in a different manner, based on Sifry Deut . #289. , “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”
“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her 5:1 ). ! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.
MISHNAH: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says “it was written and signed in my presence”, he shall not marry the wife 1:1 ). If the witness would marry the divorcee, his testimony would be suspect because of his interest in the validity of the divorce. . “He died”, “I killed him”, or “we killed him”, he shall not marry the wife. Rebbi Jehudah said, “I killed him”, the wife cannot be married. 23:1 ). Therefore, there is no evidence of the death and the wife cannot claim to be a widow. , “we killed him”, the wife can be married.
HALAKHAH: 3:7 on the Mishnah quoted later, “I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin , he is trustworthy.” “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce 63b , this is the opinion of Rav; Samuel is not mentioned there. . Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin , the same holds. “ 3:7 . I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin ,” he is not trusted in any way reads לא הכל ממנו “is not everything from him?”; the father’s evidence is nothing and everything depends on the word of the suitor. This seems to be the correct version even though the two mss. agree in Yebamot . . The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons are invalid. If they come and testify, there will be no doubt; the testimony of the suitor is verifiable. In the case of the divorce, everybody knows that the woman is married and the testimony is unverifiable. . One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin . The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: Samuel. This is the correct version even though the two mss. agree in Yebamot . If one of the two suitors is permitted to marry the girl, the rest of the world is excluded and both are trustworthy even for marriage. : “ 3:7 . This one says, I gave her qiddushin , and that one says, I gave her qiddushin . Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries. 3:7 , about the father who btrothed his daughter to an unknown suitor. ” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin , and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin , he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin , he is not trusted in any way.
As you take it, if he killed him, a suspect in a case can neither judge nor testify in it. If he did not kill him, the person is alive.
“We killed him,” she should be married to others but not to him. “They said before Rebbi Jehudah, it happened that a robber was caught in Kappadokian Caesarea. When he went out to be executed, he said to them, go and tell the wife of Simeon ben Cahana that I killed him when he was coming into Lydda. The case came before the Sages and they confirmed his words. Rebbi Jehudah said to them: Is that a proof? He only said, we killed him.”
MISHNAH: A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow. 30:2–17 ). She can go to a competent rabbi who may find a way to relieve her from her vow if she sincerely repents. If he did not find a way to repeal the vow, the husband will divorce her (obviously, he need not pay her anything.) Since the refusal of the rabbi to annul the vow forces the divorce, he cannot profit from his act or people will suspect him of bending the law for his own profit. cannot marry her. If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court 5 judges. In the other cases of the Mishnah, the availability of the woman for marriage depends on unforseeable circumstances. . And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them of this kind are known from the Cairo Genizah . . And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married. All are permitted to their sons or brothers.
HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, Mishnah 3:7 . , we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel 39b (R. Abba ben R. Jacob in the name of R. Joḥanan). In the Babli, the circumstances of this ruling are very much in dispute. . What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon 2:7 . If somebody finds perishables (with characteristics that might allow the indentification of the lawful owner), he sells them under the supervision of a court. R. Tarphon holds that he uses the money in his own business; therefore he is totally responsible for it. R. Aqiba says, he may not touch the money; therefore, he is not responsible if it is stolen. . It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba. 30:2–17 ). She can go to a competent rabbi who may find a way to relieve her from her vow if she sincerely repents. If he did not find a way to repeal the vow, the husband will divorce her (obviously, he need not pay her anything.) Since the refusal of the rabbi to annul the vow forces the divorce, he cannot profit from his act or people will suspect him of bending the law for his own profit. said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.
“ “And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them.” It only says “who died”; therefore, not if they were divorced. “And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married”, since usually nobody sins for an uncertain future. “All are permitted to their sons or brothers,” since usually nobody sins for the benefit of either his son ot his brother.