Shevuot 49b

״מֵת״ – וְהוּא שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה אוֹ נִגְנַב אוֹ אָבַד; ״נִשְׁבַּר״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה אוֹ נִגְנַב אוֹ אָבַד; ״נִשְׁבָּה״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִגְנַב אוֹ אָבַד; ״נִגְנַב״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה אוֹ אָבַד; ״אָבַד״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה אוֹ נִגְנַב; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – פָּטוּר.

It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured or stolen or lost; or if he responded: It was stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or lost; or if he responded: It was lost, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen, in any of the above cases, if the owner of the ox said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the borrower said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing an offering for his false oath, since the oath did not render him exempt from liability to pay. He would have been liable to pay in any case.

״הֵיכָן שׁוֹרִי?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אַתָּה סָח״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה אוֹ נִגְנַב אוֹ נֶאֱבָד; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב.

But if the owner said to the borrower: Where is my ox? And the borrower said to him: I do not know what you are talking about, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and the borrower said: Amen, the borrower is liable to bring a guilt-offering, as he took an oath that would render him exempt from liability to pay.

אָמַר לְנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר: ״הֵיכָן שׁוֹרִי?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״מֵת״ – וְהוּא שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה; ״נִשְׁבַּר״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה; ״נִשְׁבָּה״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר; ״נִגְנַב״ – וְהוּא שֶׁאָבַד; ״אָבַד״ – וְהוּא שֶׁנִּגְנַב; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – פָּטוּר.

If an owner said to a paid bailee or a renter: Where is my ox? And the latter said to him: It died, but the truth was that it was injured or captured; or if he said: It was injured, but the truth was that it died or was captured; or if he said: It was captured, but the truth was that it died or was injured; or if he said: It was stolen, but the truth was that it was lost; or if he said: It was lost, but the truth was that it was stolen, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, the paid bailee or renter is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering.

״מֵת״ אוֹ ״נִשְׁבַּר״ אוֹ ״נִשְׁבָּה״ – וְהוּא שֶׁנִּגְנַב אוֹ אָבַד; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – חַיָּיב. ״אָבַד״ אוֹ ״נִגְנַב״ – וְהוּא שֶׁמֵּת אוֹ נִשְׁבַּר אוֹ נִשְׁבָּה; ״מַשְׁבִּיעֲךָ אֲנִי״, וְאָמַר ״אָמֵן״ – פָּטוּר.

If the paid bailee or renter said: It died or was injured or captured, but the truth was that it was stolen or lost, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, the paid bailee or renter is liable to bring a guilt-offering. If the paid bailee or renter said: It was lost or stolen, but the truth was that it died or was injured or captured, and the owner said: I administer an oath to you concerning your claim, and he said: Amen, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering.

זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַמְשַׁנֶּה מֵחוֹבָה לְחוֹבָה, וּמִפְּטוּר לִפְטוּר, וּמִפְּטוּר לְחוֹבָה – פָּטוּר. מֵחוֹבָה לִפְטוּר – חַיָּיב. זֶה הַכְּלָל: כׇּל הַנִּשְׁבָּע לְהָקֵל עַל עַצְמוֹ – חַיָּיב. לְהַחְמִיר עַל עַצְמוֹ – פָּטוּר.

This is the principle: Anyone who changes from one claim of liability to another claim of liability or from one claim of exemption to another claim of exemption or from a claim of exemption to a claim of liability is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering. If he changes from a claim of liability to a claim of exemption, he is liable. This is the principle: Anyone who takes an oath to be lenient with himself is liable; if he takes an oath to be stringent with himself, he is exempt.

גְּמָ׳ מַאן תְּנָא אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: מִי אִיכָּא תַּנָּא דְּלֵית לֵיהּ אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי קָאָמֵינָא לָךְ: מַאן תַּנָּא דְּאָמַר שׂוֹכֵר כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר דָּמֵי? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught that there are four types of bailees? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: It is Rabbi Meir. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: And is there a tanna who does not accept that there are four types of bailees, as the question and your answer indicate? Rav Naḥman said to him: This is what I am saying to you: Who is the tanna who says that a renter has the same halakhic status as a paid bailee? With regard to this question, Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: It is Rabbi Meir.

וְהָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר אִיפְּכָא שָׁמְעִינַן לֵיהּ – דִּתְנַן: שׂוֹכֵר כֵּיצַד מְשַׁלֵּם? רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר! רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ אִיפְּכָא תָּנֵי.

The Gemara challenges: But we have heard that Rabbi Meir said the opposite, as it is taught in a baraita : How does a renter pay? Rabbi Meir says: He pays like an unpaid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: He pays like a paid bailee. The Gemara explains: Rabba bar Avuh taught this baraita while reversing the opinions, stating that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that a renter is like a paid bailee; therefore, he said that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

הָנֵי אַרְבָּעָה הָווּ?! שְׁלֹשָׁה הָווּ! אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין, וְדִינֵיהֶן שְׁלֹשָׁה.

The Gemara asks: Are these in fact four types of bailees? There are actually only three, as the halakhot relating to a paid bailee and a renter are identical. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: There are indeed four types of bailees with regard to the manner in which they accepted the deposit, but only three halakhot that apply to them.

אָמַר לְשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם כּוּ׳, ״הֵיכָן שׁוֹרִי״ כּוּ׳, אָמַר לְאֶחָד בַּשּׁוּק כּוּ׳, אָמַר לְשׁוֹמֵר כּוּ׳, ״הֵיכָן שׁוֹרִי?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אַתָּה סָח״ כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: וְכוּלָּן פְּטוּרִין מִשְּׁבוּעַת שׁוֹמְרִין, וְחַיָּיבִין מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אַף פְּטוּרִין מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי.

§ The following cases were stated in the mishna: If the owner of an ox said to an unpaid bailee: Where is my ox; or if the owner of an ox said to someone in the marketplace: Where is my ox that you stole; or if he said to a bailee: Where is my ox, and the other person said to him: I do not know what you are talking about. With regard to all of these situations referred to in the mishna, Rav says: All of them are exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for falsely taking an oath of the bailees, but they are liable to bring a sin-offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance. And Shmuel says: They are exempt from bringing a sin-offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance as well.

בְּמַאי קָמִפַּלְגִי? שְׁמוּאֵל סָבַר: לֵיתַהּ בִּלְהַבָּא. וְרַב סָבַר: אִיתֵיהּ בְּלָאו וָהֵן.

With regard to what principle do they disagree? Shmuel holds that he is exempt from bringing an offering because there is no possibility of taking that oath with regard to an event that may occur in the future, i.e., that the deposited animal will die or be stolen or be lost, and Shmuel holds that one is not liable for taking an oath on an utterance in the case of any oath that one cannot take with reference to the future. And Rav holds that there is an obligation to bring a sin-offering because it is possible to take both a negative oath and a positive one. One of the conditions necessary in order for one to incur liability for an oath on an utterance is that the oath can be formulated as both a negative and a positive statement. This oath meets that criterion as one can formulate the oath in the negative, e.g., the deposit was not stolen, as well as in the positive, e.g., it was stolen.

וְהָא אִיפְּלִיגוּ בַהּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא – דְּאִתְּמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁזָּרַק פְּלוֹנִי צְרוֹר לַיָּם״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא זָרַק״ – רַב אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: פָּטוּר. רַב אָמַר חַיָּיב – דְּאִיתַהּ בְּלָאו וְהֵן, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר פָּטוּר – דְּלֵיתַהּ בִּלְהַבָּא!

The Gemara challenges: But they already disputed this question on another occasion (see 25a), as it was stated: With regard to one who says: On my oath so-and-so threw a stone into the sea, or: On my oath he did not throw it, Rav says: If it was later discovered that his statement was false, he is liable to bring an offering for his oath. And Shmuel says: He is exempt. Rav says that he is liable, as the oath can be positive or negative. And Shmuel says he is exempt because this oath cannot be stated with regard to the future, since he cannot control what so-and-so does.

צְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַב, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִנַּפְשֵׁיהּ קָמִישְׁתְּבַע; אֲבָל בְּהָךְ, דְּבֵי דִינָא מַשְׁבְּעִי לֵיהּ – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לִשְׁמוּאֵל, כִּדְרַבִּי אַמֵּי; דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: כׇּל שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁהַדַּיָּינִים מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ – אֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי.

The Gemara explains: It was necessary to state the dispute in the case of a bailee as well, as if they would teach it to us only in the case where one took an oath that so-and-so threw a stone, it may have been understood that it is only in this case that Rav says that the person taking the oath is exempt, since he is taking a false oath of his own accord, but in the case in the mishna here, where it is the court that is administering the oath to him, say that Rav concedes to Shmuel that he is exempt, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ami. As Rabbi Ami says: In the case of any oath that is administered by the judges, one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for falsely taking an oath on an utterance.

וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא – בְּהָא קָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לְרַב; צְרִיכָא.

And conversely, if the dispute had been stated only in this case, i.e., the case of the bailee to whom the court administers the oath, one might have said: It is in this case that Shmuel says that he is exempt, in accordance with Rabbi Ami’s statement, but in a case where one took an oath that so-and-so threw a stone, say that Shmuel concedes to Rav that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.

גּוּפָא – אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: כׇּל שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁהַדַּיָּינִין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ, אֵין בָּהּ מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי; שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע לְבַטֵּא בִשְׂפָתַיִם״ – מֵעַצְמוֹ. כִּדְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: ״כִּי״ מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בְּאַרְבַּע לְשׁוֹנוֹת: אִי, דִּלְמָא, אֶלָּא, דְּהָא.

Having mentioned Rabbi Ami’s ruling, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Ami says: In the case of any oath that is administered by the judges, one is not liable for falsely taking an oath on an utterance, as it is stated in the verse: “Or if [ ki ] anyone swears clearly with his lips to do evil or to do good, whatever it is that a man shall utter clearly with an oath, and it is hidden from him…and the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his sin” (Leviticus 5:4–6). Only if one takes the oath of his own accord is he liable, as the verse can be understood in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish. As Reish Lakish says: The term ki has four distinct meanings: If, perhaps, rather, and as. According to Rabbi Ami, its meaning in the above verse is: If, indicating that only if one takes the oath of his own accord is he liable.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: כּוּלָּן פְּטוּרִין מִשְּׁבוּעַת שׁוֹמְרִין וְחַיָּיבִין מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי; חוּץ מֵ״אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ מָה אַתָּה סָח״ דְּשׁוֹאֵל, וּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה דְּנוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְשֶׁבְּשׂוֹכֵר – שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּפָרוֹ מָמוֹן.

Rabbi Elazar says: All of them, i.e., all those listed in the mishna as exempt, are exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for taking an oath of the bailees, but they are liable to bring a sin-offering for taking an oath on an utterance, except for a borrower who says: I do not know what you are talking about, and a paid bailee or a renter who claims that the deposit was stolen or lost. In these cases, the bailee is liable for taking an oath of the bailees, as he denied a monetary claim, meaning that he wanted to render himself exempt from liability to pay. This halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav. This chapter explained that a bailee who makes a false claim and takes an oath to that effect is not always liable for falsely taking an oath of the bailees. The principle with regard to this matter was stated at the end of the mishna: Any bailee who makes a false claim that would in any case not render him exempt from liability to pay, and takes an oath to that effect, is not liable for falsely taking an oath of the bailees.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִין, וּסְלִיקָא לַהּ מַסֶּכֶת שְׁבוּעוֹת