Sanhedrin 86b

לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ בָּאנוּ, וְהָנֵי אַחֲרִינֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ דָּבָר קָא עָבְדִי לֵיהּ.

It is in order to flog him, not to execute him, that we came to court. And these other witnesses, through their testimony, are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution, and are therefore liable to be executed for giving conspiring testimony.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: אִי הָכִי, עֵידֵי מְכִירָה נָמֵי לִיקְטְלֵיהּ, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיְּכוֹלִין עֵידֵי גְנֵיבָה לוֹמַר ״לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ בָּאנוּ״! וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּקָסָבַר חִזְקִיָּה דְּלָא לָקֵי,

Rav Pappa objects to this: If so, and Ḥizkiyya concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan in the case of the final testimony of the stubborn and rebellious son, let them also execute the witnesses to the sale of one who was abducted, as the witnesses to the abduction could say: It is in order to flog the abductor, not to execute him, that we came to court. And if you would say that Ḥizkiyya holds that one who abducts another and does not sell him is not flogged, that is difficult.

וְהָא אִיתְּמַר: עֵידֵי גְּנֵיבָה בְּנֶפֶשׁ שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ, חִזְקִיָּה וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – חַד אָמַר: לוֹקִין, וְחַד אָמַר: אֵין לוֹקִין. וְאָמְרִינַן: תִּסְתַּיֵּים דְּחִזְקִיָּה דְּאָמַר לוֹקִין, מִדְּאָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין.

But wasn’t it stated: With regard to witnesses to the abduction who were rendered conspiring witnesses prior to the testimony of the witnesses to the sale, Ḥizkiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree. One says: They are flogged, and one says: They are not flogged. And we say: It may be concluded that it is Ḥizkiyya who said that they are flogged, from the fact that Ḥizkiyya said: They are not executed.

דְּאִי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר נֶהֱרָגִין, הָוֵה לֵיהּ לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו. אִיהוּ לָא לָקֵי, אִינְהוּ הֵיכִי לָקוּ?

Since if one were to suggest that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan who said that they are flogged, that cannot be. Since he says that conspiring witnesses are executed in this case, it is a prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court -imposed death penalty, and the principle is: With regard to any prohibition that is given as a warning of liability for a court -imposed death penalty, one is not flogged for its violation, even in a case where the transgressor is not executed. The abductor is not flogged. How then could the conspiring witnesses be flogged for testifying against them, as the punishment for conspiring witnesses is identical to the punishment of the one against whom they testified? Rather, it is certain that Ḥizkiyya holds that the conspiring witnesses to the abduction are flogged, and therefore everyone agrees that the conspiring witnesses to the sale are executed.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּעֵידֵי מְכִירָה דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּנֶהֱרָגִין, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּעֵידֵי גְנֵיבָה. חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין, גְּנֵיבָה לְחוֹדַהּ קָיְימָא וּמְכִירָה לְחוּדַהּ קָיְימָא. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: נֶהֱרָגִין, גְּנֵיבָה אַתְחַלְתָּא דִמְכִירָה הִיא.

Rather, Rav Pappa says: The previous explanation is rejected, and instead the dispute must be explained as follows: With regard to the witnesses to the sale of the abductee, it is clear that everyone agrees that they are executed, as theirs is testimony concerning an entire matter and would have led to his execution. When they disagree, it is with regard to the witnesses to the abduction. Ḥizkiyya says: They are not executed, as he holds that abduction stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by lashes, and the sale stands discrete as an independent prohibition punishable by strangulation. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They are executed, as the abduction is the beginning of the process that culminates with the sale. The witnesses testifying to the abduction are testifying to a transgression that will culminate with the sale of the abductee.

וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּעֵדִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים שֶׁל בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ, שֶׁאֵין נֶהֱרָגִין, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיְּכוֹלִין לוֹמַר: ״לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ בָּאנוּ״.

The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes with regard to the initial witnesses concerning a stubborn and rebellious son who testified that he engaged in gluttonous and drunken conduct and who were rendered conspiring witnesses that they are not executed, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him for actions that he might perform in the future, that we came to court. Therefore, there is no connection between their testimony and punishment for future actions.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה, וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה.

Abaye said in summary: All concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and all concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son, and there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה: בְּעֵדִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים, שֶׁאֵין נֶהֱרָגִין, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיְּכוֹלִין לוֹמַר: ״לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ בָּאנוּ״.

The Gemara elaborates: With regard to the initial witnesses, all, even Rabbi Yoḥanan, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are not executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, as they could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct, not to execute him, that we came to court.

וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה: בְּעֵדִים אַחֲרוֹנִים שֶׁנֶּהֱרָגִים, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁעֵדִים הָרִאשׁוֹנִים יְכוֹלִין לוֹמַר: ״לְהַלְקוֹתוֹ בָּאנוּ״, וְהָנֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ דָּבָר קָא עָבְדִי לֵיהּ.

And with regard to the final witnesses, all, even Ḥizkiyya, concede in the case of a stubborn and rebellious son that they are executed if they are rendered conspiring witnesses, due to the fact that the initial witnesses could say: It is in order to flog him for past conduct that we came to court, and these final witnesses are the ones who did this to him, i.e., they are responsible for the entire matter of his execution and are therefore liable to be executed.

וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּבֵן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה: שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים ״בְּפָנֵינוּ גָּנַב״, וּשְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים: ״בְּפָנֵינוּ אָכַל״.

And there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son in a case where two of the final witnesses, who testify after the son was already flogged for engaging in gluttonous and drunken conduct, say: He stole in our presence, and two other witnesses say: He ate in our presence. The dispute is whether the testimony of these two pairs of witnesses is testimony concerning an entire matter or testimony concerning half a matter.

אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: עֵדֵי מְכִירָה בְּנֶפֶשׁ שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁיָּכוֹל לוֹמַר ״עַבְדִּי מָכַרְתִּי״.

Rav Asi says: The witnesses to the sale of a person who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold. In that case, the witnesses are not testifying that he violated a capital transgression, as they cannot attest to the fact that the individual he sold was first abducted.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: כְּמַאן אָזְלָא הָא שְׁמַעְתָּא דְּרַב אַסִּי? כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: ״דָּבָר״, וְלֹא חֲצִי דָבָר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: דְּאִי כְּרַבָּנַן, נֶהֱרָגִין? הָא ״מִתּוֹךְ״ קָאָמַר!

Rav Yosef says: In accordance with whose opinion is that halakha of Rav Asi? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: The testimony of witnesses is valid only when they attest to an entire matter and not to half a matter. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: According to your explanation, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold: The testimony is valid when they testify to an entire matter and even when they testify to half a matter, are the conspiring witnesses executed? Doesn’t Rav Asi say that they are not executed due to the fact that the one against whom they testified could say: Although they testified that I sold an individual, it was my slave that I sold? According to that reasoning, even the Rabbis would concede that they are not executed.

אֶלָּא, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, וּבִדְלָא אֲתוֹ עֵידֵי גְּנֵיבָה. אִי הָכִי, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דַּאֲתוֹ לְבַסּוֹף.

Rather, you may even say that Rav Asi’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and it is concerning a case where only witnesses to the sale came to testify and witnesses to the abduction did not come to testify. In that case the accused can avoid punishment; therefore, the conspiring witnesses are not executed. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating that halakha ? Obviously, in that case they are not executed, as there is no way to determine that the one he sold is not a slave. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that they are not executed even if witnesses to the abduction ultimately came after the witnesses to the sale had testified and testified that he sold a freeman, not his slave.

וְאַכַּתִּי מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּקָא מְרַמְּזִי רַמּוֹזֵי. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: רְמִיזָא מִילְּתָא הִיא? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: רְמִיזָא לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא.

The Gemara asks: But still, what is the purpose of stating that halakha ? When the witnesses to the sale testified, their testimony was not sufficient to execute the accused. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach the halakha in a case where they are not executed even where the first and second pairs of witnesses gesture to one another, ostensibly indicating that the conspiring witnesses to the sale were aware that the witnesses to the abduction would follow and that therefore the initial witnesses are part of the conspiracy to testify and execute the accused. And consequently, it is necessary to teach this halakha lest you say: Gesturing is a significant matter, and the legal status of the two testimonies is that of a single testimony. Therefore, Rav Asi teaches us that gesturing is nothing of significance.

מַתְנִי׳ זָקֵן מַמְרֵא עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט״. שְׁלֹשָׁה בָּתֵּי דִינִין הָיוּ שָׁם: אֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת, וְאֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב עַל פֶּתַח הָעֲזָרָה, וְאֶחָד יוֹשֵׁב בְּלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית.

MISHNA: A rebellious elder according to the court, who does not observe the ruling of the court, is executed by strangulation, as it is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment …and you shall arise and ascend unto the place that the Lord your God shall choose…and you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you…and the man that shall do so intentionally, not to listen…and that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:8–12). There were three courts there in Jerusalem. One convenes at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one convenes at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, and one convenes in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

בָּאִין לָזֶה שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח הַר הַבַּיִת, וְאוֹמֵר: כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי, וְכָךְ דָּרְשׁוּ חֲבֵירַי. כָּךְ לִימַּדְתִּי, וְכָךְ לִימְּדוּ חֲבֵירַי. אִם שָׁמְעוּ, אָמְרוּ לָהֶם.

An elder who issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of his colleagues, and his colleagues come to that court that is at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them.

וְאִם לָאו, בָּאִין לָהֶן לְאוֹתָן שֶׁעַל פֶּתַח עֲזָרָה, וְאוֹמֵר: כָּךְ דָּרַשְׁתִּי וְכָךְ דָּרְשׁוּ חֲבֵירַי, כָּךְ לִימַּדְתִּי וְכָךְ לִימְּדוּ חֲבֵירַי. אִם שׇׁמְעוּ, אָמְרוּ לָהֶם.

And if not, they come to those judges who are convened at the entrance to the Temple courtyard, which is a more significant tribunal. And the elder says: This is what I interpreted and that is what my colleagues interpreted; this is what I taught and that is what my colleagues taught. If the members of the court heard a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court says it to them.

וְאִם לָאו, אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ בָּאִין לְבֵית דִּין הַגָּדוֹל שֶׁבְּלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית, שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ יוֹצְאָה תּוֹרָה לְכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה׳״. חָזַר לְעִירוֹ, שָׁנָה וְלִמֵּד בַּדֶּרֶךְ שֶׁהָיָה לָמֵד – פָּטוּר, וְאִם הוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת – חַיָּיב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן״. אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיּוֹרֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת.

And if not, these judges and those judges come to the High Court, the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges that is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah emerges to the entire Jewish people, as it is stated: “And you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you from that place that the Lord shall choose and you shall observe to perform according to all that they shall teach you” (Deuteronomy 17:10). They are the ultimate arbiters who establish the halakha that is binding. If they ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then returned to his city, and nevertheless, he taught in the manner that he was teaching previously, he is exempt from punishment. But if he instructed others to act on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is liable to be executed, as it is stated: “And the man that shall do so intentionally not to listen” (Deuteronomy 17:12), meaning that one is not liable unless he instructs others to act.

תַּלְמִיד שֶׁהוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹת – פָּטוּר. נִמְצָא חוּמְרוֹ קוּלּוֹ.

A student who is not yet an elder, i.e., he has not been ordained, who instructs others to act contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, is exempt, as a ruling given prior to ordination is not a valid ruling. It follows that his stringency is his leniency. The stringency imposed upon the student that he is not sanctioned to issue rulings results in the leniency that if he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling that is contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is exempt.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר״ –

GEMARA: The Sages taught with regard to that which is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between mark and mark, even matters of controversy within your gates, then you shall arise, and ascend to the place that the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 17:8). “If there shall be a matter too hard [ yippaleh ] for you”;