Avodah Zarah 16b

וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: סְתָם אֲרִי שָׁבוּר הוּא אֵצֶל מְלָאכָה.

and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna on 14b, that it is permitted to sell to a gentile large livestock that are damaged. Yet, it is prohibited to sell large undamaged beasts, just as one may not sell large undamaged livestock. Rav Ashi says: It is not necessary to explain that the mishna is referring to such a specific case. Rather, an ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor, as lions are not generally used to perform labor. Therefore there is no concern that a lion will be used to perform prohibited labor on Shabbat.

מֵיתִיבִי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה, כָּךְ אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן חַיָּה גַּסָּה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמּוֹכְרִין לָהֶן בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה — חַיָּה גַּסָּה אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב חָנָן בַּר רָבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita : Just as one may not sell large livestock to gentiles, so too one may not sell large beasts to them. And even in a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles; nevertheless, one may not sell large beasts to them. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava is a conclusive refutation.

רָבִינָא רָמֵי מַתְנִיתִין אַבָּרַיְיתָא וּמְשַׁנֵּי, תְּנַן: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן דּוּבִּין וַאֲרָיוֹת וְלֹא כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים, טַעְמָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק, הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק — מוֹכְרִין.

The Gemara presents a different version of this discussion. Ravina raises a contradiction between the mishna here and a baraita and resolves the contradiction. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. Ravina analyzes the mishna: The reason a beast such as a lion cannot be sold to gentiles is that it can cause injury to the public, from which it may be inferred that with regard to another beast, which does not cause injury to the public, one may sell it to gentiles.

וּרְמִינְהִי: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין מוֹכְרִין בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה, כָּךְ אֵין מוֹכְרִין חַיָּה גַּסָּה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמּוֹכְרִין בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה, חַיָּה גַּסָּה אֵין מוֹכְרִין. וּמְשַׁנֵּי: בַּאֲרִי שָׁבוּר, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: סְתָם אֲרִי שָׁבוּר הוּא אֵצֶל מְלָאכָה.

And Ravina raises a contradiction from a baraita : Just as one may not sell large livestock to gentiles, so too, one may not sell large beasts to them. And even in a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles, one may not sell large beasts to them. The baraita indicates that one may never sell large beasts to gentiles, even if it poses no danger to the public. And Ravina resolves the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita : The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a damaged lion, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Ashi says there is a different explanation: An ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן: מַאן לֵימָא לַן דַּאֲרִי חַיָּה גַּסָּה הִיא? דִּלְמָא חַיָּה דַּקָּה הִיא!

Rav Naḥman objects to the inference drawn from the mishna: Who will tell us that a lion is considered a large beast? Perhaps it is considered a small beast, in which case it cannot be inferred that the mishna permits the sale of large beasts.

רַב אָשֵׁי דָּיֵיק מַתְנִיתִין וּמוֹתֵיב תְּיוּבְתָּא, תְּנַן: אֵין מוֹכְרִין לָהֶן דּוּבִּים וַאֲרָיוֹת וְלֹא כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ נֶזֶק לָרַבִּים. טַעְמָא דְּאִית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק, הָא לֵית בֵּיהּ נֶזֶק מוֹכְרִין.

The Gemara explains: Rav Ashi examined the mishna here carefully, and from it he raises a refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava, who permitted the sale of large beasts. We learned in the mishna: One may not sell bears, or lions, or any item that can cause injury to the public, to gentiles. Rav Ashi inferred two conclusions from here. First, the reason a beast such as a lion cannot be sold to gentiles is because it can cause injury to the public, whereas with regard to a beast that does not cause injury to the public, one may sell it to gentiles. This inference was cited in contradiction of the opinion of Rav, as explained before.

וְטַעְמָא אֲרִי, דִּסְתָם אֲרִי שָׁבוּר הוּא אֵצֶל מְלָאכָה, אֲבָל מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא דְּעָבֵיד מְלָאכָה — לָא. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב חָנָן בַּר רָבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

And Rav Ashi then inferred, in resolution of Rav’s opinion, that the reason the mishna specifies that one may sell a lion if it does not pose a danger to the public is that an ordinary lion is considered damaged with regard to labor. But a different animal that performs labor may not be sold. This presents a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rav Ḥanan bar Rava is a conclusive refutation.

וְחַיָּה גַּסָּה מִיהַת מַאי מְלָאכָה עָבְדָא? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֲמַר לִי מָר יְהוּדָה, דְּבֵי מָר יוֹחָנִי טָחֲנִי רֵיחַיִם בַּעֲרוֹדֵי.

The Gemara asks: But in any event, what labor can a large beast perform? Why is it necessary to prohibit the sale of large beasts if they are not trained to perform any labor? Abaye said: Mar Yehuda said to me that in the house of Mar Yoḥani, they grind the mill with wild asses, which are considered large beasts.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כִּי הֲוֵינַן בֵּי רַב יְהוּדָה, אֲמַר לַן: גְּמִירוּ מִינַּאי הָא מִילְּתָא, דְּמִגַּבְרָא רַבָּה שְׁמִיעַ לִי, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא אִי מֵרַב אִי מִשְּׁמוּאֵל: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס.

§ Rabbi Zeira said: When we were in the study hall of Rav Yehuda, he said to us: Learn from me this matter, which I heard from a great man, but I do not know if I heard it from Rav or from Shmuel: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm, i.e., the symptoms of vitality required at the time of slaughtering.

כִּי אֲתַאי לְקוּרְקוּנְיָא, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס. אָמֵינָא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אִיתְּמַר. כִּי אֲתַאי לְסוּרָא, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה דְּיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר לַהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס. אָמֵינָא: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אִיתְּמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב וְאִיתְּמַר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

Rabbi Zeira continued: When I came to the city of Korkoneya, I found Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi sitting and saying in the name of Shmuel: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to myself: One can conclude from here that this was stated in the name of Shmuel. When I came to Sura, I found Rabba bar Yirmeya sitting and saying in the name of Rav: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to myself: One can conclude from here that this was stated in the name of Rav, and it was also stated in the name of Shmuel.

כִּי סְלֵיקִית לְהָתָם, אַשְׁכַּחְתֵּיהּ לְרַב אַסִּי דְּיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: אָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס. אֲמַרִי לֵיהּ: וְלָא סָבַר לַהּ מָר דְּמַאן מָרָא דִּשְׁמַעְתְּתָא רַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה? אָמַר לִי: פַּתְיָא אוּכָּמָא, מִינַּאי וּמִינָּךְ תִּסְתַּיֵּים שְׁמַעְתָּא.

When I ascended to there, Eretz Yisrael, I found Rav Asi sitting and saying that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says in the name of Rav: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm. I said to him: And doesn’t the Master hold that the Master who is responsible for dissemination of this halakha is Rabba bar Yirmeya? Why don’t you attribute the statement to him? Rav Asi said to me: Black pot [ patya ], a term of endearment for a scholar who works hard studying Torah: From me and from you this halakha may be concluded. In other words, our two statements should be combined to form one accurate attribution of the halakha .

אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי: אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, אָמַר רַב אַסִּי, אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה, אָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא, אָמַר רַב: חַיָּה גַּסָּה הֲרֵי הִיא כִּבְהֵמָה דַּקָּה לְפִירְכּוּס.

The Gemara notes that in fact this ruling was also stated: Rabbi Zeira says that Rav Asi says that Rabba bar Yirmeya says that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya says that Rav says: The status of a large beast is like that of small livestock with regard to a spasm.

אֵין בּוֹנִין כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שָׁלֹשׁ בָּסִילְקָאוֹת הֵן, שֶׁל מְלָכִים, וְשֶׁל מֶרְחֲצָאוֹת, וְשֶׁל אוֹצָרוֹת. אָמַר רָבָא: שְׁתַּיִם לְהֶיתֵּר וְאֶחָד לְאִיסּוּר, וְסִימָן: ״לֶאְסֹר מַלְכֵיהֶם בְּזִקִּים״.

§ The mishna teaches that one may not build a basilica in conjunction with gentiles. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There are three types of basilicas: Those of kings, and those of bathhouses, and those of storehouses. Rava says: Two of these types are permitted, as they are not used for inflicting the death penalty, and one is prohibited [ le’isor ]. And a mnemonic device for this ruling, that the basilica of kings is prohibited, is the verse: “To bind [ le’esor ] their kings with chains” (Psalms 149:8).

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: כּוּלָּם לְהֶיתֵּר. וְהָתְנַן: אֵין בּוֹנִין עִמָּהֶן בָּסִילְקֵי, גַּרְדּוֹם, אִיצְטַדְיָיא וּבִימָה! אֵימָא: שֶׁל גַּרְדּוֹם וְשֶׁל אִיצְטַדְיָיא וְשֶׁל בִּימָה.

And there are those who say that this is what Rava says: All these types of basilica are permitted. The Gemara asks: How can it be permitted to build any type of basilica; but didn’t we learn in the mishna: One may not build with them a basilica, a tribunal, a stadium, or a platform? The Gemara answers: Say that the mishna means the following: One may not build in conjunction with gentiles a basilica of a tribunal, or of a stadium, or of a platform. But it is permitted to build a basilica that is not used for sentencing and inflicting the death penalty.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כְּשֶׁנִּתְפַּס רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמִינוּת, הֶעֱלֻהוּ לַגַּרְדּוֹם לִידּוֹן. אָמַר לוֹ אוֹתוֹ הֶגְמוֹן: זָקֵן שֶׁכְּמוֹתְךָ יַעֲסוֹק בִּדְבָרִים בְּטֵלִים הַלָּלוּ?

§ Apropos the above discussion, the Gemara relates incidents involving Sages who were sentenced by the ruling authorities. The Sages taught: When Rabbi Eliezer was arrested and charged with heresy by the authorities, they brought him up to a tribunal to be judged. A certain judicial officer [ hegemon ] said to him: Why should an elder like you engage in these frivolous matters of heresy?

אָמַר לוֹ: נֶאֱמָן עָלַי הַדַּיָּין. כְּסָבוּר אוֹתוֹ הֶגְמוֹן: עָלָיו הוּא אוֹמֵר, וְהוּא לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא כְּנֶגֶד אָבִיו שֶׁבַּשָּׁמַיִם. אָמַר לוֹ: הוֹאִיל וְהֶאֱמַנְתִּי עָלֶיךָ, דִּימוֹס — פָּטוּר אַתָּה.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The Judge is trusted by me to rule correctly. That officer thought that Rabbi Eliezer was speaking about him; but in fact he said this only in reference to his Father in Heaven. Rabbi Eliezer meant that he accepted God’s judgment, i.e., if he was charged he must have sinned to God in some manner. The officer said to him: Since you put your trust in me, you are acquitted [ dimos ]; you are exempt.

כְּשֶׁבָּא לְבֵיתוֹ, נִכְנְסוּ תַּלְמִידָיו אֶצְלוֹ לְנַחֲמוֹ, וְלֹא קִיבֵּל עָלָיו תַּנְחוּמִין. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: רַבִּי, תַּרְשֵׁינִי לוֹמַר דָּבָר אֶחָד מִמַּה שֶּׁלִּימַּדְתַּנִי? אָמַר לוֹ: אֱמוֹר. אָמַר לוֹ: רַבִּי, שֶׁמָּא מִינוּת בָּא לְיָדְךָ

When Rabbi Eliezer came home, his students entered to console him for being accused of heresy, which he took as a sign of sin, and he did not accept their words of consolation. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, allow me to say one matter from all of that which you taught me. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Speak. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, perhaps some statement of heresy came before you