Nazir 29a

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ אִשָּׁה נָמֵי! סָבַר: אִישׁ חַיָּיב לְחַנֵּךְ בְּנוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת, וְאֵין הָאִשָּׁה חַיֶּיבֶת לְחַנֵּךְ אֶת בְּנָהּ.

said that Reish Lakish said: The purpose is in order to educate him in mitzvot, to teach him how to observe the mitzva of naziriteship. The Gemara asks: If so, even a woman as well should be able to impose naziriteship on her son for educational purposes. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that a man is obligated to educate his son in mitzvot, but a woman is not obligated to educate her son in mitzvot.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַמְּטוּ לְהָכִי: בְּנוֹ — אִין, בִּתּוֹ — לָא. אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֲפִילּוּ בִּתּוֹ! קָסָבַר: בְּנוֹ — חַיָּיב לְחַנְּכוֹ, בִּתּוֹ — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב לְחַנְּכָהּ.

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, for that reason one can understand the ruling of the mishna, which indicates that for his son, yes, a father can vow that he should be a nazirite, but with regard to his daughter, no, he cannot do so, as a halakha learned by tradition cannot be questioned. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, a father should even be able to impose naziriteship upon his daughter for the sake of her education. Why does the mishna specify a son? The Gemara answers that Reish Lakish holds: A father is obligated to educate his son, whereas he is not obligated to educate his daughter, and for this reason he cannot vow that she should be a nazirite.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַהָכִי: בִּנְזִירוּת — אִין, בִּנְדָרִים — לָא. אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ — אֲפִילּוּ נְדָרִים נָמֵי!

The Gemara asks another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why the mishna indicates that with regard to naziriteship, yes, a father can impose a vow upon his son, but with regard to other vows, no, he cannot do so. However, according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, who says it is for the son’s education, a father should even be able to impose regular vows upon him as well. Why does the mishna specify naziriteship?

לָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִיבַּעְיָא בִּנְדָרִים, דְּלֵית לֵיהּ נִיוּוּל, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ בִּנְזִירוּת, דְּאִית לֵיהּ נִיוּוּל — אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי חַיָּיב לְחַנְּכוֹ.

The Gemara answers: According to Reish Lakish the tanna of this mishna is speaking utilizing the style of: It is not necessary, as follows: It is not necessary to ask whether a father can impose regular vows of a mitzva where there is no deprivation of the son when he fulfills his father’s vow, but even with regard to naziriteship, where there is deprivation of his son, as the son must refrain from wine and shaving, even so the father is obligated to educate him, and therefore he can vow in this manner too.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי: מִיחָה אוֹ שֶׁמִּיחוּהוּ קְרוֹבָיו.

The Gemara asks another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai with regard to a nazirite, this explanation is consistent with that which the mishna teaches: If he objected, or his relatives objected for him, the naziriteship is canceled, as the transmitted halakha may be that the acquiescence of the relatives is necessary.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, כׇּל כְּמִינֵיהוֹן קְרוֹבִים דְּאָמְרִין לֵיהּ: לָא תַּיגְמְרֵיהּ מִצְוֹת?! קָסָבַר: כֹּל חִינּוּךְ דְּלָא חֲשִׁיב — לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that this vow serves educational purposes, is this really in the power of the relatives to say to the father: Do not teach him mitzvot? The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that with regard to any education that is not important, e.g., the optional mitzva of naziriteship, the son is not amenable to the suffering he must endure for this purpose, and therefore he or his relatives can object.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי מְגַלֵּחַ וְעָבֵיד הַקָּפָה.

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, it is due to that reason that the son must shave all of his hair at the conclusion of his naziriteship, despite the fact that he thereby performs the rounding of the corners of his head, in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not round the corners of your heads” (Leviticus 19:27). Since a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai has the status of Torah law, a minor nazirite shaves despite this prohibition.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת, הָא קָעָבֵיד הַקָּפָה!

The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason the vow of naziriteship takes effect is in order to educate him in mitzvot, and it applies only by rabbinic law, how does he explain the fact that this nazirite performs the rounding of the head? How does a naziriteship, which is by rabbinic law, override a Torah prohibition?

קָסָבַר: הַקָּפַת כׇּל הָרֹאשׁ מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וְחִינּוּךְ מִדְּרַבָּנַן. וְאָתֵי חִינּוּךְ דְּרַבָּנַן, וְדָחֵי הַקָּפָה דְּרַבָּנַן.

The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that the rounding of the entire head is prohibited only by rabbinic law, as the Torah itself prohibited shaving only the corners of the head, and the mitzva of education also applies by rabbinic law. And therefore the mitzva of education, which is by rabbinic law, comes and overrides the prohibition against rounding the head, which likewise applies by rabbinic law.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַהָכִי מְגַלֵּחַ מַיְיתֵי קׇרְבָּן.

The Gemara continues to ask along the same lines: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why when he shaves at the conclusion of his naziriteship he brings an offering, as the halakha is that the minor is a nazirite in all regards, which means his offering is obligatory, like that of an adult nazirite.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, כְּדֵי לְחַנְּכוֹ בְּמִצְוֹת — הָא קָא מַיְיתֵי חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה! קָסָבַר: חוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason is in order to educate him in mitzvot, the minor’s offering is not a Torah obligation, which means that he brings non-sacred animals into the Temple courtyard for slaughter. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds that the prohibition against slaughtering non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard does not apply by Torah law but by rabbinic law, and therefore this prohibition is disregarded due to the importance of the son’s education.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר, אַהָכִי כִּי מִיטַּמֵּא מַיְיתֵי קׇרְבַּן צִיפֳּרִין, וְאָכֵיל כֹּהֵן מְלִיקָה.

The Gemara asks yet another question: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a halakha with regard to a nazirite, this is why when the son becomes ritually impure he brings an offering of birds, and the priest may eat the bird sin-offering that was killed by means of pinching, nipping the neck of the bird, rather than by regular slaughter. This permits a bird to be eaten only in the case of a proper bird offering.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, הָא קָאָכֵיל נְבֵילָה!

The Gemara continues its question: However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said that Reish Lakish said that the reason the vow takes effect is to educate the son in mitzvot, in this case the priest eats an unslaughtered animal carcass. If the son is not obligated to bring the offering, the priest will be eating a bird that was killed in a manner that does not render it fit for consumption, which means it has the status of an unslaughtered carcass.

קָסָבַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאֵין שְׁחִיטָה לָעוֹף מִן הַתּוֹרָה. וְחוּלִּין בַּעֲזָרָה לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that slaughter of a bird is not obligatory by Torah law. Rather, by Torah law birds are fit to be eaten no matter how they are killed, and it was the Sages who decreed that they must be slaughtered. And he also maintains that the prohibition against bringing non-sacred animals for slaughter in the Temple courtyard does not apply by Torah law. Consequently the rabbinic mitzva of education overrides these prohibitions, as they too are rabbinic.

וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הָכִי? וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לְחַטַּאת הָעוֹף שֶׁהִיא בָּאָה עַל הַסָּפֵק שֶׁאֵינָהּ נֶאֱכֶלֶת — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהַזָּב אֶת זוֹבוֹ לַזָּכָר וְלַנְּקֵבָה״, מַקִּישׁ נְקֵבָה לְזָכָר: מָה זָכָר מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל הַוַּדַּאי — אַף נְקֵבָה מְבִיאָה קׇרְבָּן עַל הַוַּדַּאי, וּמָה זָכָר מֵבִיא עַל הַסָּפֵק — אַף נְקֵבָה מְבִיאָה עַל הַסָּפֵק.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yosei hold this opinion? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: From where is it derived that the bird sin-offering that comes due to uncertainty is not eaten? The verse states: “And they who have an issue, whether a male or a female” (Leviticus 15:33), which juxtaposes a female to a male: Just as a male brings an offering for a definite sin, i.e., for a transgression he is sure he committed inadvertently, so too, a female brings an offering for a definite sin. And just as a male brings a provisional guilt-offering for his uncertain transgression, so too, a female brings an offering for her case of uncertainty.

וּמָה זָכָר, מִמִּין שֶׁהוּא מֵבִיא עַל הַוַּדַּאי מֵבִיא עַל הַסָּפֵק — אַף נְקֵבָה מִמִּין שֶׁהִיא מְבִיאָה עַל הַוַּדַּאי מְבִיאָה עַל הַסָּפֵק. אִי: מָה זָכָר מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן וְנֶאֱכָל — אַף נְקֵבָה מְבִיאָה קׇרְבָּן וְנֶאֱכָל! אָמַרְתָּ:

And furthermore: Just as a male brings an animal for his uncertain transgression, a ram as a guilt-offering, from the same type from which he brings a definite sin-offering, an animal sin-offering, so too, a female brings the same type for her case of uncertainty from the same type from which she brings for a definite offering, i.e., a bird if she is a zava or gave birth. This leads to the following question: If so, one can continue this line of thought: Just as a male brings an offering and it is eaten, so too, a female brings an offering and it should be eaten when she sacrifices an offering for uncertain childbirth. With regard to this case you say: