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Ketubot 109a

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Babylonian Talmud · folio map

Ketubot 109a

Ketubot 109a. The full printed text of this folio side — 14 numbered segments, about 405 words — with the classic commentaries printed on the page.

Original text

Segment 1

תֵּשֵׁב עַד שֶׁיַּלְבִּין רֹאשָׁהּ. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: יְכוֹלָה הִיא שֶׁתֹּאמַר: אִילּוּ אֲנִי פָּסַקְתִּי לְעַצְמִי — אֵשֵׁב עַד שֶׁיַּלְבִּין רֹאשִׁי, עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאַבָּא פָּסַק — מָה אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לַעֲשׂוֹת? אוֹ כְּנוֹס, אוֹ פְּטוֹר. אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.

the betrothed woman can be left to sit unwed in her father’s house until her head turns white. If the groom does not wish to marry without a dowry he cannot be forced to do so, as the father failed to fulfill his promise. Admon says that she can say: Had I apportioned the money myself and broken my promise, I would agree to sit until my head turns white. However, now that my father was the one who apportioned the dowry, what can I do? Either marry me or release me by a bill of divorce. Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.

Segment 2

גְּמָ׳ מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אַדְמוֹן וַחֲכָמִים עַל הַפּוֹסֵק מָעוֹת לַחֲתָנוֹ וּפָשַׁט לוֹ אֶת הָרֶגֶל, שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה הִיא שֶׁתֹּאמַר: ״אַבָּא פָּסַק עָלַי, מָה אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לַעֲשׂוֹת״.

GEMARA: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna , as it is taught in the Tosefta (13:1) that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Admon and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to one who promises and apportions money for his son-in-law as a dowry and subsequently went bankrupt, that the betrothed woman can say: My father apportioned money for me; what can I do?

Segment 3

עַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ — עַל שֶׁפָּסְקָה הִיא עַל עַצְמָהּ. שֶׁחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: תֵּשֵׁב עַד שֶׁתַּלְבִּין רֹאשָׁהּ. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר, יְכוֹלָה הִיא שֶׁתֹּאמַר: כִּסְבוּרָה אֲנִי שֶׁאַבָּא נוֹתֵן עָלַי, וְעַכְשָׁיו שֶׁאֵין אַבָּא נוֹתֵן עָלַי — מָה אֲנִי יְכוֹלָה לַעֲשׂוֹת? אוֹ כְּנוֹס אוֹ פְּטוֹר. אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.

With regard to what did they disagree? It is with regard to a case where she apportioned money for herself, as the Rabbis say: Let her sit until her head turns white, as she did not fulfill her promise. However, Admon says that she can say: I thought that my father would give the money for me, and now that my father is not giving the money for me, what can I do? Either marry me or release me. And it is with regard to this case that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, as the betrothed woman has no money of her own, and she was clearly relying on her father to provide the dowry.

Segment 4

תָּנָא: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בִּגְדוֹלָה, אֲבָל בִּקְטַנָּה — כּוֹפִין. כּוֹפִין לְמַאן? אִילֵימָא לְאָב — אִיפְּכָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כּוֹפִין לַבַּעַל לִיתֵּן גֵּט.

§ It is taught: In what case is this statement said? It is said in the case of an adult woman. However, with regard to a minor girl, the court compels payment. The Gemara asks: Whom do they compel? If we say that they coerce the father to pay, the tanna should have stated the opposite. It is more reasonable to suggest that the father is compelled to pay when an adult woman promises the money, as the promises of an adult are legally valid, whereas a minor is not legally competent and therefore her promises are of no consequence. Rather, Rava said: In the case of a minor, the court compels the groom either to give her a bill of divorce or to marry her.

Segment 5

אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּחִזְקִיָּה: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ״רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן״ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: אֲפִילּוּ בְּבָרַיְיתָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי קָאָמְרִינַן בַּמִּשְׁנָה?! בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל קָאָמְרִינַן.

§ Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar said in the name of Ḥizkiyya: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Does this halakhic principle apply even when the debate between Admon and the Rabbis is recorded in a baraita ? Rav Naḥman said to him: Did we say: Anywhere it is recorded in the Mishna? We said: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said, which means even in a baraita .

Segment 6

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר יִרְמְיָה: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — אֵין הֲלָכָה כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ. מַאי קָאָמַר?

Rabbi Zeira said that Rabba bar Yirmeya said: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, i.e., Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai (see 107b); however, with regard to the seven statements that Admon said, the halakha is not in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, i.e., Rabban Gamliel. The Gemara asks: What is he saying? What does this ruling mean?

Segment 7

אִילֵּימָא הָכִי קָאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, וְשִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְלֹא כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ. וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּחִזְקִיָּה: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ״רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן״ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ!

If we say that this is what he is saying: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, and with regard to the seven statements that Admon said, the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion and also not in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, but didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar say in the name of Ḥizkiyya: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion.

Segment 8

אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — אֵין הֲלָכָה כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ. הָא כְּמוֹתוֹ — הֲלָכָה בְּכוּלְּהוּ.

Rather, this is what Rabbi Zeira is saying: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and is also in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, i.e., Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai. With regard to the seven statements that Admon said, the halakha is not only in accordance with the ruling of Rabban Gamliel, who ruled similarly to Admon in three of these cases. Rather, the halakha is in accordance with Admon’s ruling in all seven cases.

Segment 9

וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּחִזְקִיָּה: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל ״רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן״ — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, אָמַר — אִין, לֹא אָמַר — לָא!

The Gemara questions this interpretation: Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar say in the name of Ḥizkiyya: Anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion? It may be inferred from here that in those cases concerning which Rabban Gamliel said his statement, yes, the halakha is in accordance with Admon’s ruling, but in those cases where Rabban Gamliel did not say his statement, no, the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Admon.

Segment 10

אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר חָנָן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, שִׁבְעָה דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָמַר אַדְמוֹן — יֵשׁ מֵהֶן שֶׁהֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ, וְיֵשׁ מֵהֶן שֶׁאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ אֶלָּא כַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ.

Rather, this is what Rabbi Zeira is saying: With regard to the two statements that Ḥanan said, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and is also in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him. With regard to the seven statements that Admon said, there are among these rulings those in which the halakha is in accordance with his opinion and in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him, and there are among these rulings those in which the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion but in accordance with he who ruled similarly to him.

Segment 11

בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ, אִינָךְ — לָא.

The Gemara explains the above statement. In other words, anywhere it is recorded that Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, whereas in those other cases, where Rabban Gamliel remained silent, indicating that he did not agree with him, the halakha is not in accordance with Admon.

Segment 12

מַתְנִי׳ הָעוֹרֵר עַל הַשָּׂדֶה, וְהוּא חָתוּם עָלֶיהָ בְּעֵד — אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: הַשֵּׁנִי נוֹחַ לִי, וְהָרִאשׁוֹן קָשֶׁה הֵימֶנּוּ.

MISHNA: With regard to one who contests ownership of a field, claiming that a field under the control of someone else actually belongs to him, and the claimant himself is signed as a witness on the bill of sale to that other person, Admon says: His signature does not disprove his claim of ownership of the property, as it is possible that the claimant said to himself: The second person is easier for me, as I can reason with him, but the first owner, who sold the field to the current holder, is more difficult to deal with than him. The claimant might have been afraid to protest against the first one, who is perhaps violent, and therefore he was even willing to sign as a witness to transfer the field to the control of someone more amenable to his ensuing protest.

Segment 13

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ. עֲשָׂאָהּ סִימָן לְאַחֵר — אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ.

And the Rabbis say: He has lost his right to contest ownership, as he signed a bill of sale that states that the field belongs to the present holder. If he established that field as a marker for another field, everyone agrees that he has lost his right. In other words, if the claimant wrote a document concerning another field and in that document he listed the first field as a boundary marker and described it as belonging to someone else, even Admon concedes that he has lost his right, as he had no reason to say it belonged to someone else other than his belief this was in fact the case.

Segment 14

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא עֵד, אֲבָל דַּיָּין — לֹא אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ. דְּתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אֵין הָעֵדִים חוֹתְמִין עַל הַשְּׁטָר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן קְרָאוּהוּ.

GEMARA: Abaye said: They taught this dispute only with regard to a witness who signed on a bill of sale. However, a judge who was contesting the ownership of a field and at the same time sat on a court that certified the bill of sale for that very tract of land has not lost his right. This is as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Witnesses do not sign a document unless they have read it, which means that a witness cannot reasonably claim that he is certifying only part of document; it is assumed that he read and is aware of everything it contains.

Ketubot 109a

Ketubot 109a

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