Chullin 117a

מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ, וְחַיָּיבִין עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר וְטָמֵא, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּדָּם.

one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. And second, one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibition of piggul , if it was from an offering that was slaughtered with the intent to sprinkle its blood or partake of it beyond its designated time, and due to the prohibition of notar , if it was from an offering whose period for consumption has expired. And third, if one is ritually impure, he is liable due to the prohibition of partaking of it while impure. This is not so with regard to blood, as one is not liable in these cases for violating the prohibitions of piggul , notar , and partaking of offerings while impure, but rather is liable only for violating the prohibition of consuming blood.

וְחוֹמֶר בַּדָּם, שֶׁהַדָּם נוֹהֵג בִּבְהֵמָה וְחַיָּה וָעוֹף, בֵּין טְמֵאִים וּבֵין טְהוֹרִים, וְחֵלֶב אֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג אֶלָּא בִּבְהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה בִּלְבַד.

And the more stringent element in the prohibition of blood is that the prohibition of blood applies to domesticated animals, undomesticated animals, and birds, both kosher and non-kosher, but the prohibition of forbidden fat applies only to a kosher domesticated animal.

גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יוּרַם מִשּׁוֹר זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים״, וְכִי מָה לָמַדְנוּ מִשּׁוֹר זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים מֵעַתָּה?

GEMARA: According to the mishna, one who consumes forbidden fat of an offering is liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Yannai said: They are derived from a verse, as the verse states that the sacrificial portions of a bull brought for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest must be burned upon the altar: “As it is taken off from the bull of the peace offering” (Leviticus 4:10). But what, then, do we learn from the bull of the peace offering? Everything that is specified with regard to a peace offering is stated with regard to this bull as well (see Leviticus 4:8–9).

הֲרֵי זֶה בָּא לְלַמֵּד, וְנִמְצָא לָמֵד, מַקִּישׁ שׁוֹר זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים לְפַר כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ: מָה פַּר כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ יֵשׁ בּוֹ מְעִילָה, אַף שׁוֹר זֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים יֵשׁ בּוֹ מְעִילָה.

Rather, this phrase initially comes to teach a halakha about the bull brought as an offering for an unwitting sin of the anointed priest, but it turns out that it actually derives a halakha from that case, as the verse juxtaposes the bull of the peace offering to the bull of the anointed priest. It teaches that just as the bull of the anointed priest, as an offering of the most sacred order, is subject to the prohibition on misuse of consecrated property, as offerings of the most sacred order are called “the sacred items of the Lord” (see Leviticus 5:15), so too the sacrificial portions of the bull of the peace offering, including its forbidden fat, are subject to misuse of consecrated property, even though it is an offering of lesser sanctity and is considered the property of the owner before slaughter.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: כְּעוּרָה זוֹ שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבִּי, ״כׇּל חֵלֶב לַה׳״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים לִמְעִילָה?

Rabbi Ḥanina said to Rabbi Yannai: Is that derivation that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught unattractive, that you derive a new one? He taught that when the Torah states with regard to peace offerings, which are of lesser sanctity: “All the fat is the Lord’s” (Leviticus 3:16), it serves to include the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity in the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property, even though the prohibition is stated explicitly only with regard to offerings of the most sacred order.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״חֵלֶב״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חֵלֶב – אִין, יוֹתֶרֶת וּשְׁתֵּי כְלָיוֹת – לָא. כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יוּרַם״.

Abaye said: Rabbi Yannai’s derivation was necessary, as, if the Merciful One had written only the verse “All the fat is the Lord’s,” I would say that the fat of offerings of lesser sanctity, yes, they are included in the prohibition, but the diaphragm and the two kidneys of such offerings are not, even though they are also burned upon the altar. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “As it is taken off from the bull of the peace offering,” to teach that even these portions are subject to the prohibition of misuse.

וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יוּרַם״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: חֵלֶב אַלְיָה דְּלֵיתַהּ בְּשׁוֹר – לָא, כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כׇּל חֵלֶב״.

And conversely, if the Merciful One had written only the phrase: “As it is taken off from the bull,” I would say that the prohibition applies only to those portions that are found in a bull, and that the fat of a sheep tail, which is not found in a bull, is not included. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “All the fat is the Lord’s,” to teach that the prohibition of misuse applies to all portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, including a sheep tail, which is referred to as fat in Leviticus 3:9.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מָרִי לְרַב זְבִיד: אִי אַלְיָה אִיקְּרַאי ״חֵלֶב״, תִּיתְּסַר בַּאֲכִילָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עָלֶיךָ אָמַר קְרָא ״כׇּל חֵלֶב שׁוֹר וְכֶשֶׂב וָעֵז״ – דָּבָר הַשָּׁוֶה בְּשׁוֹר וְכֶשֶׂב וָעֵז.

Rav Mari said to Rav Zevid: If a sheep tail is called “fat,” it should be prohibited for consumption, like forbidden fat. Rav Zevid said to Rav Mari: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “You shall eat no fat, of ox, or sheep, or goat” (Leviticus 7:23). This teaches that the Torah designates as forbidden fat only an item that is found equally in an ox, and a sheep, and a goat. Since the ox and goat do not have a tail that consists of a large amount of fat, the sheep’s fatty tail is not prohibited.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״חֶלְבּוֹ הָאַלְיָה״ אִיקְּרַאי, ״חֵלֶב״ סְתָמָא לָא אִיקְּרַאי. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, לֹא יִמְעֲלוּ בָּהּ! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְרַב זְבִיד.

Rav Ashi said a different explanation: It is called “the fat tail,” but it is not called simply: Fat, without specification. The Gemara objects: If that is so that the addition of a modifier indicates that the tail is not truly fat, then one who derives benefit from the tail should not be liable for misuse of consecrated property either. Rather, it is clear that the correct answer is as stated by Rav Zevid.

מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּדָּם, מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר עוּלָּא: דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״לָכֶם״, שֶׁלָּכֶם יְהֵא. דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: ״לְכַפֵּר״ – לְכַפָּרָה נְתַתִּיו, וְלֹא לִמְעִילָה.

§ The mishna teaches: This is not so with regard to blood, as one who derives benefit from blood is not liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Ulla said: The verse states with regard to blood: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls” (Leviticus 17:11). The term “to you” indicates that it shall be yours, rather than consecrated property, and is therefore not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a different derivation. By using the term “to make atonement,” the verse teaches that God is saying: I gave it to achieve atonement, but not to be subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״הוּא״, הוּא לִפְנֵי כַּפָּרָה כִּלְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה, מָה לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה אֵין בּוֹ מְעִילָה, אַף לִפְנֵי כַּפָּרָה אֵין בּוֹ מְעִילָה.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that this halakha is derived from the latter part of the verse, which states: “For it is the blood that makes atonement for the soul” (Leviticus 17:11). The term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains as it is, i.e., it is before atonement as it is after atonement. As the Gemara will state, there is a principle that once the mitzva involving a consecrated item has been performed, the item is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. Accordingly, the term “it is” teaches that just as after atonement, i.e., after the blood has been sprinkled upon the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property, as the mitzva has already been performed, so too, before atonement, i.e., before the blood has been sprinkled upon the altar, it is not subject to the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property.

וְאֵימָא הוּא לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה כְּלִפְנֵי כַּפָּרָה: מָה לִפְנֵי כַּפָּרָה – יֵשׁ בּוֹ מְעִילָה, אַף לְאַחַר כַּפָּרָה – יֵשׁ בּוֹ מְעִילָה! אֵין לְךָ דָּבָר שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה מִצְוָתוֹ וּמוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ.

The Gemara objects: But if the term “it is” teaches that the status of the blood remains the same before and after atonement, one can say just the opposite: It is after atonement as it is before atonement. Just as before atonement the blood is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, so too, after atonement it is subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara responds: This cannot be the case, since as a rule, there is no item whose mitzva has been performed and is still subject to the prohibition of misusing of consecrated property.

וְלָא? וַהֲרֵי תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן, דְּנַעֲשָׂה מִצְוָתוֹ, וּמוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשָׂמוֹ אֵצֶל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ״!

The Gemara asks: And is there no such case? But there is the mitzva of the daily removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar, the mitzva of which has been performed, and yet one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property, as it is written: “And he shall take up the ashes of what the fire has consumed of the burnt offering on the altar, and he shall put them beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3). The ashes must be left there, where they are absorbed into the ground, and one who removes and derives benefit from them violates the prohibition against misuse of consecrated property, even though their mitzva has been performed. This contradicts the principle posited above.

מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵאי תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן וּבִגְדֵי כְהוּנָּה (שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד), וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.

The Gemara answers: The principle does not apply in that case, because the mitzva of the removal of the ashes and the matter of the four white priestly vestments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, which may not be used again, are both specified as exceptions to the halakha that the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property does not apply after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And as a rule, any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases. The principle therefore remains in place.

הָנִיחָא לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי: ״וְהִנִּיחָם שָׁם״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁטְּעוּנִין גְּנִיזָה, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי דּוֹסָא דְּאָמַר שֶׁלֹּא יִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן לְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים אַחֵר, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the Sanctuary, and shall leave them there” (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that these four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are not fit for further use, and they require interment. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who said that the verse teaches only that the High Priest may not use the vestments on Yom Kippur in a different year, but they are fit for an ordinary priest and do not require interment, what is there to say? If the priestly vestments are not an exception to the halakha that there is no prohibition of misuse of consecrated property after the performance of a mitzva, the removal of the ashes remains as the only exception. Why, then, does it not serve as a paradigm for other instances in the Torah?

אֶלָּא, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵאי תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִים הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִים הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.

The Gemara responds: Rather, it is because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken to atone for an unsolved murder (Deuteronomy 21:1–9) are two verses that come as one, as it is also prohibited to derive benefit from the heifer after its mitzva is performed. And any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? תְּרֵי

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to apply to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to apply to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Two