Daf 2b: Finding and Buying: Oaths, Possession, and Disputed Money

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·TerutzBava Metzia 2b

   דְּאִי תְּנָא מְצִיאָה הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מְצִיאָה הוּא דִּרְמוֹ רַבָּנַן שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם דְּמוֹרֵי וְאָמַר, חַבְרַאי לָאו מִידֵּי חָסַר בָּהּ, אֵיזִל אֶתְפִּיס וְאִתְפְּלֵיג בַּהֲדֵיהּ! אֲבָל מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר, דְּלֵיכָּא לְמֵימַר הָכִי – אֵימָא לָא. וְאִי תְּנָא מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר, הוּא דִּרְמוֹ רַבָּנַן שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם דְּמוֹרֵי וְאָמַר: חַבְרַאי דְּמֵי קָא יָהֵיב וַאֲנָא דְּמֵי קָא יָהֵיבְנָא, הַשְׁתָּא דִּצְרִיכָא לְדִידִי אֶשְׁקְלֵיהּ אֲנָא, וְחַבְרַאי לֵיזִיל לִטְרַח לִיזְבַּן, אֲבָל מְצִיאָה, דְּלֵיכָּא לְמֵימַר הָכִי – אֵימָא לָא. צְרִיכָא.

   The page opens by continuing the answer to why the Mishnah must address both finding an object and purchasing one. Had only finding been taught, we might limit the oath to that case: a person could justify grabbing a share because the finder paid nothing for the object. Had only purchasing been taught, we might limit the oath to that case: a claimant could argue that he too is paying, needs the object now, and can leave the other buyer to shop elsewhere. Each direction of the argument proposes a different rationalization; neither establishes that one is always more serious. Both cases must therefore be taught so that the oath requirement is not restricted to either one. This lays a foundation for the chapter: an oath also addresses people who justify wrongful seizure, not just openly acknowledged theft.

2. 02·TerutzBava Metzia 2b

   מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר, וְלִחְזֵי זוּזֵי מִמַּאן נָקֵט? לָא צְרִיכָא דְּנָקֵט מִתַּרְוַיְיהוּ, מֵחַד מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ וּמֵחַד בְּעַל כָּרְחֵיהּ, וְלָא יָדַעְנָא מִי הוּא מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ, וּמִי הוּא בְּעַל כָּרְחֵיהּ.

   The Gemara objects that a dispute between buyers could apparently be clarified by checking whose money the seller accepted. The question assumes that knowing about the payment would identify the transaction the seller accepted, avoiding division under uncertainty. The answer places the Mishnah in a case where the seller received money from both: willingly from one and unwillingly from the other. We do not know which payment belonged to the transaction he accepted and which was forced upon him. Payment itself therefore does not distinguish the buyers, and the Mishnah's uncertainty remains. This does not establish that payment alone decides all questions of acquisition; it explains why a potentially clarifying fact fails to help here.

3. 03·KushyaBava Metzia 2b

   לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּבֶן נַנָּס, דְּאִי בֶּן נַנָּס, הָאָמַר: כֵּיצַד אֵלּוּ וָאֵלּוּ בָּאִין לִידֵי שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא?

   The Gemara proposes that the Mishnah does not fit Ben Nannas's position. Ben Nannas objects to imposing contradictory oaths when one must be false. The background is the discussion of a shopkeeper and workers in tractate Shevuot, whose accounts of payment cannot both be true. The objection assumes that two holders who each claim full ownership likewise produce necessarily contradictory oaths. Requiring both to swear would then conflict with his position. We must now examine what the Mishnah's oaths actually say, rather than rely only on the conflict between the initial ownership claims.

4. 04·TerutzBava Metzia 2b

   אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בֶּן נַנָּס, הָתָם וַדַּאי אִיכָּא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא. הָכָא אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דְּלֵיכָּא שְׁבוּעַת שָׁוְא, אֵימוֹר דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי אַגְבְּהוּהָ.

   The Gemara answers that the Mishnah can fit Ben Nannas as well. In his case, one oath must be false; in our Mishnah, both oaths could be true. The two holders may have lifted the found object together and acquired it jointly. Each swears that his share is no less than half, so both oaths can be true even though each initially claimed the whole object. The answer does not prove that joint acquisition occurred; it removes the certainty that the court is imposing a false oath. This distinction carries the resolution: conflicting claims do not necessarily produce conflicting oaths when the oaths are more narrowly worded.

5. 05·KushyaBava Metzia 2b

   לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּסוֹמְכוֹס, דְּאִי כְּסוֹמְכוֹס, הָאָמַר: מָמוֹן הַמּוּטָּל בְּסָפֵק – חוֹלְקִין בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה.

   The Gemara now tests whether the Mishnah fits Sumakhos. Sumakhos rules that money whose ownership is uncertain is divided without an oath. The garment also appears to have uncertain ownership, yet the Mishnah requires an oath. The difficulty concerns not division itself, which both sources allow, but the oath attached to it. The objection assumes that the relevant ownership disputes all fall under the same rule. The following discussion tests whether structural differences justify a different result.

6. 06·KushyaBava Metzia 2b

   וְאֶלָּא מַאי, רַבָּנַן? הָא אָמְרִי הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵרוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה!

   The Gemara challenges the alternative of assigning the Mishnah to the Sages rather than Sumakhos. The Sages hold that one seeking to remove property from another bears the burden of proof. That principle appears to require evidence rather than division merely because ownership is uncertain. The objection assumes that the Mishnah removes property without proof, so attribution to the Sages also needs explanation. The argument now reaches a junction: Sumakhos seems to pose a problem about the oath, while the Sages seem to pose a problem about division. Progress requires examining how joint possession changes the burden of proof.

7. 07·TerutzBava Metzia 2b

   הַאי מַאי, אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן: הָתָם דְּלָא תָּפְסִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ אֲמַרוּ רַבָּנַן הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה, הָכָא דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ תָּפְסִי [פָּלְגִי] לַהּ בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

   The Gemara resolves the difficulty with the Sages by distinguishing forms of possession. Where both parties do not hold the property, someone seeking to remove it from its possessor needs evidence. In our Mishnah, both hold it, so neither has a superior position as possessor of the entire garment. Division with an oath fits this situation without canceling the rule that the claimant seeking removal bears the burden of proof. The answer shows that uncertainty alone does not determine the outcome; we must also ask who possesses the property. This distinction is a structural foundation for the tractate's further discussions of two holders.

8. 08·KushyaBava Metzia 2b

   אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ סוֹמְכוֹס, הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה הָתָם דְּלָא תָּפְסִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ – חוֹלְקִין בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה, הָכָא דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ תָּפְסִי לַהּ – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!

   The same distinction in possession appears to strengthen rather than resolve the difficulty with Sumakhos. If he allows division without an oath even where both parties do not hold the property, all the more so when both hold it. Joint possession seems to provide stronger grounds for division, not a reason to add an oath. The argument assumes that stronger grounds for division also support dispensing with the oath. At this stage, possession alone therefore cannot explain the Mishnah's oath requirement. A further distinction is needed.

9. 09·TerutzBava Metzia 2b

   אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא סוֹמְכוֹס: כִּי אָמַר סוֹמְכוֹס שֶׁמָּא וְשֶׁמָּא, אֲבָל בָּרִי וּבָרִי – לָא אָמַר.

   The Gemara proposes limiting Sumakhos's statement to shema ve-shema, where neither party knows with certainty what happened. In our Mishnah, each asserts a definite claim that the garment is his. On this answer, Sumakhos did not state his rule of division without an oath for a case of bari u-vari. The distinction shifts attention from the object's possession to the parties' professed knowledge. An uncertainty acknowledged by both does not present the same clash of definite claims found in the Mishnah. This removes the direct contradiction with Sumakhos without establishing a comprehensive rule for every case of bari u-vari.

10. 10·KushyaBava Metzia 2b

    וּלְרַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר: אָמַר סוֹמְכוֹס אֲפִילּוּ בָּרִי וּבָרִי, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

    The Gemara objects from Rabbah bar Rav Huna's understanding of Sumakhos. According to him, Sumakhos stated his rule even for bari u-vari. The Mishnah's oath therefore cannot be explained merely by the fact that both parties assert certainty. This objection does not erase the distinction between certainty and uncertainty; it shows that the distinction fails to reconcile the Mishnah under this interpretation of Sumakhos. An answer is needed that does not limit his rule to shema ve-shema. The proposed resolution is thus tested against another transmitted understanding of the same position.

11. 11·TerutzBava Metzia 2b

    אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא סוֹמְכוֹס, כִּי אָמַר סוֹמְכוֹס – הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא דְּרָרָא דְמָמוֹנָא, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא דְּרָרָא דְמָמוֹנָא – לָא.

    The Gemara proposes a new distinction: Sumakhos stated his rule where there is derara de-mamona, not where it is absent. This term requires careful interpretation: Rashi explains it as monetary loss, while Tosafot emphasize a doubt that exists for the court even without the parties' claims. On Tosafot's reading, an event that independently generates monetary uncertainty differs from a dispute whose uncertainty arises from the litigants' assertions. Our Mishnah lacks that independent basis for doubt in the Gemara's presentation. This distinction can limit division without an oath even if Sumakhos includes bari u-vari in his rule. The foundation of the argument has shifted: the focus is now the character of the monetary doubt, not the claimants' degree of confidence.

12. 12·KushyaBava Metzia 2b

    וְלָאו קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא? וּמָה הָתָם דְּאִיכָּא דְּרָרָא דְמָמוֹנָא לְמָר, וְאִיכָּא דְּרָרָא דְמָמוֹנָא לְמָר,

    The Gemara opens another objection: does this distinction actually generate an a fortiori argument against the answer? It begins with the case in which each party has derara de-mamona. The fact that each side has it is now something whose argumentative force must be reconsidered, not an accepted key to exemption from an oath. On Rashi's interpretation, mentioning each party's monetary loss highlights the financial risk involved in division. The supplied text ends mid-sentence, before the comparison is completed. We therefore mark an open objection: the latest distinction is still being tested, and this page alone does not provide a final answer.

1. 1Why must the oath requirement be taught for both finding and purchasing? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2What allows the Mishnah to fit Ben Nannas? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3How is the Mishnah's division reconciled with the Sages? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4Why is the distinction between shema ve-shema and bari u-vari insufficient according to Rabbah bar Rav Huna? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What is the state of the discussion at the end of the supplied text? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.