Daf 3a: Division, Fraud, and Rabbi Ḥiyya’s Oath

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·KushyaBava Metzia 3a

   וְאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר כּוּלָּהּ לְמָר, וְאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר כּוּלָּהּ לְמָר, אָמַר סוֹמְכוֹס: מָמוֹן הַמּוּטָּל בְּסָפֵק חוֹלְקִין בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה, הָכָא, דְּלֵיכָּא דְּרָרָא דְמָמוֹנָא, דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ הִיא, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!

   The page opens in the middle of an objection to aligning the Mishnah with Sumakhos. In the comparison case, the entire sum might belong to just one party, yet Sumakhos calls for division without an oath. With the garment, ownership might genuinely be shared, so division could reflect reality. Despite the absence here of derara demamona, the challenger treats that possibility as an even stronger reason to divide without an oath. Why, then, does the Mishnah require one?

2. 02·TerutzBava Metzia 3a

   אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא סוֹמְכוֹס, שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ מִדְּרַבָּנַן הִיא כִּדְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁבוּעָה זוֹ תַּקָּנַת חֲכָמִים הִיא, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד הוֹלֵךְ וְתוֹקֵף בְּטַלִּיתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ וְאוֹמֵר: שֶׁלִּי הוּא.

   The Gemara answers that even Sumakhos can accept the Mishnah’s oath. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains that it is a rabbinic enactment meant to stop someone from grabbing another person’s garment and demanding a share. The objection assumed that the oath arose from the law of uncertainty itself. The answer separates two levels: division determines how the property is handled, while the oath protects the process against exploitation. Sumakhos’s rule of division without an oath therefore does not exclude a special enactment here.

3. 03·KushyaBava Metzia 3a

   לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאִי כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – הָא אָמַר: אִם כֵּן מָה הִפְסִיד רַמַּאי? אֶלָּא הַכֹּל יְהֵא מוּנָּח עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ.

   The discussion now tests whether the Mishnah fits Rabbi Yosei’s position. The background is Bava Metzia’s deposit case: one person deposited one hundred and another two hundred, but each claims two hundred. The Sages return one hundred to each and retain the disputed hundred, while Rabbi Yosei withholds everything. In his view, returning even the liar’s undisputed amount leaves him with nothing to lose through his lie. The challenger assumes that this concern about rewarding fraud should likewise require withholding the garment rather than dividing it.

4. 04·KushyaBava Metzia 3a

   אֶלָּא מַאי רַבָּנַן – כֵּיוָן דְּאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן: ״הַשְּׁאָר יְהֵא מוּנָּח עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ״, הָא נָמֵי כִּשְׁאָר דָּמֵי, דִּסְפֵיקָא הִיא!

   The Gemara challenges the attempt to identify the Mishnah specifically with the Sages. The Sages too retain the uncertain portion of the deposit until Elijah comes. Apparently, the entire garment corresponds to that disputed portion, since its ownership is contested. The assumption is that uncertainty alone is enough to transfer the withholding rule from one case to another. If that assumption is correct, the Mishnah poses a difficulty for the Sages as well as Rabbi Yosei.

5. 05·TerutzBava Metzia 3a

   הַאי מַאי? אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רַבָּנַן, הָתָם דְּוַדַּאי הַאי מָנֶה דְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ הוּא אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן: יְהֵא מוּנָּח עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ. הָכָא דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ הוּא, אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן: פָּלְגִי בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

   The answer rejects the automatic comparison between these forms of uncertainty. In the deposit case, the additional hundred certainly belongs to one person alone, so dividing it would give the other person money that is not his. With the garment, both may be owners, so division could be entirely correct. For the Sages, this difference allows division with an oath in the garment case and withholding in the deposit case. The answer is not that every uncertainty is resolved by division, but that this division could match actual ownership.

6. 06·KushyaBava Metzia 3a

   אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא, הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה הָתָם דִּבְוַדַּאי אִיכָּא מָנֶה לְמָר וְאִיכָּא מָנֶה לְמָר, אֲמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי יְהֵא מוּנָּח עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ, הָכָא דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר דְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ הוּא – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!

   The difficulty with Rabbi Yosei nevertheless remains. In the deposit case, each person certainly owns one hundred, yet Rabbi Yosei withholds even that amount. With the garment, one claimant might own nothing at all, apparently giving an even stronger reason to withhold it. This kal vaḥomer turns on how much ownership is certain for each claimant. At this stage, the challenger still understands Rabbi Yosei as broadly extending withholding in a disputed case.

7. 07·TerutzBava Metzia 3a

   אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, הָתָם – וַדַּאי אִיכָּא רַמַּאי, הָכָא מִי יֵימַר דְּאִיכָּא רַמַּאי? אֵימָא תַּרְוַיְיהוּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי אַגְבְּהוּהָ.

   The Gemara answers that the Mishnah can fit Rabbi Yosei too. In the deposit case, someone is certainly lying, since both depositors cannot be telling the truth about their deposits. No such certainty exists with the garment: both may have lifted it together. Their claims could therefore reflect a mistake about acquisition rather than deliberate falsehood. The answer changes the axis of comparison: what matters here is not the amount of undisputed money but certainty that a liar is present.

8. 08·TerutzBava Metzia 3a

   אִי נָמֵי: הָתָם קָנֵיס לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְרַמַּאי כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי, הָכָא מַאי פְּסֵידָא אִית לֵיהּ דְּלוֹדֵי.

   A second answer focuses on the purpose of Rabbi Yosei’s penalty. In the deposit case, the liar also loses access to the hundred he actually deposited, creating pressure to admit the truth. With a found garment, if someone grabs property that is not his, withholding it does not deprive him of property he previously owned. The loss intended to induce admission is therefore absent. This answer distinguishes the cases by the penalty’s effectiveness, not merely by whether a liar is certainly present.

9. 09·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 3a

   תִּינַח מְצִיאָה, מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְשַׁנִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא.

   The Gemara limits the force of the last answer. With a found object, the grabber has no prior investment to lose, but the Mishnah also covers a purchase, as established earlier in the tractate. Where money has been paid, one cannot simply assume that a liar has no loss that might induce admission. The Gemara therefore prefers the first answer: the garment case has no definite liar. In a purchase too, both parties may be mistaken about whom the seller agreed to sell to, so deliberate deception is not inevitable.

10. 10·KushyaBava Metzia 3a

    בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן וּבֵין לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, הָתָם גַּבֵּי חֶנְוָנִי עַל פִּנְקָסוֹ דְּקָתָנֵי: זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל, וְזֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. מַאי שְׁנָא דְּלָא אָמְרִינַן נַפְּקֵיהּ לְמָמוֹנָא מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וִיהֵא מוּנָּח עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ, דְּהָא בְּוַדַּאי אִיכָּא רַמַּאי!

    The Gemara tests its distinctions against the shopkeeper’s ledger case, known from tractate Shevuot. An employer instructed a shopkeeper to pay his workers; the shopkeeper says he paid, while the workers say they received nothing. The cited rule lets both sides swear and collect from the employer. One account is certainly false, creating a difficulty for both the Sages and Rabbi Yosei. Why not take the money from the employer and retain it, rather than allow payment to someone whose claim is false?

11. 11·TerutzBava Metzia 3a

    אָמְרִי הָתָם, הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ חֶנְוָנִי לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת: אֲנָא שְׁלִיחוּתָא דִידָךְ קָא עָבְדִינָא, מַאי אִית לִי גַּבֵּי שָׂכִיר, אַף עַל גַּב דְּקָא מִשְׁתְּבַע לִי, לָא מְהֵימַן לִי בִּשְׁבוּעָה, אַתְּ הֶאֱמַנְתֵּיהּ, דְּלָא אֲמַרְתְּ לִי בְּסָהֲדֵי הַב לֵיהּ.

    The answer begins by mapping the shopkeeper’s claim against the employer. The shopkeeper says he acted on the employer’s instructions, so he seeks reimbursement from the employer, not from the worker. He never accepted the worker’s credibility, and the worker’s oath does not determine his claim. The employer could have required payment before witnesses but did not. The worker’s denial therefore cannot automatically block the shopkeeper’s claim.

12. 12·TerutzBava Metzia 3a

    וְשָׂכִיר נָמֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת: אֲנָא עֲבַדִי עֲבִידְתָּא גַּבָּךְ, מַאי אִית לִי גַּבֵּי חֶנְוָנִי, אַף עַל גַּב דְּמִשְׁתְּבַע לִי לָא מְהֵימָן לִי. הִלְכָּךְ, תַּרְוַיְיהוּ מִשְׁתַּבְעִי וְשָׁקְלִי מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת.

    The worker also has an independent claim against the employer: he worked for him and is owed wages. The worker never agreed that the shopkeeper’s oath would establish that those wages had been paid. The shopkeeper and worker are therefore not competing for one deposit, but pursuing claims arising from separate relationships with the employer. This structural difference answers the objection even though one account is certainly false. The conclusion in this case is that both swear and collect from the employer.

13. 13·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 3a

    תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי כְּלוּם, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז – נוֹתֵן לוֹ חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז, וְיִשָּׁבַע עַל הַשְּׁאָר. שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא הוֹדָאַת פִּיו גְּדוֹלָה מֵהַעֲדָאַת עֵדִים, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר.

    Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches a new rule: the claimant demands one hundred, the defendant denies everything, and witnesses establish a debt of fifty zuz. The defendant pays fifty and swears concerning the balance he denies. The innovation is that partial admission is not the only route to an oath on the remainder of a claim. Rabbi Ḥiyya says that the defendant’s admission should not have greater force than witness testimony, grounding this in a kal vaḥomer. The rule and direction of proof are stated here, but the detailed inference has not yet been built.

14. 14·RayaBava Metzia 3a

    וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּטַלִּית זֶה אוֹמֵר אֲנִי מְצָאתִיהָ וְכוּ׳. וְהָא הָכָא כֵּיוָן דְּתָפֵיס, אֲנַן סָהֲדִי דְּמַאי דְּתָפֵיס הַאי דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, וּמַאי דְּתָפֵיס הַאי דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, וְקָתָנֵי: יִשָּׁבַע!

    Support is brought from the Mishnah of two people holding a garment. For this proof, each person’s possession provides an anan sahadi basis for treating his share as his. Against each person’s claim to the entire garment, there is thus evidentiary support for the other’s partial ownership, despite the claimant’s refusal to admit it. Yet the Mishnah requires an oath, and this is offered as support for Rabbi Ḥiyya. There are no actual witnesses here; the argument uses the evidentiary force of possession. This is the proof proposed at this stage, not the completion of its examination later in the sugya.

15. 15·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 3a

    מַאי ״שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא הוֹדָאַת פִּיו גְּדוֹלָה מֵהַעֲדָאַת עֵדִים מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר״? שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר הוֹדָאַת פִּיו הוּא דְּרַמְיָא רַחֲמָנָא שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ כִּדְרַבָּה.

    The Gemara asks what underlies Rabbi Ḥiyya’s need for a kal vaḥomer. It presents the possibility that the Torah imposed an oath specifically when the defendant personally admits part of the claim. On this view, admission is not merely evidence establishing an amount; it belongs to a distinctive human situation that explains the oath. Rabbah’s explanation will supply the basis for this distinction. To justify Rabbi Ḥiyya, it will be necessary to show why partial witness testimony requires an oath even without the defendant’s admission.

16. 16·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 3a

    דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה מוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטַּעֲנָה יִשָּׁבַע? חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ, וְהַאי בְּכוּלֵּיהּ בָּעֵי דְּנִכְפְּרֵיהּ, וְהָא דְּלָא כַּפְרֵיהּ – מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין אָדָם מֵעִיז פָּנָיו

    Rabbah’s teaching is cited, beginning with the question of why the Torah requires a partial admitter to swear. Rabbah identifies a presumption that a person does not brazenly deny his debt in his creditor’s presence. In the account presented here, the defendant would like to deny everything, but confronting the person he owes prevents him from doing so. His partial admission therefore cannot simply prove that he is truthful about the remainder. This principle explains why partial admission might differ from complete denial contradicted by witnesses. The page ends here in the middle of Rabbah’s teaching, before his explanation of the oath is completed.

1. 1How can the garment oath fit Sumakhos’s position? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2Why can the Sages divide the garment but retain the disputed hundred in the deposit case? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3Which answer does the Gemara return to after the objection from a purchase? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4What is the central structural distinction in the shopkeeper’s ledger case? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What does Rabbi Ḥiyya teach when one hundred is claimed and witnesses establish fifty? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.