MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried. 19:15 ) is a rabbinic institution. and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. 30:14 . . If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah of each wife should be given to her sons; only the remainder is distributed among all sons. . If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery 5:1 ); inadvertent adultery is not a cause of forced divorce unless the husband is a Cohen. They treated the inadvertent adultery in this case under the rules of the intentional. This argument is not found in the Babli. . Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him. 24:1–4 . The language of the verses makes it clear that this law applies only if the first marriage was consummated. Since, in general, “to take a wife” means to perform a formal betrothal (cf. Chapter 1, Notes 63, 95; Peah 6, Note 46 ), the prohibition is triggered by formal betrothal to the second husband. ? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.
So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife.” In all these cases, the marriages would have been valid if the information about the death of husband or wife or absence of a child had been true (explanation of RITBA). , for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman. 18 ) on incest prohibitions, it is technically considered incestuous. ; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. 18:18 ). and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.
“Nor usufruct.” Rebbi Avina said, that she cannot recover from him the usufruct he took. That means. v . אלמנה ) “Rebbi Ḥanina said, that means …” The ms. text corresponds to the Sephardic text before R. Isaac Fasi (§116, 28b in the Wilna edition). , before the first [husband] returned. But if he took after the return of the first, she can recover.
“And if she took anything one takes it away from her.” That means, if she took something after the first [husband] returned. But if she took before the first returned, just as she cannot take from him so he cannot take from her on RIF , Wilna edition 26b. .
“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity. 5:11–31 . If the husband formally accuses his wife of infidelity, she is forbidden to him until she is cleared ( Mishnah Soṭah 1:3 ). R. Aqiba holds that any child conceived in a union which is not unconditionally permitted is a bastard. the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.
“Neither of them may defile himself for her.” That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A man defiles himself for his acceptable wife but he does not defile himself for his disqualified wife.. 21:4 : “A husband may not defile himself if this desecrates him.” ”
Some Tannaim state, she leaves under thirteen disabilities, but some Tannaim state, she leaves under fourteen disabilities. He who says that she leaves under thirteen disabilities takes what she finds and what she earns as one case, but he who says under fourteen disabilities takes each one by itself.
Rebbi Jeremiah said, the promiscuous levitic woman still eats tithe. One has stated thus: If a levitic woman was kidnapped or if any one barred for her copulated with her, he is not empowered to disable her. One does not suspect even a hint of disability for Levites who were compromised from their mother’s side. But did we not state: “the daughter of a Levite from tithe”? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that an Israel came upon her and she bore him a son.
Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe. 18:1 ), he holds that even if a priestly woman loses her priestly status she is still levitic. . Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim 5:9. . Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him. 3:11–13 ). If the disabled son of a Cohen has to be redeemed, it follows that with the priestly he also lost the levitic status. This disproves R. Bisna’s statement. In the Babli, Bekhorot 47b , there is a dissenting opinion that even if the father died before 30 days, the son does not have to give his redemption money to a Cohen since his father, being a Cohen, could not be sued for the money by other Cohanim. This does not change the validity of the argument given here. . If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.
Had it not already been stated: “she has no ketubah ”? if she predeceases the husbands. Since it was stated earlier that she has no claim to any ketubah sum, the statement about her children seems superfluous. Rebbi Yose ben Jacob said, that you should not say, they fined her but not her heirs. Therefore it was necessary to say, she has no ketubah also refers to the claim of the children (explanation of Rav Papa in Babli 91a ). .
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour 5:1 ; Sifry Num . 19. Unless she is cleared from the accusation, she may not marry her presumed paramour after being divorced or after her husband’s death . Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother 1:2 . , so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife.” In all these cases, the marriages would have been valid if the information about the death of husband or wife or absence of a child had been true (explanation of RITBA). , for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman. 18 ) on incest prohibitions, it is technically considered incestuous. ; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. 18:18 ). and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) 1:2 . But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery 5:1 ); inadvertent adultery is not a cause of forced divorce unless the husband is a Cohen. They treated the inadvertent adultery in this case under the rules of the intentional. This argument is not found in the Babli. . Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions. 18:24 . Adultery is declared impure repeatedly in the law of the suspected wife, Num . 5:11–31 . This argument is the only one given in the Babli, 11a . .
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows from the first husband; therefore, the husband is entitled to receive her earnings. . Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice. 4:2 ). Her transgression is neither intentional (for which no sacrifice would atone, Num . 15:30–31 ) nor careless; no guilt is attached to her in the eyes of the earthly or the Heavenly court. ; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters from her first husband. .
What does Rebbi Eleazar say about ketubah ? If you say that he is entitled to things that come to him in prohibition, then ketubah that came to him in permission certainly whose obligation he accepted voluntarily when she was permitted to him. !
It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar; R. Yose will hold that the husband gets nothing to induce him to grant a speedy divorce. ; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar with her is invalid as marriage act but effective to free the co-wives. The reason given in the Babli is that R. Simeon holds that no rabbinic decree exists in this case after the death of the first husband. The Babli holds that the composition principle in this Mishnah is that direction of agreement is always the same, either the later agree with the former (Rav Huna) or the former agree with the later (R. Joḥanan). This explains the slight deviation in the Mishnah from the chronological principle (R. Simeon is slightly older than R. Eleazar ben Shamua). The Yerushalmi rejects such schematism. . This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees.
Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman, if she remarried without permission like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman. Is that not uprooting a principle 1:3 (fol. 46a), Babli 4a . ? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood. 3:17 ). However, it is clear from the context that only fat is forbidden which may be burned on the altar (cf., e. g., Lev . 4:8 ). Therefore, a technical ruling is needed to define which fat of cattle, sheep, or goats qualifies as חלב. If the court rules that certain fat that was considered forbidden is now permitted, a lay person who follows their ruling is excused; the sin is the court’s. But if the layman uses the permission of fat to eat of the permitted fat when it still contains blood, he is guilty since the ruling never included permission to eat “unkoshered” fat. Similarly, a permission to remarry does not include permission of promiscuity whose prohibition has biblical roots that have nothing to do with adultery. The Babli concurs, 92a . .
MISHNAH: A woman’s husband and son went overseas and people came and told her, your husband died and after that your son died, and she remarried. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted to marry outside the family. . Then she must leave and the first and the last is a bastard. children are bastards.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). 2:2 . Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave 22b ; Tosephta 14:1 . In the Babli, the position of “the rabbis here” is that of R. Joḥanan only, based on a minor Tanna R. Menaḥem bar Yose. . There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave 22b ; Tosephta 14:1 . In the Babli, the position of “the rabbis here” is that of R. Joḥanan only, based on a minor Tanna R. Menaḥem bar Yose. . In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain2:2 : “Rebbi Joshua agrees if somebody says to another person: This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him, one believes him [in the absence of documents] since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permitted {the person stating that the field was another person’s being the same who states that now it belongs to him}. But if there are witnesses that it belongs to [the second person’s] father and [the first] says I bought it from him, he cannot be believed [without documents]. The situation described in the Yerushalmi is that each party in a court case brings two witnesses; Simeon proves that when his father died the field was still in his possession and Reuben (who is in actual possession) brings two witnesses that the field was not in Simeon’s father’s possession when he died. In that case, we do not say that the case is undecidable on basis of the evidence before the court and, therefore, the field should be split between the parties (position of Symmachos, in Babli Baba meṣi‘a 2b) but that the burden of proof is on the claimant and, therefore, the field remains in the possession of Reuben. The situation discussed in the Babli Ketubot 22b is different: Reuben is in actual possession of the field the number of years which creates a presumption of ownership, but he has no documentation of his acquisition. Simeon brings two witnesses that his father had died in possession of the field. Since squatting is no proof of ownership, the court puts Simeon in possession. Later, Reuben comes again to court with two witnesses who testify that Simeon’s father was not in possession at the time of his death. By the same principle as above, the field remains in the possession of Simeon. The commentators, following the Babli, require to substitute “Simeon” for “Reuben” at all occurrences here and in Ketubot . Such a correction is unwarranted. . So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession2:2 : “Rebbi Joshua agrees if somebody says to another person: This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him, one believes him [in the absence of documents] since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permitted {the person stating that the field was another person’s being the same who states that now it belongs to him}. But if there are witnesses that it belongs to [the second person’s] father and [the first] says I bought it from him, he cannot be believed [without documents]. The situation described in the Yerushalmi is that each party in a court case brings two witnesses; Simeon proves that when his father died the field was still in his possession and Reuben (who is in actual possession) brings two witnesses that the field was not in Simeon’s father’s possession when he died. In that case, we do not say that the case is undecidable on basis of the evidence before the court and, therefore, the field should be split between the parties (position of Symmachos, in Babli Baba meṣi‘a 2b) but that the burden of proof is on the claimant and, therefore, the field remains in the possession of Reuben. The situation discussed in the Babli Ketubot 22b is different: Reuben is in actual possession of the field the number of years which creates a presumption of ownership, but he has no documentation of his acquisition. Simeon brings two witnesses that his father had died in possession of the field. Since squatting is no proof of ownership, the court puts Simeon in possession. Later, Reuben comes again to court with two witnesses who testify that Simeon’s father was not in possession at the time of his death. By the same principle as above, the field remains in the possession of Simeon. The commentators, following the Babli, require to substitute “Simeon” for “Reuben” at all occurrences here and in Ketubot . Such a correction is unwarranted. ? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave 2:2 . .” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says 1:6–9. .
If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice 2, Note 162 . because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
MISHNAH: They came and told her, your son died and after that your husband died, and she was married in levirate. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted. 18:16 ) punishable by divine extirpation ( Lev . 21:21 ), which makes all children of this union bastards, whether conceived before or after the husband’s death. . Then she must leave and the first and the last is a bastard. children are bastards.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. , Halakhah 8:6. In both places, the problem discussed is not the one stated in the Mishnah. The parallel discussion in the Babli is 92a/b where there is no mention of the position of R. Jeremiah. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah . Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah , the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. 17:12 . . Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita 8:6. supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,. 21:7 , from the list of women prohibited to a priest. ” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.
HALAKHAH: “If they told her, your husband died,” etc. “If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Her only problem would be aspersion on the priesthood, but the court will not tolerate aspersion.
How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.
From where that no betrothal is valid for a married woman? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s.. 24:2 . ” When she leaves his house she may be with another. And from where that no betrothal is valid for incestual relations? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rav Huna: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s.” Why does the verse say “another”? To exclude the list of incest relations 88b, this is quoted in the name of R. Yannai; there the argument is rejected as insufficient. Perhaps for “another” one should translate “an outsider”. The Babli always subsumes adultery under incest prohibitions and does not need a separate argument. .
MISHNAH: A man’s wife went overseas, they came and told him: your wife died, and he married her sister. If after that his wife returned, she is permitted to return to him. He is permitted [to marry] the relatives of the second, the second is permitted his relatives. 18:18 ) it is non-existent and the restrictions detailed in Mishnah 4:8 do not apply. . If the first [sister] died, the second one is permitted to him. They said to him, your wife died, and he married her sister; if afterwards they said to him that she was still alive but died later, the first child is a bastard, the last is not a bastard. If they said to him “your wife died,” and he married her paternal sister, “she died” and he married her maternal sister, “she died” and he married her paternal sister, “she died” and he married her maternal sister, but it turned out that all were alive, the first, third, and fifth are permitted to him and they would release their co-wives of one of them releases all others. ; the second and fourth are prohibited to him and intercourse of any one of these does not release the co-wife. If he has intercourse with the second one after the death of the first, the second and fourth are permitted to him and they would release their co-wives; the third and fifth are prohibited to him and intercourse of any one of these does not release the co-wife.
HALAKHAH: “If a man’s wife went overseas,”, etc. It is written: “If a man slept with her ;. 5:13 ; written in the paragraph about the wife suspected of unfaithfulness, from where one infers that an adulterous wife is forbidden to her husband. It is implied here that an action of the husband has no influence on her status (but in the paragraph after the next it is pointed out that the husband’s action may forbid him to her). Sifry Num . 7 (an involved argument in the style of the paragraph after the next), a short parallel in the Babli, 95a . ” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her. There, it also says “replacing your husband,” that excludes rape cases.
Rebbi Mattaniah said, they made a fence about situations that occur frequently but not about rare situations. 19). . A man frequently travels overseas; it is infrequent that a woman travels overseas.
It was stated 9(15)-(18). : Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them. 20:14 . .” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned, the prohibition ( Lev . 18:17 ) is that of incestuous intercourse; the prescription of the punishment ( Lev . 20:14 ) deals only with the case that a man marries a woman and her mother. The problem is that if one of them is married to him, he cannot possibly marry the other since any act of incestuous betrothal or final marriage is invalid and legally nonexistent. Therefore, while intercourse with mother and daughter is incestuous and forbidden, it is a capital crime only if the man is married to one of them at the time he sleeps with the other. The innocent wife did not commit any crime and, therefore, cannot be punished. Cf. Chapter 11, Note 46 . . So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition, as in the Yerushalmi, this is R. Aqiba’s position. In the Babli, 95a , this is an amoraic interpretation of R. Simeon ben Laqish reported by R. Ammi. . So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one, “one of them.” He reads the unusual word אתהן (substituting for אותן) as abbreviation of את אחת מהן . . And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. 7 as argument that her husband’s adulterous relationship with her mother does not prohibit the wife, and explained in detail in Num. Rabba Naśo 9(35) (most probably a Provençal text): “Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person, this refers to adultery since her prohibition is not permanent (her husband could divorce her), the cause of the prohibition ( the husband ) became forbidden ( he has to divorce his wife ), if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, this refers to a man sleeping with his mother-in-law whose prohibition is permanent , it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition ( the wife ) should forbidden”, the verse says “with her ” (cf. Note 134 ). A simple and short version is in Sifre Zuṭa, Midrash Haggadol Num . 12, ed. Rabbinowitz p. 51 . . Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed. 24:2 ) “she went and was another’s”. “To be a man’s” is everywhere explained as to be formally betrothed to him (cf. Chapter 1, Note 63 ). ? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. 270 in the name of R. Eleazar ben Azariah. The reason given is the expression ( Deut . 24:4 ) “after she had been defiled” which for the anonymous majority means that a wife divorced for adultery is permanently forbidden to her ex-husband. . Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon Chapter 3, Note 25 .) The following argument is closely reproduced in the Babli, 95a . said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus ? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her 4:5 , Babli Yebamot 56b ). The case of Mishnah 1 is classified as negligence, not error. , he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her ;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.
Immi the father of Samuel bar Immi in the name of Rav Jehudah: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon. There came a case before Rebbi Mana and he removed her from him. Does he hold with Rebbi Jehudah? No, she regularly came to him.
Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter.
“Rebbi Yose says, anything which disables,” etc. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If his wife’s sister was married, since he disables her for others, he disables her for himself. But his wife’s unmarried sister which he does not disable for others, he does not disable for himself. As Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she needs a bill of divorce from him.
“If they said to him “your wife died,” etc. How can that be? A man has a daughter and a stepdaughter, a woman has a daughter and a stepdaughter. They married and had a daughter. It starts with the woman’s stepdaughter.
MISHNAH: [A male] nine years and one day old disables for the brothers and the brothers disable for him; only that he disables at the beginning and the brothers disable at beginning and end. How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old who copulated with his sister-in-law disabled her for the brothers. If [any one of] the brothers copulated with her, “bespoke” her, divorced her, or performed ḥalîṣah with her, they disabled her for him.
HALAKHAH: “[A male] nine years and one day old disables,” etc. At the end he does not disable after his “bespeaking”, but after his intercourse he disables. However he can disable only by one act but they may disable by four acts.
1:2, fol. 59b/c which has a better and more complete text. “How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son.. 21:9 , speaking about a minor girl sold by her father as a slave with the understanding that her price would count as betrothal gift in case the owner would desire to marry her or would give her to his son. In that case, the betrothal is called “allotment”. If she is not married, she regains her freedom by reaching adulthood at 12 years of age. ” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers 3, Mekhilta deR. Simeon ben Ioḥai Chap. 21 (p. 167); Babli Qiddushin 17b . . He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus ! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance. 27:6–11 . , what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.
“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine (sc., vinum ),“spiced wine”. . Rebbi Tanḥum: R. Naḥum, a third generation Amora, student of Samuel bar Abba. His name fits into the scheme of things but not the fifth generation R. Tanḥum. answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. וְכָאן שֶׁלֹּא עָשִׂיתָ אָח כְּבֵן וּשְׁאָר כָּל־הַקְּרוֹבִים כְּבֵן אֵין אַתְּ עוֹשֶׂה בֶן בֵּן כְּבֵן: “but here, where neither the brother nor the other relatives take the role of the son, the grandson does not take the role of the son.” The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son. 21:2–3 ), the grandson or grandfather is absent. Among Cohanim, the grandson may not defile himself for his grandfather. . He said, there went the spiced wine.
“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement 19a ) which seems to be valid here also and explains the apparent duplication of the argument in this paragraph. . Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah( Qiddushin 1:2 , fol. 59c; Babli 19a ) that the money given to the father does not count as bride money but that the allotment is a legal betrothal since from the moment of betrothal she is no longer a servant. The money with which she is bought is money with which her services are bought for the duration of her servitude. By allotment, the value of the remainder of the money (computed by the remaining days of her servitude) is given as wedding gift. This implies that on the last day of her servitude she can be allotted to master or son only if at least a peruṭah’s worth of servitude is left (if the day’s worth is prorated by hours). . Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor 7:4 ) who by intercourse does acquire preliminarily his sister-in-law by biblical standards, except that his wife cannot be prosecuted for adultery since it is written ( Lev . 20:10 ): “A man who commits adultery with a man’s wife”. This implies that there are cases where a woman can be legally married to a male without being a man’s wife. ? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with and without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.
“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish cannot accept the statement in the next Mishnah that the widow of a childless minor is not subject to the laws of levirate. who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah , as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah .” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it which opened this paragraph must follow R. Yose ben R. Jehudah while the Mishnah follows the anonymous majority. comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts 46a . . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.
Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah ? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah ; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.
Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah learned from Aḥaz, as it was stated: Aḥaz produced a child at age nine. 16:2 ). His son Ḥizqiah became king at age 25 ( 2K . 18:2 ). That seems to mean that Ḥizqiah was born when his father was 11 years old. However, since the first year of the reign is only counted from the day of accession to the next New Year’s Day, it is possible that he was born when his father was 10 and was conceived when he was 9. This computation has no parallel in the sources. , Haran at age six. 11:27 ) and at least two years younger than Abraham. , and Caleb at age ten following him who identifies Caleb ben Ḥeṣron with Caleb ben Yephuneh. 4:15 , with Caleb ben Ḥeṣron whose descendants are mentioned in 1Chr . 2:18–21 . Caleb ben Ḥeṣron is described as the great-grandfather of Beṣalel who built the Tabernacle. {The Babli never mentions the problem of the quite impossible identification of the two Calebs.} Since Caleb ben Yephuneh was 40 years of age in the year after the Exodus ( Jos . 14:7) and Beṣalel is called “man” in Ex . 36:4 , he was at least 13 years of age, only 27 years younger than his great-grandfather. That means that Caleb, Uri, and Ḥur all were fathers at age 9. If Caleb was father at age 10, then one of his descendants was father at age 8. .
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah ; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah , Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.
The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future 47b , disagrees and treats the man who at age 20 has no pubic hair and shows the body characteristics of a castrate as castrated by nature who never will be accepted as a man; otherwise he will be a minor until age 35, half the normal life span. (There is an Amora who disagrees and holds that many cases of impotent men without pubic hair can be treated medically.) . Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son. 21:18–21 . Since he is called “son” rather than “child”, it is concluded that he must be an adult. The Babli concurs, 80a . since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings 16a . In the Babli, that opinion is unopposed. . Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.