MISHNAH: A judicial oath. 22:8 , where the expression where he says, this is it is read as partial admission on the part of the defendant. The oath cannot be required by biblical standards if the defendant rejects the claim in its entirety; it cannot be administered by rabbinical standards if the amount in dispute or the amount admitted are below a certain threshhold. is about a claim of two silver coins, / 6 of a denar . The silver half- oboloi minted in Yehud in Persian times had long disappeared when the Mishnaic system of currency was formulated. and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah . Half- peruṭot have been found. . If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah .” He is not liable minus 1 peruṭah , i. e., 63 peruṭot , the statutory minimum of 64 peruṭot is not reached; the oath cannot be imposed by rabbinic rules. . “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah .” He is liable. . “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. 1:1 , explained there in detail in Notes 77–98 . Parallels are in the Babli Qiddušin 11b . The question is, why do the House of Hillel require a larger minimal amount for litigation before a court than the House of Shammai but a much smaller sum than the House of Shammai for legal marriage by symbolic acquisition. The answer is that different biblical verses are the basis. Since a Hebrew slave girl is a minor sold by her father for a maximum of 6 years, or until she reaches the age of 12, or until she is married by the person who buys her or one of his sons. In order to get the maximum for his money, the man buying her might use her as a servant up to the last day of her servitude and then marry her on that day. Since if the original price is divided by the sum of all days of her servitude and only pennies pay for the service of one day, only pennies are left on the last day but nevertheless the marriage is legal. Therefore only pennies are needed for a legal marriage ceremony. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos , but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi . The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar , but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos . The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi . Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar , so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar . The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver . 21:10 . . Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver ? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar . But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah , more than silver two peruṭot . The smallest silver coin is an obolos , 1 / 6 of a denar . The silver half- oboloi minted in Yehud in Persian times had long disappeared when the Mishnaic system of currency was formulated. . So why is it not an obolos ? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah ? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos , the end of the diminution a peruṭah . If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah , so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah ! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah , you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah . Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah ’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah , so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah .
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, 22:6 . etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah ’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it ? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah . From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi . But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah , more than silver two peruṭot . The smallest silver coin is an obolos . So why is it not an obolos ? Or vessels ; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels ? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels , including clay vessels1:1 Note 96 for the arguments which show that this reading is impossible. . Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot , that the claim should be about a peruṭah ’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah ’s worth39b, s.v . מה . . This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi ’s worth.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah ? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah .” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim”, or that only the situation of monetary claim and denial can be adjudicated by judicial oath, to support the opponents of R. Joḥanan in the next paragraph. The interpretation of the statement in the Babli has no relation to the discussion here. .
“And the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. ” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims that another had stolen. 22:8 , the basis of the Mishnah. A deposited something with B. B claims that the item was lost and as unpaid trustee he is not liable for damages. A accuses B of having appropriated the item for himself, i. e., to have stolen it. R. Joḥanan holds that this claim is no different from all other claims adjudicated under the rules of Ex . 22:6–8 and, therefore, an oath can be imposed on B only if the latter acknowledges liability for part of the claim. , the latter is not liable unless he partially admit. But all his colleagues106b , bottom) he is R. Ḥiyya bar Joseph, a student of Rav and member of R. Joḥanan’s court. differ from him. How do the colleagues uphold for this is it . 22:6 reads: About anything criminal, about an ox, about a donkey, about a sheep, about a garment, about anything lost, if he says, for this is it, the suit of them shall come before the Elohim, he whom the Elohim find guilty shall pay double to his neighbor. Elohim means “the powerful;” it can be applied both to God and to judges. From this double meaning it is inferred that judges impose an oath before God on the accused if the latter has acknowledged for this is it, i. e., a partial admission. On the other hand, double restitution is the fine for the thief. Therefore R. Joḥanan is justified in his conclusion that since v.6 declares the entire paragraph to be about deposits, the entire sentence deals with the case of A accusing B of theft of the deposit. ? If he claims money from him. If he claims money from him, is that double he shall pay to his neighbor does not apply to deposits but to repayment of loans and debts ( Lev . 5:24 ). They have to take the position that this very long sentence deals with different subjects in different parts and that an oath is due on demand of the claimant for any accusation that a deposit was stolen. ? But this is a mixture of paragraphs.
Rebbi Ze`ira said, he is not liable unless the denial be of two silver coins not counting the acknowledgment of one peruṭah . In the Babli, 39b , this is the position of Rav, R. Ḥiyya bar Joseph’s teacher, disputed by Samuel who only requires the total claim to be for at least two oboloi . . This follows Rebbi Joḥanan’s colleague.
“ ‘You are holding a mina for me’, ‘I am not holding anything for you’, he is not liable.” Even “you are holding a lot for me,” “I am not holding anything for you”, he is not liable? But the following: “You are holding a mina for me.” “I am holding only a peruṭah for you.” He is liable is no different from two oboloi . If the defendant admits to owing a peruṭah and the claim is at least 2 oboloi , there is liability. The lower bound is not a function of the size of the claim. . Rav and Rebbi Joḥanan both are saying: Only if he made the loan in the presence of witnesses. But if he made the loan not in the presence of witnesses, he could tell him, you gave me a loan but I returned half of it. Rebbi Yudan said, in money matters one does not argue “because.” Because he could have told him, you did not give me a loan, he could tell him, you gave me a loan but I returned half of it? The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ ‘You are holding a mina for me;’ he said ‘yes’. The next day he said, ‘return it to me,’ ‘I returned it to you;’ he is not liable. ‘I am not holding anything for you,’ he is liable.”
“`You are holding a mina for me,’ ‘I am not holding anything for you.’ ” Issy said, one who gives a loan to another in the presence of witnesses should claim repayment only in the presence of witnesses. Rebbi Avin said, the word of Issy: If one gives a loan to another in the presence of witnesses, [the debtor] should not repay except in the presence of witnesses. The Mishnah disagrees with him: “ ‘You are holding a mina for me;’ he said ‘yes’. The next day he said, ‘return it to me,’ ‘I returned it to you;’ he is not liable. ‘I am not holding anything for you,’ he is liable18a , explicitly notes that repayment in the presence of witnesses is not a legal requirement. .”
MISHNAH: “You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes”. The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of witnesses.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “You are holding a mina for me;” etc. Rebbi Abun said, it is usual for people to give loans to others not in the presence of witnesses but to ask for repayment in the presence of witnesses.
“You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of X and Y.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses. Think of it, if he said, I returned it in the presence of witnesses. Bar Kappara stated: “when X and Y are standing there.” Think of it, if he said, “when X were Y are standing there.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rebbi Ada bar Ahava in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, and he said, let X and Y come.
169b . If somebody produced both a document and ḥazaqah 5:5 Note 100 , Qiddušin 1:1 Note 30 .) It can mean taking possession by active use, but here it means a presumption of permanence of an established status quo ante . The particular application meant here is validation of squatter’s rights after three years of uncontested occupation (which must be combined with a claim, not necessarily proven, of rightful acquisition, Bava qamma 7:4 Note 49 .) . Rebbi says, it should be judged by the document. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, it should be judged by ḥazaqah . Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A case came before Rebbi Jehudah following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: How? Did Rebbi switch his opinion? There he said, it should be judged by the document. But here he said it should be judged by ḥazaqah . Would we say, before he changed his opinion? Even if you say, after he changed his opinion. Rebbi only wanted to determine the truth of the matter170a/b . . “If somebody occupied real estate on the basis of a document of sale and it was found invalid, this is not ḥazaqah based on the document must be thrown out by the court. The only problem is whether he should be allowed to plead a substitute claim. .”2:2 . Rebbi Jeremiah said, in dispute. Rebbi Samuel said, Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abinna: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Yose said, there if one produced both a document and ḥazaqah. Here if he came with a document are presented to the court, where either one alone would be sufficient. The Tosephta deals with a case where a forged document was produced and only after it was rejected a claim of ḥazaqah was entered. . Rebbi Yudan said, there if he presented two groups of witnesses; here one who contradicts his own proofs.
Rebbi Marinus was guarantor for his daughter-in-law17a. . They went to court before Rebbi Ḥama the father of Bat Qappara and Rebbi Hoshaia. After he had admitted he said to him, I gave. They asked the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya; Rebbi Ḥiyya asked Rebbi: One who became liable in court cannot be trusted. What is the meaning of “he cannot be trusted”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he pays on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I gave. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, also for oaths it is the same. What is the meaning of “also for oaths it is the same”? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he swears on his own initiative, he is trusted when he says, I swore. But from the orders of others, he cannot be trusted.
MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a pound of twelve (Troy) ounces. of gold,” “I am holding for you only a pound of silver;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a gold denar ,” “I am holding for you only a silver denar , or a tressis “three as; something of little value.”. , or a dupondius ; two bits”. , or a peruṭah ,” he is liable since all kinds of coin the defendant admits only a debt of one peruṭah , 1/4800, it is a valid admission which makes the defendant liable for an oath. are one.
HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a pound of gold,” etc. 5:5. In the opinion of S. Lieberman, the Tosephta is quoted here to indicate that the rules for Second Tithe and judicial oaths are different. Second Tithe is the part of the harvest which the farmer should eat with his family at the place of the Sanctuary. If this is not practical, the crop can be redeemed and the sanctity transferred to the coins which then have to be spent in purity at the place of the Sanctuary. Problems arise when in the wallet chosen for the sanctified coins other coins are found which do not directly correspond to the farmer’s memory. “Eight of gold(or, after Diocletian’s currency reform, the solidus .) I have in the wallet and one finds there eight gold denarii ; or fifty t etradrachmas and one finds 200 denar ; or 200 denar and one finds 50 tetradrachmas ; these are profane. Eight gold denarii I have in the wallet and one finds fifty tetradrachmas usually is counted as 25 silver ii . 8 gold denarii are 200 silver denarii or 50 tetradrachmas . ; or 200 denar and one finds 50 tetradrachmas , these are Second [Tithe].” “ ‘You are holding for me a pound of gold,’ ‘I am holding for you only a pound of silver;’ he is not liable. ‘You are holding for me a gold denar ,’ ‘I am holding for you only a silver denar .’5:8 , 9 . The background text is from Tosephta 5:9 : “‘You are holding for me a gold denar as gold coin,’ ‘I am holding for you only a silver denar , or a tressis , or a dupondius , or a peruṭah ,’ he is liable.” The incomplete sentence in the Halakhah seems to be a text, not found in the Tosephta, “ ‘You are holding for me a gold denar ,’ ‘I am holding for you only a silver denar, ’ he is not liable.” The formulation of the text points to the first two Amoraic generations during the military anarchy in the Roman Empire, when the gold denar was a unit of accounting but not an actual coin. Then the status of a claim for a gold denar is similar to the claim for a pound of gold; if it is answered by an admission of silver units it is not an admission of the kind of the claim. But a claim for an actual gold coin which is answered by an admission of silver or bronze coins is an admission of the kind of the claim. In the rabbinic literature of the Middle Ages, זָהוּב is the name of the standard gold coin of the author’s country. ” Rebbi Jacob bar Abinna said, earlier, we were saying, “a gold denar ” is a detail; “gold denarii ” are not detail. If he had said, “a gold denar , a gold coin” it would have been correct when a gold coin was claimed. . It was found stated, “a gold coin of a denar ,” he is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a kor . of grain;” “I am holding for you only a letek . of legumes;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rebbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I see the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate; if [the other] admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about1:5, Note 474 . If the defendant is liable to take an oath, the claimant can add to the oath all of his outstanding claims even if they in themselves would not force an oath. This is known as “rolling over of oaths.” A property is guaranteed if the seller as a matter of routine must guarantee the title to the property; this is the case with real estate. .
HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. 13:4 , fully explained there in Notes 79–89 . A parallel is in the Babli 40a , Ketubot 108b . Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.
So is the Mishnah: If he denied part of the real estate he is liable, part of the vessels he is not liable.
MISHNAH: One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor. One does not put an oath on a minor but one swears for a minor and the Temple.
HALAKHAH: “One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor,” etc. It is written: If a man give to his neighbor . 22:6 . , to exclude the minor4:4 (Note 67, Eruvin 7:6) finds this in the first words of v. 6, if a man give . Babli 42a ; Mekhilta dR. Simeon ben Ioḥai 22:6. . So far if a minor gave to him and the minor requested from him. If he gave it as a minor and requested it as an adult? The verse says, his neighbor; only if giving and requesting are equal106b ) and the Mekhilta derive this from v. 8, before the judges shall come their mutual affair ; the oath is possible only if both parties have the same standing. . Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, is that not obvious by what Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of theft in respect of his neighbor’s lost object is liable? “Where is my lost object?” He told him, it was stolen106b . A lost an object with enough unique features that the finder would have been required to publicly ask for its owner to come and reclaim it. B found the object. A has witnesses who saw B taking the object. When A comes to ask B, the latter claims that it was stolen. Since Ex . 22:8 lists lost objects as subjects of judicial oaths, it is clear that B has to swear upon A’s request even though A never handed the object to B. This excludes an interpretation like that given in Note 83 . ( Babli Yoma 79b , Yebamot 48b , Soṭah 8a , Zevaḥim 17a , 90a , 94b , Menaḥot 69b , Keritut 3b ). . Rebbi Abba said, explain it if he told him, you already asked me when you were underage and I was freed from swearing for you. An oath of the Eternal shall be between both of them . 22:10 . , to exclude the heir16. . Rebbi Illa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The baraita is about the heir explaining the verse between them is directed also to the heirs. Since normally only the defendant has to swear, the expression between them is interpreted as biblical endorsement of the rule that if the defendant is disqualified as a witness he also is disqualified from swearing; in that case the claimant has to swear that he is entitled to the money. Heirs, who cannot swear in cases of claims against the father’s estate, can as claimants force oaths of debtors to the estate. Babli 47b . .
Between both of them . 22:10 . it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name . 5:5 . “It” is the curse mentioned in v. 4 . , etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there 2:2 , Satan’s answer. Having no joints at knees or ankles, he could never sit down. The order of topics is better in Lev. rabba 6(1 ) where it is explained that the Satan has to move perpetually because he has no joints but the curse of a false oath comes and dwells at length in the house of the swearer. . But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones . 5:5 . “It” is the curse mentioned in v. 4 . . Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. 6(1 ). Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.
MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. 22:6 restricts the judicial oath to transactions between human persons. . Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay4:8) refer to the subjects about which one does not swear. Cf. Mishnah 8:1. . Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things2:1, the reading is: sacrifices. If a person makes a vow “to sacrifice an animal”, and if then the designated animal is lost or develops a defect, he has to provide a replacement; this is a vow implying a guarantee. But if he vowed “to sacrifice this animal,” and anything happens to the designated animal, he does not have to provide a substitute; there is no guarantee. for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.
HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person3:6 ). But how could an oath about deposits be administered by the court to a disqualified person or about a disqualified subject? It can only happen if the person swears without waiting for instructions from the court, which characterizes his action as a blurted oath subject to all its rules. ? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep . 22:9 , about the oath of the paid trustee. Breaking, kidnapping, and dying are all mentioned in the verse. . Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. 25:14 .) . From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader56b , where the baraita is quoted as proof that the laws of overcharging apply to penny matters. , it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear , a general statement. To cause evil or cause good , a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out , a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. 5:4 is out of place since the argument is about Ex . 22:9 . The text should be similar to that of Mekhilta dR. Ismael Mišpaṭim 15 (pp. 300–301): About anything criminal , a general statement. About an ox, or a donkey, or a sheep, detail . About anything lost , a repeat general statement. . Since the detail. 22:9 . is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.
Somebody tears up another’s documents without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana98a/b , to Rava who is a known adaptor of Galilean rules and an older contemporary of R. Mana II. , one said, he is liable; the other said, he is not liable. The one who said he is liable, as a fine) but also the lien on the debtor’s property which is not something recoverable in biblical law. It has to be dealt with in local police law. . The one who said he is not liable: he is like one who obstructs the depositions of witnesses. A widow who grabs documents is like a person who ties up the mouths of witnesses.
Rebbi Immi said, those who write, “on condition that I have the right to seize movables,” cannot collect5:10, Note 227 ), this is valid only in matters that do not involve court actions. In both Talmudim, court-ordered foreclosures are restricted to real estate. Therefore, a contract which provides foreclosure of movables, while valid, cannot be enforced. Only in the Middle Ages, when Jews in many cases could not hold real estate, was the restriction to real estate lifted by Gaonic decree. . Rebbi Mana said, if he writes and declares, “even though the Court will not enforce,” he collects4:2). .
1:2, Notes 118–122 ( ק ). The Mishnah has to be understood that R. Simeon only frees from liability for an oath which is applicable only to disagreements between humans, but not for payment which was fixed at 125% for concealed debts against humans in Lev. 5:20–25 , and for amounts due to God in Lev . 5:14–15 . ( Babli Bava meṣi`a 25a/b ). “Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied ; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied .” Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied ; but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied but not against his neighbor and he lied .
MISHNAH: One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count. How is that? “I handed over to you a full house; or I handed over to you a full wallet,” But the other says, “I do not know; take what you left with me;” he is not liable. One says, up to the gutter; the other says, up to the window; he is liable.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥanina said, One says, a large candelabra, but the other says, a small candelabra; he is liable since we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if it was a candelabra composed of sections. One says, a large belt; the other says, a small belt. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated something but we do not know what he stated. If you say “liable”, a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” If you say “not liable”, a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “If one says the adult one and the other says the underage one, let the seller swear that he sold the underage one. If both say that they do not know, they shall split.8:5. The buyer bought one of two slaves, one adult and one underage, with their garments or other property. There is a dispute about which slave was sold. Even though there is no oath about sales of slaves, there is an oath about their garments or other possessions, and an oath about the sale of the slave can be attached to that oath by rollover ( Note 70 .) We found a case where Mishnaiot Ševuot 6:9 and Bava meṣi`a 8:5 present an irreconcilable contradiction. ”
MISHNAH: One gave a loan to another on a pledge and the pledge was lost. He told him, “I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,” but the other one says “no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth a tetradrachma ”; he is not liable(half a tetradrachma ), the debtor refuses. He denies the entire claim; the burden of proof is on the claimant. . “I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,” but the other one says “no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth three šeqel ;” he is liable; he admits part of the claim and has to take the oath. . “You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,” and the other says “no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma ;” he is not liable, the creditor denies it completely; the creditor does not have to swear. . “You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,” and the other says “no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth five denar ;” he is liable for the pledge, the debtor asks for four. The creditor has to swear. . Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge, lest one swear and the other produce the pledge1:1, Note 3. .
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge. The Mishnah says, also the borrower can be believed, as we have stated: “He told him, ‘I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel ,’ but the other one says ‘no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth a tetradrachma ‘; he is not liable.” A person encountered another in the market and said, you owe me two denarii and your pledge is worth two denarii . He answered, I owe you one denar but my pledge is worth two denarii . The case came before the judges of Nahardea. They said, since everybody agrees that it is worth two denarii , he has to bring witnesses on the other [ denar ]. They had not heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge.
A person encountered another in the market and took away his linen cloth. saying, “this sheet will not leave my hand until you give me what you are holding for me.” It came before Samuel. He told him, return his linen cloth to him and sue him. Does Samuel follow the judges of Nahardea? There, the pledge was held by him, here the pledge was not held by him II כבb reads R . Zeˋira instead of Samuel . This reading is not likely to be correct.) .
Samuel says, the oath does not move away from between them. If the lender swears, he swears and takes. But if the borrower swears, the other will present the pledge. “Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, about the first part: “ ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,’ and the other says ‘no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma ;’ he is not liable. ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it,’ ” etc. “And the other says, ‘I do not know’.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: You do not know, the other knows. Rebbi Joshua [the Southerner] asked before Rebbi Jonah: There you say, you do not know, the other knows; but here you say so? There is desecration of an oath, here there is no desecration of an oath.