MISHNAH: An oath about testimony. 5:1 requires a variable value sacrifice by a person who heard an imprecation when he had knowledge and refuses to testify. This is read to mean that a person is approached by a party in a civil suit and asked to testify in their behalf. If then either he swears an oath that he will testify in court (“by his own word”) or the party asks him to swear that he will appear (“by the word of others”) while he answers “Amen” but does not utter an oath by himself, he becomes liable for the sacrifice if he reneges on his commitment. applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “An oath about testimony,” etc. 3:10, Notes 150–165 , with a related text in Yoma 6:1. The many parallels in Babli (30a ,b, Yoma 62b ), Tosephta, and halakhic Midrashim are indicated in Sanhedrin. Rams . 16:5 , 7 , 8 . Any indeterminate plural means 2, the minimum of many. , the minimum of rams are two. Why does the verse say two ? That they be equal.
Sheep , the minimum of sheep are two. Then why does the verse say two ? That both be equal. 27:38, Num . 28:3 . .
The minimum of birds are two. Then why does the verse say two ? that both be equal. 14:4 . .
The minimum of trumpets are two. Then why does the verse say two ? that both be equal. 10:1 . .
Rebbi Ḥaggai objected to Rebbi Yose, not R. Yasa as in Sanhedrin . . Is there not written: The two men shall stand . 19:17 . ? Now, is not two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two ? That both be equal? But it is written. 24:17 . : Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte , the orphan , … That means that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why is there written two ? It is free to be combined and to infer from it an equal cut . It is said here two and it is said there two men were left . 11:26.74 . Since there one speaks of men but not women nor underaged, also here men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge; consequently a woman may not be a witness.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose. It is said here two and it is said there. 19:15 . by the mouth of two witnesses . Since there it must be by the testimony of two witnesses, also here by the testimony of two witnesses. Then why does the verse say two . 19:17 . ? Lest one of them be standing while the other be sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. With one he puts up, to the other he is unfriendly.
Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna: The witnesses have to stand while testifying. What is the reason? The two men shall stand . 19:17 . . Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Also the parties have to stand at the moment the verdict is given. What is the reason?: Who have the quarrel before the Eternal . 19:17 . .
3:10, Notes 166–200 . ( Babli Sanhedrin 27b , 28a ). It is written. 24:16 . : Fathers shall not be killed because of sons . Is it not already written, each one should be killed for his own crime ? Why does the verse say, fathers shall not be killed because of sons ? Fathers shall not be killed on the testimony of sons, and sons shall not be killed on testimony of fathers. From here that witnesses shall not be relatives of the accused.
From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would each of them not be killed by the other’s testimony? From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by the other’s sentencing?
From where that judges may not be relatives of one another? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of judges. Since witnesses may not be relatives of one another, neither may judges be relatives of one another.
So far only fathers and sons; from where the other relatives? Rebbi Ze`ira says, and sons includes the remaining relatives.
So far according to Rebbi Aqiba.
From where following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: The congregation shall judge between the beater , etc35:24 ; between the slayer and the avenger of the blood . . The congregation be neither relatives of the murderer nor relatives of the murdered. Rebbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is engaged in vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And from where that the witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of those who vote. 23:2 . . Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would they not be killed by each other’s testimony?
From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by his sentence?
“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell , he has to bear his punishment . 5:1 . If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, from where? The verse says, if he was a witness , had seen or known; if he does not tell he shall bear his punishment . 5:1 . One who is qualified to testify according to biblical standards; this excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell , he has to bear his punishment . If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
From where two witnesses? And he is a witness , this makes two. Following Rebbi Ismael, who said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses; unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Two witnesses.” Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that one person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, you could find him liable for an oath of testimony. How could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?
Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.
Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment . 23:2 . , a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.
1:1 Notes 56–71 , Ketubot 2:4 Note 87 , Sanhedrin 3:10 Note 197 . Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. 5:1 requires a variable value sacrifice by a person who heard an imprecation when he had knowledge and refuses to testify. This is read to mean that a person is approached by a party in a civil suit and asked to testify in their behalf. If then either he swears an oath that he will testify in court (“by his own word”) or the party asks him to swear that he will appear (“by the word of others”) while he answers “Amen” but does not utter an oath by himself, he becomes liable for the sacrifice if he reneges on his commitment. . If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person , a person . 5:1 about oaths concerning testimony and 5:21 about the person accused of larceny who swears falsely in purgation by oath; cf. Chapter 3:12, Note 165 . The parallel use of identical terms is an equal cut which allows transfer of rules from one occurrence to the other. . Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words; others formulate the oath to which he is asked to assent. In 5:21 he himself formulates the oath to deny a deposit , or a loan , or robbery . The equal cut allows one to transfer one situation to the other; oaths about testimony may be formulated by the potential witness himself; oaths of a person accused of larceny may be formulated by the aggrieved party. . Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court11:1 Notes 30,34 ( Sanhedrin 9:1 ); Chapter 5:2]. R. Meїr holds that the laws to be transferred are what can be read off the corresponding verses; the rabbis transfer laws only in the context of the verses on both sides. Verse 5:21 reads, to deny a deposit … and he swears to a lie ; it is understood that this creates guilt whether or not it was before a court. But testimony is before a court; therefore v. 5:1 only speaks of guilt incurred in a court trial. R. Meїr holds that an oath formulated by another person following the situation of v. 1 transferred to v. 21 cannot create liability for a sacrifice outside of court, but an oath pronounced by himself (v. 21) always creates such a liability. The rabbis hold that while we accept that the equal cut shows that oaths formulated by himself are covered by v. 1, the context of that verse forces the conclusion that one refers to court proceedings only. .
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?
Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by his own formulation before the court: would he not be liable for each instance separately? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit?” But here, since they can come back and admit, they are liable for each single instance.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: is formulated independently from the Babylonian Tosephta. “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation . 5:1 . . Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate. 5:21–22 (a deposit, a loan, extortion and robbery, a find) refer to monetary claims about movables. Since there can be no sacrifice for an oath about deposits relating to real estate, one might argue that there can be no sacrifice for an oath about testimony involving real estate, asserted in Tosephta 4:1 . ? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?
Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional. 4 it is emphasized that these apply only to atone for חֵטְא בִשְׁגָגָה “sins in error.” In most cases of reparation sacrifices described in Chapter 5, there is no mention of error. It follows that the word חֵטְא alone covers both intentional and unintentional sins. .
MISHNAH: If both of them disavowed simultaneously, both of them are liable; one after the other, the first is liable but the second is not liable. If one reneged but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable. If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group disavowed and after this the second, both are liable since testimony could be upheld by either one of them.
HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir ; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir . 6:21 . An obligatory sacrifice cannot be brought voluntarily. Therefore it cannot be dedicated before the obligation exists. The dedication cannot be undone ( Lev . 27:9 ). Therefore, the original sacrifice has to be rededicated as voluntary offering and a new sacrifice be given as obligatory sacrifice. Nazir 2:9 (Note 118 ), 3:2 (Note 32 ), Tosephta Nazir 2:6 , Num . rabba 10(42). . If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin 10:11 Note 110 . ?
So is the Mishnah: “If one disavowed but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable.” Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah if the second changed his opinion immediately after the speaking of the first. Because if the first changed his opinion, one would accept him; then the second would become the first 2:1 (Notes 50–52 ), Mo ` ed qaṭan 3:7 (83c l. 37), Nazir 4:1 Note 12 ]. Anything said immediately following testimony is part of the testimony. The rule that a witness cannot change his testimony does not apply to corrections made immediately. Babli 32a . .
If they were ten. There are Tannaïm who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaïm who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, holds with him who said, the testimony can be verified by the remaining [witnesses]. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, holds with him who said, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated 1:12–13 (in most Mishnah editions, Mishnah 1:8). It is obvious that the attributions have to be switched. If in civil suits any testimony supported by 2 witnesses is acceptable then only the last, single, remaining witness is not liable ( Note 46 ). But if the testimony of a group is only acceptable if all witnesses are qualified and testify in parallel then the first disqualification disqualifies the group and only the first witness is liable. . Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two”. Therefore if there had been one, testimony that was partially invalidated it is totally invalidated.
MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. 5:21–22 . . “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one. 5:21–22 . .
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Parashah 8(8–10). From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. 5:1 , “or” is used twice, in vv. 21–22 four times. . Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove. 35:22–23 , in the description of accidental homicide, “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove. 5:14 , the presumption of innocence of the deviant woman is introduced by “or”. The imprecation is not the woman’s but the Cohen’s, v. 19. since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove. 5:4 , “or” is used twice. since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. 5:5 : It shall be if he causes damage by some of these ; some will require a sacrifice but not others. The decision what to include is left to the religious authorities guided by the hermeneutical principle of “equal cut”. Babli 33b , Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 17(1). . Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims. 5:21–22 (a deposit, a loan, extortion and robbery, a find) refer to monetary claims about movables. Since there can be no sacrifice for an oath about deposits relating to real estate, one might argue that there can be no sacrifice for an oath about testimony involving real estate, asserted in Tosephta 4:1 . 17(2). .
MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that X owes me full damages or half damages. 21:35–36 . , double restitution or quadruple and quintuple restitution. 22:3 ; 21:37. , that X raped or seduced my daughter. 22:16 ) or raping her ( Deut . 22:29 ). , or that my son hit me. 21:15 ). , or that my neighbor injured me. 21:18 ; Mishnah Bava qamma 8:1 . , or that he set fire to my grain stack on the Day of Atonement 5:4 Notes 138–139 . ;” these are liable.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. 17(1). It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness , or saw , or knew . 5:1 . , etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me. 22:16 ) or raping her ( Deut . 22:29 ). .” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable 12b , בָּרִי וְשֶׁמָּא בָּרִי עָדיף “between certain and perhaps, certain is preferred.” If a claim is asserted as certain but the defense is that possibly it is false, there is no defense. . “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him 91b . . Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I am a Cohen, that I am a Levite, that I am not the son of a divorcee, that I am not the son of a woman having received ḥalîṣah , that X raped or seduced his daughter 7:1, Notes 19–70 ). , or that my son injured me. 21:15 ). , or that my neighbor injured me or set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath:” these are not liable.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. 11(4). A person who would sin , a person who would sin as an equal cut. 5:1 about oaths concerning testimony and 5:21 about the person accused of larceny who swears falsely in purgation by oath; cf. Chapter 3:12, Note 165 . The parallel use of identical terms is an equal cut which allows transfer of rules from one occurrence to the other. . Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.
“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging 7:1 Note 51 is true only for R. Joḥanan but not for R. Simeon ben Laqish. The latter holds that since a violation of the Day of Atonement in front of witnesses after due warning will expose the perpetrator to flogging, there can be no monetary claim even if there are no witnesses and the case of desecration is not one for the courts. . He explains it following Rebbi Meїr who said, he is flogged and he pays 7:1 Note 7 . Cf. Babli Ketubot 33b . . In any case he did not make him lose money. Is it not that since he wanted to give him but did not give to him; it is as if he made him lose money.
MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable. 5:1 is quite explicit that it applies only to persons who already know the testimony. since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. 10:9 Notes 133–134; Giṭtin 6:1 Note 39 , Bava meṣi`a 4:2 Note 49; Babli Bava meṣi`a 49a , Bekhorot 13b ; Sifra Qedošim Pereq 8(7 ). Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody wanted to change his mind after he had promised a gift to another person, he may change his mind. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Did He not say “a true yes”. 19:36 . The pun identifies the measure הִין with the Aramaic equivalent הֵן of the Hebrew כֵּן “yes”. It shows that -ֵ was pronounced like -ִי (Itacistic η = ῖ). The verse is read as exhortation to be honest in business dealings. ? At the moment when he said it, it was a true yes.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them 8(6) the language is that of the Sephardic Mishnah, based on the expression and he is a witness of Lev . 5:1 . The Babli (35a ) infers from this verse that the demand for testimony must be personal; it is not enough that the claimant know the identity of the witness, the request must be delivered individually. If the claimant sees a group of people which includes the two whom he wants as his witnesses, he may not address the group collectively; he must summon them personally. .
MISHNAH: If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you, X and Y, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me, but they knew from another witness, or one of them was a relative or disqualified. These are not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.
MISHNAH: If he sent through his slave in law. or the defendant said to them, “I am putting an oath on you that you shall come and testify for him,” they are not liable unless they hear from the mouth of the claimant 8(4). .
HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell , he has to carry his iniquity ? Not . 5 :8*1 writes the negation as לוֹא which is read both as לוֹ and as לֹא. In the first version, אִם לוֹ יַגִּיד, the liability may only be triggered if he told him , if the claimant personally challenged the witness and if the witness personally accepted the challenge ( Babli 35a ). In the second version, אִם לֹא יַגִּיד, the liability is triggered if he does not testify. , from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.
MISHNAH: “I put an oath upon you, I command you, I bind you,” these are liable. “By Heaven and Earth,” they are not liable. “By א-ד, by י-ה, by the Almighty, by Sabaoth, by the Gracious and Merciful, by the Forbearing and Most Benevolent,” and all substitute names, they are liable. One who curses by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. 24:15 ) refers only to blaspheming the Name ( Sanhedrin 7:14 ). . One who curses his father or mother by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. 21:17 ). . One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition. 19:14 ; Sifra Qedošim Parashah 2(13 ). . “May God punish you, so may God punish you,” this is the imprecation mentioned in the Torah. “May He not punish you, may He bless you, may He do well with you,” Rebbi Meїr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.
HALAKHAH: “I put an oath upon you,” etc. to the end. “I put an oath upon you” without addition, they are liable. “I am binding you, I am roping you in,” they are liable.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution. 7:14 . Only here is opinion of the Sages attributed to R. Jehudah; in the Babli (Sanhedrin 66a ) it is attributed to R. Menaḥem ben R. Yose. ”
“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive 3:4 Note 136 , Nedarim 1:4 Note 158 . (The explanation given there that the statement of R. Yasa in the name of R. Joḥanan is a rhetorical question is incorrect; the statement is a straightforward declarative sentence.) The Babli (36a , Nedarim 11a , 13b , Soṭah 17a ) is totally opposed; it proposes to switch the attributions in the Mishnah between R. Meїr and the Sages. . “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice . 5:1 . , to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation 8(2). .