MISHNAH: Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another are forbidden to enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his 1:6 explains that the parties of a common courtyard can force a partition if the area of the courtyard exceeds a certain minimum. As the Babli explains, 46b , R. Eliezer ben Jacob refers only to a courtyard larger than the minimum. He holds that each square inch of the courtyard is potentially the property of one owner, only it was not determined who the actual owner is. Therefore, each of the partners can claim that he temporarily steps only onto his own property. It must be that R. Eliezer ben Jacob permits a straight walk from the entrance gate to the house door; this would be the domain belonging to the person’s house in a separation of properties. . Both are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there. If one of them made a vow not to have usufruct from the other, he cannot enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, one can say to the other, I enter into my property, I do not enter into yours. One forces the one who made the vow to sell his part.
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede but in the contract agreed that they would not insist on excluding the other party from entering the separate domain of the other party. Then for the rabbis the split did not change anything. , it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There 3:6 . It is stated there that simply putting a stove, a grindstone, or chickens into a courtyard does not create a presumption of ownership, but building a foundation for the grindstone or an enclosure for the oven does. , we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership. 12, Note 29 ( Mishnah Baba batra 3:4 ). ” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing 57b . The statement of R. Jeremiah does not appear in the Babli. , for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership 3:6 it is asserted that only a wall of at least ten hand-breadths around an oven or a hearth does count. The text here is very close to Tosephta Baba batra 2:13 : Putting an oven or a hearth in a courtyard does not establish a presumption of ownership, but making a roof of any size does. . Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners can acquire one from the other 8:1, Note 15 , rabbinic practice does not recognize transfer of property by payment, but only by delivery or a symbolic act indicating delivery. Also, since anything found on a person’s real estate is his, one can state that real estate acquires for its owner (cf. Peah 5, Note 125 ; Kilaim 8, Note 46 ). If there is only one owner, delivery of goods into the courtyard is legal delivery and transfer of ownership. R. Joḥanan asserts here that even among partners on their common real estate one may assume, following R. Eliezer ben Jacob, that the place on which some merchandise is put is at least temporarily owned by the acquiring party alone. This supports the opinion in the Babli, 46b , that practice follows R. Eliezer ben Jacob. R. Abun bar Cahana follows the opinion of the anonymous majority, that common property is not divisible, and requires an action by the acquirer, either collecting the objects or at least moving them in a symbolic display of ownership rights. and are responsible for damages inflicted by one on the other 3:8 to show that an owner is liable for injuries on his property suffered by anybody being on the property by right or invitation. . Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if they were collected he does not acquire unless he moves.
“I enter my property, I do not enter yours.” And you say, one forces him? It was not said on this, but on: “I enter your partner’s property, I do not enter yours.” In that case one forces the [maker of the vow] to sell his part. If he says, you shall not have any usufruct from me. But not if he says, I shall not have any usufruct from you.
MISHNAH: If anyone from outside was under a vow of no usufruct from one [of the partners], he should not enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, he can say to him, I enter your partner’s property, I do not enter yours.
HALAKHAH: “If anyone from outside was,” etc. And we did not state “one forces”! Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If he was a frequent maker of vows, one forces him,” because the other [partner] can say to him, one came to me and you did such and such to him; a second person and you did such and such to him; the third time he tells him either you undo your vow or sell your part.
MISHNAH: If one was under a vow not to have usufruct from another and he owns a bathhouse or an olive press leased out in town; if he retains the grip of a hand, Swiss legal German Hand , French (for real estate) main . on them, the other one is forbidden; if he retains no grip of a hand on them, the other one is permitted. If a person says to another, a qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: What is the grip of a hand? One half, a third, or a quarter.
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this” to 46b) has a slightly enlarged text: משום ביתך או משום זה “because of ‘your house’ or because of ‘this’?” The text as it stands is completely intelligible. A vow because of “your house” becomes void if it is no longer the other’s, because of “this” is permanent. ? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it. does not say that if he said “this house” the heirs do not have to rebuild, it follows that “your house” is determining, not “this”. This means that if the house collapses and he rebuilds, it is forbidden, but if it is sold, it is permitted. ” 9:14 , source of the Mishnah. There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. 27:6–11 ), not by his father’s will. . ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos forbidding his property during his lifetime, is valid, but the second one for the time after his death is invalid since nobody can forbid to another person anything not in his possession. Why does it become valid if combined? ? switches the Mishnaiot quoted, respectively, by Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose. Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot . In Baba Qama , the text is: “We have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim ,” but there, the reference is to a Mishnah in Neziqin , cf. Note 39 . The difference is not a variant reading. : “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden”. In Baba Qama this last sentence is missing; the preceding one reads: “Because he said ‘these’, he forbade to him both during his lifetime and after his death.” forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
MISHNAH: “I am ḥerein for you is an expression for a gift to the Temple of offerings that cannot be redeemed, Lev . 27:28 . As a term for a vow, it is equivalent to qorbān . ”, the addressee is forbidden. “You are for me ḥerem ,” the vower is forbidden. “I am for you and you are for me,” both are forbidden. Both are permitted the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia and forbidden the institutions of their own town.
HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.
8a , Sanhedrin 112a . “A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved 36a , Makkot 16a ); since voter rolls change continuously, it is impossible to get all people who voted for the vow together to ask for dissolution. . A vow made in public cannot be dissolved 36a , decides against this. . “If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion. 2:21 ), God dissolved his vow not at the Senna-bush but in Midian, with the consent of his family ( Ex . 3:18 ). .
It turns out that one disagreement is like an other other disagreement, as it was stated: On the Day of Atonement, one has to detail one’s deeds, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not have to detail the sin, Yerushalmi 1:9 (45c, 1. 48); Babli 86b . [There, the first author is R. Jehudah ben Baba. In the first hand of the Munich ms. the second author is R. Jehudah; this seems to have been the reading of Maimonides ( Tešubah 2:3) and Tosafot Yešenim ad loc .] . Some Tannïm state, one has to detail the vow; some Tannïm state, one does not have to detail the vow. A person made a vow not to earn money. He came before Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom. He asked him, what did you forswear to yourself? He said to him, not to earn money. Rebbi Yudan said to him, is there anyone doing that? He said to him, as a gambler. He said, praise to Him Who chose the Torah and the Sages who said, one has to detail the vow.
MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery 4:8 ). Following the terminology of the Book of Ruth, in Babylonian/rabbinic terminology this act is called קִנְיָן “acquisition”. , the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.
HALAKHAH: “What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia,” etc. So is the Mishnah: A town square which is crossed by a public road is as if from the returnees from Babylonia. A man used a Torah scroll for his preliminary marriage2:3, Note 46 ; Demay 4:2, Note 19 ; Yebamot 1:1, Note 63 . to a woman. Rebbi Sabbatai and Rebbi Ḥasida brought the matter before Rebbi Yose who said, she is not married. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, you read the letter and there is written in it “not only”. Rebbi Mana said, I asked before Rebbi Ḥizqiah, what means “not only”? Did he marry with a Torah scroll which is private property 3:7 , end), it is doubtful whether monetary value was transferred. (For that reason, a modern marriage is concluded by the gift of a gold ring without a stone, whose commercial value can be easily determined.) ? He said to us, she is not married. That comes to tell you, even if he used the public Torah scroll to marry, that is “not only”. But that means, even if he used a privately owned Torah scroll to marry, that is “she is not married.”
“Rebbi Jehudah says, even if only one signs over his part to the Patriarch,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One of them has to sign over his part to the Patriarch.
MISHNAH: If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another has nothing to eat, the other donates [food] as a gift to a third party and the person is permitted it. It happened in Bet Ḥoron with a person whose father was by a vow forbidden usufruct from him; when he married off his son he said to a friend, here the courtyard and the meal are given to you as a gift and they shall be yours until my father has come and eaten with us at the [wedding] meal. He said to him, if they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven. He said, I did not give you my property that you should dedicate it to Heaven. He said to him, you gave me your property only that you and your father should eat, drink, and be friendly with one another and let the sin hang on my head. When the case came before the Sages they said, any gift with the proviso that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.
HALAKHAH: “If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.
28a . Hillel the Elder had eighty pairs of students. The greatest among them was Jonathan ben Uzziel, the least important Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai. Once he fell sick and all came to visit him. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai waited in the courtyard. He said to them, where is the least important among you who is a head in wisdom and a head for generations? Unnecessary to speak of the greatest among you! They said, he is in the courtyard. He said to them, let him enter. When he entered, he said to them “to let my lovers inherit substance; their treasuries I shall fill.. 8:21 . Cf. Mishnah Uqeṣin 3:12 . ”
“Rabbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is what happened 133b with Shammai trying and failing to attack the method. : Jonathan ben Uzziel’s father vowed not to let him have any usufruct from him and in his will gave his part to Shammai. What did Shammai do? He sold some, gave some to the sacred fund, gave him the remainder as a gift, and said: He who wants to attack this gift, let him first get back [the merchandise] from the buyers and from the sacred fund; after that he can get [the remainder] back from this one.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that nobody can give a gift to a friend on condition that he not dedicate it to Heaven? So is the Mishnah: Any gift similar to that of Beth Ḥoron, which was dishonest in that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.