MISHNAH: Father and husband jointly dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl 30:4–6 ). Similarly, the husband can dissolve the vows of his wife if she lives “in his house” ( vv. 11–15 ). A preliminarily married girl (cf. Peah 6:2 Note 46 ; Demay 4:1, Note 19 ; Terumot 8:1, Note 9 ) remains under her father’s jurisdiction until she is taken to her husband’s house in the final ceremony. It is asserted that during her status as preliminarily married wife, the father can dissolve her vows since she is “in his house” and the husband is given special authority over her vows in vv. 7–9 which, therefore, are not duplicated in vv. 11–15. The power of dissolution in any case is restricted to the day after the father or husband first was informed of the vow (vv. 6,9,13,15). But if one of them agreed to the vow within the allotted period, he can no longer object after that. . If the father dissolved but not the husband, or the husband but not the father, it is not dissolved; one does not have to mention whether one of them confirmed it.
HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. It is written 30:7 . The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ. , “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written 30:11 . “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written 30:4 . “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say 30:7 . The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ. , ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her, 30:7 . The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ. ” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar 153 by R. Joshia, student of R. Ismael. The final argument in this paragraph is attributed to R. Ismael in the Babli, 68a . : “If she should be a man’s” 30:7 . The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ. , the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl He reads the verse as dealing with a case where there is no residual power of the father. But since vv. 11 ff. speak of the married woman, he must find a case of a preliminarily married woman free from her father. . The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died1:2, Note 118 ). The husband can dissolve her vows only after the definitive marriage or after she became an adult. The latter case is the one dealt with by R. Eleazar. ? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife. 30:17 . ” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter. 30:17 . ” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
“One does not have to mention if one of them confirmed it.” Come and see; if the father dissolved, it is not dissolved, and you say so? Not on that it was said, but on the following: If the father dissolved his part but the husband did not have time to dissolve before he died, the father dissolves the husband’s part. Rebbi Nathan said, those are the words of the House of Shammai. But the statement of the Sages is that he does not need to dissolve dissolve”. The Babli has a long discussion about the nature of the joint powers of dissolution. If the powers are parallel, then the dissolution by one of the parties has no influence on the other; the husband’s death leaves half of the vow undissolved and undissolvable. But if the powers are joint ones, then the husband’s death opens the way for the father to exercise his now unrestrained powers. There is no reason to think that the Yerushalmi makes a similar distinction. if [the husband] did not confirm it. But if [the husband] confirmed, [the father] cannot void.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution] The argument follows the Sages in the previous paragraph, who hold that the husband’s death automatically voids the vow. For them, the power of the husband is secondary and the woman cannot be prosecuted. . But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood 30:4–6 ). Similarly, the husband can dissolve the vows of his wife if she lives “in his house” ( vv. 11–15 ). A preliminarily married girl (cf. Peah 6:2 Note 46 ; Demay 4:1, Note 19 ; Terumot 8:1, Note 9 ) remains under her father’s jurisdiction until she is taken to her husband’s house in the final ceremony. It is asserted that during her status as preliminarily married wife, the father can dissolve her vows since she is “in his house” and the husband is given special authority over her vows in vv. 7–9 which, therefore, are not duplicated in vv. 11–15. The power of dissolution in any case is restricted to the day after the father or husband first was informed of the vow (vv. 6,9,13,15). But if one of them agreed to the vow within the allotted period, he can no longer object after that. .
HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!
“Since the husband dissolves in adulthood.” The Mishnah follows Rebbi Eleazar, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar 153 by R. Joshia, student of R. Ismael. The final argument in this paragraph is attributed to R. Ismael in the Babli, 68a . : “If she should be a man’s” 30:7 . The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ. , the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl He reads the verse as dealing with a case where there is no residual power of the father. But since vv. 11 ff. speak of the married woman, he must find a case of a preliminarily married woman free from her father. .
MISHNAH: If she made a vow while preliminarily married, was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even to a hundred men, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. That is the principle: as long as she did not leave her father’s power for one moment, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.
HALAKHAH: “If she made a vow while preliminarily married,” etc. Rebbi Hila said, “being she will be”. 30:7 . “To be” applied to a woman means “to be married,” Deut . 24:2 . , even for a hundred beings, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days 5:2 states that a girl who never was married before has 12 months after the preliminary marriage to prepare her trousseau and a widow 30 days. An adult girl, for whom the father no longer has responsibility, is supposed to have a trousseau by the twelfth month of her adulthood and can marry immediately (cf. the commentary ascribed to Rashi to the Babli, 73b, and Halakhah Ketubot 5:3 ). If the groom does not bring her into his house by the appointed time (by means of the final marriage ceremony), he nevertheless becomes resposible for her upkeep as if he were completely married. , Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months,” etc. Rebbi Eliezer holds that the matter depends on the support. If he preliminarily married a woman on condition to support her, the husband dissolves for her. If he completely married a woman on condition that he support her, the father dissolves for her. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband never dissolves before she enters his domain.
MISHNAH: If a woman was waiting for her levir 4:3, Note 84 . The Mishnah must speak about an underage girl who became a widow after a preliminary marriage only, and who still is under her father’s jurisdiction. The question is only whether the levir may dissolve her vows in conjuction with the father, since for a woman who is emancipated from her father, either by coming of age or by final marriage, the husband can dissolve only vows made after the final marriage act. , whether it be one or two, Rebbi Eliezer says, he shall dissolve 2:12, Note 12 ; 6:1 ). The rabbinic equivalent of the preliminary marriage is called “bespeaking” ( Yebamot 2:1, Note 6 ). The legal power of “bespeaking” is a matter of controversy but it is certain that adultery with a “bespoken” woman is not a capital crime. While under the obligation to marry a levir, the widow by biblical law is unable to contract a valid marriage with any other man ( Yebamot 1:1, Note 94 .) For R. Eliezer, the latter fact gives any levir the status of a husband in matters of vows. . Rebbi Joshua says, for one but not for two. Rebbi Aqiba says, neither for one nor for two.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman was waiting for her levir,” etc. Following Rebbi Aqiba, who can dissolve? For example, what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddušin are valid for her 60a ; Yerushalmi Yebamot 3:4 (Notes 102–104 ), 5:1 (Note 35 ); Qiddušin 3:1 , (63c 1. 71). A man gives something of value to a woman to serve as qiddušin money for a preliminary marriage in a month’s time. If other men also give her deferred qiddušin , they all might end up preliminarily married to her and none of them can marry her. In that case, she is not bound to any one by marriage in the sense of R. Aqiba. , who dissolves? And what Rebbi Jacob 1:2, 59c 1. 8, one reads: “R. Joḥanan said.” Since there is no R. Jacob without father’s name among the students of R. Joḥanan (there are R. Jacob bar Aḥa and R. Jacob bar Idi), the name has to be considered a scribal error. said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, he can allot her to his underage son. 21:7–11 ), about a situation intrinsically connected to the Jubilee year which became void with the exile of the Ten Tribes. The verse gives the master the right to marry the girl by considering the price he paid for her as qiddušin money, or to give her to his son as wife without additional expenditure. If the son is a minor, she becomes his wife by biblical decree, But the wife of a minor cannot be prosecuted for adultery [ Sifra Qedošim Pereq 9(11 )]. Can the underage husband, biblically married to his underage wife, dissolve her vows? , who dissolves? And what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa sind in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, she does not even need a reparation offering for a possible sin, Babli 113a , Yerushalmi 14:1 Note 7. (The rules of reparation offerings for possible sins are in Lev . 5:17–19 ). , who dissolves?
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows for a wife which he himself acquired, so much more that he should be able to dissolve for a wife which Heaven acquired for him. Rebbi Aqiba answered him: No. What you say is about a wife which he himself acquired, where nobody else has any authority over her; what can you say about the wife which Heaven acquired for him, where others have authority over her? Rebbi Joshua said to him, Aqiba, your words apply to two levirs. What can you reply about one levir? He said to him, the sister-in-law does not belong completely to her man as the wife belongs completely to her husband.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
MISHNAH: If somebody says to his wife, all vows that you might vow from now until I shall return from place X shall be confirmed, he did not say anything; [if he says] they shall be dissolved, Rebbi Eliezer says, they are dissolved, but the Sages say, they are not dissolved. Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows that came under the category of prohibition, should he not be able to dissolve vows that did not yet come under the category of prohibition? They said to him, it says. 30:14 . The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels. ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them”. What can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them he can dissolve his own vows before he made them?” ? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them? when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” (As R. Eliezer agrees in the Mishnah.) ” “But it says. 30:14 . The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels. , ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
MISHNAH: The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day; this can imply a lenient or a stringent implementation. How is that? If she made the vow Friday night, he may dissolve during the night and the next day until [the next] nightfall. If she made the vow shortly before nightfall, he dissolves until it becomes dark; for after dark he cannot dissolve.
HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated 157a . : “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say Num . 156 this is attributed to R. Simeon himself. , the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day. 30:15 . .” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing. 30:6 , 8 , 13 . In the Babli, 76b , and Sifry Num . 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours. It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num . 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing. .” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night of Friday night is problematic. It is a correction by the scribe himself and probably an insertion at the wrong place. , he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.
“It shall be dissolved at the time of the afternoon prayer,” it is permanently dissolved. “It shall be confirmed at the time of the afternoon prayer,” it is permanently confirmed. “It shall be dissolved until the time of the afternoon prayer,” it is as if he said, “it shall be dissolved starting with the time of the afternoon prayer.”
There 24:5 . , we have stated: “One dissolves vows on the Sabbath.” It was stated: Both vows that intrude on the Sabbath and vows that do not intrude on the Sabbath. “And one asks about vows that intrude on the Sabbath 24:5 . ,” therefore not if there is no need for the Sabbath. The Elder can dissolve the next day. Then for Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon who say that the dissolution of vows is from time to time, he should not dissolve even vows that intrude on the Sabbath! Explain it according to everybody, if she made the vow at the start of Friday night.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.
Rebbi Joḥanan; required by the general style of the Yerushalmi. said, earlier generations were asking, may a man ask about his confirmation? How is that? If his wife made a vow, her husband heard it and did not dissolve for her. It is obvious that he cannot dissolve as a husband. May he dissolve as an Elder? What are we talking about? If it is about vows between him and her, these are vows of himself. But we must talk about vows between her and others. [Is that not a Mishnah 2:5: “A man [sitting as judge] can permit all vows except his own. R. Jehudah says, nor his wife’s vows concerning others.” ? “Not his wife’s vows between her and others!”] Is that not Rebbi Jehudah’s? It was stated in the name of Rebbi Judah; Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of the Sages 2:5; Code Hilkhot Ševu‘ot 6:6) disagrees and follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah. .
May one permit 2:5; Code Hilkhot Ševu‘ot 6:6) disagrees and follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah. vows in the night? Since vows under the husband’s jurisdiction, about which “on the day ” is written. 30:6 , 8 , 13 . In the Babli, 76b , and Sifry Num . 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours. It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num . 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing. , he may dissolve in the night, vows under the jurisdiction of the Elder, where “on the day” is not written, not so much more 62b . ? Can one permit through an interpreter? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Abba bar Ẓutra was made an interpreter for Rebbi Joḥanan in the case of a woman who did not know Syriac. 19:15 ; Makkot 1:9. Sifry Deut . 188.) .
It was stated: One is asked about vows only while sitting and wrapped. The one who is asked must be sitting and the one who is asking is standing; from the following 19:17 . : “And the two people who have the dispute shall stand.” “Standing” means only “being judged”. That is for asking legal rules 4:1 (35b, 1. 30 ff.), Sanhedrin 3:10 (21c 1. 15ff.), Yoma 6:1 (43b 1. 51 ff.); Babli Ševu‘ot 30a ; Sifry Deut. 190. . Asking about sermons from where? The verse says “shall stand, and shall stand” is interpreted as sign of an addition; to answer anything of a theological nature, the Sage has to sit. The Babli disagrees, 77b ; the opinion of the Yerushalmi is quoted as that of Rabban Gamliel II. . Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus went to permit the vow of Rebbi Immi. He remained standing to say “there is no vow”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of the older Gamliel. He remained standing to say “there is no vow, there is no oath”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of Gamliel the grandson. He said to him, do not treat me as you treated my grandfather, but sit down and I shall remain standing.
1:8 , 76c 1. 62. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah, Jeremiah bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Three who know how to find an opening may permit like an Elder., s. v . אמר רב אחא בר יעקב.). In Bekhorot 36b , the same rule is attributed to R. Ḥiyya bar Abin in the name of Rav Amram, a student of Samuel’s student Rav Naḥman. . They thought, at a place where no Elder was available. The rabbis of Caesarea: Even at a place of an Elder. They said before Rebbi Yasa: Rav Huna is “head of tribes”. 30:2 ). . Who are the heads of tribes? Rav Huna is head of the heads of tribes.
May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes 5a , Rav received full rabbinic powers except the right to decide anything in matters of firstlings. (A firstling of cattle, sheep, or goats must be sacrificed unless it has a blemish which disqualifies it as a sacrifice. In the absence of a Temple, the firstling must graze until it develops a blemish; Deut . 15:19–23 .) The full ordination was refused to him since his intent was to return to Babylonia and Rebbi disapproved of that. After him, all rabbis with the limited diaspora ordination received the title of “Rav”. . After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him. 13–14 ) must be seen with both eyes, a one-eyed or blind person could not be ordained to decide on their ritual purity. ; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.
May one appoint Elders for a fixed time? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Rebbi Eleazar and asked him to intervene with the Patriarch Rebbi Jehudah, that the latter should write him a letter of recommendation for seeking a livelihood in a foreign country. He intervened, and [the Patriarch] wrote for him: Here we are sending you as our representative a great personality with all our powers until he shall return to us 5b , has a similar story involving R. Joḥanan who similarly gave conditional ordination to Rebbi Shimen. . Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Dositheus, Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of the old Rebbi Dositheus: He wrote him the following. Here we are sending you a great personality who will not be ashamed to say “1 did not learn this”.
May one permit wearing a coat “coat”. ? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One permits wearing a coat. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi permitted wearing a coat. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: At a place where one does not wear a toga. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, for easy vows.