MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell, the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties] and you want to burden us with the old ones?
HALAKHAH: “If a woman inherited property,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Before she was preliminarily married and n-reflexive niph‘al. J. N. Epstein ( loc. cit. Chapter 5, Note 33, p. 474 ) sees in this sentence only the introduction to the following question since in all quotes of the Mishnah in other parts of the Yerushalmi the formulation of the Mishnah is used. . What is the difference between before she was preliminarily married and after she was preliminarily married? Before she was preliminarily married, it fell to her; after she was preliminarily married it fell to her and him an interest. .
6:2, explained there in Notes 45–55 (variants פ ). Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.
Rebbi Jehudah said, they argued before Rabban Gamliel: Because preliminarily married she is his wife and definitively married she is his wife; just as the sale by the latter is void, the sale by the former also should be void. He said to them, we are ashamed of the new ones, now you want to roll the new on over the old ones! The new ones, after the definitive marriage; the old ones before the definitive marriage, when she was married in the second ceremony.
MISHNAH: If she inherited property after she was definitively married, both agree that if she sold or gave away the husband retrieves from the hand of the buyers. [If she interited] before she was definitively married 7, Note 1 ). and [sold] after she was definitively married, Rabban Gamliel said if she sold or gave away it is valid. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, they said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, did he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties], and you want to burden us with the old ones?
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows 10:1 . He has no rights to dissolve the vows of his adult preliminarily married wife. , what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties: Properties known to the husband she shall not sell and if she sold or gave away it is invalid. Those unknown to the husband she shall not sell but if she sold or gave away it is valid.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, properties known to the husband are real estate, those not known to the husband are movables. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, properties known to the husband are those she inherited in the presence of the husband, those not known to the husband are those she inherited while her husband was overseas. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The following are properties not known to the husband, what she inherited while her husband was overseas.
MISHNAH: If she inherited money; real estate should be bought with it and he eats its yield. For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; with produce connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much the property is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his, cut it is hers; real estate should be bought from it and he eats its yield.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited money; real estate should be bought,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s opinion since Rebbi Meïr considers standing [produce] as if it were cut 6:6. In rabbinic interpretation, Ex. 22:8 defines when an oath is required by the court: “About any criminal matter, about an ox, a donkey, a sheep, a garment, or anything lost, if he agrees that this is it, the suit shall be heard by the judges …” This is read to mean that an oath is needed if the defendant agrees that the plaintiff has a case but that he owes less than what is being claimed (cf. Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 15). The part of the claim in dispute is what the claimant considers criminal withholding of his property by the defendant. If the defendant rejects the entire claim, the claimant has to prove his case by witnesses or documents; if the defendant admits part of the claim the claimant can request that he swear not to owe more. But since the examples given in the verse are all about movables, it is concluded that claims of real estate cannot be resolved by an oath (Mishnah Ševuot 6:5). On that, R. Meïr states that “some things are on the ground but are not real estate”. The example given is that the claim is “I handed over to you (to harvest and make wine from) ten vines full of fruit” but the defendant claims “there were ony five.” In that case, R. Meïr requires the defendant to swear but the Sages hold that anything connected to the ground is like real estate. Since the produce on the field is considered as the wife’s capital, not the husband’s produce, R. Jeremiah infers that the Mishnah does not represent practice since it follows R. Meïr in a case in which the majority disagrees. . Rebbi Yose said, he did not hear that Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, Rebbi Meïr said this only for standing grain ready to be harvested and grapes ready to be harvested; therefore not unripe produce 15:3, Note 79 ; Babli Ševuot 43a . . But here, even unripe produce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, are not the arguments of Rebbi Meïr contradictory? There 6:6. , he did not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut, but here he considers standing [produce] as if it were cut. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Meïr does not consider standing [produce] as if it were cut. But if you see cut grain, you empower the woman; if you see an unseeded field, you empower the man. In case of doubt you estimate how much it is worth unseeded and how much seeded. If before it was seeded it was worth (two denars) and when it was seeded (one denar), with that denar real estate should be bought and he reaps its yield.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered at her entrance he was disabled at her exit, and in the circumstances where he was disabled at her entrance he was empowered at her exit. What was connected to the ground at her entrance is his and at her exit is hers, what was cut from the ground at her entrance is hers and at her exit is his 15:5, Notes 67–68 . .
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered,” etc. You say, at her entrance they are his: If she sold them they are not sold, if she gave them to a sharecropper he has the reward from it, if she dedicated them as First Fruits they are not dedicated You say, at her exit they are hers, if he sold them they are not sold, if he gave them to a sharecropper she has the reward from it, if he dedicated them as First Fruits, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since they disagreed: 1:6, Notes 119–121 . Cf. Sifry Deut. #301. ( Deut . 26:11 ): ‘You shall enjoy all the good things that the Eternal, your God, gave to you and your house.’ This teaches that a person brings First Fruits from his wife’s property.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after her death but not during her lifetime. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, during her lifetime and after her death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion since he said, a person does not inherit from his wife as a biblical rule. 27:7–11 (only that the children inherit from their mother, Num. 36:3 ). In the Babli, Giṭṭin 47b . it is supposed that R. Simeon ben Laqish accepts that the wife is mentioned obliquely in Num. 27:11 and his disagreement with R. Joḥanan is about a technicality; the opinion attributed here to R. Simeon ben Laqish is attributed in the Babli, 84a , to Rav. In Bekhorot 52b , it is asserted without dissent that the husband’s right of inheritance is biblical. (Maimonides, Hilkhot Naḥalot 6:8, asserts that the husband’s right of inheritance from his wife is only rabbinic practice.) . In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it never was dedicated. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is dedicated and the holiness is removed.
MISHNAH: If she inherited old male and female slaves, they should be sold and real estate bought with the proceeds, of which he eats the yield. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, she does not have to sell because they are the glory of her father’s house.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited male and female slaves,” etc. The Mishnah speaks of those who do not work enough והרי ), if they cannot work at all they cannot be sold. for their upkeep. But if they work enough for their upkeep, she does not have to sell because the glory of her father’s house still exists.
MISHNAH: If she inherited old vines or olive trees, they should be sold for their wood and real estate bought with the proceeds, of which he eats the yield. Rebbi Jehudah says, she does not have to sell because they are the glory of her father’s house.
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists. But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita 2:5, Notes 107,108. The quote is from Tosephta Baba Batra 6:18 , Babli Baba Batra 7a , Baba Meṣi‘a 104a . supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”
MISHNAH: If somebody invests in his wife’s properties, if he invested much but it yielded little, or he invested little but it yielded much, what he invested he invested and what it yielded it yielded. If he invested and had no yield, he shall swear how much he invested and get repaid income from his investment, he can ask to be repaid. .
HALAKHAH: “If somebody invests in his wife’s properties,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. Assi said, that is, if the investment is greater than the increase in value. But if the increase in value is greater than the investment, one gives him the increase in value. A baraita disagrees39a . with Assi: “In all cases one evaluates it as for a sharecropper.” The baraita disagrees about planting; what Assi said was about a building. The baraita disagrees about planting, is that what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. He said to him, in one case if he ate, in the other if he did not eat.
MISHNAH: 4:3 , explained there in Notes 84–95 (variants noted י). If a woman waiting for her levir inherited property, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that if she sells or gives away it is valid. If she died, what shall be done with her ketubah and the properties which enter and leave with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s and the father’s heirs shall split it. But the House of Hillel say, the properties are in the hands of the holders; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and the properties which enter and leave with her in the hands of the father’s heirs.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Her heirs, those who inherit her ketubah are obliged to bury her. Rebbi Yose said, if Rebbi Hoshaia had not stated this, we would have had a problem. If she had no ketubah, do they not have to bury her? This is difficult. If a woman has no ketubah, does she not have to be buried? A wife, even if she has no ketubah, must be buried. This one, if she has a ketubah, is entitled to burial costs. But here, if she does not have a ketubah, she is not entitled to burial costs.
MISHNAH: If his brother left money, real estate should be bought with it and he eats its yield it is not available to the brother who marries the widow without due safeguards. . For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much it is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his, cut it is up for grabs is guaranteed only by real estate. The author of this part of the Mishnah must hold that the statement about money left was R. Meïr’s who holds that a ketubah can be guaranteed and paid for by movables. . If he took possession first, it is his; if she took possession first, real estate should be bought for the proceeds and he eats its yield. 4:4, Note 96 . If he married her, she is his wife in every respect 4:4, Notes 97–100 . except that her ketubah is a lien on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “If his brother left money,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is necessary, if the money was deposited with him in a levirate marriage is guaranteed by the estate and Mishnah 11 states that all the property is under this lien, it seems superfluous to note that cash left by the first husband cannot be spent by the levir. Then it is noted that it is necessary to state that money deposited with the levir has to be accounted for and separated for the wife’s ketubah. In the Babli, 81b , this is an explicit baraita. , that you would not let him say, since I am the heir it is mine.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his” is guaranteed by her first husband’s estate, there is no reason why the standing grain should go to the levir. If the husband had lived, it would have been his, but it could not be the levir’s before the latter actually married the widow. One has to correct the Mishnah to hers from his. This argument is R. Simeon ben Laqish’s in the Babli, 82a . but [ ]; it is understood in the text. . In which respect? In case the heir took it fund, she can go to court and have him acquire real estate for the corresponding amount. , one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties. 46a , 66b ; Giṭṭin 40b ; Ketubot 59b , Nedarim 86b ; Baba Qama 90a ) that dedications to the Temple break contracts. This rule is not mentioned in the Yerushalmi and the latter’s position in this matter is not known. In Rashi’s interpretation, only dedications to the altar break contracts, not dedications which are purely monetary gifts to Temple or charity. Therefore, that principle does not apply here in any case. The text is Mishnah ‘Arakhin 6:2. There it is stated that if somebody dedicates his encumbered property, neither can the wife collect her ketubah nor a creditor his claim from Temple property which must first be redeemed. Then it is stated that if the creditor’s claim is at least equal to the appraised value of the property, he may lend another denar to the debtor and force him to redeem it to be able to foreclose the now secular property. ” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption 32b , Pesaḥim 31a . The redemption is purely symbolical since the debtor did not have the right to injure the creditor’s claim by dedication; therefore, the dedication is invalid. . Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny is larceny with Temple property which requires restitution in the amount of 125% and a sacrifice; Lev. 5:14–16 . R. Joḥanan implies that a person using the dedicated property for his personal advantage before it was redeemed is obligated for a sacrifice. On the other hand, it is sinful to offer unnecessary sacrifices which would be ”profane animals in the Temple courtyard.” If the sacrifice is valid then the dedication must be valid and could not be undone by a token amount but would require appraisal by a Cohen ( Lev. 27:11–14 ). . That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate. 5:14 restricts me‘ilah to “the Eternal’s holy things”, which excludes real estate. ? But we talk about standing grain when standing but will be subject once it is cut. . Since if the administrator misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule mean that the levir can take the standing grain, cut it, and keep it, but that the their’s standing vis-à-vis the creditor is like the administrator’s vis-à-vis the creditor. Since the creditor’s lien is on the real estate, it cannot cover the grain once it is cut and made movable. (Cf. the commentary RYDBZ ad loc. in the Wilna ed., and the novellae of Rashba, Giṭṭin 40b , end.) . Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.
MISHNAH: He cannot split the inheritance, reserve the amount necessary for the ketubah in a separate account, and use the remainder for his business. If he wants to commingle the inheritance with his own properties for his working capital, he has to pledge all his properties for her ketubah . should not say to her “here your ketubah is lying on the table” but “all my properties are pledged for your ketubah. ” If he divorced her, she has no ketubah- lien. If he took her back, she is like all women who have a ketubah .
HALAKHAH: , explained there in Notes 97–101 . “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah ’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah. ” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah. ” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah , the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah 65(18 ). .” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah , the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah ; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
was unsecured and not privileged against the heirs. In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah. ” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.
Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed three things 14b , he is credited only with the institution of the ketubah and a decree about impurity of metal vessels ( Note 102 ). “The institution of the ketubah ” probably means the formulation of the ketubah as a contract, which was unnecessary as long as the sum due was paid, or at least earmarked, as bride money. His decrees can be dated to the reign of his sister Shlomzion (Salome), widow of Alexander Yannai, 79–69 B.C.E. : That a person should use his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings. And that children have to go to school 21a , universal mandatory schooling is attributed to the post-Herodian High Priest Joshua ben Gamla. The Babli also notes that before Joshua ben Gamla’s time there was organized higher instruction only for youths 16 years and older. This cannot refer to Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ’s institution reported in the Yerushalmi since by no stretch of the imagination can a 16 year old teenager be called תִּינּוֹק. . Also, he decreed impurity for glass ware 6:21 ), leather and textiles ( Lev. 13:49 ), bone and wood ( Num. 31:20 ). Other vessels cannot become impure; to this fact one attributes the great number of stone vessels found on archeological sites of the Second Temple period. (Similarly intrinsically pure vessels made of cow dung have not survived for the archeological record.) The impurity of glass vessels, unknown to Moses, is purely rabbinical. One has to take the information that the impurity of glass ware “was decreed” by the head of the Synhedrion with a grain of salt. Most probably, he simply codified the rules which were popularly observed before, when the Pharisees obtained the leadership in the state. The reasons given in the Babli Šabbat 16a/b for the rules are inconsistent since the rules, derived from popular observance without any scriptural basis, are inconsistent as a mixture of two different sets of rules. Glass vessels are compared to earthenware vessels since the former are made from sand, the latter from clay. They are also compared to metal vessels since if broken they can be melted down and made into new vessels. . But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Yose ben Yo‘ezer from Ṣereda and Yose ben Joḥanan 65(18 ). from Jerusalem decreed impurity for Gentile lands 7:17 ) was codified which attributed to the earth of Gentile lands (within or without the Holy Land) the impurity of rotting human bodies. and glass ware; Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṭabbai? Rebbi Jonah said, Jehudah bar Ṭabbai and Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed on metal vessels 16b , what they decreed was that metal impure by the impurity of the dead should not become pure by being melted down, but only by sprinkling with water containing ashes of the red cow. The political background of this decision (which seems to contradict biblical rules, Num. 31:22–23 ) and the reliability of the Babli in this respect is difficult to establish. ; Hillel and Shammai decreed on the purity of hands 2:3, Notes 136–137 ; Babli Šabbat 14b ). . 1:7, following Note 55 (variants noted ש ). Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Levi: That was the current practice; they forgot it, but the later ones got up and agreed to the opinion of the earlier ones to teach you that everything the Court insists on will come to be in the end just as Moses was told on Sinai; as Rebbi Mana said ( Deut. 32:47 ): “For it is not an empty word, from you,” if it is empty it is from you because you do not exert yourself about it. “Because it is your life,” when is it your life? At the time that you exert yourself!