MISHNAH: Two robbery 4:3 that the judges in criminal law were paid from the Temple taxes. judges were in Jerusalem, Admon and Ḥanan ben Absalom. Ḥanan said two things and Admon seven. If somebody went overseas and his wife now is demanding sustenance, Ḥanan says that she is made to swear in the end or her husband returns and claims that she sold too much of his property. In both cases she has to provide an accounting and swear that nothing of her husband’s money remains in her hand. . The High Priests’ sons disagreed with him and said, she is made to swear in the beginning and in the end; Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos endorsed their statement. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai said, Ḥanan said correctly that she is made to swear only in the end.
HALAKHAH: “Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem,” etc. Did not Rebbi Phineas say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: 469 synagogues were in Jerusalem and each one of them had a Book house and a study house; the Book house for Scripture and the study house for Mishnah 3:1 (73d 28), Thr. rabbati 2:2, Introduction #12; in Ta‘anit 4, (69a 13) the number of schools is put at 500 in the name of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. In the Babli, 105a , the number is 394. ? But these two were appointed for robberies; to teach you that if anybody has the power to intervene, if he does not exercise his power the misconduct is attributed to him. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: Naḥum the Mede also was with them. In Rebbi Nathan’s opinion, three robbery judges were in Jerusalem.
1:4, 1. 66 f., Notes 198–208. The variant readings from there are indicated by ס . To the sources indicated there one may add Gen. rabba 85(8) (in the name of R. Immi.) Rebbi Ḥizqiya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi used to explain three verses for praise. “She sat at the entrance to the double spring.” Is this possible? Even the most brazen whore would not do that. But she lifted her eyes to the door to which all hope is directed; she said before Him: Master of the universe, do not let me leave this house empty. Another explanation: “She sat at the entrance to the double spring;” she opened his eyes and told him, I am single and pure. “And Eli was very old; …, that they slept with.” It is written “they bedded them overseas”, i. e., with the intent to return. In this version, the court will intervene in behalf of the married woman. But “if somebody left for overseas”, i. e., emigrated permanently, then the Mishnah only deals either with an abandoned wife or a widow, but not with a wife who expects her husband to return. ”. Rebbi said, the women were bringing their nests to become purified for their husbands and they were deferring the sacrifices; the verse counts it as if they had slept with them. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, that is what he scolds them for: “Why do you disregard my slaughter sacrifice and my flour sacrifice?” Could he remove them from the serious sin and scold them for the simple one? “His sons did not walk in his ways,” that they were taking tithe and judging. Rebbi Berekhiah said, a camel caravan was passing by, they neglected public needs and dealt in merchandise.
It happened that Rebbi Ismael allotted sustenance to a woman in the markets of Sepphoris. What means “in the markets”? From the markets. Rebbi heard this and said, who told him that he did not send her? Who told me that he did not leave for her? Do the passers-by know? Rebbi Hila said, this is what Rebbi asked: Rebbi is of the opinion that the Mishnah does not speak of a married woman but of a widow. He said, Samuel and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the Mishnah deals with a widow. It was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: “If somebody left overseas”, i. e., with the intent to return. In this version, the court will intervene in behalf of the married woman. But “if somebody left for overseas”, i. e., emigrated permanently, then the Mishnah only deals either with an abandoned wife or a widow, but not with a wife who expects her husband to return. for overseas and his wife demands sustenance.” They wanted to say, for him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a married woman, “in the beginning” that he did not send her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. For him who says, the Mishnah speaks of a widow, “in the beginning” that he did not leave for her, “in the end” that she did not put aside and did not act dishonestly. Samuel, Rebbi Berekhiah’s brother, said, that she did not renounce her ketubah in the orphans’ favor at the same time also renounces her claim to sustenance. .
is also discussed in the Babli, 107b . If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah 15:1 states that in this case the widow may remarry without proof of the husband’s death, she certainly must be believed regarding the monetary implications of her husband’s death. . My husband divorced me, she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman, she can be supported from her ketubah minus the amounts already taken for her sustenance (Interpretation of the Babli). . “If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support. In this case, does one listen to him? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” 3:1, Notes 11–12. The marriage contract explicitly notes that the husband will “work for, honor, feed, and provide for” his bride “in the manner of Jewish husbands.” The language seems to imply that this is a contract following rabbinic guidelines; this is the position of Nachmanides and R. Asher ben Ieḥiel ( Rosh Ketubot Chap. 13, Sec. 6.) Maimonides holds that nevertheless the obligation is biblical, Hilkhot Iššut 12:2. The wife may not sell Sabbatical produce for her needs since Sabbatical produce may not be used to pay debts of any kind. But if the husband is present, she may eat of his Sabbatical fruits; since his obligation to feed his wife is only rabbinical, this is not considered paying his debts with Sabbatical produce. Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support contract the wife is entitled to live as well in her husband’s absence as in his presence, the court is entitled to grant her money to make up the difference. . In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.
If somebody was overseas and said, certain things should be given to his sons, his daughters are included. If he said that when he was dying, certain things should be given to his sons, his daughters are not included.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Practice follows Ḥanan in his two statements; practice does not follow Admon in his seven statements. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him.
MISHNAH: If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife, Ḥanan says, he lost his money. The High Priests’ sons disagreed with him and said, let him swear on what he expended, that she shall collect; Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos endorsed their statement. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai said, Ḥanan said correctly that he put his money on a deer’s antler.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons 15:1 states that in this case the widow may remarry without proof of the husband’s death, she certainly must be believed regarding the monetary implications of her husband’s death. ? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that he would not expect his wife to starve. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel .” If somebody does not pay his šeqel , does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.
Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, what is greater? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other said, it is not like annona and head-tax.
There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.
Is not the property of the finder forbidden to the owner of the cow? Ulla bar Ismael in the name of Rebbi Isaac: If each man’s property was forbidden to the other.
Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?
As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father stated at the start of the parallel paragraph in 4:6 : “If the husband refused to bury her, the father buries her and recovers his expenses in court.” . Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.
MISHNAH: Admon promulgated seven [rules]. If somebody dies and is survived by sons and daughters. If the estate is large, the sons inherit and the daughters will be sustained. If the estate is small, the daughters shall be sustained and the sons shall go begging. Admon said, because I am a male, shall I lose? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.
HALAKHAH: “Admon promulgated seven [rules],” etc. 9:1 , in a somewhat different formulation. How large is a large estate? Rebbi Ze‘ura, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: That there should be twelve months of sustenance for all of them. Samuel heard this and said, this is the opinion of Rabban Gamliel ben Rebbi, but the Sages say, until they reach adulthood or are married. They asked before Rebbi Yose, the person who was asked is R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, R. Joḥanan’s successor as head of the Academy. , what did you hear from Rebbi Joḥanan? He said to them, let us explain the words of the Sages by their words! Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone.
When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa, the statement is in the name of “the Babylonian R. Ammi”, i. e., R. Immi, the constant companion of R. Yasa. said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property as prior mortgage holder, the daughters cannot since their claim was created only at their father’s death, when the sons already were legal owners of the property. The same statement by R. Assi (= Yasa) in the name of R. Joḥanan is in the Babli, 103a . . So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah ; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”
As you say, after deduction for her ketubah , after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him daughters’ dowries are listed together with the ketubah and outstanding loans as diminishing the free portion of the estate used to determine whether it is “small” or “large”. who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank, her claim of support by the estate is of equal weight with that of sons and daughters. . The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons is in worse shape, but the original meaning can be gleaned from it even if the original text is lost irretrievably: פְּעָמִים שֶׁאַלְמָנָה דוֹחָה אֶת הַבָּנוֹת עַל יְדֵי הַבָּנִים. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהָאַלְמָנָה דוֹחָה לְבָנוֹת עַל יְדֵי בָנִים כֶּן תִּדְחֶה אַלמָנָה לְבָנִים. “Sometimes the widow pushes out the daughters by means of the sons. Just as the widow pushes out the daughters by means of the sons, should she not push the sons out?” Since clearly here the roles of “sons” and “daughters” are exchanged, the question is whether the widow’s sustenance should not preempt the daughters’ if the estate is not sufficient for all of them. ? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.
“The sons shall go begging.” Some Tannaïm state, “shall support themselves., the Escurial ms. has a third reading יסחרו “shall go around.” ” He who says “shall support themselves”, “make yourselves comfortable under the tree.. 18:4 . The text reads וְהִשָּׁעֲנוּ תַּחַת הָעֵץ. ” He who says, “go begging”, “may his children wander about begging, asking out of their ruins.109:10 . ”
Rav Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Ḥanan made two statements, practice follows him; Admon made seven statements, practice does not follow him. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him.
MISHNAH: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels, Admon says, since he admitted part of the claim he is made to swear, but the Sages say, what he admitted was not of the kind that was claimed 6:1) of Ex . 22:8 that the defendant has to swear that he does not owe more than he admitted. In Admon’s interpretation, a claim for amphoras of oil is a claim for oil and the vessels in which it is contained, but for the Sages it is simply a claim for a certain standard measure of oil; if ownership of the vessels is also claimed, it would have to be stated explicitly. This Mishnah is repeated as part of Mishnah Šebuot 6:3, in a series of explanations of what means “agreeing to part of the claim.” . Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement,
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free 6:3. Since the deviations between the two texts are not easily described as variant readings, both texts are given here side by side. It is seen that the basis of discussion is Mishnah Šebuot 6:6, not Ketubot 13:4 . The major additions and changes in the Šebuot text are indicated by italics in the translation. .
Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free 6:3 which states that if the claim was for wheat but the defendant admits an obligation for barley, the admission is not relevant for the claim and the defendant does not have to swear, except that Rabban Gamliel holds that any admission by the defendant obligates the latter to swear. This sentence is followed by a copy of the Mishnah here, detailing the difference between Admon and the majority about claims for oil with or without the containers. It is now claimed in the name of R. Joḥanan that if a claim is put forward for two unrelated items, the admission in full of liability for one item does not induce an obligation on the defendant to swear if he denies all liability for the second claim since the two claims, while stated together before the court and treated at the same time, really constitute two separate suits. This opinion is quoted in the name of R. Ḥiyya bar Abba in the name of R. Joḥanan in the Šebuot text and in the Babli, 108b ; it is explicitly rejected in the name of R. Joḥanan in the Babli Šebuot 40a where R. Joḥanan, Rav Naḥman and Samuel are quoted as stating that any claims which form one suit have to be treated as one common claim. The inconsistency of the Babli was recognized by the early commentators. . And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated40a ; cf. the preceding Note. The Babli, loc. cit ., implies that R. Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion in the matter is unknown. . Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state 6:3. The Mishnah states that if one suit contains claims that have to be adjudicated following different rules of procedure, they cannot be consolidated and have to be treated separately. Since claims for real estate cannot be resolved by taking oaths (Mishnah Šebuot 6:5), if the claim was for movables and real estate, an admission by the defendant either of the claim for movables in full or for the claim for real estate either partially or in full cannot trigger an obligation to swear. “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate 6:3: A partial admission about movables triggers an obligation to swear about movables and real estate; a partial admission about real estate does not trigger an obligation to swear. As explained in this Mishnah, also Mishnah Qiddušin 1:5 , and quoted in the Šebuot text, an obligation to swear about movables induces an obligation to swear about real estate. ? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty text for an intelligible version of this statement. . One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.
MISHNAH: If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law but then goes bankrupt, she must wait until her hair grows white. Admon says: “If I had obligated myself, I would have to wait until my hair grows white. My father obligated himself, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law,” etc. The Mishnah [deals with the case] that he obligated himself in her presence. But if he obligated himself not in her presence, even the rabbis will agree1:6 ). This implies in particular that a preliminarily married underage girl, whose father has promised money but has not paid, can always force a divorce once she reaches adulthood and is able to act in her own behalf. (The Babli, 109a , and Tosephta 12:4 hold that the court will intervene on behalf of a minor whose father does not pay and whose groom does not want to marry without money.) .
It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Admon and the rabbis did not disagree about one for whom the father had promised money but went bankrupt that she may sit until her hair grows white. Where did they disagree? If she promised herself. Admon says, she might say, “I was of the opinion that my father wants to give, but now my father does not want to give, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.
MISHNAH: If somebody protests about a field when he himself had signed as a witness, Admon says: “The second one fits me, the first one was harder”; but the Sages say, he lost his right [of appeal]. If he made [the field] a marker for another, he lost his right.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody protests about a field,” etc. Not only if he himself made it a marker for another [field], but even if a third person made it for a fourth, when he signed as a witness, he lost his right.
MISHNAH: If somebody went overseas and lost the way to his field, Admon says, he shall go the shortest way but the Sages say, he has to buy a right of access for a hunded minas or fly through the air.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he sues with reasons. This means, only if four [owners] surround him. Samuel says, even if one surrounds him on all sides. Joshua’s stipulation! “If he was lost in vineyards or fields, he crosses and leaves until he reaches a road to his house, even a plot full of vineyards, for this is one of the conditions under which Joshua distributed the Land to Israel.” Joshua stated this to leave, maybe to enter? Joshua stipulated for a person, perhaps for his cow? Rebbi Yose said, his cow usually returns; since a swarm of bees does not usually return, they treated it as if it were his body.
4:2 . Rebbi Jeremiah said, both Admon and Rebbi Aqiba said the same thing, as we have stated there 4:2 . The Mishnah belongs to a series of statements about commercial contracts. If somebody sold cisterns in his backyard to a third party, R. Aqiba holds that nobody buys anything which he cannot use; therefore, it is understood that the seller, by offering the cisterns for sale, did also offer access to them. But the Sages hold that people also buy real estate for speculation and, therefore, the sale covers only what is explicitly stated in the sales contract and nothing more. : “If he sold them to another person, Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the Sages say, he has to buy access.” He had not heard that Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They disagree when nothing was mentioned. Where do we hold? If it is obvious that access was included, everybody agrees that he does not have to pay for access. If it is obvious that access was not included cisterns are sold. , everybody agrees that he has to pay for access. But we must hold that nothing was mentioned. Then Rebbi Aqiba said, he does not have to buy access, but the rabbis say, he has to buy access. But in the case here, even while it is clear that he had access, everybody is not one of interpretation of commercial contracts but of enforcing a claim if it is not known against whom the claim could be enforced. agrees that he has to pay for access.
MISHNAH: If somebody produces a promissory note on another person who in his turn produces a document that [the creditor] sold him a field, Admon says, “if I really owed you, you should have collected what is yours when you sold me the field;” but the Sages say, that one was smart when he sold him real estate because he can take it as a pledge.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody produces a promissory note on another person,” etc. Rebbi Jonah says, if it is worth it; Rebbi Yose says, even if it is not worth it. Think of it, if he had real estate! He can say to him, I want good real estate. Think of it, if he had good real estate! He can say to him, I want mine. In addition, he can say to him, to care for two parcels overtaxes my powers.
MISHNAH: If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other, Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” But the Sages say, each collects the amount of his note.
HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [ zuz ]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid. 21:35 requires the owner of the animal to pay half of the damages caused by his steer. If two such steers fight with one another and injure one another, Mishnah Baba qama 3:9 prescribes that money changes hands only for the amount for which one injury was estimated to be larger than the other. Since the fighting steers create obligations for their owners, it is seen that mutual obligations can be counted one against the other. . He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon can be upheld as lectio difficilior . . Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect.
MISHNAH: There are three districts for marriage, Judea, Transjordan 9:2, Note 39 . These districts are considered separate entities. , and Galilee. One does not move from one village to another village and from one walled city 9:5, Note 216 . to another walled city, except that in one district one moves from one village to another village and from one walled city to another walled city, but not from a village to a walled city or from a walled city to a village. One moves from a bad neighborhood to a better one but not from a better one to a worse one. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, not even from a bad neighborhood to a better one, because the better neighborhood tests.
HALAKHAH: “There are three districts for marriage, Judea, Transjordan, and Galilee.,” etc. The Mishnah refers to the case that he was from Judea and married a woman in Galilee, or from Galilee and married a woman in Judea. But if he was from Judea and married in Judea, or from Galilee and married in Galilee, one forces her to move. the place of origin of the groom and the place of the wedding, in order not to leave any doubt in which district the husband could dwell without his wife being able to object. ”‘I, x, am from Judea and married a woman in Judea,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Galilee’ one does not force her to move. ‘I, X, am from Galilee and married a woman in Galilee,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Judea’ one does not force her to move. One moves from a mostly Gentile village to a totally Jewish village but not from a totally Jewish village to a mostly Gentile village.”
And from where that a better neighborhood tests? Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Ḥama in the name of Ḥanina: “That disaster should not cling to me and I die.. 19:19 , Lot speaking to the angels who had told him to move to the mountains to escape the destruction of Sodom. The climate in the Moabite mountains is much healthier that in the plain of the Dead Sea. A slightly expanded version is in Gen. rabba 50(20) by R. Berekhia in the name of R. Levi. The Babli, 110b , quotes a verse of Sirach to the same effect. ” He was in the plain and was directed to the mountains, and you say so? But from here that a better neighborhood tests!
MISHNAH: Everybody moves to the Land of Israel but not everybody leaves. Everybody moves to Jerusalem but not everybody leaves. How is this? If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel and bill of divorce were executed in the same country, it is clear that the sum stipulated in the ketubah , whose payment was triggered by the bill of divorce, has to be settled in the coin of the country. . If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel determines the currency. But if he married in Kappadokia and had to pay in coins of Israel, it implies that the bill of divorce, the trigger of the payment, determines the currency. (In the Babli, 101b , and the Tosephta, 12:6 , Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel states that the place of executing the ketubah determines its currency.) The Babli, 110b , concludes that, since the Persian coins current in Kappadokia are better than the debased Roman coins in Israel, the obligation of the ketubah is a rabbinic institution and the possibility of paying with debased coin was part of the institution. The Yerushalmi (also Tosephta, 12:6 ) will argue that the Jewish coins of Israel, not the Roman coins, are meant and, therefore, the Mishnah proclaims a stringency which can only be explained by giving the ketubah biblical status. ; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in coin of Kappadokia. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of Kappadokia and bill of divorce were executed in the same country, it is clear that the sum stipulated in the ketubah , whose payment was triggered by the bill of divorce, has to be settled in the coin of the country.
HALAKHAH: “Everybody moves,” etc. If he wants to move to the Land of Israel but she does not, one forces her to move. If she wants but he does not, one does not force him to move. If he wants to move to Jerusalem but she does not, one forces her to move. If she wants but he does not, one does not force him to move. If he wants to leave the Land of Israel but she does not, one does not force her to leave. If she wants to leave but he does not, one forces her not to leave.
“He pays her in coin of the Land of Israel.” This implies that the coins of the land of Israel are the best of all countries the Land but not of the Land. It must refer to the minting standards of the two revolts whose Jewish coins were intended to be used for the Temple tax and as such were of full weight, i. e. the “holy sheqel”. This also must be the meaning of the statement in the Tosephta 12:6 , cf. S. Lieberman, תוספתא כפשוטה כתובות p. 389. . This supports him who says that a woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah, against Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, as it was stated a biblical obligation. In Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai p. 209, a Babylonian compilation in the opinion of J. N. Epstein, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel is quoted as saying that ketubah has no fixed sum from the Torah; i. e., the institution is biblical, “the mohar of virgins”, but the amount and all details are rabbinical. The Babli follows the saboraic rule that practice always follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel in the Mishnah; a principle not known to the Yerushalmi and certainly rejected here. Cf. also 1:2, Notes 112–120 , 4:8 (29a 1. 30), 4:12 Note 248 ; Yebamot 7:2 Note 63, 15:3 Note 63 . For biblical status of ketubah, Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Mišpaṭim 17 (p. 308, ed. Horovitz-Rabin). : A woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, a woman’s ketubah is only an institution of the Soferim .