MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah and a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable 4:27–35 ) or, in the absence of a Temple, repentance and an expiatory action. since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable 4:27–35 ) or, in the absence of a Temple, repentance and an expiatory action. since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable Chapter 8) since by definition the rebellious Elder came to ask the High Court; in the matter he came to ask, his knowledge is not independent of the Court. , but one depending on the Court is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled.” etc. A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev. 4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b , discussed in detail Šabbat 93a. Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat 93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable. In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted. : the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction 6:9 Note 154 , Yebamot 12:1 Note 10 , Sotah 9:2 Note 63 , Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Babli Megillah 23b , Yoma 43a , Bava qamma 15b , Bava batra 15a , Sanhedrin 15a , 44b , 66a , Makkot 9b , Ševuot 7b , Menahot 9b , 67a , Hulin 132a .) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה. .
8:1, Notes 14–22 . As explained there, the background of the paragraph in Terumot is different from the one presumed here; therefore at a place where the readings there and here seem to be opposite to one another, both are correct in their settings. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable 8:1; a childless woman of non-priestly birth, married to a Cohen, was eating heave in purity, as is her right and duty, when she was informed of her husband’s death. By this death she returns to her non-priestly status and heave is forbidden to her. Nevertheless, she is not liable for a reparation sacrifice nor to pay for the heave eaten in error. This is the topic of Terumot 8:1, it is not followed up here. ? What is the difference between him 6:1. who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath 4:27 . , who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable 8:1, Note 18 . The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14 of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14 was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable ( Mishnah Pesahim 6:4 ). . They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden 8:1, Note 18 . The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14 of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14 was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable ( Mishnah Pesahim 6:4 ). , who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring 4:28 . Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God. . Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring ? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.
In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable 4:27 . Since our halakhic Midrashim are all from the school of R. Aqiba, we have to accept the occasional indications of the Yerushalmi on the interpretations of the school of R. Ismael. For him, the verses 4:27–28 detail the conditions on which a private person is permitted and obligated to bring a purification offering. . But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated 6:4 ; Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah 3(1), 6(1), Ahare Mot Parašah 4(8 ). Reparation sacrifices are required (1) for sins against a fellow man after restitution ( Lev. 5:20–26 ; Num. 5:5–10 ), (2) misappropriation of sancta ( Lev. 5:14–16 ), (3) to regain sanctified status after skin disease ( Lev. 14 ). A suspended reparation sacrifice is due if a person suspects that he may have committed an inadvertent sin, without having proof either way. Since the sin is forgiven on the Day of Atonement (with due repentance), such a sacrifice cannot be offered after that day since the scapegoat carries away all iniquities ( Lev. 16:21 ). : From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says 4:28 . Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God. , or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring , even after the Day of Atonement. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev. 4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b , discussed in detail Šabbat 93a. Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat 93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable. In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted. : the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent} 6:9 Note 154 , Yebamot 12:1 Note 10 , Sotah 9:2 Note 63 , Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Babli Megillah 23b , Yoma 43a , Bava qamma 15b , Bava batra 15a , Sanhedrin 15a , 44b , 66a , Makkot 9b , Ševuot 7b , Menahot 9b , 67a , Hulin 132a .) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה. on the Court is not liable.
the obligation of the High Court, as representatives of the people, to offer a purification sacrifice for a wrong ruling as described in Lev. 4:13–21 . It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable for something that was clear to them and then covered from them. What is the reason? something was hidden 4:13 . An erring High Priest ( Lev. 4:1–12 ) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court. , something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. 5:1–13 ), where the same condition in mentioned in Lev. 5:2 , 3 , 4 . R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in Ševuot 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him , therefore he had known, and he knew 5:4 : … an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt … , these are two knowledges. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times 5:2–3 ) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [ Ševuot 14b , Keritut 19a , Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple. , therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.
They are not liable unless they void part and confirm part 4(7). . Samuel said, only if they ruled that it was permitted; but not if they ruled that it was not prosecutable. They are not liable unless instruction was given from the ashlar hall Chapter 1, Note 345 . . Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of this Tanna: From that place which the Eternal will choose 17:10 . . Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they ruled unanimously 4(4).] . There 1:2, Note 166 . He holds that a ruling of the High Court to intercalate a month based on the testimony of laymen is valid only if it not only is unanimous in fact but also in reason. Concurrent opinions, reaching the same conclusion for different reasons, invalidate the judgment. Why is this not mentioned here? The text confirms the reading of the ms. in Roš Haššanah (2:6 58b l.25) against the one in Sanhedrin. , Rebbi Zeˋira said, only if they all rule for the same reason. And here, what?
“And a single person went and acted inadvertently following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them 6:13, Note 128 ; Sanhedrin 1:2, p. 36). . If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left; 17:11 . ” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left 154, Cant. rabba 1(18), which require one to follow the instructions of the rabbis even if they tell him to believe that left is right. Sound methodology would require one to follow the Talmud in preference to Midrashim. The Sifry text seems to be formulated as a polemic against the Yerushalmi. . What about it? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable action following the wrong teachings of the High Court has the status of unintended action even if it was intended. “Liable” and “not liable” here refer to criminal responsibility, not to obligations to offer sacrifices. .
The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude. But any individual who acted on his own is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat 27:35. . For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate, since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.
Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah by instruction from the Court. If the Court ruled to eliminate the entire body, since the Court has to bring a bull a private person does not have to bring a female sheep or goat. If they ruled to confirm part and to eliminate part, since the Court does not bring a bull a private person has to bring a female sheep or goat.
Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says. 4:27 . , [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them) in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 7(5), quoted in the Babli, 2b . Usually, a prefix מ “from” is interpreted to mean “not all”. This is behind the reading of B. The reading of the ms., in brackets, is that of Sifra and the Babli; it means that without instruction from the Court, any number of the people, maybe all except the members of the Court, may be required to bring private purification offerings simultaneously. This would not be a case that all of the congregation of Israel err ( Lev. 4:13 ); this expression is reserved for pronouncements of the Court. , even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption? The statement of a baraita 7(7), quoted in the Babli, 2a . The apostate wants to forget; even if he really forgot it was desired by him; he never qualifies for a purification offering, even if his transgression happens to be in a situation for which the Court would have to bring an offering if its conditions were fulfilled. disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him 4:28 . Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God. ; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “ A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress ; these are restrictions, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev. 4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b , discussed in detail Šabbat 93a. Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat 93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable. In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted. : the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed.
MISHNAH: If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred and reversed themselves; whether they brought their atonement or they did not bring their atonement4:13–21 . , another person went and acted on their instructions, Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable, but Rebbi Eliezer says, it is in doubt. What is the doubt? If he remained at home, he is liable; if he went overseas he is not liable. Rebbi Aqiba said, I agree in this case that he is closer to not being liable than being liable. Ben Azzai asked him, what is the difference between him and the one staying at home? For one who stays at home might be informed but the other one could not be informed.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court gave an instruction; then they realized that they erred,” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he removed form סַלֵּק, from the root סלק “to raise, lift”, means “to remove (from office)”, comparable to German entheben. Here it must mean, “to silence the opposing party” either by a convincing argument of the single opponent, or by a formal judgment of the High Court. them, their instruction would be invalid. If they removed him, his instruction would be invalid. But we hold in the case that each side stands by its answer. For him, their instruction is no instruction, for they did not remove him. For others it is an instruction, for he did not remove them. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum, since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously 4(4).] ? One explains it, that he was not present. Does this invalidate? He explains it following Rebbi, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]. Since Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they instructed unanimously; is it the same in retraction or by majority? If it is obvious for you by majority, what kind of majority? The majority of those who instructed or the majority of those remaining? How is this? If there were a hundred but ten of them had died. If you say, a majority of those who instructed, 51. If you say, a majority of those remaining, 46.
7:1 , explained there in Notes 10–21 . In the translation, the words in brackets follow the text of B. The ms. text here has quite a number of scribal errors. A parallel is in the Babli, Zebahim 12b . If somebody had selected his purification sacrifice when he became a deaf-mute, or insane, or an apostate, or the Court rules that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Aḥa switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person [terminally ill]. The Rebbi of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and [Rebbi] Immi, [one] switches and one says like [this] Tanna.
He who switches has none of these difficulties. For him who says, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside, who would accept it from him? He has to wait until the Court retracts, or if he was a Cohen who served, sacrificed, and atoned. If he was Simeon ben Azzai, who would accept it from him? He has to wait until the Court retracts, for him who says, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside.
Are consequences of a ruling like the ruling? Do ruling within ruling combine? How is that? If the public ate forbidden fat and designated their sacrifices. If you say that consequences of a ruling are like the ruling, the Court is liable. If you say that consequences of a ruling are not like the ruling, the Court is not liable. The following should be obvious to you: the consequences of a ruling are like the ruling. Do ruling within ruling combine with each other? How is that? If the Court ruled that the fat in the right side kidney was permitted but that of the left side and its cover was forbidden; then they reversed themselves and said the opposite. Most ate the first time, and most the second time. If you say that they combine, they are liable for one. But if you say that they do not combine, they are liable for two. Do two instructions about one kind of work.” While the text as it stands is difficult, the text of B is impossible since, as explained in Makkot 3:11, while committing one sin one may commit any number of others at the same time. The following example makes it clear that instead of “two instructions about one kind of work” one has to read “one instruction about two kinds of work.” combine? How is that? If a majority ate and a majority slaughtered. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are once liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are twice liable. If a minority ate the first time and a minority the second time. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion they are liable; in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion they are not liable.
Rebbi Zeˋira said, the time span is between them7(3) that R. Simeon does not hold him liable (for a sacrifice) but R. Meïr does. It is explained that neither does R. Simeon free him forever nor R. Meïr hold him liable immediately, but R. Meïr holds him liable if he could have heard, and R. Simeon only if he had ample time to be informed. The reading of the ms., שֶׁיִּשְׁפַּע עַד, i. e., “until he had ample (time to be informed)” is preferable over that of B, “until he actually was informed.” . Rebbi Meïr said, one gives him time until he may hear. Rebbi Simeon said, until he must have heard, and we have stated so: If the Court instructed in the upper market and a single person was in the lower market, or the Court on the ground floor and a single person on the upper floor, he is not liable until he actually heard.
In Rebbi Aqiba’s opinion it remains a doubt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, if he stands between two domains, between two domains of the Land of Israel and domains of the Land of Israel.
7:6 (34c line 66), following the wording of B. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. For instructions they considered the settlement of the Land of Israel is not quoted here (in contrast to the Babli, 3a ), the definition of the Land of Israel is that given in Ševi ˋ it 6:1, Notes 31–51. . For impurity they considered the majority of those coming to the Temple precinct 94b . A private sacrifice may be presented in the Temple only by a person ritually pure. But the Passover lamb has the status of a public sacrifice; if most of the public are impure (of a kind which cannot be remedied by simple immersion in water), the sacrifice is slaughtered and eaten in impurity (cf. Nazir 9:2 Note 66 .) . How? Do they estimate every group or only the first group? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, when they are still outside they estimate themselves finding that most of Israel were impure. . Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: For appearance 31:10–13 ) could proceed in impurity if most of Israel in the domain of Solomon’s empire were impure. they consider from Levo- Ḥamat to the brook of Egypt. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: The reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi is, at that time Solomon celebrated the holiday, and all of Israel , 8:65 (misquoted in B.) etc.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable( Lev. 15:19 ) followed by another 11 days. If a woman has a discharge on one of these 11 days, she is not classified as niddah but as zavah, whose rules are spelled out in Lev. 15:25–30 . Since the verse speaks of a discharge of many days, it is concluded that the full rules of zavah only apply after 3 days. For the first and second discharges in that 11 day period, the woman is called “watching one day to the next day”. For a day she is under the rules of niddah ( Lev. 15:25 ) and therefore forbidden to her husband. But since the verse uses the expression all the days of the flow of her impurity shall be like the days of her menstruation, one could think that she is impure only during the day and not during the following night, or that a discharge during the night does not make her impure. This is clearly a matter of rabbinic interpretation. ; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable 16:29 , nobody should go out from his place, which is explained in Jer. 17:22 by do not move a load from your houses. Since as a matter of principle prophetic utterances should not be used as legal texts, the ruling of the Court could not be dismissed out of hand. ; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable 17:3 clearly defines prostrating oneself in idolatry as a capital crime. Therefore, one has to agree with Maimonides’s Commentary that the Court changed the definition of “prostration”, e. g., ruling that kneeling down, bowing the head to the ground, is not punishable as long as one does not lie on the ground with outstretched hands and feet. ; these are liable for it is said 4:13 . Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 4(7–8 ). something was hidden , something but not an entire subject.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, “of a subject,” not the entire subject. Rebbi Hila said, “of the commandments”, not entire commandments 4:13 , R. Hizqiah reads דָּבָר וְנֶעֱלַם as וְנֶעֱלַם מִדָּבָר, presupposing a script which does not differentiate between regular and final mem. R. Hila’s comment is really unnecessary since מִכָּל־מִצְוֹת already means “of any commandments” but not entire commandments. In all situations, prefix mem is read as partitive, some but not all; cf. Nazir 5:4 Note 105 . . 5:1 , explained in Notes 8–10 , Nazir 5:1 Note 56 . Is that written? As Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from the beginning of the paragraph to its end. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. You have to pour oil on it, it is a flour offering, to include all flour offerings for pouring 12 on Lev. 2:6. The ms. text follows the argument of Sifra while B reproduces the text of Sotah and Nazir. The argument of Sifra has no connection with the theories of RR. Johanan and Jeremiah; it is a straightforward reading of the verse. Since it is stated that one has to pour oil on the bread crumbs because it is a flour-offering, it follows that a flour-offering requires pouring oil over it unless it be explicitly excluded as in the purification offering of v. 5:11. .
But would you not have eliminated the entire notion of one who watches a day for the next day But since the verse declares the one who watches a day for the next day as being under the rules of niddah for whom such relations are forbidden ( Lev. 18:19 ), such a ruling would in effect eliminate all rules for the one who watches a day for the next day. Cf. Note 99 . Babli 4a . ? If they said, the night is permitted but the day is forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bending? Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbiddenשחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah Šabbat 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable. . Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of prostrating? If they said, it is permitted to prostrate oneself but forbidden to sink down19:18 shows that going down on one’s knees is forbidden worship, it is possible to imagine a ruling that going down onone’s knees is prosecutable but other forms of prostration are not. . Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of taking out? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, if they said, one dried fig is permitted but two dried figs are forbidden and all of Tractate ˋ Eruvin. Moving minute quantities from domain to domain is not punishable. For example, transporting vegetable seeds in a volume less that of a dried fig is not punishable (Mishnah Šabbat 9:7). The long list of minimal quantities is traditional, not biblical. A wrong ruling in these matters does not abolish the principle that some minimal quantity is defined for everything. . This follows him who said that bringing in and taking out are the same (1:1, 2b l.11 ff.) whether the inclusion of putting down is scriptural or is a matter of indirect inference. If one accepts that “taking up” implies “putting down”, then the formulation of the Mishnah covers rulings both about taking up and putting down; but if the biblical status of “putting down” is different from “taking up”, the latter should have been mentioned. An answer is unnecessary since the consensus is that “taking up” implies “putting down”. . But for him who said that bringing in and taking out are two notions, would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bringing in? Rebbi Yose said, not that they said that it was permitted to eat fat; they knew that it is forbidden to eat fat, but the Torah gave permission to the Court to instruct. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the [amount of] an olive today and of two olives tomorrow today, two tomorrow, etc., they might come to disestablish the entire commandment by a succession of steps, none of which can be classified as total negation of the commandment. ? What about a prophet and seducer11:8, Note 112 ( Tosephta Sanhedrin 14:13 ). ? I could think that if they said to you, do not put on phylacteries today, put them on tomorrow 6:8 , 11:18 ), wearing them is a daily biblical commandment. , that you should listen to them. The verse says 13:6 where the reading is בָּ֑הּ לָלֶ֣כֶת. , to walk in them, in all of them, not only in part of them; you would have eliminated the notion of that entire day. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject. Rebbi Mana understood it from the followingשחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah Šabbat 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable. ; Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled but one of them knew that it was in error and he told them, you are erring, or that the distinguished member of the Court was not there Note 71 . , or that one of them was a proselyte, or a bastard, or a Gibeonite, or a childless old man, it is not liable since it is said here “congregation” and it is said there “congregation” 4:13 ; “there” is Num. 35:12 , 24 ,25 containing the rules of criminal courts. . Since in the congregation mentioned there, all of them were worthy of ordination, also the congregation here all have to be worthy of ordination.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled but one of them knew that it was in error,” etc. The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, since Rebbi said, no one invalidates but the distinguished member of the Court (at Lydda) [only]. It is written 15:24 , detailing the rules governing the sacrifice of a goat if the Court unintentionally permitted idolatry. This is taken as biblical proof that the Court cannot rule in the absence of its president. : If from the eyes of the congregation, from him who is appointed as eyes of the congregation. It is written 11:16 , the appointment of the 70 Elders, the paradigm for the High Court. Babli 4b , they shall stand there with you. Just as you are neither proselyte, nor Gibeonite, nor a bastard. Proselytes are reasonable, but bastards? does the court appoints bastards? Rav Ḥuna said, when they breached the rules and appointed. Rebbi Ḥanania, Rebbi Mana. One said, as part of the Seventy; the other said, apart from the Seventy. He who said, apart from the Seventy, is understandable. But he who said, as part of the Seventy, therefore not apart from the Seventy? Since he is not suitable for ordination, he is considered like a stone.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled in error and the public acted in error, they have to bring a bull; intentionally but they acted in error, they bring a female sheep or goat; in error but they acted intentionally, they are not liable., that the sin to be expiated was committed unintentionally ( Lev. 4:2 , 13 , 22 , 27 ). If both Court and public acted in error, the conditions for a sacrifice by the Court are satisfied. If the Court intentionally gave a false ruling, their sin cannot be atoned by a sacrifice; the public are forced to bring individual sacrifices. If the Court ruled in error but the public, although realizing the error, intentionally followed the false ruling, the Court cannot bring a sacrifice since the public did not follow their intent, and the public is barred from any sacrifice since they did not act in error. .
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled in error,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Since Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai was sitting before them. “Intentionally but they acted in error.” Is there intentional misdeed or error with respect of an instruction by the Court? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If not most of the public accepted it. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if they rebelled against their instruction 4:13 . . What is the difference between them? If they first accepted and then rebelled. In the opinions of the colleagues, since they rebelled, they are not liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Zeˋira, since at the first moment they accepted it, those are liable.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled and all the public or a majority acted on their instruction, they bring a bull; or in a matter of idolatry a bull and a goat 4:13–31 (a bull) and Num. 15:22–26 (a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification offering). The verses in Num. are interpreted to refer to the sin of idolatry since that is the only sin by which in one action one violates all commandments ( Num. 15:22 ). Since the sacrifice for violating all commandments cannot be less than that for violating one commandment, it is logical that the sacrifice for idolatry must be more than the regular sacrifice Lev. 4:13–31 . ( Sifry Num. 111) , the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and in a matter of idolatry the Twelve Tribes bring twelve bulls and twelve goats. Rebbi Simeon says, thirteen oxen, and in a matter of idolatry thirteen bulls and thirteen goats; a bull and a goat for each tribe; a bull and a goat for the Court.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and all the public acted,” etc. 7:6 . Num. 9:9–14 prescribes that individuals who were impure on Passover have to bring their Passover sacrifice a month later, on the Second Passover celebrated on the 14 of the Second Month. It is concluded that if the entire people are impure, the Second Passover is impossible and everybody celebrates the (First) Passover in impurity in the Temple. The problem then arises which percentage of the people have to be impure so that they represent the entire people; just as here the question is, how many people do have to follow the erroneous ruling of the Court so that “all of Israel were in error” ( Lev. 4:13 ). Who stated “a majority”? Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: Either half of the tribes or half of each tribe, if only it be a majority. Rebbi Jehudah says, half of each tribe, but only a majority of entire tribes. One tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Meïr says, all tribes are called “the public” 4:14 ). The difference of opinions in the Mishnah is traced to different interpretations of this notion. R. Meïr holds that only the entire people of Israel qualify as “public”; RR. Jehudah and Simeon consider each tribe as a separate public. ( Babli 5b , Pesahim 80a , Menahot 15a ). . Rebbi Jehudah says, each single tribe is called “public”. And Rebbi Simeon follows Rebbi Jehudah. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said, each single tribe is called “public”, so Rebbi Simeon says, each single tribe is called “public”. What is between them? Dragging. Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Simeon says, one tribe does not drag all tribes. [Even though Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes,] text; required by the context. he agrees that only if the ruling came from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of that Tanna: From this place which the Eternal will choose 17:10 . . Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Bejamin ben Levi: The verse supports him who said that each tribe is called “public”, as it is written 35:11 , said to Jacob after the birth of 11 sons. Babli 5b . : A people and a public of peoples will come from you, and Benjamin was not yet born. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, just as they differ here, so they differ about impurity 7:6 . Num. 9:9–14 prescribes that individuals who were impure on Passover have to bring their Passover sacrifice a month later, on the Second Passover celebrated on the 14 of the Second Month. It is concluded that if the entire people are impure, the Second Passover is impossible and everybody celebrates the (First) Passover in impurity in the Temple. The problem then arises which percentage of the people have to be impure so that they represent the entire people; just as here the question is, how many people do have to follow the erroneous ruling of the Court so that “all of Israel were in error” ( Lev. 4:13 ). , as we have stated: If the public was half pure and half impure; pure [people] celebrate the first [Passover] and impure the second. Rebbi Jehudah said, the pure ones celebrate for themselves, and the impure ones celebrate for themselves equal to the number of impure ones. . They told him, there is no split Passover; either all celebrate in impurity or all celebrate in purity. Who is “they told him”? Following Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated 2:2 . : “If one of the loaves or one of the (leftovers) [orders] and all sources of the Mishnah; it is the only one which makes sense. The Mishnah speaks of the two public cereal offerings which have to be baked, viz., the weekly show-bread and the two leavened loaves presented at Pentecost. The 12 show-breads were presented in two rows, here called “orders” ( Lev. 24:6 ). became impure, Rebbi Jehudah said, both have to be brought to be burned for a public offering cannot be split. But the Sages say, the impure in its impurity, and the pure shall be eaten.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, who is “they told him”? The Sages are the opinions of his opponents and R. Jehudah in Menahot, both seem to contradict themselves. One has to conclude that they agree in principle and they only differ about the practical applications of their theory. In this sense, B reads: The Sages acting in the sense of R. Jehudah. who argue like Rebbi Jehudah.
MISHNAH: If the Court ruled and seven tribes or a majority acted on their saying they bring a bull and for idolatry they bring a bull and a goat, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the seven tribes who sinned bring seven bulls, and the remaining tribes who did not sin bring because of them a bull each, for also those who did not sin each bring a bull because of the sinners. Rebbi Simeon says eight bulls, and for idolatry eight oxen and eight goats, a bull and a goat for each tribe and a bull and a goat for the Court.
HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled and seven tribes acted,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in his 4(17); Babli 3a , 5b . name, if six sinned and they are a majority. Therefore seven even though they do not form a majority are liable 45a , this is the conclusion of R. Johanan. Since in the next sentence R. Eleazar disagrees, one has to assume that the name originally was stated here also. . Rebbi Eleazar said, he only said “six and they are a majority”. Therefore for five, even though they are a majority, they are not liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a baraita said so: Half of the tribes on condition that they be most of the population. And similarly, half of the population on condition that they be most of the tribes. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the question of the Anointed Priest, is it as from the High Court or a lower court?
MISHNAH: If the Court of one of the tribes ruled and that tribe acted on their pronouncement, that tribe is liable but any other tribes are not liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. But the Sages say, they are only liable for a ruling by the High Court, as it is said, if the entire congregation of Israel be in error, and something was hidden from the eyes of the congregation . 4:13 . The verse is misquoted; the masoretic text reads הַקָּהָל “the public” instead of הָעֵדָה “the congregation”, supporting R. Jehudah. In most Mishnah sources, only the first clause of the verse is copied. , not the congregation of that tribe.
HALAKHAH: "If the Court of one of the tribes ruled," etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is the Court's obligation. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the public's obligation. Rebbi Simeon said, it is an obligation of the Court and an obligation of the public. What is Rebbi Meïr's reason? It is said here from the eyes , and it is said there from the eyes . Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, here it also refers to the Court. What is Rebbi Jehudah's reason? It is said here from the eyes , and it is said there from the eyes . Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public. What is Rebbi Simeon's reason? It is said here from the eyes , and it is said there from the eyes . Since from the eyes said there refers to the Court, also from the eyes here refers to the Court. Since from the eyes said there refers to the public, here it also refers to the public. For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to bring. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who brings? As we have stated, "one imposes and collects, the words of Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Jehudah says, they are brought from the Temple tax". For him who says, it is the Court's obligation, the Court has to lay their hands on. For him who says, it is the public's obligation, who lays their hands on? As we have stated, three from every tribe, led by the president of the Court, lay their hands on the head of the bull. " Their hands , the hands of each single one. Their hands on the head of the bull ; the bull needs laying on of hands but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon said, the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders; for Rebbi Simeon says, every public purification offering whose blood is brought inside needs laying on of hands. " One objected to Rebbi Jehudah, is it not written, they presented the goats of the purification offering The goats were offered by Josiah to atone for the idolatry of his father Ahas. ? Rebbi Hiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: If one of the public died, can it be brought in his stead? They answered, is it not written, those who came from captivity 8:35 : Those who came from captivity, from the diaspora, sacrificed elevation offerings to the God of Israel, twelve bulls for all of Israel, 96 goats, 77 sheep, purification goats twelve, all of it an elevation offering for the Eternal. An elevation offering is completely burned; the meat of a purification offering is eaten by the priests. To call a purification offering an elevation offering is a contradiction in terms. ? Is a purification offering an elevation offering? But just as an elevation offering is not eaten, this purification offering was not eaten 15:24 by the Mishnah. That verse requires the congregation to bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification offering. If a purification offering which may not be eaten can be called an elevation offering, it is possible to identify this bull with the one prescribed in Lev. 4:13. V. 24 requires the congregation (i. e., its Elders) to proffer the sacrifices but v. 25 requires the Cohen to conduct the entire ceremony. Both the opinions that the Elders do the laying on of their hands as also that the Cohen has to do it have biblical support. . Rebbi Jehudah says, they brought it for idolatry; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it was a temporary ruling. Rebbi Jeremiah (learned) [did not say] so but the bull needs laying on of hands by the Elders while the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by the Elders. By whom? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, by Aaron and his sons. Rebbi Yose told him, Rebbi Ḥiyya also stated, he shall put his hands on, they shall put their hands on 16:21 prescribes that Aaron has to lay his hand on the live goat. Since the entire service of the Day of Atonement is by the unaided High Priest, the mention of the name seems to be superfluous; it could as well have said “he has to lay his hands on.” It is concluded (next Note) that this is the only case in which the High Priest is required to lay his hands on. In parallel, one may read Lev. 4:15 where the Elders of the congregation are required to lay their hands on the bull, that they are not required to lay their hands on the goat. , to include the goats of idolatry for laying on hands but not by the Elders. Rebbi Yose (learned) [did not say] so but the living [goat] needs laying on of hands by Aaron, but the goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by Aaron. It is written so, “ Aaron shall lean with both his hands on the living goat’s head; the living [goat] needs laying on of hands by Aaron, but he goats of idolatry do not need laying on of hands by Aaron. 4(4 ). ” What does Rebbi Jeremiah do with this? He explains it, for a common priest 15:25 requires the participation of a common priest, all biblical requirements are satisfied by having the common priest do the entire ceremony. .
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Following Rebbi Meïr can be understood only following R. Meïr who declares the bull to be the exclusive responsibility of the Court. . There, it was stated: If the Court ruled and the public acted 4(10). The Court is not liable as long as the public did not act on their instructions. . If a member of the Court died, they are not liable. If a member of the public died, they are liable. Rebbi Meïr told them, if he relieves others of their liability, not so much more for himself? They told him, he can relieve others from their liability since they have where to hang on; he cannot relieve himself of liability since he has nothing to hang on.
Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Ḥisdai. There, it was stated4(12). : “If the Court ruled, and they themselves acted, and they realized what they ruled about. If they erred in what they ruled, would they be liable? The verse says, if the sin became known 4:14. V. 13 makes it clear that the actions of the people trigger the obligation of the bull, not the actions of the court when it is not followed by the people. , not that the sinners became known.” Anyway you take it18b , Keritut 19a , R. Eliezer is quoted to hold that if one is not sure of the exact category of the sin committed it does not matter as long as all of them require a sacrifice. R. Joshua holds that a purification sacrifice is possible only if the legal definition of the transgression is known, as in all cases the verse requires that the sin be known ( Lev. 4:14 for the court, v. 23 for the prince, v. 28 for a private person; cf. Note 22 .) From the text here it seems that the Yerushalmi tradition switches the names. , if about fat [ they ruled they are liable, if about Sabbath they ruled they are liable. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this follows Rebbi Eliezer; it does not follow Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Yose said, but] it follows Rebbi Joshua if they ruled and they did not know whether about idolatry or about any other commandment. If about idolatry by a bull, if about any other commandment a goat. Since it is in doubt whether a bull or [a bull and] a goat, it is a difference in sacrifice and he is not liable.