Bava Kamma 74b

נִיפּוֹק בְּעֵינוֹ; הִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ – נִיפּוֹק בְּשִׁינּוֹ; סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ וְהִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ – נִיפּוֹק בְּעֵינוֹ וְשִׁינּוֹ!

the slave should go free on account of his eye, and if he knocked out his tooth he should go free on account of his tooth, and if the master both blinded his eye and knocked out his tooth, the slave should go free on account of both his eye and his tooth, without the master having to pay damages for the loss of his tooth.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, עָלֶיךָ אָמַר קְרָא: ״תַּחַת עֵינוֹ״ – וְלֹא תַּחַת עֵינוֹ וְשִׁינּוֹ, ״תַּחַת שִׁינּוֹ״ – וְלֹא תַּחַת שִׁינּוֹ וְעֵינוֹ.

Abaye said to him in response: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “And if a man smites the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall let him go free for his eye’s sake” (Exodus 21:26). The phrase “for his eye’s sake” indicates: But not for the sake of both his eye and his tooth. The same can be inferred from the subsequent verse: “And if he smites out his bondman’s tooth or his bondwoman’s tooth, he shall let him go free for his tooth’s sake” (Exodus 21:27). The phrase “for his tooth’s sake” indicates: But not for the sake of both his eye and his tooth.

אָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: גָּנַב עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וְטָבַח וּמָכַר עַל פִּיהֶם, וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין – מְשַׁלְּמִין לוֹ אֶת הַכֹּל.

The Gemara returns to Rava’s opinion that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony. Rav Idi bar Avin said: We too can learn from the mishna that Rava’s claim is correct, as it teaches (72b): If one stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered the animal or sold it, also based on the testimony of the same witnesses, and these witnesses were found to be conspiring witnesses, these conspiring witnesses must pay everything, i.e., not only the principal amount but also the fourfold or fivefold payment.

מַאי, לָאו דְּהֵעִידוּ עַל הַגְּנֵיבָה וְחָזְרוּ וְהֵעִידוּ עַל הַטְּבִיחָה, וְהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַגְּנֵיבָה וְחָזְרוּ וְהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַטְּבִיחָה?

What, is it not referring to a case where they testified concerning the theft and then testified concerning the slaughter, and they were subsequently rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the theft and then were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the slaughter?

וְהָא כֵּיוָן שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַגְּנֵיבָה – לְגַבֵּי טְבִיחָה הָווּ לְהוּ מוּכְחָשִׁין, וְקָתָנֵי: מְשַׁלְּמִין לוֹ אֶת הַכֹּל. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ הַכְחָשָׁה לָאו תְּחִילַּת הֲזָמָה הִיא, אַטְּבִיחָה אַמַּאי מְשַׁלְּמִין? אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ הַכְחָשָׁה תְּחִילַּת הֲזָמָה הִיא?

Rav Idi bar Avin states his inference: But once they were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the theft, their testimony with regard to the slaughter is in effect contradicted, i.e., nullified, as testimony concerning the slaughter of an animal without prior testimony establishing that the animal was stolen is meaningless. And yet the mishna teaches that the witnesses must pay everything. And if it enters your mind that the contradiction of testimony is not the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, why should they pay a fine for lying about the slaughter? Their testimony concerning the slaughter was rendered irrelevant before it was established as conspiring testimony. Rather, must one not conclude from this mishna that the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony?

אָמְרִי: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהוּזַּמּוּ עַל הַטְּבִיחָה תְּחִילָּה,

The Sages say in refutation of this inference: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the witnesses were rendered conspiring witnesses with regard to the slaughter first, before they were rendered conspiring witnesses in their testimony concerning the theft itself. In this case, the testimony concerning the slaughter was not rendered irrelevant before it was rendered conspiring testimony.

וּבִפְלוּגְתָּא: עֵדִים שֶׁהוּכְחֲשׁוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף הוּזַּמּוּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, חַד אָמַר: נֶהֱרָגִין, וְחַד אָמַר: אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין.

And this is a matter in the dispute between other amora’im , before Rava and Abaye discussed it. As it was stated: With regard to witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted by two other witnesses and ultimately were rendered conspiring witnesses, this is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar. One said: These witnesses are killed, like all conspiring witnesses in a capital case, as the contradiction of testimony is the start of determining that testimony is conspiring testimony, and one said: They are not killed.

תִּסְתַּיֵּים דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הוּא דְּאָמַר אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: עֵדִים שֶׁהוּכְחֲשׁוּ בְּנֶפֶשׁ – לוֹקִין.

The Gemara suggests: It may be concluded that it is Rabbi Elazar who says they are not killed. As Rabbi Elazar says: Witnesses who were contradicted in a case involving the taking of a life, i.e., a capital case, are flogged for violating the prohibition: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13).

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הוּא דְּאָמַר נֶהֱרָגִין – אַמַּאי לוֹקִין? הָוֵה לֵיהּ לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁנִּיתַּן לְאַזְהָרַת מִיתַת בֵּית דִּין – אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו!

And if it enters your mind that it is Rabbi Elazar who says that witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted and ultimately found to be conspiring witnesses are killed, why are they flogged in this case? There is always the possibility that they might be rendered conspiring witnesses, which would render them liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment. Consequently, this is a case of a prohibition given as warning of liability for court -imposed capital punishment, and there is a principle that one is not flogged for violating any prohibition given as warning of liability for court -imposed capital punishment.

אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הוּא דְּאָמַר אֵין נֶהֱרָגִין? תִּסְתַּיַּים.

Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this statement that it is Rabbi Elazar who says that witnesses to a capital crime who were first contradicted and ultimately were found to be conspiring witnesses are not killed? The Gemara affirms: It may be concluded that this is so.

לוֹקִין?! תְּרֵי וּתְרֵי נִינְהוּ, מַאי חָזֵית דְּסָמְכַתְּ אַהָנֵי? סְמוֹךְ אַהָנֵי!

The Gemara asks a question with regard to Rabbi Elazar’s opinion that witnesses who were contradicted in a capital case are flogged. Why are they flogged simply because their testimony was contradicted? They are two witnesses, and they are contradicted by two other witnesses. What did you see in the testimony of the second set of witnesses that leads you to rely on those witnesses to the extent that the first set of witnesses is flogged? You could just as well rely on these witnesses, i.e., the first witnesses. How can the court ever determine with certainty that a given testimony is false based merely on contradictory testimony?

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: בְּבָא הָרוּג בְּרַגְלָיו.

Abaye said: The contradiction to which Rabbi Elazar is referring involves a case where the witnesses testified that they saw a certain person murdered, and subsequently the individual who was allegedly killed came to the court on his feet, conclusively disproving their testimony.

מַתְנִי׳ גָּנַב עַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם, וְטָבַח וּמָכַר עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד אוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.

MISHNA: If one stole an ox or a sheep, as established based on the testimony of two witnesses, and he subsequently slaughtered or sold the stolen animal, as established based on the testimony of one witness or based on his own admission, i.e., he himself admitted that he performed these acts, without there being any witness testimony, he pays the double payment, but he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

גָּנַב וְטָבַח בַּשַּׁבָּת; גָּנַב וְטָבַח לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה; גָּנַב מִשֶּׁל אָבִיו, וּמֵת אָבִיו, וְאַחַר כָּךְ טָבַח וּמָכַר; גָּנַב וְהִקְדִּישׁ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ טָבַח וּמָכַר – מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל, וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה.

If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat, which is a capital offense, or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it for the purpose of idol worship, or if he stole his father’s animal and subsequently his father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, or if he stole an animal and subsequently he consecrated it as an offering and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, in all these cases the thief pays the double payment, but he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: קֳדָשִׁים – שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָם, מְשַׁלֵּם. תַּשְׁלוּמֵי אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה – שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיב בְּאַחְרָיוּתָם, פָּטוּר.

Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of sacrificial animals for which the owner bears financial responsibility to replace with another animal if one of the original animals that one stole is lost or dies, the thief is obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment if he slaughters one of the animals. If it is a sacrificial animal for which the owner bears no financial responsibility, the thief is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment.

גְּמָ׳ עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד – פְּשִׁיטָא!

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if the fact that the thief slaughtered or sold the animal was established based on the testimony of one witness, he is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious?

אָמְרִי: הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – דּוּמְיָא דְּעַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד; מָה עַל פִּי [עֵד] אֶחָד – כִּי אָתֵי עֵד אֶחָד מִצְטָרֵף בַּהֲדֵיהּ, מִיחַיַּיב; עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ נָמֵי – כִּי אָתוּ עֵדִים, מִיחַיַּיב.

The Sages say in response: By stating this case, the mishna teaches us this halakha : The case of the thief slaughtering the animal established based on the testimony of one witness is similar to a case where it is established based on his own admission. Just as in the case where the slaughter is established based on the testimony of one witness, if one other witness comes and corroborates the testimony of the first, he joins together with the first witness and together their testimony is rendered a valid testimony of two, and the thief becomes obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, so too, where the slaughter is established based on his own admission, if witnesses come after his admission he becomes obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara comments: This interpretation of the mishna serves to exclude that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: One who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from payment, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability.

גּוּפָא – אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – פָּטוּר. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב הוּנָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שֶׁסִּימֵּא אֶת עֵין טָבִי עַבְדּוֹ, וְהָיָה שָׂמֵחַ שִׂמְחָה גְּדוֹלָה.

Since Rav Huna’s halakha was mentioned, the Gemara discusses in detail the matter itself. Rav Huna says that Rav says: One who admits he is liable to pay a fine is exempt from payment, even if afterward witnesses come and testify to his liability. Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a baraita : There was an incident involving Rabban Gamliel, who blinded the eye of his Canaanite slave Tavi, and he experienced great joy as a result. Rabban Gamliel had long wanted to emancipate Tavi, but it is generally prohibited to emancipate a Canaanite slave. The injury provided a fortuitous opportunity for Rabban Gamliel to emancipate his slave, as blinding the eye of one’s slave results in his emancipation (see Exodus 21:27).

מְצָאוֹ לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, אָמַר לוֹ: ״אִי אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁטָּבִי עַבְדִּי יָצָא לְחֵירוּת?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״לָמָּה?״ אָמַר לוֹ: ״שֶׁסִּמִּיתִי אֶת עֵינוֹ״. אָמַר לוֹ: ״אֵין בִּדְבָרֶיךָ כְּלוּם, שֶׁכְּבָר אֵין לוֹ עֵדִים״.

Rabban Gamliel encountered Rabbi Yehoshua and said to him: Do you know that my slave Tavi was emancipated? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Why? What circumstances enabled you to emancipate him? Rabban Gamliel said to him: I was able to do so, as I blinded his eye. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabban Gamliel: Your statement is nothing, and is not grounds for his emancipation, as he has no witnesses who can testify that you did this to him. The principle is that one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. One pays a fine only based on the testimony of witnesses. The requirement to emancipate one’s slave after injuring his eye is a type of fine.

הָא יֵשׁ לוֹ עֵדִים – חַיָּיב, וְשָׁמְעִינַן מִינַּהּ: מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּאוּ עֵדִים – חַיָּיב!

The Gemara infers from the baraita : But if Tavi had witnesses who could testify with regard to the injury, Rabban Gamliel would be obligated to emancipate him, even if they testify after Rabban Gamliel’s admission. And we can learn from this that one who admits that he is liable to pay a fine is liable, even if afterward witnesses come and testify with regard to his liability.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּלָא בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין אוֹדִי. וְהָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אַב בֵּית דִּין הֲוָה!

Rav Huna said to Rav Ḥisda: This case involving Rabban Gamliel is different, as he admitted to his actions when he was not in the presence of a court. An admission not in the presence of a court does not exempt the perpetrator from paying the relevant fine. The Gemara challenges: But Rabbi Yehoshua was the president of the court, so it is likely that the encounter took place in court.