Bava Kamma 55b

מַתְנִי׳ הַכּוֹנֵס צֹאן לַדִּיר, וְנָעַל בְּפָנֶיהָ כָּרָאוּי, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה – פָּטוּר. לֹא נָעַל בְּפָנֶיהָ כָּרָאוּי, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה – חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: In the case of one who brought his flock of sheep into the pen and locked the door before it in a manner that is appropriate, and despite this sheep went out and caused damage in another person’s field by eating produce or trampling it, the owner is exempt, since he safeguarded the animals appropriately. If he did not lock the door before the sheep in a manner that is appropriate, and sheep went out and caused damage, the owner is liable, since his negligence led to the damage.

נִפְרְצָה בַּלַּיְלָה אוֹ שֶׁפְּרָצוּהָ לִסְטִים, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה – פָּטוּר. הוֹצִיאוּהָ לִסְטִים – לִסְטִים חַיָּיבִין.

If the owner locked the door appropriately but the wall of the pen was breached at night, or bandits breached it, and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage by eating or trampling, the owner of the sheep is exempt from liability. If the bandits themselves took the sheep out of the pen and the animals subsequently caused damage, the bandits are liable.

הִנִּיחָה בַּחַמָּה, אוֹ שֶׁמְּסָרָהּ לְחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, וְיָצְאָה וְהִזִּיקָה – חַיָּיב.

If the owner left the animal in the sun, causing it to suffer, or if he conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who are not able to safeguard it, and the animal went out and caused damage, the owner is liable because he was negligent.

מְסָרָהּ לְרוֹעֶה – נִכְנַס הָרוֹעֶה תַּחְתָּיו.

If the owner conveyed the animal to a shepherd to care for it, the shepherd enters in his place and is responsible for the damage.

נָפְלָה לְגִינָּה וְנֶהֱנֵית – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁנֶּהֱנֵית. יָרְדָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ וְהִזִּיקָה – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה. כֵּיצַד מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה? שָׁמִין בֵּית סְאָה בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׂדֶה – כַּמָּה הָיְתָה יָפָה, וְכַמָּה הִיא יָפָה.

If the animal fell into a garden and derives benefit from produce there, its owner pays for the benefit that it derives and not for other damage caused. If the animal descended into the garden in its usual manner and caused damage there, its owner pays for what it damaged. How does the court appraise the value of the damage when the owner pays for what it damaged? The court appraises a large piece of land with an area required for sowing one se’a of seed [ beit se’a ] in that field, including the garden bed in which the damage took place. This appraisal includes how much it was worth before the animal damaged it and how much is it worth now, and the owner must pay the difference. The court appraises not only the garden bed that was eaten or trampled, rather the depreciation in value of the bed as part of the surrounding area. This results in a smaller payment, as the damage appears less significant in the context of a larger area.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אָכְלָה פֵּירוֹת גְּמוּרִים – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת פֵּירוֹת גְּמוּרִים. אִם סְאָה – סְאָה, אִם סָאתַיִם – סָאתַיִם.

Rabbi Shimon says: This principle of appraisal applies only in a case where the animal ate unripe produce; but if it ate ripe produce, the owner pays the value of the ripe produce. Therefore, if it ate one se’a of produce, he pays for one se’a , and if it ate two se’a , he pays for two se’a .

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵיזֶהוּ ״כָּרָאוּי״, וְאֵיזֶהוּ ״שֶׁלֹּא כָּרָאוּי״? דֶּלֶת שֶׁיְּכוֹלָה לַעֲמוֹד בְּרוּחַ מְצוּיָה – זֶהוּ כָּרָאוּי. שֶׁאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לַעֲמוֹד בְּרוּחַ מְצוּיָה – זֶהוּ שֶׁלֹּא כָּרָאוּי.

GEMARA: The Gemara clarifies the definition of locking the door in a manner that is appropriate. The Sages taught: What is considered locking in a manner that is appropriate, and what is considered locking in a manner that is not appropriate? If one locked the door such that it is able to withstand a typical wind without collapsing or opening, this is considered a manner that is appropriate, whereas if he locked the door such that it is unable to withstand a typical wind, this is considered a manner that is not appropriate.

אָמַר רַבִּי מָנִי בַּר פַּטִּישׁ: מַאן תַּנָּא מוּעָד דְּסַגִּי לֵיהּ בִּשְׁמִירָה פְּחוּתָה – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דִּתְנַן: קְשָׁרוֹ בְּעָלָיו בְּמוֹסֵירָה, וְנָעַל לְפָנָיו כָּרָאוּי, וְיָצָא וְהִזִּיק – אֶחָד תָּם וְאֶחָד מוּעָד, חַיָּיב; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

Rabbi Mani bar Patish said: Who is the tanna who taught with regard to animals that are forewarned that it is sufficient for the owner to provide only reduced safeguarding? Since the mishna deals with damage categorized as Eating or Trampling, for which all animals are considered forewarned, it must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in a mishna (45b): If the owner of an ox tied it with reins to a fence or locked the gate before it in a manner that is appropriate, but nevertheless the ox went out and caused damage, whether the animal is innocuous or forewarned the owner is liable because this is not considered sufficient precaution to prevent damage; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: תָּם – חַיָּיב, מוּעָד – פָּטוּר; שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְלֹא יִשְׁמְרֶנּוּ בְּעָלָיו״ – וְשָׁמוּר הוּא זֶה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין לוֹ שְׁמִירָה אֶלָּא סַכִּין.

The mishna continues: Rabbi Yehuda says that if the ox is innocuous the owner is liable even if he safeguarded it appropriately, since the Torah does not limit the required safeguarding for an innocuous animal. But if the ox is forewarned, the owner is exempt from payment of damages, as it is stated in the verse describing the liability for damage caused by a forewarned animal: “And the owner has not secured it” (Exodus 21:36), and this ox that was tied with reins or behind a locked gate was secured. Rabbi Eliezer says: A forewarned ox has no sufficient safeguarding at all other than slaughtering it with a knife. According to this mishna, only Rabbi Yehuda maintains that reduced safeguarding is sufficient to render exempt from liability the owner of an ox that is forewarned.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, שָׁאנֵי שֵׁן וָרֶגֶל – דְּהַתּוֹרָה מִיעֲטָה בִּשְׁמִירָתָן. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: אַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים הַתּוֹרָה מִיעֲטָה בִּשְׁמִירָתָן, וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: בּוֹר, וָאֵשׁ, שֵׁן, וָרֶגֶל.

The Gemara answers: You can even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that the owner of a forewarned ox is liable even if he provides only reduced safeguarding. Although animals are considered forewarned with regard to Eating and Trampling, one cannot apply to them a halakha stated with regard to an animal that is forewarned with regard to Goring. The halakha is different with regard to Eating and Trampling since the Torah limited the required standard of safeguarding for them. As the amora Rabbi Elazar says, and some say it was taught in a baraita : There are four matters for which the Torah limited their required standard of safeguarding, and these are: Pit, and Fire, Eating, and Trampling.

בּוֹר – דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר אוֹ כִּי יִכְרֶה אִישׁ בֹּר, וְלֹא יְכַסֶּנּוּ״, הָא כִּסָּהוּ – פָּטוּר.

Where does the Torah limit the required standard of safeguarding with regard to the category of Pit? As it is written: “If a man shall open a pit, or if a man shall dig a pit and not cover it, and an ox or a donkey fall therein, the owner of the pit shall pay” (Exodus 21:33). One can infer: But if he covered it, he is exempt from liability, even though it is possible that the pit would become uncovered in the future.

אֵשׁ – דִּכְתִיב: ״שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם הַמַּבְעִר אֶת הַבְּעֵרָה״ – עַד דְּעָבֵיד כְּעֵין מַבְעִיר.

Where does the Torah limit the required standard of safeguarding with regard to the category of Fire? As it is written: “The one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation” (Exodus 22:5), which is interpreted to mean that one is exempt from liability unless he acts in a manner that is similar to actively kindling the fire in another’s property by being negligent.

שֵׁן – דִּכְתִיב: ״וּבִעֵר בִּשְׂדֵה אַחֵר״ – עַד דְּעָבֵיד כְּעֵין ״וּבִעֵר״.

Where does the Torah limit the required standard of safeguarding with regard to the category of Eating? As it is written: “If a man causes a field or vineyard to be eaten, and he set his animal loose, and it feed [ uvi’er ] in the field of another” (Exodus 22:4). This indicates that the owner does not bear liability unless he acts in a manner that is similar to causing his animal to feed there, by being negligent.

רֶגֶל – דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשִׁלַּח״ – עַד דְּעָבֵיד כְּעֵין וְשִׁלַּח.

Where does the Torah limit the required standard of safeguarding with regard to the category of Trampling? As it is written: “If a man causes a field or vineyard to be eaten, and he set his animal loose [ veshilaḥ ], and it feed in the field of another” (Exodus 22:4). This indicates that the owner is not liable unless he acts in a manner that is similar to setting his animal loose.

וְתַנְיָא: ״וְשִׁלַּח״ – זֶה הָרֶגֶל, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״מְשַׁלְּחֵי רֶגֶל הַשּׁוֹר וְהַחֲמוֹר״. ״וּבִעֵר״ – זֶה הַשֵּׁן, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר יְבַעֵר הַגָּלָל עַד תֻּמּוֹ״.

And it is taught in a baraita : With regard to the term veshilaḥ : This is referring to damage by Trampling, and similarly, the verse states: “That send forth [ meshaleḥei ] the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20). With regard to the term uvi’er : This is referring to damage by Eating, and similarly, the verse states: “As one consumes with the tooth, until it be all gone” (I Kings 14:10).

טַעְמָא דְּעָבֵיד כְּעֵין ״וְשִׁלַּח״ ״וּבִעֵר״, הָא לָא עָבֵיד – לָא.

Evidently, the reason for the owner’s liability is specifically that he acted in a manner that is similar to setting the animal loose or causing it to feed. One can infer: But if he did not act in such a manner, even if he provided only reduced safeguarding, he is not liable.

אָמַר רַבָּה: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי ״צֹאן״ – מִכְּדֵי בְּשׁוֹר קָא עָסְקִינַן וְאָתֵי, נִיתְנֵי ״שׁוֹר״! מַאי שְׁנָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״צֹאן״? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּהַתּוֹרָה מִיעֲטָה בִּשְׁמִירָתָן?

Rabba said: The wording of the mishna is also precise, as it taught the halakha specifically with regard to sheep. This raises the question: Since we have been dealing with cases involving an ox in all the previous mishnayot , then let this mishna also teach the halakha with regard to an ox. What is different in this mishna that it teaches the case of sheep? Is it not because the Torah limited its requirements specifically with regard to the safeguarding against damage that is more likely to be caused by sheep, i.e., caused by Eating and Trampling, since sheep are unlikely to gore? If so, the wording of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who holds that a reduced level of supervision is sufficient only with regard to Eating and Trampling, but not Goring.

לָאו; מִשּׁוּם דְכָאן קֶרֶן לָא כְּתִיבָא בַּהּ, שֵׁן וָרֶגֶל הוּא דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ; וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּשֵׁן וָרֶגֶל – דְּמוּעָדִין הוּא. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara rejects this: One can not necessarily derive from the wording of the mishna that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Perhaps the mishna specifically uses the case of sheep to teach the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, because if it would have used an example of an ox here, one might have thought that it also includes damage caused by Goring, about which it is not written in the Torah that reduced supervision is sufficient. Therefore, the mishna specifically uses the example of sheep, to indicate damage caused by Eating and Trampling, about which it is written that reduced supervision is sufficient. And it teaches us that only with regard to Eating and Trampling, for which animals are considered forewarned from the outset, is reduced supervision sufficient according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara concludes that this is a valid reading of the mishna and one may learn from it that the mishna may even be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

תַּנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים הָעוֹשֶׂה אוֹתָן פָּטוּר מִדִּינֵי אָדָם, וְחַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן: הַפּוֹרֵץ גָּדֵר בִּפְנֵי בֶּהֱמַת חֲבֵירוֹ, וְהַכּוֹפֵף קָמָתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ בִּפְנֵי הַדְּלֵיקָה, וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר עֵדֵי שֶׁקֶר לְהָעִיד, וְהַיּוֹדֵעַ עֵדוּת לַחֲבֵירוֹ וְאֵינוֹ מֵעִיד לוֹ.

§ It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said: There are four matters in which one who commits an offense concerning them is exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven and it would be proper for him to pay compensation, and the cases are as follows: One who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, thereby allowing the animal to escape; and one who bends another’s standing grain before a fire so that it catches fire; and one who hires false witnesses to testify; and one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalf.

אָמַר מָר: הַפּוֹרֵץ גָּדֵר בִּפְנֵי בֶּהֱמַת חֲבֵירוֹ. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא בְּכוֹתֶל בָּרִיא – בְּדִינֵי אָדָם נָמֵי נִיחַיַּיב! אֶלָּא

The Gemara clarifies each of the cases listed in the baraita . The Master says: With regard to the case of one who breaches a fence that stood before another’s animal, what are the circumstances? If we say it is speaking of a stable wall that would not have fallen by itself, the one who breached it should also be liable according to human laws, at least for the damage caused to the wall. Rather, here