Yevamot 54a

יָשֵׁן לֹא קָנָה בִּיבִמְתּוֹ. אֶלָּא בְּנִתְקָע — וְהָא אָמַר רַבָּה: נָפַל מִן הַגָּג וְנִתְקַע — חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים, וּבִיבִמְתּוֹ לֹא קָנָה.

a sleeping man has not acquired his yevama , as he did not intend to perform the act of intercourse at all? Rather, the mishna was referring to one who was inserted into his yevama by accident. But didn’t Rabba say: One who fell from a roof and was inserted into a woman due to the force of his fall is liable to pay four of the five types of indemnity that must be paid by one who damaged another: Injury, pain, medical costs, and loss of livelihood. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as he did not intend to perform the act, and if she is his yevama , he has not acquired her in this manner.

אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּון לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְקָפַתּוּ יְבִמְתּוֹ, וּבָא עָלֶיהָ. שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲנוּסִים דְּבֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּון לְאִשְׁתּוֹ, וּתְקָפוּהוּ גּוֹיִם וְדִבְּקוּם זֶה בָּזֶה, וּבָא עָלֶיהָ.

Rather, it is a case where he intended to have intercourse with his wife and became erect, and his yevama forcefully grabbed hold of him and he had intercourse with her. The Gemara further asks: If so, what are the circumstances of the case when both of them were coerced that was mentioned by the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya? The Gemara answers: It is a case where he intended to have intercourse with his wife, and gentiles grabbed hold of him and pressed him and his yevama against each other, and he thereby had intercourse with her.

מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, מִצְוָה. דָּבָר אַחֵר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״ — בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן.

§ The Gemara inquires as to the source of these halakhot : From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught with regard to the verse “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), that this indicates that the act of intercourse in this circumstance is a mitzva, i.e., it is preferable to the alternative, which is ḥalitza . Alternatively, the verse “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her,” indicates that it does not matter how he had intercourse with her, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.

וְהָא אַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ לְמִצְוָה? לְמִצְוָה מִ״וְּאִם לֹא יַחְפּוֹץ הָאִישׁ״ נָפְקָא, הָא חָפֵץ — יִבֵּם, וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא: בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן.

The Gemara asks: Didn’t you derive from this phrase that the act of intercourse in this case is a mitzva? How can the same phrase also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: The fact that it is a mitzva is derived from the verse: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama ” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that if he wishes, he performs levirate marriage, which is preferable to ḥalitza . Therefore, when the verse cited above came, it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, כְּדַרְכָּהּ. ״וּלְקָחָהּ״ — שֶׁלֹּא ״כְּדַרְכָּהּ״. ״וְיִבֵּם״ — בִּיאָה גּוֹמֶרֶת בָּהּ, וְאֵין כֶּסֶף וּשְׁטָר גּוֹמְרִין בָּהּ. ״וְיִבְּמָהּ״ — בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ. דָּבָר אַחֵר: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג כּוּ׳.

It is taught in another baraita that the phrase: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” indicates that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in typical sexual intercourse. The next phrase, “and take her,” includes even atypical, i.e., anal, sexual intercourse. The concluding phrase of the verse, “and consummate the levirate marriage,” indicates that sexual intercourse completes her acquisition, but money and a marriage document do not complete her acquisition to him as his fully betrothed wife, in contrast to the regular halakhot of marriage. By emphasizing “and consummate the levirate marriage with her,” the verse teaches that he acquires her even if he acted against her will. Alternatively: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” indicates that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.

וְהָא אַפֵּיקְתֵּיהּ לִכְדַרְכָּהּ! הָהוּא — מִ״לְּהָקִים לְאָחִיו שֵׁם״ נָפְקָא, בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁמֵּקִים שֵׁם. וְכִי אֲתָא קְרָא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד, בֵּין בְּאוֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן.

The Gemara asks: Didn’t you derive from this phrase that levirate marriage has been performed if they engage in typical sexual intercourse? How can it also indicate that it does not matter what the intentions of the two parties were during the act of intercourse? The Gemara answers: That halakha is derived from a different verse: “To establish a name for his brother” (Deuteronomy 25:7), which indicates that intercourse must occur in the place where he establishes a name, i.e., where it can lead to childbirth. Therefore, when the verse cited above came, it indicated that levirate marriage has occurred whether the parties acted unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to coercion or willingly.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: יָשֵׁן — לֹא קָנָה בִּיבִמְתּוֹ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״יְבָמָהּ יָבֹא עָלֶיהָ״, עַד דִּמְכַוֵּין לַהּ לְשֵׁם בִּיאָה. וְהָתַנְיָא: בֵּין עֵר [בֵּין יָשֵׁן! אֵימָא: בֵּין עֵרָה בֵּין יְשֵׁנָה.

§ The Gemara addresses the matter itself cited in the previous discussion. Rav Yehuda said: A sleeping man has not acquired his yevama , as the verse states: “Her brother-in-law will have intercourse with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that he does not acquire her unless he intends to act for the sake of sexual intercourse. Since a sleeping man does not intend to engage in sexual intercourse, he does not acquire his yevama . The Gemara asks: Isn’t it taught in a baraita that one acquires his yevama through sexual intercourse regardless of whether he was awake or asleep? The Gemara answers: Say the baraita in the following emended form: Whether she was awake or asleep. The woman’s awareness is not a necessary component in order to perform levirate marriage.

וְהָתַנְיָא: בֵּין עֵר] הוּא בֵּין יָשֵׁן הוּא, בֵּין עֵרָה הִיא בֵּין יְשֵׁנָה הִיא! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בְּמִתְנַמְנֵם. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי מִתְנַמְנֵם? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: נִים וְלָא נִים תִּיר וְלָא תִּיר, כְּגוֹן דְּקָרוּ לֵיהּ וְעָנֵי, וְלָא יָדַע לְאַהְדּוֹרֵי סְבָרָא, וְכִי מַדְכְּרוּ לֵיהּ מִדְּכַר.

The Gemara asks further: Wasn’t it taught in another baraita that one acquires his yevama through sexual intercourse regardless of whether he was awake or he was asleep and regardless of whether she was awake or she was asleep? The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here when the baraita says that a sleeping man acquires his yevama ? It is referring to a man who is dozing. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of dozing? Rav Ashi said: One is asleep but not asleep, awake but not awake, when, if they call him, he will answer, but he is unable to provide a reasonable answer. And when they later inform him of what happened, he remembers it.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבָּה: נָפַל מִן הַגָּג וְנִתְקַע — חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים, וּבִיבִמְתּוֹ לֹא קָנָה. בְּנֵזֶק, בְּצַעַר, בְּשֶׁבֶת, בְּרִפּוּי. אֲבָל בּוֹשֶׁת לָא מִיחַיַּיב, דְּאָמַר מָר: אֵין חַיָּיב עַל הַבּוֹשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיִּתְכַּוֵּון.

The Gemara returns to the statement of Rabba cited earlier in order to discuss the matter itself that Rabba addressed. Rabba said: One who fell from a roof and was inserted into a woman due to the force of his fall is liable to pay four of the five types of indemnity that must be paid by one who damaged another, and if she is his yevama he has not acquired her in this manner. He is liable to pay for injury, pain, loss of livelihood, and medical costs. However, he is not liable to pay for the shame he caused her, as the Master said: One is not liable to pay for shame unless he intends to humiliate his victim. Consequently, one who fell from a roof accidentally is not liable to pay for the shame he caused the woman.

אָמַר רָבָא: נִתְכַּוֵּון לְהָטִיחַ בַּכּוֹתֶל וְהֵטִיחַ בִּיבִמְתּוֹ — לֹא קָנָה. לְהָטִיחַ בִּבְהֵמָה וְהֵטִיחַ בִּיבָמָה — קָנָה, דְּהָא קָמְכַוֵּין לְשֵׁם בִּיאָה בְּעוֹלָם.

Rava said: If he intended to press his sexual organ into a wall, and he accidentally pressed it into his yevama , he has not acquired her, as he did not intend to engage in an act of sexual intercourse. However, if he intended to press his sexual organ into an animal, and he pressed it into his yevama , he has acquired her, as he at least intended to act for the purpose of sexual intercourse in general, i.e., for some form of sexual intercourse.

אֶחָד הַמְעָרֶה. אָמַר עוּלָּא: מִנַּיִן לְהַעֲרָאָה מִן הַתּוֹרָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכַּב אֶת אִשָּׁה דָּוָה וְגִלָּה אֶת עֶרְוָתָהּ אֶת מְקֹרָהּ הֶעֱרָה״, מִכָּאן לְהַעֲרָאָה מִן הַתּוֹרָה.

§ We learned in the mishna that both one who merely begins the act of intercourse and one who completes it has acquired the yevama through this act. Ulla said: From where is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered an act of sexual intercourse by Torah law? As it is stated: “And if a man shall lie with a woman having her sickness and shall uncover her nakedness, he has made naked [ he’era ] her fountain” (Leviticus 20:18). The verse is referring to the first stage of intercourse, and from here it is derived that the initial stage of intercourse [ ha’ara’a ] is considered sexual intercourse by Torah law.

אַשְׁכְּחַן נִדָּה, שְׁאָר עֲרָיוֹת מִנַּיִן? וְכִי תֵּימָא: נֵילַף מִנִּדָּה — מָה לְנִדָּה שֶׁכֵּן מְטַמְּאָה אֶת בּוֹעֲלָהּ!

The Gemara asks: We have found a source for this halakha in the case of a menstruating woman, the subject of the verse cited above. From where is it derived that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse with regard to the rest of those with whom relations are forbidden? And if you say we should derive it from the halakha with regard to a menstruating woman, what comparison can be made to a menstruating woman, concerning whom the halakha is more stringent than others with whom relations are forbidden, in that she causes one who has intercourse with her to become ritually impure?

אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מֵאֵשֶׁת אָח, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִקַּח אֶת אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו נִדָּה הִיא״ — וְכִי אֵשֶׁת אָחִיו [לְעוֹלָם] נִדָּה הִיא? אֶלָּא כְּנִדָּה: מָה נִדָּה בְּהַעֲרָאָה — אַף אֵשֶׁת אָח בְּהַעֲרָאָה.

Rather, the halakha in other cases comes from a verse about a brother’s wife, as it is written: “And if a man shall take his brother’s wife, it is impurity [ nidda ]” (Leviticus 20:21). The word nidda generally refers to a menstruating woman, and so the Gemara asks: Is his brother’s wife always menstruating? Rather, it means that the halakha with regard to her is like that of a menstruating woman: Just as one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with a menstruating woman through the initial stage of intercourse, so too, one is liable to receive punishment for violating the prohibition against engaging in sexual intercourse with a brother’s wife through the initial stage of intercourse.

מָה לְאֵשֶׁת אָח — שֶׁכֵּן בְּיָדוֹ לְרַבּוֹת, דְּאִי בָּעֵי מְקַדֵּשׁ וְאָזֵיל כִּי אַלְפָּא.

The Gemara asks: What comparison can be made between a brother’s wife and other women with whom relations are forbidden? The prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife is more stringent in that it is within his power to increase the number of women forbidden by this prohibition, as, if he wishes, he can go on betrothing a thousand women, all of whom would be forbidden to his brother. Consequently, the prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife cannot serve as a model for other prohibitions.

אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מֵאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְעֶרְוַת אֲחוֹת אִמְּךָ וַאֲחוֹת אָבִיךָ לֹא תְגַלֵּה כִּי אֶת שְׁאֵרוֹ הֶעֱרָה״. אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לַאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם — שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו.

Rather, the halakha in other cases comes from a verse with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as it is written: “And you shall not uncover the nakedness of your mother’s sister nor of your father’s sister; for he has made naked [ he’era ] his kin” (Leviticus 20:19). The Gemara asks: It is possible to refute this source as follows: What comparison can be made between other women with whom relations are forbidden and a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, which are unique in that they are prohibited due to a prohibition that comes on its own? The prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister does not stem from marriage, but from the biological fact that she is his father’s or mother’s sister. It is therefore dissimilar to prohibitions that result from marriage.

מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא, תֵּיתֵי [חֲדָא] מִתַּרְתֵּי. מֵהֵי תֵּיתֵי? תֵּיתֵי מֵאֵשֶׁת אָח וַאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם — מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן אֲסוּרִין מִשּׁוּם שְׁאֵר.

The Gemara states: The principle that the initial stage of intercourse is considered sexual intercourse does not come from any one of the sources cited above. Let it come by deriving the halakha in any one other case from the common denominator of two of the sources mentioned above. The Gemara asks: From which two sources could this principle come to be derived? If you say it can come to be derived from the combination of the source with regard to a brother’s wife and the source with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, what comparison may be drawn from these cases, which are unique in that they are prohibited because they are kin?

אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִנִּדָּה וַאֲחוֹת אָב וַאֲחוֹת אֵם. מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן אִיסּוּר הַבָּא מֵאֵלָיו. אֶלָּא תֵּיתֵי מִנִּדָּה וְאֵשֶׁת אָח, דְּמַאי פָּרְכַתְּ.

Rather, let it come from the prohibition proscribing a menstruating woman and the prohibition with regard to a father’s sister and a mother’s sister, as a menstruating woman is not prohibited as a family relative. The Gemara raises a difficulty: What comparison may be drawn from these cases, which are each a prohibition that comes of its own accord, as neither one is created through marriage? Rather, let it come from the prohibition proscribing a menstruating woman and the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife. As, what can you say to refute this teaching? These two cases do not share any unique features that might be cause for stringency.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: מָה לְנִדָּה וְאֵשֶׁת אָח, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין לָהֶם הֶיתֵּר בְּחַיֵּי אוֹסְרָן, תֹּאמַר בְּאֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ לָהּ הֶיתֵּר בְּחַיֵּי אוֹסְרָהּ!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, strongly objects to this: What comparison may be drawn based upon the precedent of a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife, which are stringent in that they cannot be permitted to others for the duration of the existence of the factor that renders them prohibited? A menstruating woman is forbidden as long as she experiences a flow of menstrual blood, while a brother’s wife is forbidden for the duration of the brother’s lifetime. Can you say the same with regard to a married woman, who can become permitted during the lifetime of the one who renders her prohibited, i.e., if her husband divorces her?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: אַטּוּ נִדָּה וְאֵשֶׁת אָח בְּחַיֵּי אוֹסְרָן הוּא דְּאֵין לָהֶם הֶיתֵּר, אֲבָל לְאַחַר מִכָּאן יֵשׁ לָהֶם הֶיתֵּר? נִדָּה —

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Is that to say that it is only during the existence of the factor that renders them prohibited that a menstruating woman and a brother’s wife cannot be permitted to others, but afterward, when the prohibiting factor has been resolved, they can be permitted? In the case of a menstruating woman,