Kiddushin 49a

גֵּט פָּשׁוּט, עֵדָיו מִתּוֹכוֹ. מְקוּשָּׁר, עֵדָיו מֵאֲחוֹרָיו. פָּשׁוּט שֶׁכָּתְבוּ עֵדָיו מֵאֲחוֹרָיו, וּמְקוּשָּׁר שֶׁכָּתְבוּ עֵדָיו מִתּוֹכוֹ – שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִים. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מְקוּשָּׁר שֶׁכָּתְבוּ עֵדָיו מִתּוֹכוֹ – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁיָּכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ פָּשׁוּט. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַכֹּל כְּמִנְהַג הַמְּדִינָה.

In an ordinary document, its witnesses are to sign inside it, i.e., on the written side of the paper. In a folded and tied document, its witnesses are to sign on the back of it. With regard to an ordinary document whose witnesses wrote their signatures on the back of it, or a tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it, both of these are not valid. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: A tied document whose witnesses wrote their signatures inside of it is valid, because one can transform it into an ordinary document by untying it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Everything is in accordance with regional custom. If an ordinary document is generally used and one wrote a bound one, or vice versa, the document is invalid.

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: וְתַנָּא קַמָּא לֵית לֵיהּ מִנְהַג הַמְּדִינָה? וְאָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בְּאַתְרָא דִּנְהִיגִי בְּפָשׁוּט וַעֲבַד לֵיהּ מְקוּשָּׁר, אִי נָמֵי: בְּאַתְרָא דִּנְהִיגִי בִּמְקוּשָּׁר וַעֲבַד לֵיהּ פָּשׁוּט – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּוַדַּאי קְפִידָא.

And we discussed it: And does the first tanna not accept that one should follow the regional custom? It is not reasonable that he should take issue with such a basic concept. And Rav Ashi says that they have a dispute in a case where one instructed a scribe to write a document for him: If they are in a place where the custom is to write an ordinary document, and he made a tied one for him; alternatively, if they are in a place where the custom is to write a tied document, and he made an ordinary one for him; in both of these cases, everyone agrees that he was certainly particular in his instructions to the agent that he should follow the regional custom, and if the latter deviated from the custom the document is invalid.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי, בְּאַתְרָא דִּנְהִיגִי בֵּין בְּפָשׁוּט בֵּין בִּמְקוּשָּׁר, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״עֲבֵיד לִי פָּשׁוּט״, וַאֲזַל וַעֲבַד לֵיהּ מְקוּשָּׁר. מָר סָבַר: קְפֵידָא, וּמָר סָבַר: מַרְאֶה מָקוֹם הוּא לוֹ.

The situation in which they disagree is where they are in a place where the custom is to use either an ordinary document or a tied one, and the one requesting the document said to the scribe: Make an ordinary document for me, and the scribe went and made a tied document for him. In such a case, one Sage, the first tanna , holds that the one requesting the document was particular about wanting an ordinary document, and since the scribe wrote a tied document, it is considered to have been written without his consent. And one Sage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, holds that the one requesting the document was merely indicating his position to the scribe, stating that if the scribe wanted to save himself the trouble of writing a tied document there would no objection.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר – דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה: ״הִתְקַבֵּל לִי גִּיטִּי מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי״, וְקִבֵּל לָהּ גִּיטָּהּ מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר – פָּסוּל, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַכְשִׁיר. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: מַרְאָה מָקוֹם הִיא לוֹ.

Rabbi Elazar also holds that when one instructs an agent in such a manner he is merely indicating his position to him, as we learned in a mishna ( Gittin 65a): If there was a woman who said to her agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me from my husband in such and such a place, and he received her bill of divorce for her elsewhere, it is invalid. And Rabbi Elazar deems it valid. Apparently, he holds that she is merely indicating a place to him where he can receive the bill of divorce, but she does not insist that he accept it in that particular spot.

אָמַר עוּלָּא: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּשֶׁבַח מָמוֹן, אֲבָל בְּשֶׁבַח יוּחֲסִין, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל – אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מַאי טַעְמָא – ״מְסָאנָא דְּרַב מִכַּרְעַאי לָא בָּעֵינָא״. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אִם הִטְעָהּ לִשְׁבַח יוּחֲסִים אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת.

§ Ulla says: The dispute in the mishna between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon is only where he misled her with enhanced monetary value, i.e., he gave her something worth more than the item he had stipulated. But where he misled her with enhanced lineage, so that she was under the impression that his genealogy was less impressive than it in fact is, everyone agrees that she is not betrothed. What is the reason for this? A woman says: I do not desire a shoe that is larger than my foot. She does not wish to marry a man whose social standing is far greater than her own. This is also taught in a baraita ( Tosefta 2:6): Rabbi Shimon concedes that if he misled her with enhanced lineage, she is not betrothed.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא. דְּקָתָנֵי: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי כֹּהֵן״ וְנִמְצָא לֵוִי, ״לֵוִי״ וְנִמְצָא כֹּהֵן, נָתִין וְנִמְצָא מַמְזֵר, ״מַמְזֵר״ וְנִמְצָא נָתִין. וְלָא פְּלִיג רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

Rav Ashi says: The wording of the mishna is also precise, as the following mishna (49b) teaches: If one betroths a woman and states that the betrothal is: On the condition that I am a priest, and he was found to be a Levite; or: On the condition that I am a Levite, and he was found to be a priest; or: On the condition that I am a Gibeonite, a people prohibited by rabbinic law from marrying into the congregation, i.e., from marrying a Jew of fit lineage, and he was found to be a mamzer , who is prohibited by Torah law from marrying into the congregation; or: On the condition that I am a mamzer , and he was found to be a Gibeonite, in all of these cases she is not betrothed. And Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with these rulings. This indicates that if one misled a woman with regard to his lineage, Rabbi Shimon concedes that she is not betrothed.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: אֶלָּא דְּקָתָנֵי: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בַּת אוֹ שִׁפְחָה מְגוּדֶּלֶת״ וְאֵין לוֹ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ וְיֵשׁ לוֹ, דִּשְׁבַח מָמוֹן הוּא, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא פְּלִיג?!

Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this inference: But what about that which is taught in the same mishna: If one betroths a woman and states that the betrothal is: On the condition that I have a grown daughter or maidservant, and he does not have one; or if one betroths a woman on the condition that he does not have a grown daughter or maidservant and he does have one, the latter of which is an issue of enhanced monetary value, as the difference between one who has a maidservant and one who does not impacts how hard the woman will have to work in the home; in these cases will you also say that Rabbi Shimon does not disagree simply because the mishna does not mention his opinion in that case?

אֶלָּא פְּלִיג בְּרֵישָׁא וְהוּא הַדִּין לְסֵיפָא. הָכָא נָמֵי פְּלִיג בְּרֵישָׁא וְהוּא הַדִּין לְסֵיפָא.

Rather, it must be that he disagrees in the first clause of the mishna with regard to enhanced monetary value, and the same is true with regard to the latter clause, i.e., he also disagrees in that clause, and it was not necessary to state his dispute another time. Here too, with regard to lineage, he disagrees in the first clause, and the same is true with regard to the latter clause.

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? הָתָם, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דִּשְׁבַח מָמוֹן, פְּלִיג בְּרֵישָׁא וְהוּא הַדִּין בְּסֵיפָא. הָכָא, דִּשְׁבַח יוּחֲסִים הוּא, אִם אִיתָא דִּפְלִיג, נִתְנֵי!

The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, where both this case and that case involve an inaccuracy of enhanced monetary value, it is possible that he disagreed in the first clause and the same is true in the last clause, and the mishna did not need to restate his opinion. But here, where it is a case of enhanced lineage, which is a different issue, if it is so that Rabbi Shimon disagrees, let him teach that explicitly. The fact that no dispute is recorded in the case of enhanced lineage is proof that he concedes in that case.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָכָא נָמֵי שְׁבַח יוּחֲסִים, מִי סָבְרַתְּ מַאי מְגוּדֶּלֶת – גְּדוֹלָה מַמָּשׁ? מַאי מְגוּדֶּלֶת – גַּדֶּלֶת, דְּאָמְרָה הִיא: לָא נִיחָא לִי דְּשָׁקְלָה מִילֵּי מִינַּאי וְאָזְלָא נָדְיָא קַמֵּי שִׁיבָבוֹתַיי.

If you wish, say instead: Here too, the issue of a daughter or maidservant involves enhanced lineage, not enhanced monetary value. His statement should be understood differently. Do you maintain that what is the meaning of his statement that he has a grown daughter or maidservant; that she is actually grown up, so that she can be of help to his wife? That is not the meaning of his statement. Rather, what is the meaning of: Grown? That she grows and plaits hair, i.e., he has a daughter or maidservant who is a hairdresser. Why might the potential bride view this as a drawback? Because she can say: It is not satisfactory for me to live in the house with a hairdresser, as she will take words she hears from me and will go pass them before my neighbors, meaning she will gossip about me to others. This concern is more akin to a matter of lineage than a matter of monetary value.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי קַרְיָינָא״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁקָּרָא שְׁלֹשָׁה פְּסוּקִים בְּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר עַד שֶׁיִּקְרָא וִיתַרְגֵּם. יְתַרְגֵּם מִדַּעְתֵּיהּ?! וְהָתַנְיָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הַמְתַרְגֵּם פָּסוּק כְּצוּרָתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה בַּדַּאי. וְהַמּוֹסִיף עָלָיו – הֲרֵי זֶה מְחָרֵף וּמְגַדֵּף. אֶלָּא מַאי תַּרְגּוּם – תַּרְגּוּם דִּידַן.

§ The Sages taught: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am literate with regard to the Torah, once he has read three verses in the synagogue she is betrothed. Rabbi Yehuda says that she is not betrothed until he reads and translates the verses. The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Yehuda mean that one translates according to his own understanding? But isn’t it taught in a baraita ( Tosefta , Megilla 3:21) that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who translates a verse literally is a liar, since he distorts the meaning of the text, and conversely, one who adds his own translation is tantamount to one who curses and blasphemes God? Rather, to which translation is Rabbi Yehuda referring? He is referring to our accepted translation.

וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי דַּאֲמַר לַהּ: ״קַרְיָינָא״, אֲבָל אָמַר לַהּ: ״קָרָא אֲנָא״ – עַד דְּקָרֵי אוֹרָיְיתָא נְבִיאֵי וּכְתוּבֵי בְּדִיּוּקָא.

And this statement applies only if he said to her: I am literate, but if he said to her: I am a reader, this indicates that he is an expert in the reading of the Torah, and she is not betrothed unless he knows how to read the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings with precision.

״עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי שׁוֹנֶה״, חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר: הֲלָכוֹת, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: תּוֹרָה.

The Gemara discusses a similar case: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I study [ shoneh ], Ḥizkiyya says it means that he studies halakhot , and Rabbi Yoḥanan says it means that he studies Torah, i.e., the written Torah.

מֵיתִיבִי: אֵיזוֹ הִיא מִשְׁנָה? רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הֲלָכוֹת, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מִדְרָשׁ!

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita : What is the meaning of: Mishna? Rabbi Meir says halakhot , Rabbi Yehuda says homiletics. Neither of them, however, says that it refers to the written Torah.