Shabbat 94b

אַף בְּמוֹצִיא אֶת הַמֵּת לְקוֹבְרוֹ. אָמַר רָבָא: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּמָר לַחְפּוֹר בּוֹ וְסֵפֶר תּוֹרָה לִקְרוֹת בּוֹ — דְּחַיָּיב. פְּשִׁיטָא, דְּאִי הָא נָמֵי מְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ הִיא, אֶלָּא מְלָאכָה שֶׁצְּרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? מַהוּ דְתֵימָא, עַד דְּאִיכָּא לְגוּפוֹ וּלְגוּפָהּ, כְּגוֹן מָר לַעֲשׂוֹת לוֹ טַס וְלַחְפּוֹר, סֵפֶר תּוֹרָה לְהַגִּיהַּ וְלִקְרוֹת בּוֹ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

even one who carries out a corpse to bury it. Rava said: And Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who carries out a hoe on Shabbat with which to dig or a Torah scroll from which to read is liable. The Gemara asks: This is obvious, as if those acts of carrying out are also in the category of a prohibited labor not necessary for its own sake because the carrier’s intention is to dig or to read, if so, according to Rabbi Shimon, how can you find an act of carrying that would be considered a prohibited labor necessary for its own sake? The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, there is a novel element in Rava’s statement. Lest you say that Rabbi Shimon deems one liable only in a case where one carries out an object for the sake of the one carrying it, as well as for its own sake, for example, in a case where one carried out a hoe for its own sake, in order to sharpen its blade, and for the sake of the one carrying it, in order to dig with it, or one carried out a Torah scroll for its own sake, in order to emend it, and for the sake of the one carrying it, in order to read from it; therefore, Rava teaches us that Rabbi Shimon deems one liable for carrying out an object even when it is carried only for his own sake and not for the sake of the object.

הָהוּא שָׁכְבָא דַּהֲוָה בִּדְרוֹקֶרֶת, שְׁרָא רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְאַפּוֹקֵיהּ לְכַרְמְלִית. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֲחוּהּ דְּמָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבְנָא לָרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: כְּמַאן, כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אֵימַר דְּפָטַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מֵחִיּוּב חַטָּאת, אִיסּוּרָא דְרַבָּנַן מִיהָא אִיכָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָאֱלֹהִים, דְּעָיְילַתְּ בֵּיהּ אַתְּ? וַאֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה שְׁרֵי, דְּמִי קָאָמֵינָא לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים? לְכַרְמְלִית קָאָמֵינָא, גָּדוֹל כְּבוֹד הַבְּרִיּוֹת שֶׁדּוֹחֶה אֶת ״לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה״ שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה.

The Gemara relates: There was a corpse in the city of Derokera and Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak permitted carrying it out into a karmelit on Shabbat because, for some reason, it could not remain where it was. Rabbi Yoḥanan, brother of Mar, son of Rabbana, said to Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: In accordance with whose opinion did you permit moving the corpse to the karmelit ? If it was in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, say that in that case Rabbi Shimon exempted one from the obligation to bring a sin-offering. However, there remains a rabbinic prohibition. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: By God, have you entered into an understanding of the matter? Even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda it is permitted to carry out the corpse, as did I say they may carry it out to the public domain? I said that it may be carried out into a karmelit , which is only prohibited by rabbinic law. With regard to prohibitions by rabbinic law, the principle states: Great is human dignity, as it overrides a prohibition in the Torah: “You shall not deviate from that which they tell you to the right or to the left” (Deuteronomy 17:11).

תְּנַן הָתָם: הַתּוֹלֵשׁ סִימָנֵי טוּמְאָה וְהַכֹּוֶה [אֶת] הַמִּחְיָה עוֹבֵר בְּ״לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה״. אִיתְּמַר: אַחַת מִשְּׁתַּיִם חַיָּיב, אַחַת מִשָּׁלֹשׁ — רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר חַיָּיב, רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר פָּטוּר. רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר חַיָּיב — אַהְנִי מַעֲשָׂיו, דְּאִי מִשְׁתַּקְלָא חֲדָא אַחֲרִיתִי אָזְלָה לַהּ טוּמְאָה. רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר פָּטוּר — הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת הָא אִיתָא לְטוּמְאָה.

We learned there in a mishna discussing the halakhot of leprosy: One who plucks white hairs that are signs of impurity, and similarly one who burned the unaffected skin in the midst of a leprous sore in an attempt to purify himself, violates a prohibition, as it is stated: “Take heed [ hishamer ] in the plague of leprosy” (Deuteronomy 24:8). This ruling is based on the principle that the term hishamer indicates a prohibition. On this topic, it was stated: With regard to one who plucks one of two white hairs, everyone agrees that he is liable because a single hair remains, which is less than the measure that determines impurity, i.e., two hairs. It is with regard to one who plucks one of three white hairs that there is a dispute between the amora’im . Rav Naḥman said: He is liable. Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt. The Gemara elaborates. Rav Naḥman said: He is liable because his actions were effective, as if another hair is removed, the impurity would cease. He thereby hastened his purification and is in violation of the prohibition. Rav Sheshet said: He is exempt because his actions were ineffective, as now, in any case, the impurity is intact even after he removed one hair. His act is ineffective, and therefore he does not violate the prohibition.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ — דִּתְנַן: וְכֵן כְּזַיִת מִן הַמֵּת וּכְזַיִת מִן הַנְּבֵילָה — חַיָּיב, הָא חֲצִי זַיִת — פָּטוּר, וְהָתַנְיָא: ״חֲצִי זַיִת — חַיָּיב״! — מַאי לָאו, הָא דְּתַנְיָא ״חַיָּיב״ — דְּאַפֵּיק חֲצִי זַיִת מִכְּזַיִת, וְהָא דִּתְנַן ״פָּטוּר״ — דְּאַפֵּיק חֲצִי זַיִת מִכְּזַיִת וּמֶחֱצָה. וְרַב נַחְמָן: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חַיָּיב, וְהָא דִּתְנַן ״פָּטוּר״, דְּאַפֵּיק חֲצִי זַיִת מִמֵּת גָּדוֹל.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I derive and state my opinion? I derive it as we learned in the mishna: And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse and an olive-bulk of an animal carcass is liable. The Gemara elaborates: By inference, one who carries out half an olive-bulk is exempt. What, is it not taught in a baraita : One who carries out half an olive-bulk of a corpse is liable? Is it not that the contradiction is resolved as follows? That which was taught in the baraita : He is liable, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk. Because less than an olive-bulk of the corpse remained, it is no longer a source of ritual impurity. And that which we learned in the mishna: He is exempt, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half. Since an entire olive-bulk remains, the source of impurity remains intact. And Rav Naḥman explains it differently. Both this, the one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk, and that, the one who carried out half an olive-bulk from an olive-bulk and a half, are liable. And that which we learned in the mishna: He is exempt, is referring to a case where one carried out half an olive-bulk from a large corpse. In that case, even Rav Naḥman agrees that his action was ineffective. Since he did not carry out a measure that determines liability, he is exempt.

מַתְנִי׳ הַנּוֹטֵל צִפׇּרְנָיו זוֹ בָּזוֹ, אוֹ בְּשִׁינָּיו, וְכֵן שְׂעָרוֹ, וְכֵן שְׂפָמוֹ, וְכֵן זְקָנוֹ, וְכֵן הַגּוֹדֶלֶת, וְכֵן הַכּוֹחֶלֶת, וְכֵן הַפּוֹקֶסֶת — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּת.

MISHNA: With regard to one who removes his fingernails with one another on Shabbat without scissors, or with his teeth, and the same is true with regard to one who removes his hair with his hands, and the same is true with regard to his mustache, and the same is true with regard to his beard, and the same is true with regard to a woman who braids her hair, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blue eye shadow, and the same is true with regard to one who applies blush, Rabbi Eliezer deems them all liable, as they each performed a labor prohibited by Torah law. And the Rabbis prohibited performing all of these actions due to rabbinic decree. None of the actions constitute prohibited labors.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בַּיָּד, אֲבָל בִּכְלִי — חַיָּיב. פְּשִׁיטָא, ״זוֹ בָּזוֹ״ תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: רַבָּנַן בִּכְלִי נָמֵי פָּטְרִי, וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״זוֹ בָּזוֹ״ — לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute is specifically with regard to a case where one removes his fingernails by hand; however, everyone agrees that one is liable if he removes them with a utensil. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We explicitly learned the phrase: With one another, in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the Rabbis also exempt one who removes his fingernail with a utensil, i.e., because one is not interested in the removed nail, he did not perform the prohibited labor of shearing, and that which was taught in the mishna: With one another, is intended to convey the far-reaching nature of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that one is liable even in a case where he removed his fingernails with one another; therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that this is not so.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מַחֲלוֹקֶת לְעַצְמוֹ, אֲבָל לַחֲבֵירוֹ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּטוּר. פְּשִׁיטָא, ״צִפׇּרְנָיו״, תְּנַן! מַהוּ דְתֵימָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לַחֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי מְחַיַּיב, וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״צִפׇּרְנָיו״ לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

And Rabbi Elazar said: The dispute is specifically with regard to one who removes fingernails for himself; however, with regard to one removing fingernails for another, everyone agrees that he is exempt. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. We explicitly learned the phrase: His fingernails, in the mishna. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable for cutting another’s fingernails as well, and that which was taught in the mishna: His fingernails, is intended to convey the far-reaching nature of the statement of the Rabbis that one is exempt even in a case where he removes his own nails, and all the more so in a case where he removes another’s; therefore, Rabbi Elazar teaches us that everyone agrees that he is exempt when removing another’s nails.

וְכֵן שְׂעָרוֹ כּוּ׳. תָּנָא: הַנּוֹטֵל מְלֹא פִי הַזּוּג — חַיָּיב. וְכַמָּה מְלֹא פִי הַזּוּג? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: שְׁתַּיִם. וְהָתַנְיָא: וְלַקׇּרְחָה שְׁתַּיִם! אֵימָא: וְכֵן לַקׇּרְחָה שְׁתַּיִם.

We learned in the mishna: And the same is true with regard to one who removes his hair with his hands; Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. One of the Sages taught in the Tosefta : One who removes enough of his hair to fill the opening of the scissors on Shabbat is liable. And how much is enough to fill the opening of the scissors? Rav Yehuda said: Two hairs. The Gemara asks: But was it not taught later in that baraita : And with regard to the Torah prohibition against removing one’s hair and causing baldness as an expression of mourning the dead: “Nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead” (Deuteronomy 14:1), one who removes two hairs is liable? Apparently, enough to fill the opening of a scissors is a different amount of hairs. The Gemara answers: Say that these are not two different measures. The baraita is saying: And the same is true for baldness, two is the measure.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: הַנּוֹטֵל מְלֹא פִי הַזּוּג בְּשַׁבָּת — חַיָּיב. וְכַמָּה מְלֹא פִי הַזּוּג — שְׁתַּיִם. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אַחַת, וּמוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּמְלַקֵּט לְבָנוֹת מִתּוֹךְ שְׁחוֹרוֹת, שֶׁאֲפִילּוּ אַחַת חַיָּיב. וְדָבָר זֶה אַף בַּחוֹל אָסוּר, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֹא יִלְבַּשׁ גֶּבֶר שִׂמְלַת אִשָּׁה״.

That was also taught in a baraita : One who removes enough of his hair to fill the opening of the scissors on Shabbat is liable. And how much is enough to fill the opening of the scissors? It is two hairs. Rabbi Eliezer says: One is liable for removing even one hair. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer that one who collects and plucks white hairs from among black ones is liable even if he removed a single hair. His actions indicate that one hair is significant for him. And this matter of plucking white hairs is prohibited for men even on weekdays, as it is stated: “A woman shall not don a man’s clothes, and a man shall not wear a woman’s garment” (Deuteronomy 22:5). The Sages derive that any action typically performed by women for beautification is prohibited for men.

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: צִפּוֹרֶן שֶׁפֵּירֵשׁ רוּבָּהּ, וְצִיצִין שֶׁפֵּרְשׁוּ רוּבָּן, בַּיָּד — מוּתָּר, בִּכְלִי — חַיָּיב חַטָּאת. מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דְּבִכְלִי חַיָּיב חַטָּאת, וּבַיָּד מוּתָּר לְכַתְּחִלָּה?! הָכִי קָאָמַר: פֵּירְשׁוּ רוּבָּן, בַּיָּד — מוּתָּר, בִּכְלִי — פָּטוּר אֲבָל אָסוּר. לֹא פֵּירְשׁוּ רוּבָּן, בַּיָּד — פָּטוּר אֲבָל אָסוּר, בִּכְלִי — חַיָּיב חַטָּאת. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר. אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְהוּא שֶׁפֵּרְשׁוּ כְּלַפֵּי מַעְלָה וּמְצַעֲרוֹת אוֹתוֹ.

It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to a fingernail, the majority of which has been severed, and it is only connected to the finger by a small piece; and with regard to shreds of skin, the majority of which have been severed from the body; by hand, one is permitted to completely remove them on Shabbat. If he removes them with a utensil, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara wonders: Is there any matter where one who performs an action with a utensil is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he performs that action by hand, it is permitted ab initio , and it is not even prohibited by rabbinic decree? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar meant to say: If the majority has been severed, removing the rest by hand is permitted. If he removes the rest with a utensil he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so ab initio . And if the majority has not yet been severed, if he removes the rest by hand he is exempt, but it is prohibited to do so ab initio . If he did so with a utensil, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yehuda said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar in this matter. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that is if the partially severed portions of the fingernail were severed facing upward near the nail and cause him pain; in that case one may remove them ab initio .

וְכֵן הַגּוֹדֶלֶת כּוּ׳. גּוֹדֶלֶת, כּוֹחֶלֶת וּפוֹקֶסֶת מִשּׁוּם מַאי מְחַיְּיבָא? אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: גּוֹדֶלֶת — מִשּׁוּם אוֹרֶגֶת, כּוֹחֶלֶת — מִשּׁוּם כּוֹתֶבֶת, פּוֹקֶסֶת — מִשּׁוּם טוֹוָה. אֲמַרוּ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: וְכִי דֶרֶךְ אֲרִיגָה בְּכָךְ, וְכִי דֶרֶךְ כְּתִיבָה בְּכָךְ, וְכִי דֶרֶךְ טְוִיָּה בְּכָךְ?! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: לְדִידִי מִפָּרְשָׁא לִי מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא,

We learned in the mishna: And the same is true with regard to a woman who braids her hair, and one who applies blue eye shadow, and one who applies blush; Rabbi Eliezer deems them liable by Torah law. The Gemara asks: For performance of what prohibited labor is a woman who braids her hair, or who applies blue eye shadow, or who applies blush on Shabbat liable? Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: A woman who braids her hair is liable due to weaving, as braiding and weaving are similar actions. A woman who applies blue eye shadow is liable due to writing. A woman who applies blush is liable due to spinning. Women would make a string from a doughy substance and pass it over their faces to redden their complexion. The Rabbis said before Rabbi Abbahu: And is that the typical manner of weaving, and is that the typical manner of writing, and is that the typical manner of spinning? Rabbi Eliezer would certainly agree that one who performs a prohibited labor in an atypical manner is exempt. Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said: This matter was explained to me by Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, himself.