Zevachim 108b

מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹגֵג, אָנוּס וּמוּטְעֶה. אִי הָכִי, הָכָא נָמֵי מִיבְּעֵי לְמַעוֹטֵי אָנוּס, שׁוֹגֵג וּמוּטְעֶה!

to exclude from the liability for karet one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The term “that man” teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive karet . The Gemara challenges: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is necessary to exclude one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?

תְּרֵי ״הָהוּא״ כְּתִיבִי.

The Gemara explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, two instances of the term “that man” are written: “Blood shall be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive karet , and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.

וְאֶלָּא ״לַה׳״ לְמָה לִי? לְהוֹצִיא שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ.

The Gemara has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase “ ish ish .” Accordingly, the Gemara asks: But why do I need the term “to the Lord”? The Gemara explains: It is written to exclude from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur scapegoat outside the courtyard.

חוֹמֶר בְּהַעֲלָאָה כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּאֵבֶר וְהֶעֱלוּ, שֶׁחַיָּיבִין. שֶׁיָּכוֹל וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְהֶדְיוֹט, שֶׁחַיָּיב – שְׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ בְּסַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטוּ, פְּטוּרִין; הַמַּעֲלֶה לְהֶדְיוֹט, שֶׁפָּטוּר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁשְּׁנַיִם שֶׁאָחֲזוּ, פְּטוּרִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

The Sages taught in a baraita : What halakha is alluded to when the verse states: “Any man [ ish ish ]… that offers up a burnt offering or sacrifice” (Leviticus 17:8)? The verse teaches that two people who grasped a limb of an offering and offered it up together outside the courtyard are liable. It is necessary for the verse to teach this, as one might have thought to say: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to slaughtering outside the courtyard, one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable, and nevertheless, two who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering are exempt, then with regard to offering up outside the courtyard, where one who offers up for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt, is it not logical that two who grasped a limb and offered it up will also be exempt? To counter this, the verse states “ ish ish ” to teach that they are liable for offering up together; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: ״הַהוּא״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם. אִם כֵּן, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״? דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִּלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם.

Rabbi Yosei says that the halakha concerning this case is derived from a different verse. The term “that [ hahu ] man” (Leviticus 17:9), which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together. The baraita asks: If so, what halakha is alluded to when the verse states “ ish ish ”? The baraita explains: Rabbi Yosei holds that the reason the Torah uses the doubled term “ ish ish ” is that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and no halakhot are to be derived from it.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – הַאי ״הַהוּא״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעוֹטֵי שׁוֹגֵג, אָנוּס, מוּטְעֶה. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – מֵ״הוּא״–״הַהוּא״. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – ״הוּא״–״הַהוּא״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, what does he derive from the term “that man”? The Gemara explains: This term: “That man,” is necessary to exclude from liability one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yosei derives that halakha from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated “ hahu .” The Hebrew word for: That, hahu , is formed of the definite article ha and the pronoun hu . And Rabbi Shimon does not expound any halakhot from the fact that the verse could have stated hu and instead stated “ hahu .” He holds that the expanded form is used because the Torah spoke in the language of people.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – מִדְּהַאי ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם, הָהוּא ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ נָמֵי דִּבְּרָה תּוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם. וְאֶלָּא הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְהֶדְיוֹט מְנָא לֵיהּ דְּחַיָּיב? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִ״דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא דָּם שָׁפָךְ״ – וַאֲפִילּוּ הַשּׁוֹחֵט לָאִישׁ.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yosei, from the fact that he holds that nothing is to be derived from the phrase “ ish ish ” written with regard to offering up, as he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, then also with regard to that phrase: “Any man [ ish ish ]” (Leviticus 17:3), written with regard to slaughtering, since he holds that the Torah spoke in the language of people, he should not derive any halakhot from it. But if so, from where does he derive that one who slaughters outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is liable? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “Blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood” (Leviticus 17:4), which teaches that even one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary man is liable.

הֶעֱלָה וְחָזַר וְהֶעֱלָה כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵבָרִים; דְּמָר סָבַר: כִּי כְּתִיב ״לַעֲשׂוֹת אֹתוֹ״ – עַל הַשָּׁלֵם הוּא חַיָּיב וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶחָסֵר, אַכֹּל בְּהֵמָה כְּתִיב; וּמָר סָבַר: אַכֹּל אֵבֶר וְאֵבֶר כְּתִיב. אֲבָל אֵבֶר אֶחָד – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

The Gemara cites two opinions concerning the case under dispute. Reish Lakish says: The dispute in the mishna concerns four or five limbs that were offered up in different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds: When it is written: “To sacrifice it” (Leviticus 17:9), which teaches the halakha that for offering up a complete item one is liable but that one is not liable for offering up an incomplete item, it is written with regard to a whole animal. Accordingly, liability to bring a sin offering is incurred only once one offers up the entire animal, even if that was done limb by limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that that verse is written with regard to each and every limb of an animal. Accordingly, one is liable for each limb he offered up. But with regard to the offering up of one limb in parts, everyone agrees that a person is liable to bring only one sin offering. According to Rabbi Shimon this would apply even if that were the only limb that was offered up; according to Rabbi Yosei this would apply only if the rest of the animal had already been offered up.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵבֶר אֶחָד – דְּמָר סָבַר: מוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (והעלו) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – חַיָּיב, וּמָר סָבַר – פָּטוּר; אֲבָל בְּאַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה אֵיבָרִין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אֵבֶר וְאֵבֶר.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone agrees that one is liable even for offering up a single limb. Furthermore, if an offering is slaughtered outside the courtyard, everyone agrees that one is liable only once an entire limb has been offered up. The dispute in the mishna concerns one limb from an offering that was slaughtered inside the courtyard that was then taken outside and offered up in parts, during different lapses of awareness. As one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that for offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple, that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the Temple, one is liable. Accordingly, one is liable for each part of the limb. And the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt for offering up part of a limb outside the courtyard. Accordingly, liability is incurred only once all the parts of the limb have been offered up. But with regard to offering up four or five limbs, everyone agrees that one is liable for each and every limb, as they understand that the phrase “to sacrifice it” is written with regard to each and every limb.

וּפְלִיגָא דְּעוּלָּא, דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – שֶׁחַיָּיב. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמוּקְטְרֵי בַּחוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ – דְּמָר סָבַר פָּטוּר, וּמַר סָבַר חַיָּיב.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside the Temple courtyard that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside the courtyard, that one is liable. They disagree only with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר עוּלָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּמוּקְטְרֵי חוּץ שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר, לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בְּמוּקְטְרֵי פְּנִים שֶׁחָסְרוּ (וְהֶעֱלוֹ) [וְהֶעֱלָן] בַּחוּץ, דְּמָר סָבַר פָּטוּר, וּמַר סָבַר חַיָּיב.

There are those who say there is a different version of Ulla’s statement, according to which he agrees with his teacher, Rabbi Yoḥanan. Ulla says: Everyone in the mishna concedes with regard to offerings that, having been slaughtered outside the Temple are unfit and so will be burned outside, that became incomplete and were offered up outside, that one is exempt. They disagree only with regard to offerings that are fit to be burned inside that became incomplete and were instead offered up outside. As one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds that one is exempt, and the other Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that one is liable.

(וּפְלִיגִי) [וּפְלִיגָא] דַּאֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אַלִּישָּׁנָא קַמָּא דְּעוּלָּא; דְּאָמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: כְּמַאן מַהְדְּרִינַן פּוֹקְעִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ? כְּמַאן – דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

And the statement of Shmuel’s father disagrees with the first version of Ulla’s statement, as Shmuel’s father says: In accordance with whose opinion do we restore limbs that were dislodged from upon the altar to the altar? In accordance with whose opinion? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei recorded in the mishna. Shmuel’s father assumes that Rabbi Yosei holds that incomplete limbs are never offered up on the altar, even if they were dislodged from the altar. Accordingly, he holds that one is not liable for offering them up outside the Temple courtyard. This is contrary to the first version of Ulla’s opinion, according to which one is liable for offering up incomplete offerings that were slaughtered inside the courtyard. Evidently, Ulla holds that an incomplete limb that was dislodged from the altar is to be restored to the altar.

וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּבֶן נֹחַ מִזְבֵּחַ לַה׳״.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up upon the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable. Rav Huna says: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei? As it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord, and took of every pure animal, and of every pure bird, and offered up burnt offerings on the altar” (Genesis 8:20). Noah was particular to use an altar rather than one of the available rocks. Apparently, this was because placing an item upon an altar is the only act that can be considered offering up.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּקַּח מָנוֹחַ אֶת גְּדִי הָעִזִּים וְאֶת הַמִּנְחָה וַיַּעַל עַל הַצּוּר לַה׳״.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? As it is written: “And Manoah took the kid with the meal offering, and offered it up upon the rock, to the Lord” (Judges 13:19). Evidently, even placing an offering upon a rock is considered an act of offering up.

וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, וְהָכְתִיב: ״וַיִּבֶן מִזְבֵּחַ לַה׳״! הַהוּא גּוּבְהָה בְּעָלְמָא. וְאִידַּךְ נָמֵי, הָא כְּתִיב: ״וַיִּקַּח מָנוֹחַ״! הוֹרָאַת שָׁעָה הָיְתָה.

The Gemara explains how each tanna interprets the verse that supports the other. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Shimon’s, isn’t it written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: That verse is referring merely to an elevated place and not specifically to an altar. But also according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yosei’s, isn’t it written: “And Manoah took …and offered it up upon the rock”? How does he explain that verse? The Gemara answers: The use of a rock in that case was a provisional edict issued in exigent circumstances, by the angel who visited Manoah, and so one cannot derive normative halakha from it.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: ״מִזְבֵּחַ פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד״; וְאֵין מִזְבֵּחַ בְּבָמָה; לְפִיכָךְ הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הָאֶבֶן – חַיָּיב.

And if you wish, say instead that the reason of Rabbi Shimon is as it is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Shimon says that the verse states: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar of the Lord at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 17:6). From here it is apparent that only in the Sanctuary is there a requirement for an altar, but a specifically erected altar is not required in order to offer up on a private altar during periods when it is permitted to do so. Therefore, one who offered up outside the courtyard on a rock or on a stone is liable.

יָצָא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! הָכִי קָאָמַר: לְפִיכָךְ בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת – הֶעֱלָה עַל הַסֶּלַע אוֹ עַל הָאֶבֶן, חַיָּיב.

The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita : If the baraita was referring to offering up during a period when the use of private altars is permitted, it should have concluded: One who offered up outside on a rock or on a stone has fulfilled his obligation. Why does it state instead that he is liable? The Gemara explains: This is what the baraita is saying: Since there is no requirement for a specifically erected altar during a period when private altars are permitted, therefore, during a period when the use of private altars is prohibited, one who offers up outside on a rock or on a stone is liable.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: קֶרֶן וְכֶבֶשׁ וִיסוֹד וְרִיבּוּעַ – מַהוּ שֶׁיְּעַכְּבוּ בְּבָמָה?

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises a dilemma: Features that are indispensable with regard to the altar in the Temple are the corner, the ramp leading to the altar, the base of the altar, and the square shape. What is the halakha with regard to whether they are also indispensable for the validity of a private altar during a period when it is permitted to use private altars?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה, תַּנְיָא: קֶרֶן וְכֶבֶשׁ וְרִיבּוּעַ וִיסוֹד – מְעַכְּבִין בְּבָמָה גְּדוֹלָה, וְאֵין מְעַכְּבִין בְּבָמָה קְטַנָּה.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught in a baraita : The corner, the ramp, the base, and the square shape are all indispensable for the validity of a great public altar, but they are not indispensable for the validity of a small private altar.