Menachot 82b

תֹּאמַר בְּפֶסַח דּוֹרוֹת שֶׁטָּעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ?

Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?

אָמַר לוֹ: הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״וְעָבַדְתָּ אֶת הָעֲבֹדָה הַזֹּאת בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַזֶּה״, שֶׁיִּהְיוּ כׇּל עֲבוֹדוֹת שֶׁל חוֹדֶשׁ הַזֶּה כָּזֶה.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The Paschal offerings should be compared, as the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “And it shall be when the Lord shall bring you into the land of the Canaanite, and the Hittite, and the Amorite, and the Hivite, and the Jebusite, which He swore to your fathers to give you, a land flowing with milk and honey, that you shall perform this service in this month” (Exodus 13:5). This indicates that all the services of this month for the generations shall be like this, the Paschal offering of Egypt.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִי סָבַר לַהּ דְּאֵין דָּנִין אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר – לֵיקוּ בְּמִילְּתֵיהּ!

The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: Initially, Rabbi Akiva rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer based on the claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. He then rejects the statement of Rabbi Eliezer on a technicality, namely that the two Paschal offerings have different sacrificial requirements. The Gemara therefore challenges: And as for Rabbi Akiva, if he holds that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, then let him stand by his statement.

אִי הֲדַר בֵּיהּ, וְהַאי דְּלָא גָּמַר מִפֶּסַח מִצְרַיִם מִשּׁוּם הַאי פִּירְכָא הוּא, פֶּסַח מִדְבָּר יוֹכִיחַ!

And if he retracted and conceded that one derives the possible from the impossible, and the fact that he did not derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt is due to that refutation that he proposed, i.e., that the Paschal offerings are different, then the Paschal offering that was sacrificed in the second year in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect. That offering did require placement of the blood and sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money, as there were no tithes in the wilderness.

לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר קָאָמַר: לְדִידִי אֵין דָּנִין אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר, לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ דָּנִין אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר – מָה לְפֶסַח מִצְרַיִם שֶׁכֵּן אֵינוֹ טָעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, תֹּאמַר בְּפֶסַח דּוֹרוֹת שֶׁטָּעוּן מַתַּן דָּמִים וְאֵימוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ?

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Akiva stated this objection in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. He meant as follows: According to my opinion, one does not derive the possible from the impossible, and this is a sufficient reason why one cannot derive the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt. And even according to your opinion, in which you said that one derives the possible from the impossible, this comparison can be refuted: What is notable about the Paschal offering sacrificed in Egypt? It is notable in that it did not require the placement of blood on the altar nor that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar. Can you say the same with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations, which requires the placement of blood on the altar and that the sacrificial portions be consumed by the altar?

וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: ״וְעָבַדְתָּ״.

And in response to this, Rabbi Eliezer said to him that the halakha with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations should be derived from the halakha of the Paschal offering in Egypt, since the verse states with regard to the Paschal offering of the generations: “That you shall keep this service in this month.”

וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: פֶּסַח מִדְבָּר יוֹכִיחַ!

The Gemara asks: But why must Rabbi Eliezer cite this verse? Let him say to Rabbi Akiva: The Paschal offering brought in the wilderness will prove that this refutation is incorrect, since it did require placement of the blood and consumption of sacrificial portions on the altar, yet it was brought only from non-sacred money.

לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא קָאָמַר לֵיהּ, לְדִידִי דָּנִין אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר, וּמִשּׁוּם הַאי פִּירְכָא – פֶּסַח מִדְבָּר יוֹכִיחַ, לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ אֵין דָּנִין אֶפְשָׁר מִשֶּׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר – ״וְעָבַדְתָּ״.

The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Akiva. He meant as follows: In my opinion, one derives the possible from the impossible. And as for that refutation that you raised, that the Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations have different sacrificial requirements, the Paschal offering of the wilderness will prove that this is not a valid refutation. According to your opinion, in which you said that one does not derive the possible from the impossible, the verse states: “That you shall keep this service in this month,” indicating that the Paschal offering of the generations is compared to the Paschal offering in Egypt.

וְהַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי לִיפְרוֹךְ? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: זֹאת אוֹמֶרֶת, אֵין מְשִׁיבִין עַל הַהֶיקֵּשׁ.

The Gemara challenges: But even now, let Rabbi Akiva refute this comparison by the same claim that one cannot derive the possible from the impossible. Rav Sheshet says: That is to say that one cannot refute a juxtaposition, i.e., one cannot refute such a derivation based on reasoning.

וּבְתַרְבִּיצָא אֲמוּר: וְכִי דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ חוֹזֵר וּמְלַמֵּד בְּהֶיקֵּשׁ? בִּכְלָלָא אִיתְּמַר, פֶּסַח כּוּלֵּיהּ חֲדָא מִילְּתָא הִיא.

And in the study hall [ uvetarbitza ] they discussed the statement of the mishna that the halakha that all obligatory offerings must be brought from non-sacred property is derived from the Paschal offering of the generations, and they said: But can a matter derived via juxtaposition, i.e., the Paschal offering of the generations, whose halakha is derived by juxtaposition from the Paschal offering in Egypt, again teach a matter via another juxtaposition? The Gemara responds: This is not considered an instance of a matter derived by juxtaposition teaching a matter derived by another juxtaposition. Rather, the statement of the mishna that all offerings are juxtaposed to the Paschal offering was stated in a general manner, since the entire Paschal offering is one matter. The Paschal offering in Egypt and the Paschal offering of the generations are both referred to as a Paschal offering.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, פֶּסַח דְּאֵינוֹ בָּא אֶלָּא מִן הַחוּלִּין מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מֵהָא דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: ״זֹאת הַתּוֹרָה לָעֹלָה וְלַמִּנְחָה וְלַחַטָּאת וְלָאָשָׁם וְלַמִּלּוּאִים וּלְזֶבַח הַשְּׁלָמִים״.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Akiva, who rejects the proofs of Rabbi Eliezer, from where does he derive that the Paschal offering comes only from non-sacred money? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Akiva derives it from that which Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: It is stated: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the inauguration offering, and of the sacrifice of peace offerings” (Leviticus 7:37). This verse connects all of the specified offerings, such that individual aspects of each offering are applicable to all of the offerings.

״עוֹלָה״ – מָה עוֹלָה טְעוּנָה כְּלִי, אַף כֹּל טָעוּן כְּלִי. מַאי הִיא? אִילֵימָא מִזְרָק, גַּבֵּי זִבְחֵי שַׁלְמֵי צִיבּוּר נָמֵי כְּתִיב ״וַיָּשֶׂם בָּאַגָּנֹת״.

The Gemara details these aspects. The verse states: “Of the burnt offering,” to teach that all of the offerings are like a burnt offering in that just as a burnt offering requires a utensil in its preparation, so too do all animal offerings require a utensil. What is the utensil? If we say it is a bowl, a utensil used for collecting the blood, as is learned from the burnt offerings that were sacrificed at Mount Sinai, that cannot be correct, as a utensil for collecting blood does not need to be learned from a burnt offering. With regard to communal peace offerings it is also written: “And they offered burnt offerings, and they sacrificed peace offerings… And Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins” (Exodus 24:5–6).

אֶלָּא סַכִּין, וְעוֹלָה גּוּפַהּ מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּשְׁלַח אַבְרָהָם אֶת יָדוֹ וַיִּקַּח אֶת הַמַּאֲכֶלֶת לִשְׁחֹט אֶת בְּנוֹ״, וְהָתָם עוֹלָה הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיַּעֲלֵהוּ לְעֹלָה תַּחַת בְּנוֹ״.

Rather, the term utensil must be referring to a knife, as the slaughter may be performed only with a knife and not with a sharp stone or reed. The Gemara asks: And with regard to a burnt offering itself, from where do we derive that it must be slaughtered with a knife? This is learned from that which is written: “And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slaughter his son” (Genesis 22:10); and there, Abraham was sacrificing a burnt offering, as it is written: “And offered it up for a burnt offering instead of his son” (Genesis 22:13).

״מִנְחָה״ – מָה מִנְחָה אֵינָהּ נֶאֱכֶלֶת אֶלָּא לְזִכְרֵי כְהוּנָּה, אַף כֹּל אֵין נֶאֱכָלִין אֶלָּא לְזִכְרֵי כְהוּנָּה. מַאי? אִי חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם –

The Gemara continues to expound the aforementioned verse (Leviticus 7:37). When the verse mentions a meal offering, it teaches that just as a meal offering is eaten only by males of the priesthood (see Leviticus 6:9–11), so too are all of the offerings mentioned in this verse eaten only by males of the priesthood. The Gemara asks: With regard to what offering is it that this halakha must be derived? If one suggests that it is with regard to the sin offering and the guilt offering,