Keritot 24b

מַאי לָאו ״דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין״ – דְּהָדְרָא לְמָרַהּ? לָא, דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין – וְהוּא נָמֵי לָא קָנֵי לַהּ, וְכׇל הַמַּחֲזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ.

What, is it not that when the baraita states: His statement is effective, this means that the gift returns to its previous owner? This ruling contradicts the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds that in such a case anyone who takes possession of the item acquires it. The Gemara answers: No, the phrase: His statement is effective, means that the previous owner also does not acquire the item; and as the item is not in the possession of either the giver or receiver of the gift, anyone who takes possession of it acquires it.

מֵיתִיבִי: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ: ״דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עַל שָׂדֶה זוֹ״, ״אֵין לִי עֵסֶק בָּהּ״, וְ״יָדִי מְסוּלֶּקֶת הֵימֶנָּה״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. וְהָא ״יָדִי מְסוּלֶּקֶת הֵימֶנָּה״ כְּאִי אֶפְשִׁי דָּמֵי, וְקָתָנֵי: לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם!

The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Reish Lakish from a baraita : With regard to one who says to another person with whom he shares property: I have no legal dealings or involvement with this field, or: I have no business with it, or: My hand is removed from it, he has not said anything of consequence, i.e., he does not relinquish his ownership of the property. But the phrase: My hand is removed from it, is like the phrase: I do not want it, and yet it is taught in the baraita that he has not said anything. This ruling apparently contradicts the opinion of Reish Lakish, who holds that in such a case anyone who takes possession of the item acquires it.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר: כִּי סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ מִדִּין וּדְבָרִים, מִגּוּפַהּ דְּשָׂדֶה לָא סַלֵּיק נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

The Gemara responds: That case in the baraita there is different, as when he says that he is removing himself, he is referring to removal from legal dealings or involvement. He is not removing himself from the field itself.

מֵיתִיבִי: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, וְאָמַר הַלָּה: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״, אִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי כֹּהֵן – אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כְּבָר זָכוּ בָּהֶן יוֹרְשִׁין.

The Gemara raises another objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita : In the case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a document granting his property as a gift to another, and there were slaves among his property, and the other person said: I do not want them, his objection is disregarded. Consequently, if their second master, the recipient, was a priest, his slaves may partake of teruma , as they are now slaves of a priest. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once the other person said: I do not want them, the previous owner’s heirs have already acquired them.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, קָסָבַר: כִּי יָהֵיב אִינִישׁ מַתָּנָה אַדַּעְתָּא דִּמְקַבְּלִין לַהּ מִינֵּיהּ, כִּי לָא מְקַבְּלִין לַהּ מִינֵּיהּ הָדְרָא לְמָרַהּ.

Granted there is no difficulty according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as he holds that when a person gives a gift, it is with the intention that the other person will accept the gift from him. Therefore, when the other individual does not accept it from him, the gift returns to its previous owner.

אֶלָּא לְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אִי כִּי אָמַר ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כׇּל הַמַּחֲזִיק בָּהֶן זָכָה בָּהֶן, הָכָא, דְּאָמַר שֵׁנִי ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – הָווּ לְהוּ זָרִים, וְקָאָכְלִי זָרִים תְּרוּמָה! קָסָבַר: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ, וְקָסָבַר: מְעוּכָּב לְגֵט שִׁחְרוּר – אוֹכֵל בִּתְרוּמָה.

But according to the opinion of the first tanna , if Reish Lakish is correct that when one says: I do not want it, anyone who takes possession of the item acquires it, as the item becomes ownerless, then here, where the second master said: I do not want them, the slaves are non-priests, and this would mean that non-priests are partaking of teruma . The Gemara answers: The first tanna holds that with regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated but nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his master. And he further holds that a slave detained in his master’s possession only due to not having received a bill of manumission may partake of teruma if he is the slave of a priest.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יִקְרַב כּוּ׳. לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, לְמָה לִי חֵטְא? הָא אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בִּנְדָבָה אָתֵי, דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: מִתְנַדֵּב אָדָם אָשָׁם תָּלוּי בְּכׇל יוֹם!

§ The mishna teaches: In the case of one who brings a provisional guilt offering and it became known to him that he did not sin, if he made that discovery before the ram was slaughtered, Rabbi Eliezer says: It shall be sacrificed as a provisional guilt offering, as if it does not come to atone for that sin that he thought, it comes to atone for another sin. The Gemara asks: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, why do I need another sin? Doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer say that a provisional guilt offering may come as a gift offering? As we learned in a mishna (25a) that Rabbi Eliezer says: A person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּאָמְרוּ לוֹ הוּא, דִּתְנַן: אֶלָּא אוֹמְרִים לוֹ: הַמְתֵּן עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לְבֵית הַסָּפֵק.

Rav Ashi said: The opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that is taught in the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of those who spoke to Bava ben Buta in the mishna below, as we learned in the continuation of that mishna (25a): Rabbi Eliezer said that Bava ben Buta would bring a provisional guilt offering every day, and he wanted to bring one even immediately after Yom Kippur. But they said to him: Wait until you enter into a situation of potential uncertainty, so that the provisional guilt offering is brought for some sort of uncertain sin, and do not sacrifice it purely as a gift offering.

אִם מִשֶּׁנִּשְׁחַט נוֹדַע כּוּ׳. קָתָנֵי: הַבָּשָׂר יֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵפָה. אַלְמָא: חוּלִּין שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטוּ בַּעֲזָרָה – בִּשְׂרֵיפָה.

§ With regard to one who brought a provisional guilt offering and after the ram was slaughtered it became known to him that he did not sin, the mishna teaches: The flesh shall go out to the place of burning. Evidently, according to the opinion of the tanna of the mishna, non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, such as this provisional guilt offering that was mistakenly consecrated, are to be burned.

וּרְמִינְהִי: אָשָׁם וַדַּאי אֵינוֹ כֵּן, אִם עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁחַט – יֵצֵא וְיִרְעֶה בָּעֵדֶר, מִשֶּׁנִּשְׁחַט – הֲרֵי זֶה יִקָּבֵר! אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תִּבְרַאּ, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ.

But one may raise a contradiction from a ruling later in the mishna: In the case of a definite guilt offering, that is not so; if he made that discovery before the ram was slaughtered, it shall go out and graze among the flock. If it became known to him after the ram was slaughtered that he did not sin, it shall be buried. This indicates that non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard are buried. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, i.e., it cites the opinions of two different Sages. He who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha .

אָמַר רַבָּה: אָשָׁם וַדַּאי עַל אָשָׁם תָּלוּי קָרָמֵית? אָשָׁם וַדַּאי, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא צְרִיךְ לֵיהּ – לָא מַקְדֵּישׁ לֵיהּ. אָשָׁם תָּלוּי, מִתּוֹךְ שֶׁלִּבּוֹ נוֹקְפוֹ – גּוֹמֵר וּמַקְדִּשׁוֹ.

Rabba said: Are you raising a contradiction from the halakha of a definite guilt offering with regard to the halakha of a provisional guilt offering? In the case of a definite guilt offering, he consecrated it under the assumption that he was obligated to sacrifice it. Since it later became clear to him that he does not need to sacrifice the animal, it is considered as though he did not consecrate it, and the animal is non-sacred. But with regard to a provisional guilt offering, since initially his heart struck him with pangs of conscience over a sin that he might have committed, he wholeheartedly resolves to consecrate the animal. Therefore, the animal remains consecrated, and its status is that of a guilt offering disqualified for sacrifice.

אֶלָּא אִי קַשְׁיָא, אָשָׁם וַדַּאי עַל אָשָׁם וַדַּאי קַשְׁיָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: הֲרֵי זֶה יִקָּבֵר, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: וְהַבָּשָׂר יֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵיפָה! הָא וַדַּאי תִּבְרַאּ, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ.

Rather, if the mishna poses a difficulty, then the apparent contradiction between this halakha of a definite guilt offering and another halakha of a definite guilt offering is difficult. As it is taught in the mishna: If after the ram was slaughtered it became known to him that he did not sin, it shall be buried. Now say the latter clause of that section of the mishna: If after the blood was sprinkled he discovered that he did not sin, the flesh shall go out to the place of burning. Accordingly, this mishna is certainly disjointed, and he who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha .

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: רֵישָׁא דְּקָתָנֵי בְּאָשָׁם תָּלוּי: ״וְהַבָּשָׂר יֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵיפָה״ – לָא קַשְׁיָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיתְחֲזֵי כְּזֶבַח פָּסוּל.

Rav Ashi said: The first clause, which teaches with regard to a provisional guilt offering: The flesh shall go out to the place of burning, is not difficult. Its flesh is not treated like that of a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the courtyard, which must be buried. It is burned because it has the appearance of a disqualified offering, which must be burned. This reason applies equally in the case of a definite guilt offering where it became known to him that he did not sin only after the blood was sprinkled, which is why it too must be burned. But if he discovered that he was not obligated to bring the definite guilt offering after the ram was slaughtered but before its blood was sprinkled, it shall be buried, as this does not appear like a disqualified offering, since it is no longer a definite guilt offering and its blood was not sprinkled.

נִזְרַק הַדָּם – הַבָּשָׂר יֵאָכֵל. וְאַמַּאי? הָא הַוְיָא לֵיהּ יְדִיעָה! אָמַר רָבָא, אֲמַר קְרָא: ״וְהוּא לֹא יָדַע וְנִסְלַח לוֹ״, וְהָא לָא הָוְיָא לֵיהּ יְדִיעָה בִּשְׁעַת סְלִיחָה.

The mishna teaches: With regard to one who brought a provisional guilt offering, if the blood was sprinkled and then he discovered that he did not sin and the meat is intact, the meat may be eaten by the priests. The Gemara asks: But why is the meat eaten? After all, he now has certain knowledge of his sin, and a provisional guilt offering is brought only by one who is uncertain about his sin. Rava said that the verse states: “And he knew it not, and he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 5:18), and this person did not have knowledge of his sin at the time of forgiveness, i.e., when he achieved atonement, which is the moment of the sprinkling of the blood.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ הַדָּם בַּכּוֹס כּוּ׳. לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אַמַּאי יִזָּרֵק? הָא הָוְיָא לֵיהּ יְדִיעָה בִּשְׁעַת סְלִיחָה! אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל הָעוֹמֵד לִיזָּרֵק – כְּזָרוּק דָּמֵי.

§ The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Yosei says: Even if the blood of the provisional guilt offering was still in the cup but had not yet been sprinkled when he discovered that he did not sin, the blood shall be sprinkled and the meat may be eaten. The Gemara asks: According to Rabbi Yosei, why is the blood sprinkled? This person had knowledge of his sin at the moment of forgiveness. Rava said that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: The halakhic status of any blood that is received in a vessel and is ready to be sprinkled is like that of blood that has already been sprinkled.

אֵימַר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, בְּמִידֵּי דְּעוֹמֵד לִיזָּרֵק, אֲבָל הַאי, אֵין עוֹמֵד לִיזָּרֵק! אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: כְּלֵי שָׁרֵת מְקַדְּשִׁין בּוֹ אֶת הַפָּסוּל בַּתְּחִלָּה לִיקְרַב.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Say that Rabbi Shimon said this principle only with regard to an item that is ready to be sprinkled with certainty, but not with regard to the blood of this provisional guilt offering, with regard to which it will be discovered before the sprinkling that he did not sin. In this case, from the outset it was not ready to be sprinkled. They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that Rabbi Yosei holds: The service vessel consecrates disqualified offerings to be sacrificed on the altar ab initio .

אָשָׁם וַדַּאי אֵינוֹ כֵּן כּוּ׳. אִיתְּמַר: עֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה אֵימָתַי נֶאֱסֶרֶת? רַב הַמְנוּנָא אָמַר: מֵחַיִּים, רָבָא אָמַר: לְאַחַר עֲרִיפָה.

§ The mishna teaches: In the case of a definite guilt offering, that is not so, and likewise in the case of a heifer whose neck is broken that is not so. If the identity of the murderer is discovered before the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall go out and graze among the flock as a non-sacred animal. But if the identity of the murderer was discovered after the heifer’s neck was broken, it shall be buried in its place. It was stated that there is a related dispute between amora’im : From when is it prohibited to derive benefit from a heifer whose neck is broken? Rav Hamnuna says: The prohibition takes effect from when the animal is still alive. Rava says: The prohibition goes into effect after the breaking of the neck of the animal.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרָבָא – מֵעִידָּנָא דְּאִיתְעֲבִיד בַּהּ מַעֲשֶׂה, אֶלָּא לְרַב הַמְנוּנָא, מֵאֵימָתַי?

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Granted, according to Rava the prohibition takes effect from the moment that an action, i.e., breaking of the neck, was performed on the heifer. But according to Rav Hamnuna, from when exactly does the prohibition take effect?