Chullin 69a

זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ – אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ גּוּפָהּ – מוּתָּר. שֶׁאֵין גּוּפָהּ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי כְּהַאי גַּוְנָא?

This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to the slaughter is prohibited to be consumed even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter. The Gemara asks: Just prior to stating the principle, the mishna states the halakha that even if parts of a fetus are cut from it the slaughter of the mother permits it. If so, when the mishna presents the principle and states that an item that is not part of its body is permitted, what is added? Is it not to include a case like this, where the majority of the fetus has already left the womb, and nevertheless the principle clarifies that the rest of the fetus that remains inside the womb is permitted?

לָא, לְאֵתוֹיֵי קָלוּט בִּמְעֵי פָּרָה, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: קָלוּט בֶּן פָּרָה אָסוּר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אֲבָל בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ – שְׁרֵי.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it comes to include a fetus with non-cloven hooves found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the hallmarks of a kosher animal, which has split hooves and chews its cud, it is nevertheless permitted to be consumed by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. And a specific clause in the mishna permitting this is necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the hallmarks of a kosher animal. The mishna teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it is still inside its mother’s womb when the mother is slaughtered, it is permitted to be consumed.

בָּעֵי רַב חֲנַנְיָא: הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ בָּעֲזָרָה, מַהוּ? מִגּוֹ דְּהָוֵי מְחִיצָה לְגַבֵּי קָדָשִׁים – הָוֵי נָמֵי לְגַבֵּי דְּהַאי, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְגַבֵּי דְּהַאי לָאו מְחִיצָה הִיא, דִּמְחִיצַת עוּבָּר – אִמּוֹ הִיא?

§ The Gemara taught that the reason to deem a limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb forbidden for consumption is because it went outside of its boundary. Based on this, Rav Ḥananya raises a dilemma: If the fetus of a sacrificial animal of the most sacred order extended its foreleg outside the womb while in the Temple courtyard and then brought it back, what is the halakha ? Will the slaughter of the mother permit that limb? Do we say that since the courtyard is regarded as the boundary for such sacrificial animals, as they are permitted only when in the courtyard, therefore it is also regarded as the boundary for this fetus, and even if it extended its limb outside of the womb, it is irrelevant since it ultimately remained within its boundary? Or perhaps, for this fetus, the courtyard is not considered its boundary, as the boundary of a fetus is its mother, and so the limb would become prohibited.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְתִבְּעֵי לָךְ קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם? קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם מַאי טַעְמָא לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לָךְ? דִּמְחִיצַת עוּבָּר אִמּוֹ הִוא, הָכָא נָמֵי מְחִיצַת עוּבָּר אִמּוֹ הִוא.

Abaye said to Rav Ḥananya: But why don’t you raise the same dilemma with regard to the fetuses of offerings of lesser sanctity, which are permitted only within Jerusalem? Abaye continues: It would appear that concerning offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, what is the reason that you did not raise this dilemma? It is because it is clear to you that the boundary of a fetus is its mother. But here too, concerning a fetus of an offering of the most sacred order, one must say that the boundary of a fetus is its mother, and not the Temple courtyard.

בָּעֵי אִילְפָא: הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ בֵּין סִימָן לְסִימָן, מַהוּ?

§ The baraita cited on 68b discusses the case of a fetus that extended a limb outside the womb. It cites the opinion of the Rabbis that although the slaughter of the mother does not permit the consumption of the limb, it does prevent it from being defined as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. Based on this, Ilfa raises a dilemma: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb between the severing of its mother’s windpipe, which is one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter [ siman ], and the severing of the other siman , the gullet, what is the halakha ?

מִי מִצְטָרֵף סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן לְסִימָן שֵׁנִי לְטַהוֹרֵיהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה, אוֹ לָא? אָמַר רָבָא: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, אִם הוֹעִיל לוֹ סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן לְסִימָן שֵׁנִי לְהַתִּירוֹ בַּאֲכִילָה, לֹא יוֹעִיל לוֹ לְטַהוֹרֵיהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה?

Does the cutting of the first siman combine with that of the second siman to render that limb pure from the impurity of a carcass or not? The cutting of the first siman could potentially permit the consumption of the limb, as the limb was still inside the womb, whereas the cutting of the second siman could not permit consumption, as the limb had already been extended outside the womb. Since they have different effects, can they combine to render the limb pure? Rava said: It is an a fortiori inference: If the cutting of the first siman was effective to the extent that it can combine with the cutting of the second siman to permit the rest of the fetus for consumption, will it not be effective with regard to the limb to render it pure from the impurity of a carcass?

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: מַהוּ לָחוֹשׁ לְזַרְעוֹ?

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If a fetus extended a limb outside the womb, thereby rendering the limb forbidden, and then, after the mother animal was slaughtered, the fetus emerged alive, what is the halakha concerning whether there is a need to be concerned with regard to any offspring of that fetus, i.e., that the prohibition pertaining to its limb will pass on to its offspring?

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דַּאֲזַל אַבְּהֵמָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא, מַאי אִירְיָא הַאי דְּאִית בֵּיהּ אִיסּוּר יוֹצֵא?

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say the dilemma applies to the offspring in a case where the fetus matured and mated with a full-fledged, normal animal, which would be fully permitted if slaughtered, then why raise this dilemma specifically with regard to this fetus, which has a prohibition attached to it caused by leaving its boundary?

אֲפִילּוּ בֶּן פְּקוּעָה דְּעָלְמָא נָמֵי, דְּאָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְזֶרַע הָאָב, בֶּן פְּקוּעָה הַבָּא עַל בְּהֵמָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא – הַוָּלָד אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה.

Even in the case of a regular fetus that emerged alive from its mother’s womb after the mother was slaughtered [ ben pekua ], which is permitted without the need for any slaughter, the dilemma could also be raised, as Rav Mesharshiyya says: According to the statement of the one who says that when defining the status of an animal one needs to be concerned with its paternity and not only its maternity, if a ben pekua mated with a full-fledged animal, the offspring has no rectification. The offspring of two ben pekua animals is permitted without ritual slaughter. But if the father is a ben pekua but not the mother, then it is simultaneously defined as requiring slaughter, based on the mother, and being excluded from the possibility of being permitted through slaughter, based on the father. Therefore, no act of slaughter can permit it.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲזַל אַבֶּן פְּקוּעָה דִּכְוָותֵיהּ. מַאי? אֵבֶר מוֹלִיד אֵבֶר, וְחָתֵיךְ לֵיהּ וּשְׁרֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא מִבַּלְבַּל זַרְעֵיהּ?

The Gemara answers: No, the dilemma does not concern that case. Rather, it is necessary in a case in which the fetus later mated with a ben pekua like it and had offspring. Since neither of the parents require slaughter, the offspring does not require it either. In such a case, what is the halakha ? To what extent does the prohibition pertaining to the limb of the father pass to the offspring? Do we say that each limb of the father produces the corresponding limb in the offspring, and so only the parallel limb in the offspring is prohibited, and therefore one could sever that limb and the rest of the offspring will be permitted? Or perhaps the father’s seed is intermingled through the entire offspring, and so the entire offspring is prohibited.

הֲדַר אָמַר: פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִבַּלְבַּל זַרְעֵיהּ, דְּאִם כֵּן, סוֹמֵא יִוָּלֵד סוֹמֵא, וְקִיטֵּעַ יִוָּלֵד קִיטֵּעַ!

After raising this dilemma, Rabbi Yirmeya then said: It is obvious that the seed of the father is intermingled through the entire offspring, as if it were so that each limb produces the corresponding limb, every blind father would bear blind offspring, and an amputee father would bear offspring that is an amputee.

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִבַּלְבַּל זַרְעֵיהּ, וְהָכִי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לַן: בְּהֵמָה בְּעָלְמָא, לָאו מִכֹּחַ חֵלֶב וָדָם קָאָתְיָא, וְשָׁרְיָא? הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא. אוֹ דִלְמָא: תְּרֵי אִיסּוּרֵי אָמְרִינַן, תְּלָתָא לָא אָמְרִינַן?

Rather, it is obvious that the seed of the father is intermingled, and this is the dilemma we are raising: Even with regard to a regular animal, is it not produced from the influence of the forbidden fat and blood of its father and mother, and yet it is permitted to be consumed? Here too, it is no different, and although the forbidden limb of the father was an influence in the offspring’s formation, the offspring should nevertheless be permitted. Or perhaps we say that the Torah permitted these two prohibitions, the consumption of forbidden fat and the consumption of blood, but we do not say that it permitted three prohibitions, i.e., also the prohibition of a limb that left its boundary.

וּלְמַאן? אִי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר – אִיסּוּר חֵלֶב וָדָם אִיכָּא, אִיסּוּר יוֹצֵא לֵיכָּא.

The Gemara asks: And according to whom is it possible to speak of three prohibitions in order to raise this dilemma? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir that is difficult, because he holds that a fetus that has completed its gestational term is regarded as being independent of its mother and is no longer permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter. Consequently, there is a prohibition of forbidden fat and blood, just like any other animal, but there is no prohibition of a limb that leaves its boundary, as its permitted status is no longer dependent on being within its mother’s womb.

אִי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – אִיסּוּר יוֹצֵא אִיכָּא, אִיסּוּר חֵלֶב וָדָם לֵיכָּא!

And if you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that is also difficult, because he holds that since ultimately the offspring was inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, the fetus is permitted in its entirety by virtue of that slaughter. Consequently, there is a prohibition of a limb that leaves its boundary, but there is no prohibition of forbidden fat and blood.

דִּתְנַן: גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל, וְחֶלְבּוֹ אָסוּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל, וְחֶלְבּוֹ מוּתָּר.

The Gemara cites the source of the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda: As we learned in a baraita : The prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to the fetus that had already completed its gestational term when its mother was slaughtered, and likewise its fat is forbidden; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that the prohibition of the sciatic nerve does not apply to the fetus, and its fat is permitted. Evidently, according to all opinions, both the prohibitions of forbidden fat and blood and the prohibition of a limb that leaves its boundary cannot apply to the same animal.

אֶלָּא, כֹּל מִכֹּחַ לָא אָמְרִינַן דִּשְׁרֵי.

Rather, it must be that we do not say that any item that is produced from the influence of a forbidden entity is itself forbidden, as in fact it is permitted. Therefore, it would certainly be permitted to consume the offspring of a fetus whose limb had been forbidden, and the dilemma does not concern such an animal.

וְהָכִי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לַן: מַהוּ לִגְמוֹעַ אֶת חֶלְבּוֹ? חֵלֶב דְּעָלְמָא לָא כְּאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי דָּמֵי, וּשְׁרֵי, הַאי נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא.

And this is the dilemma that we are raising: What is the halakha with regard to drinking the milk of a fetus whose limb is forbidden? Isn’t regular milk of a normal animal comparable to a limb from a living animal, given that it is taken from a live animal, and yet it is permitted? If so, this milk too should be no different, and although the milk comes from an animal whose limb is forbidden as a limb from a living animal, as it was not permitted through the slaughter of its mother, nevertheless, the milk should be permitted.

אוֹ דִלְמָא הָתָם, אִית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא לְאִיסּוּרֵיהּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, הָכָא לֵית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא לְאִיסּוּרֵיהּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? תֵּיקוּ.

Or perhaps there, with regard to regular milk, the Torah waives the prohibition of a limb from a living animal, as there is a rectification for its prohibition through slaughter. But here, with regard to a fetus whose limb is forbidden as a limb from a living animal, there is no rectification for its prohibition through slaughter. The Gemara accepts that this was the dilemma, but concludes that no resolution for it was found, and so the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

חוֹתֵךְ מֵעוּבָּר וְכוּ׳. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכׇל בְּהֵמָה מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה וְגוֹ׳״, ״בְּהֵמָה … בַּבְּהֵמָה״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַוָּלָד.

§ The mishna states: If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severed pieces from a fetus that is in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha ? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The term “of the animals [ babehema ]” is translated literally as: In the animal, and is referring to the term “every animal” mentioned at the beginning of the verse. Accordingly, the verse may be read as saying: Every animal in the animal you may eat, and is referring to a fetus inside its mother. It therefore serves to include the offspring, i.e., the fetus, as being permitted by its mother’s slaughter, even if parts of the fetus had been severed.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, יָמִירוּ בּוֹ!

The Gemara objects: If that is so, that the phrase: Every animal of the animals, is referring to a fetus, then one should be able to substitute a non-sacred animal for the sanctified fetus of a pregnant offering, i.e., the non-sacred animal should become consecrated through the attempt to do so. This is because the verse referring to substitution also uses that phrase: “And if he shall substitute an animal for an animal [ behema bivhema ], it and its substitute shall be consecrated” (Leviticus 27:10). There too, the phrase “an animal for an animal” translates literally as: An animal in an animal.

אַלְּמָה תְּנַן: אֵין מְמִירִין לֹא אֵבָרִין בְּעוּבָּרִין, וְלֹא עוּבָּרִין בְּאֵבָרִין, וְלֹא אֵבָרִין וְעוּבָּרִין בִּשְׁלֵמִין, וְלֹא שְׁלֵמִין בָּהֶן!

Why, then, did we learn in a mishna ( Temura 10a): One cannot substitute limbs of a non-sacred animal for fetuses of pregnant offerings, i.e., those limbs will not thereby be consecrated; and one cannot substitute fetuses of non-sacred animals for limbs of an offering, and one cannot substitute limbs and fetuses of non-sacred animals for whole offerings, and one cannot substitute whole, non-sacred animals for them, i.e., limbs and fetuses of offerings?

אֶלָּא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכׇל בְּהֵמָה״, לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַוָּלָד.

Rather, the halakha that a fetus and its severed pieces are permitted to be consumed by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal is derived from that which the verse states: “And every animal.” The term “and every” serves to include the offspring, i.e., the fetus, as being permitted, even if parts of it had been severed.

אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ חוֹתֵךְ מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת נָמֵי, אַלְּמָה תְּנַן: חוֹתֵךְ מִן הָעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה? אָמַר קְרָא: ״אוֹתָהּ״ – שְׁלֵמָה וְלֹא חֲסֵרָה.

The Gemara objects: If so, then even if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal, those pieces should be permitted as well. Why, then, did we learn in the mishna: If one severed pieces from a fetus that was in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal, but if one severed pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it their consumption is prohibited? The Gemara explains: That verse states: “Of the animal, it you may eat,” which indicates that slaughter permits consumption of only the whole animal, but not of the parts of the animal that it is lacking, i.e., the parts that were severed.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ דְּמוּת יוֹנָה תִּשְׁתְּרֵי? אַלְּמָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ דְּמוּת יוֹנָה (אסור) [אֲסוּרָה] בַּאֲכִילָה?

The Gemara objects: If that is so, that the halakha is derived from the term “and every animal,” then even in the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds a dove-shaped fetus in it, it should be permitted. Why, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan say: One who slaughters an animal and finds a dove-shaped fetus in it, that fetus is prohibited for consumption?