Bekhorot 31a

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: וְכוּלָּן שֶׁחָזְרוּ בָּהֶן אֵין מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן עוֹלָמִית, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: חָזְרוּ בְּמַטְמוֹנִיּוֹת — אֵין מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן, בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא — מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן.

With regard to an am ha’aretz who accepts upon himself the stringent practices of a ḥaver , the Sages taught in a baraita : And with regard to all of them, when they retract and return to being amei ha’aretz , they are never accepted as ḥaverim ; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If they retracted in private, while in public they continue to act as ḥaverim , they are not accepted, but if they retract in public [ befarheseya ], they are accepted, as they can be trusted.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אִם עָשׂוּ דִּבְרֵיהֶן בְּמַטְמוֹנִיּוֹת — מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן, בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא — אֵין מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן.

There are those who say another version of this discussion: If they performed their actions as ḥaverim even in private, when they initially accepted the status of ḥaverim , then they are accepted when they wish to return to that status. Conversely, if they performed their actions as ḥaverim only in public, they are not accepted.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתָן, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״שׁוּבוּ בָּנִים שׁוֹבָבִים״. אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק אִישׁ כְּפַר עַכּוֹ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּאוֹתוֹ הַזּוּג.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa say: Both in this case and in that case they are accepted, as it is stated: “Return, you backsliding children; I will heal your backslidings” (Jeremiah 3:22). Rabbi Yitzḥak of the village of Akko says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of that pair, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, i.e., those who return are accepted in both cases.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה הָיוּ אוֹמְרִים: חָבֵר וְנַעֲשָׂה גַּבַּאי — דּוֹחִין אוֹתוֹ מֵחֲבֵירָתוֹ, פֵּירַשׁ — אֵין מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתוֹ. חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר: פֵּירַשׁ — הֲרֵי הוּא כְּכׇל אָדָם.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita : Initially, the Sages would say with regard to one who is a ḥaver and became a tax collector that he is rejected from his status as a ḥaver . Even if he later resigns from his position as a tax collector, he is not accepted. In later generations they went back to saying that if he resigns from his position as a tax collector he is like any other person and may be accepted once again as a ḥaver .

רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִיָּיא אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ שַׁעְתָּא, הֲוָה עָיֵיל גַּבֵּיהּ רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף וְאַרְבַּע מְאָה זוּגֵא דְּרַבָּנַן. שְׁמַע דְּאָתוּ, קְטַיר לְהוּ אַרְבַּע מְאָה תַּכְתָּקֵי. לְסוֹף שְׁמַעוּ דְּנַעֲשָׂה גַּבַּאי, שְׁלַחוּ לֵיהּ: זִיל לַחֲשִׁיבוּתֵיהּ, זִיל לְקַדְמוּתֵיהּ. שְׁלַח לְהוּ: הֲדַרִי בִּי. רַב יוֹסֵף לָא אֲזַל, רַבָּה אֲזַל.

The Gemara relates that one time the Sages needed Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya for a certain matter. Rabba and Rav Yosef and four hundred pairs of Sages ascended to his home. When he heard that they were coming, he tied for them four hundred chairs [ takhtekei ] to sit on. Eventually the Sages heard that he had become a tax collector. They sent him the following message: Go to your important position as a tax collector, and go to your former status, as we no longer need you. He sent to them the following message: I have repented and am no longer a tax collector. Rav Yosef did not go to him, but Rabba went to him.

רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: תְּנֵינָא, פֵּירַשׁ — אֵין מְקַבְּלִין אוֹתוֹ; רַבָּה אָמַר: תְּנֵינָא, חָזְרוּ לוֹמַר: פֵּירַשׁ — הֲרֵי הוּא כְּכׇל אָדָם.

Rav Yosef said in explanation of why he did not go: We learn in a baraita that even if such an individual resigns from his position as a tax collector he is not accepted. Rabba said: We learn in the baraita that in later generations they went back to saying that if he resigns from his position as a tax collector he is like any other person and may be accepted once again as a ḥaver .

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כׇּל הַבְּכוֹרוֹת אָדָם רוֹאֶה, חוּץ מִשֶּׁל עַצְמוֹ, וְרוֹאֶה אֶת קֳדָשָׁיו, וְאֶת מַעְשְׂרוֹתָיו, וְנִשְׁאָל עַל טׇהֳרוֹתָיו.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita : A person may inspect all firstborns for blemishes except for his own firstborns, as he has a vested interest. And despite his vested interest in these cases, one may inspect his own sanctified animals that he consecrated for the Temple, to determine whether they have blemishes and may be redeemed; and he may inspect his animal tithes to decide whether they are fit for sacrifice in the Temple; and one may ask himself with regard to his ritually pure foods, i.e., he may decide for himself whether or not they have become impure, and he is not suspected of claiming that impure food is actually pure.

אָמַר מָר: כׇּל הַבְּכוֹרוֹת אָדָם רוֹאֶה חוּץ מִשֶּׁל עַצְמוֹ. בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא בְּחַד — מִי מְהֵימַן? אֶלָּא בִּתְלָתָא, וּמִי חֲשִׁידִי? וְהָתְנַן: מֵיאֲנָה אוֹ שֶׁחָלְצָה בְּפָנָיו — יִשָּׂאֶנָּה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא בֵּית דִּין!

The Gemara analyzes the baraita . The Master said: A person may inspect all firstborns except for his own firstborns. What are we dealing with here? If we say that we are dealing with a case of one person examining a blemish, is he trusted by himself to deem any firstborn animal permitted for slaughter? The mishna on 36b states that only three people may permit a firstborn animal to be slaughtered. Rather, it must be dealing with one of three who jointly decide the status of the firstborn animal. And is he suspect in such a case? But didn’t we learn in a mishna ( Yevamot 25b): A judge before whom a woman performed refusal when she was a minor, by declaring that she did not desire the husband chosen for her by her family, or before whom she performed ḥalitza , may marry her,because he was only one member of the court, and therefore there is no suspicion of conflict of interest?

לְעוֹלָם בְּחַד, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּיָחִיד מוּמְחֶה, הָכָא נָמֵי בְּיָחִיד מוּמְחֶה.

The Gemara answers: Actually, we are dealing with a case of a single judge, and this is as Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to a different matter: Vows may be dissolved even by a single expert, and a three-member court is not always necessary. Here too, we are dealing with a single expert who deems the firstborn animal permitted. A single expert may rule with regard to the firstborn animals belonging to others, but not his own animals, due to his vested interest.

וְרוֹאֶה אֶת קֳדָשָׁיו, דְּאִי בָּעֵי מִיתְּשִׁיל עֲלַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara analyzes the last section of the baraita . And despite his vested interest, one may inspect his own sanctified animals. Why is it permitted for him to inspect them? The reason is that if he wants to avoid giving the animal to the Temple, he can issue a request from a halakhic authority to annul his oath. Consequently, he does not truly have a vested interest.

וּמַעְשְׂרוֹתָיו, דְּאִי בָּעֵי שָׁדֵי בֵּיהּ מוּמָא בְּכוּלֵּיהּ עֶדְרֵיהּ.

The baraita also teaches: And he may rule with regard to his own animal tithes to decide whether they are fit to be sacrificed in the Temple. The Gemara explains that the reason is that if he wants to avoid bringing the animals as offerings, he can inflict a blemish upon his entire herd before separating the tithe, which would render them all unfit for sacrifice in the Temple.

וְנִשְׁאָל עַל טׇהֳרוֹתָיו, דְּהָא חֲזוּ לֵיהּ בִּימֵי טוּמְאָתוֹ.

Finally, the baraita states: And one may ask himself with regard to his ritually pure foods, i.e., he may decide for himself whether or not they have become impure, and he is not suspected of claiming that impure food is actually pure. The Gemara explains that his vested interested in this case is not so great, as the food is fit for him to eat in his days of impurity.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ עַד כַּמָּה יִשְׂרָאֵל חַיָּיבִין.

MISHNA: With regard to all disqualified consecrated animals that were disqualified for sacrifice due to blemishes and were redeemed, all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the Temple treasury. In order to ensure that the Temple treasury will not suffer a loss, these animals are sold in the butchers’ market [ ba’itliz ] and slaughtered in the butchers’ market, where the demand is great and the price is consequently higher. And their meat is weighed and sold by the litra , in the manner that non-sacred meat is sold.

מַתְנִי׳ כָּל פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין, הֲנָאָתָן לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ, נִמְכָּרִין בָּאִיטְלִיז, וְנִשְׁחָטִין בָּאִיטְלִיז, וְנִשְׁקָלִין בְּלִיטְרָא,

This is the halakha with regard to all consecrated animals except for the firstborn offering and an animal tithe offering. When these become blemished and their slaughter is permitted, they are sold and slaughtered only in the owner’s house and are not weighed; rather, they are sold by estimate. The reason is that all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the owner, i.e., the priest in the case of the firstborn and the owner in the case of the animal tithe offering. It is not permitted to treat disqualified consecrated animals as one treats non-sacred animals merely to guarantee that the owner will receive the optimal price. This is in contrast to disqualified consecrated animals, where all benefit accrued from their sale belongs to the Temple treasury, and therefore the animal is sold in the market to ensure that the optimal price is received.

חוּץ מִן הַבְּכוֹר וְהַמַּעֲשֵׂר, שֶׁהֲנָיָיתָן לַבְּעָלִים. פְּסוּלֵי הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין — הֲנָיָיתָן לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ.

And although the meat of the firstborn is not weighed and sold by the litra , nevertheless, if one has non-sacred meat weighing one hundred dinars, one may weigh one portion of non-sacred meat against one portion of the meat of the firstborn, because that is unlike the manner in which non-sacred meat is weighed.

וְשׁוֹקְלִין מָנָה כְּנֶגֶד מָנָה בַּבְּכוֹר.