Arakhin 6b

אִינִי? וְהָא רַבִּי יַנַּאי יָזֵיף וּפָרַע! שָׁאנֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי, דְּנִיחָא לְהוּ לַעֲנִיִּים דְּכַמָּה דִּמְשַׁהֵי מְעַשֵּׂה וּמַיְיתֵי לְהוּ.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rabbi Yannai, who was a charity collector, borrowed money belonging to charity and repaid. The Gemara answers: The case of Rabbi Yannai is different; it is beneficial to the poor that he be allowed to borrow and repay, as the longer he leaves the charity fund empty, the more he impels people to give charity, and he thereby brings more money to the poor.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהִתְנַדֵּב מְנוֹרָה אוֹ נֵר לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת — אָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ. סָבַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא לְמֵימָר: לָא שְׁנָא לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת וְלָא שְׁנָא לִדְבַר מִצְוָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַמֵּי: הָכִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן — לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת, אֲבָל לִדְבַר מִצְוָה מוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ.

The Sages taught a baraita that deals with a similar matter: In the case of a Jew who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba thought to say that there is no difference whether he wishes to change for a voluntary matter or for a matter involving a mitzva, as in both cases it is prohibited. Rav Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When the Sages taught the baraita , they taught only that it is prohibited when he changes it for a voluntary matter, but it is permitted to change it for a matter involving a mitzva.

מִדְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גּוֹי שֶׁהִתְנַדֵּב מְנוֹרָה אוֹ נֵר לְבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁתַּקַּע שֵׁם בְּעָלֶיהָ — אָסוּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ, מִשֶּׁנִּשְׁתַּקַּע שֵׁם בְּעָלֶיהָ — מוּתָּר לְשַׁנּוֹתָהּ.

This halakha is derived from the fact that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a gentile who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, if it is before its owner’s name has been forgotten, i.e., people still remember that he donated the item, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Once its owner’s name has been forgotten, it is permitted to change it.

לְמַאי? אִילֵימָא לִדְבַר הָרְשׁוּת, מַאי אִירְיָא גּוֹי? אֲפִילּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נָמֵי!

The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what purpose is it stated that one may not change it before the owner’s name was forgotten? If we say that it is prohibited to change it for a voluntary matter, why does the baraita specifically mention a gentile? It is prohibited to change it in this manner even if it was donated by a Jew.

אֶלָּא לִדְבַר מִצְוָה, וְטַעְמָא דְּגוֹי הוּא דְּפָעֵי, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל דְּלָא פָּעֵי — שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.

Rather, the baraita must be dealing with a change for a matter involving a mitzva, and therefore it is prohibited only if the donor is a gentile and his name has not yet been forgotten. And the reason for this halakha is that it is specifically a gentile who would protest and scream: Where is the candelabrum that I donated? But in the case of a Jew, who would not protest and scream if they used his donation for a different mitzva, one may well change it.

שַׁעַזְרַק טַיָּיעָא אִינַּדַּב שְׁרָגָא לְבֵי כְנִישְׁתָּא דְּרַב יְהוּדָה, שַׁנְּיֵיהּ רַחֲבָא וְאִיקְּפֵד רָבָא. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: שַׁנְּיֵיהּ רָבָא וְאִיקְּפֵד רַחֲבָא, וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: שַׁנְּיֻיהּ חַזָּנֵי דְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא, וְאִיקְּפֵד רַחֲבָא וְאִיקְּפֵד רַבָּה.

The Gemara relates that Sha’azrak, an Arab [ tayya’a ] merchant, donated a candelabrum to Rav Yehuda’s synagogue. Raḥava changed its purpose before Sha’azrak’s name was forgotten as the donor, and Rava became angry at Raḥava for not waiting. Some say the opposite: Rava changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at Rava. And some say that the attendants of Pumbedita, the charity collectors, changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at them, and Rabba became angry at them as well.

מַאן דְּשַׁנְּיֵיהּ סָבַר דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ, וּמַאן דְּאִיקְּפֵד סָבַר זִמְנִין דְּמִקְּרֵי וְאָתֵי.

The Gemara explains: The one who changed its purpose holds that it was permitted to change it, as it was not common for Sha’azrak to be in the city and it was unlikely that he would protest the change. And the one who became angry holds that even so, they should not have changed it, as sometimes he happens to come there.

מַתְנִי׳ הַגּוֹסֵס וְהַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג — לֹא נִידָּר וְלֹא נֶעֱרָךְ. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא אוֹמֵר: נֶעֱרָךְ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּמָיו קְצוּבִין. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: נוֹדֵר וּמַעֲרִיךְ וּמַקְדִּישׁ, וְאִם הִזִּיק — חַיָּיב.

MISHNA: One who is moribund and one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court is neither the object of a vow nor valuated. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya says: He is not the object of a vow, because he has no market value; but he is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed by the Torah based on age and sex. Rabbi Yosei says: One with that status vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation.

גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא גּוֹסֵס לֹא נִידָּר — דְּלָאו בַּר דָּמִים הוּא, וְלֹא נֶעֱרָךְ — דְּלָאו בַּר הַעֲמָדָה וְהַעֲרָכָה הוּא, אֶלָּא יוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג, בִּשְׁלָמָא לֹא נִידָּר — דְּלָאו בַּר דָּמִים הוּא, אֶלָּא לֹא נֶעֱרָךְ אַמַּאי לָא?

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Granted, it makes sense that one who is moribund is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value. And it also stands to reason that he is not valuated, as he is not subject to setting, i.e., standing, and therefore is not subject to valuation. The verse states: “Then he shall be set before the priest, and the priest shall value him” (Leviticus 27:8). This teaches that anyone who cannot stand, such as one who is dying, is not included in the halakha of valuation. But with regard to one who is taken to be executed, granted, he is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value, since no one would purchase him. But with regard to the mishna’s statement that he is not valuated, why not?

דְּתַנְיָא: מִנַּיִן הַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג וְאָמַר ״עֶרְכִּי עָלַי״, שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר כְּלוּם? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל חֵרֶם לֹא יִפָּדֶה״. יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ קוֹדֶם שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִן הָאָדָם״, וְלֹא כׇּל הָאָדָם.

The Gemara answers that the reason is as it is taught in a baraita : From where is it derived that in the case of one who is being taken to be executed and who said: My valuation is upon me to donate to the Temple, that he did not say anything, and the valuation is not collected from his estate? The verse states: “Anything dedicated [ ḥerem ], that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29). This teaches that with regard to one who is worthy of excommunication [ ḥerem ], i.e., condemned to death, one cannot redeem him, i.e., pay his valuation. One might have thought that this applies even before his verdict is issued, i.e., that this halakha applies even if one issued this statement before being sentenced to death. Therefore, the verse states: “Of men,” and not all men, i.e., only some men destined to be executed have no valuation, and not all of them.

וּלְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן עֲקַבְיָא, דְּאָמַר נֶעֱרָךְ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּמָיו קְצוּבִין, הַאי ״כׇּל חֵרֶם״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya, who says in the mishna that even a person taken to be executed is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed, what does he do with the phrase “anything dedicated”?

לְכִדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: לְפִי שֶׁמָּצִינוּ לַמּוּמָתִים בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם שֶׁנּוֹתְנִין מָמוֹן וּמִתְכַּפֵּר לָהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״אִם כֹּפֶר יוּשַׁת עָלָיו״, יָכוֹל אַף בִּידֵי אָדָם כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כׇּל חֵרֶם לֹא יִפָּדֶה״.

The Gemara answers that he requires it for that which is taught in a baraita : Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: Since we found with regard to those executed at the hand of Heaven that they give money and their sins are atoned, as it is stated in the case of the owner of a forewarned ox that killed a person: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death. If there be laid upon him a ransom, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him” (Exodus 21:29–30), one might have thought that even with regard to those liable to receive the death penalty at the hands of man it is so, that one can pay in lieu of execution. Therefore, the verse states: “Anything dedicated that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29).

אֵין לִי אֶלָּא מִיתוֹת חֲמוּרוֹת, שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְּנָה שִׁגְגָתָן לְכַפָּרָה, מִיתוֹת קַלּוֹת, שֶׁנִּיתְּנָה שִׁגְגָתָן לְכַפָּרָה, מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇּל חֵרֶם״.

I have derived only that one cannot give payment in lieu of execution with regard to severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., blasphemy or cursing one’s father, for which no atonement is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation. From where is it derived that the same applies to less severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., violating Shabbat or killing, for which atonement of an offering or exile is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation? The verse states: “Anything dedicated,” to include all prohibitions punishable by court-administered execution.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: נוֹדֵר וּמַעֲרִיךְ כּוּ׳. וְתַנָּא קַמָּא מִי קָאָמַר דְּלָא?

§ The mishna teaches, with regard to one who is taken to be executed, that Rabbi Yosei says: Such a person vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation. The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna say that such a person does not vow to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury and take vows of valuation, such that Rabbi Yosei could be understood as disputing his opinion? The first tanna merely said that such an individual is not subject to vows and valuations. What is the difference between their opinions?

אֶלָּא, בְּנוֹדֵר וּמַעֲרִיךְ וּמִקַּדִּישׁ — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי, כִּי פְלִיגִי — בְּאִם הִזִּיק. תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִם הִזִּיק — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּתַשְׁלוּמִין, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: אִם הִזִּיק — חַיָּיב בְּתַשְׁלוּמִין.

Rather, with regard to whether or not one who is taken to be executed can vow to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and take vows of valuation, and consecrate his property, everyone, including the first tanna , agrees that he can. When they disagree, it is in a case where he causes damage. The first tanna holds that if he causes damage he is not liable for payment, and Rabbi Yosei holds that if he causes damage he is liable to pay compensation.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: בְּמִלְוָה עַל פֶּה גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין קָמִיפַּלְגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִלְוָה עַל פֶּה אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: מִלְוָה עַל פֶּה גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do these tanna’im disagree, as it is an accepted principle that one who causes damage must pay? Rav Yosef said: They disagree as to whether the payment can be collected from his estate. This depends on the question of whether or not one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement, i.e., a loan given without a document that places a lien on the land, can collect from the heirs. The first tanna holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs, and Rabbi Yosei holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs.

רָבָא אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מִלְוָה עַל פֶּה אֵינוֹ גּוֹבֶה מִן הַיּוֹרְשִׁין, וְהָכָא בְּמִלְוָה כְּתוּבָה בַּתּוֹרָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִלְוָה כְּתוּבָה בַּתּוֹרָה לָאו כִּכְתוּבָה בִּשְׁטָר דָּמְיָא, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: כִּכְתוּבָה בִּשְׁטָר דָּמְיָא.

Rava says: In fact, everyone agrees that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs; and here the tanna’im disagree with regard to the status of a loan that is written in the Torah, i.e., a financial obligation decreed by Torah law, such as paying damages. The first tanna holds that a loan that is written in the Torah is not considered as though it is written in a document, and may not be collected from the heirs. Rabbi Yosei holds that such a loan is considered as though it is written in a document, and therefore it may be collected from the heirs.

וְאִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ אַהָא: הַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג, הוּא שֶׁחָבַל בַּאֲחֵרִים — חַיָּיב, אֲחֵרִים שֶׁחָבְלוּ בּוֹ — פְּטוּרִין. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אַף הוּא אִם חָבַל בַּאֲחֵרִים — פָּטוּר, שֶׁלֹּא נִיתַּן לַחֲזָרַת עֲמִידַת בֵּית דִּין.

And there are those who teach the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef with regard to this baraita : In the case of one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court, if he injured another he is liable for payment. But if others injured him they are exempt, as they would be if they injured a dead person. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Even if it was he who injured others, he is exempt, as he cannot be brought back to stand before the court for judgment, since he must be executed without delay.