Daf 19b: Returning Gift Deeds and a Ketubah Receipt: Revocation, Priority, and Collusion
On Bava Metzia י״ט ע״ב (19b), we examine when the parties’ acknowledgment permits returning a document and when it could harm a third party. We will build the sugya’s blueprint around three axes: the power to revoke, the identity of the acknowledging party, and the order of rights.
- 01Distinguish the explanation separating a healthy donor from a deathly ill donor from Rav Zevid’s explanation separating the father from his son.
- 02Reconstruct who wrote, who received, and who could lose through returning the document in each suspected scheme.
- 03Explain why a new document limits the concern and how a similar concern arises with a ketubah receipt.
The full Gemara text - 19b, divided by Shakla v'Tarya
Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.
- 01·TerutzBava Metzia 19b
הָא בְּבָרִיא, וְהָא בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע. מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי: הָא אָמַר תְּנוּ נוֹתְנִין – בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע, דְּבַר מִהְדַּר הוּא. דְּאָמְרִינַן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: דִּלְמָא כַּתְבַהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא לְהַאי וְאִמְּלִיךְ וְלָא יַהֲבַהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וַהֲדַר כַּתְבַהּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא וְיַהֲבַיהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ – הַשְׁתָּא קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ מֵהָהוּא דְּיַהֲבַהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ.
The page opens with an answer to a contradiction discussed earlier: one source concerns a healthy donor, and the other a deathly ill donor. The Mishnah, from which we infer that the document is returned if the donor says “Give it,” concerns a deathly ill donor who can revoke. The concern is that the deed was written for the first recipient but never delivered, and the gift was subsequently given to someone else. Here, however, the instruction to give it to the first recipient can express revocation of the gift to the other person. The possible existence of another recipient therefore does not itself require withholding the document: that recipient’s deathbed gift remains subject to revocation. This is the foundation of the answer: rather than denying the suspected scenario, we ask whether it infringes a protected right.
- 02·TerutzBava Metzia 19b
אִי בְּמַתְּנַת בָּרִיא יַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ – לֵית לֵיהּ פְּסֵידָא, דְּכִי נָפְקָא תַּרְתֵּי, בָּתְרָיְיתָא זָכֵי, דְּהָא הֲדַר בֵּיהּ מִקַּמָּיְיתָא. אִי בְּמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע נָמֵי יַהֲבַהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, לֵית בַּהּ פְּסֵידָא – דְּבָתְרָיְיתָא זָכֵי, דְּקָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ מִקַּמָּיְיתָא.
The Gemara completes its examination of the other recipient by considering two possible kinds of gift. If the later gift was an ordinary, irrevocable gift, the later deed protects that recipient when both deeds are produced. The first deed records a deathbed gift, and the later gift shows its revocation; the old deed does not prevail merely because it bears an earlier date. If the later gift was also a deathbed gift, the sequence of documents likewise indicates that the later gift displaced the earlier one. We must distinguish evidence supplied by the old deed from an actual revocation made now: a valid present revocation of a deathbed gift exercises the donor’s power rather than improperly defeating an irrevocable right. The structure is thus tested from both sides: what the documents prove and what the donor may change.
- 03·TerutzBava Metzia 19b
כִּי קָתָנֵי בְּבָרַיְיתָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים לֹא יַחְזִיר לֹא לָזֶה וְלֹא לָזֶה – בְּבָרִיא, דְּלָאו בַּר מִהְדַּר הוּא, דְּאָמְרִינַן: דִּלְמָא כַּתְבַהּ לְהַאי מֵעִיקָּרָא וְאִמְּלִיךְ וְלָא יַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ, וַהֲדַר כַּתְבַהּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא וְיַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ – הַשְׁתָּא קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ מֵהָהוּא דְּיַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ וְסָבַר: מִהְדָּר לָא מָצֵינָא הָדַרְנָא בִּי, אֵימַר לְהוּ דַּאֲנָא לְהַאי יַהֲבִתַהּ, וְנַיהְדְּרוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ כְּתָבָא, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּכִי מַפֵּיק הַאי כְּתָבָא, דְּקָדֵים זָכֵה בֵּיהּ הוּא.
Under the first answer, the baraita prohibiting return even when both parties acknowledge the deed concerns an ordinary gift. Here, the donor cannot revoke a completed gift. He may initially have written a deed for one person without delivering it, and then validly given the property to someone else. He now seeks to make the first deed appear to record a gift completed at its earlier date. If returned, that deed could allow its named recipient to defeat the actual recipient through apparent priority. The two parties’ acknowledgment is insufficient because it may serve their interests at a third party’s expense, a recurring concern in Bava Metzia’s discussions of returning documents.
- 04·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 19b
אֶלָּא אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ אֲנַן: הַאי כְּתָבָא לָא יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ לְהַאי. דִּלְמָא מִכְתָּב כְּתַבְתְּ, מֵיהָב לָא יְהַבְתְּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וִיהַבְתַּהּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא וְקָא הָדְרַתְּ בֵּיהּ. אִי לָא יְהַבְתַּהּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא וְקָא בָּעֵית דְּתִתְּבַהּ לְהַאי, כְּתֹב לֵיהּ הַשְׁתָּא כְּתָבָא אַחֲרִינָא וְיַהֲבֵיהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, דְּאִי יָהֲבַתְּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא לֵית בַּהּ פְּסֵידָא, דְּקָדֵים זָכֵי.
The Gemara gives the practical response within the first explanation: the old deed is not returned to its named recipient. This does not establish that the donor is lying; it addresses the possibility that writing was not followed by delivery and that the property was already transferred to someone else. If the donor wishes to give now and still owns the property, he can write and deliver a new deed. The new deed gives its recipient no artificial priority based on the old date. If someone else already acquired the property through an ordinary gift, that earlier right prevails against the new deed. The distinction is not between complete trust and complete suspicion, but between a document that could distort the order of rights and one recording a present transaction.
- 05·TerutzBava Metzia 19b
מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב זְבִיד: וְהָא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דְּיָיתֵקָאוֹת קָא תָנֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב זְבִיד: הָא וְהָא בִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בֵּיהּ, וְהָא בִּבְרֵיהּ! דְּקָא אָמַר ״תְּנוּ״ נוֹתְנִין, בְּדִידֵיהּ דְּבַר מִהְדָּר הוּא, דְּאָמְרִינַן: אִי נָמֵי יַהֲבַהּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא לֵית בַּהּ פְּסֵידָא, דְּקַמָּא וּבָתְרָא – בָּתְרָא זָכֵי, דְּהָא הֲדַר בֵּיהּ מִקַּמָּא.
Rav Zevid begins by objecting to the first explanation: both sources mention testamentary documents, meaning documents of a deathly ill person. The contradiction therefore cannot be resolved by assigning one source to a healthy donor. He proposes a different distinction: both sources concern a deathly ill donor, but in one the donor himself acknowledges the gift, while in the other his son does so. When the donor himself says “Give it,” the document is returned because he holds the power to revoke. Even if he previously gave the property to another person as a deathbed gift, his later intention can displace that earlier gift. Rav Zevid thus preserves the earlier reasoning while shifting the dividing line from the donor’s condition to the identity of the person acknowledging.
- 06·TerutzBava Metzia 19b
כִּי קָא תָנֵי בְּבָרַיְיתָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים, לֹא יַחְזִיר לֹא לָזֶה וְלֹא לָזֶה, בִּבְרֵיהּ. דְּאָמְרִינַן: דִּלְמָא כְּתַב אֲבוּהּ לְהַאי, וְאִמְּלִיךְ וְלָא יַהֲבַיהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וּבָתַר אֲבוּהּ כְּתַב אִיהוּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא וְיַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ, וְהַשְׁתָּא קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ מֵהָהוּא. סָבַר: מִהְדָּר לָא מָצֵינָא הָדַרְנָא בִּי. אֵימַר לְהוּ דְּאַבָּא יַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ לְהַאי, וְנִתְּבוּ לֵיהּ כְּתָבֵיהּ, וְנֵיזִיל וְנַפֵּיק מִינֵּיהּ דְּהוּא זָכֵי וְנִפְלוֹג בַּהֲדֵיהּ.
According to Rav Zevid, the baraita prohibiting return concerns a son acknowledging his father’s gift after the father’s death. The father may merely have written the deed without delivering it, leaving the property to pass to the son by inheritance. The son then gave the property to someone else through a gift he cannot revoke. He may now claim that his father had already given the property to the recipient named in the old deed. Returning that deed would allow its recipient to argue that the property never belonged to the son and to recover it from the recipient of the son’s gift. The Gemara even describes a motive for collusion: the son and the named recipient could divide the proceeds, so their agreement does not protect the third party.
- 07·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 19b
הִלְכָּךְ אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ אֲנַן: הַאי כְּתָבָא לָא יָהֲבִינַן לֵיהּ לְהַאי, דְּדִלְמָא מִכְתָּב כַּתְבֵיהּ אֲבוּהּ מֵיהָב לָא יַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ, וִיהַבְתֵּיהּ אַתְּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא וְקָא הָדְרַתְּ בֵּיהּ. אֶלָּא אִי קוּשְׁטָא קָא אָמְרַתְּ, דִּיהַב לֵיהּ אֲבוּךְ – זִיל אַתְּ הַשְׁתָּא כְּתֹב לֵיהּ שְׁטָרָא אַחֲרִינָא, דְּאִי נָמֵי לָא יַהֲבַהּ לֵיהּ אֲבוּהּ וּכְתַבְתֵּיהּ אַתְּ לְאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא – לֵית בַּהּ פְּסֵידָא, דְּקַמָּא וּבָתְרָא – קַמָּא זָכֵי.
The conclusion under Rav Zevid’s explanation is that the father’s deed is not handed over based on the son’s acknowledgment. The precise concern is a gap between the father’s writing and delivery, combined with a gift subsequently made by the son to someone else. If the son wishes to act on his claim for the named recipient’s benefit, the Gemara directs him to write a new deed now. He thereby avoids equipping that recipient with old evidence suggesting a right predating both the inheritance and the son’s gift. If the son already gave the property to someone else, his earlier gift prevails against the new one, since the first recipient prevails in these gifts. The solution parallels the first explanation: it blocks artificial priority without blocking a new gift where one is possible.
- 08·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 19b
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מָצָא שׁוֹבָר, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה מוֹדֶה – יַחְזִיר לַבַּעַל. אֵין הָאִשָּׁה מוֹדֶה – לֹא יַחְזִיר לֹא לָזֶה וְלֹא לָזֶה.
A new baraita discusses someone who finds a receipt concerning a ketubah. If the woman acknowledges the receipt, it is returned to the husband, who needs it as evidence that the ketubah obligation was discharged. If she does not acknowledge it, it is returned to neither party. The initial reading is that her acknowledgment removes the concern that the receipt was written without reflecting an actual discharge of the obligation. The source does not yet explain, however, how other people’s rights are protected. This leads into the next question: is the creditor’s agreement sufficient when she may have sold her right?
- 09·KushyaBava Metzia 19b
בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָאִשָּׁה מוֹדֶה מִיהַת יַחְזִיר לַבַּעַל, וְלֵיחוּשׁ דִּלְמָא כָּתְבָה לִיתֵּן בְּנִיסָן, וְלֹא נָתְנָה עַד תִּשְׁרֵי, וַאֲזַלָה זְבֵנְתַּהּ לִכְתוּבְּ[תַ]הּ בְּטוֹבַת הֲנָאָה מִנִּיסָן עַד תִּשְׁרֵי. וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְשׁוֹבָר דִּכְתִיב בְּנִיסָן, וְאָתֵא לְמִטְרַף לָקוֹחוֹת שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין!
The Gemara challenges precisely the permission to return the receipt when the woman acknowledges it. She may have written it in Nisan intending to deliver it, but actually delivered it only in Tishrei. Meanwhile, she sold her contingent right to collect the ketubah for a price reflecting the likelihood that it would become collectible. The husband could present the receipt dated Nisan as though the debt had already been discharged then. This could improperly defeat the purchasers’ right, acquired before the receipt’s delivery but after its written date. The objection returns to the sugya’s foundation: a writing date does not by itself establish when the transaction was completed, and the parties’ acknowledgment may harm a third party.
- 10·TerutzBava Metzia 19b
אָמַר רָבָא:
The words “Rava said” introduce Rava’s response to the objection concerning the receipt. They mark the beginning of an answer, but its content does not appear in the supplied passage. We therefore cannot infer here how Rava protects the purchasers or explains the permission to return the receipt. At this stopping point, keep the three facts that the answer must address in view: an early date, later delivery, and a sale of ketubah rights between them. We finish the page with a precisely defined question, without supplying the next move ourselves.
Open-ended sugya practice
- 1What underlies permission to return the deed when the Mishnah concerns the deathly ill donor himself? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
- 2Why does Rav Zevid reject the distinction between a healthy donor and a deathly ill donor? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
- 3Who could be harmed by the collusion described in the son’s acknowledgment? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
- 4How does writing a new deed limit the concern in an ordinary gift? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
- 5What is the concern with a receipt written in Nisan and delivered in Tishrei? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
Draw three timelines: a healthy donor’s gift, a son’s acknowledgment of his father’s deed, and a ketubah receipt dated Nisan. Mark writing, delivery, and a third party’s right on each timeline; then explain how returning the old document could alter the apparent evidence and whether the sugya proposes a new document in that case.
The sugya does not stop at the agreement of those present: it also examines the rights of someone absent. Rav Zevid locates the contradiction in the difference between the deathly ill donor himself and his son, and the receipt discussion applies the same test to purchasers of ketubah rights. The page ends by introducing Rava, before presenting his answer.
Test yourself before marking the lesson complete.
What underlies permission to return the deed when the Mishnah concerns the deathly ill donor himself?
Original explanations and translations: Bonei Atalmud. Excerpts were checked against the site’s Gemara text. Explanations and exercises have not undergone rabbinic review and are not halakhic rulings.