Daf 19a: Returning Documents, Delivery Dates, and Purchasers’ Rights

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 19a

   אִירְכַס לֵיהּ גִּיטָּא בֵּי מִדְרְשָׁא. אֲמַר: אִי סִימָנָא – אִית לִי בְּגַוֵּיהּ, אִי טְבִיעוּת עֵינָא – אִית לִי בְּגַוֵּיהּ. אַהְדְּרוּהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ. אֲמַר: לָא יָדַעְנָא אִי מִשּׁוּם סִימָנָא אַהְדְּרוּהּ נִיהֲלִי, וְקָא סָבְרִי סִימָנִין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. אִי מִשּׁוּם טְבִיעוּת עֵינָא אַהְדְּרוּהּ נִיהֲלִי, וְדַוְקָא צוּרְבָּא מִדְּרַבָּנַן. אֲבָל אִינִישׁ דְּעָלְמָא – לָא.

   The narrative continues from the preceding page: a scholar lost a get in the study hall and offered to identify it by a mark or by visual recognition. They returned it, but he did not know which basis of identification they accepted. If they relied on the mark, he understood them to hold that identifying marks are effective by Torah law, as required here to establish the get’s identity. If they relied on visual recognition, the return rested on the credibility of a Torah scholar, not on accepting such a claim from everyone. The story connects to Bava Metzia’s investigation of identifying marks in returning lost property, but it does not establish which basis produced this return.

2. 02·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 19a

   גּוּפָא: מָצָא גֵּט אִשָּׁה בַּשּׁוּק, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַבַּעַל מוֹדֶה – יַחְזִיר לְאִשָּׁה. אֵין הַבַּעַל מוֹדֶה – לֹא יַחְזִיר לֹא לָזֶה וְלֹא לָזֶה.

   The word “gufa” returns to a previously cited baraita so that it can be examined directly. The baraita says that a get found in the marketplace is returned to the woman when the husband acknowledges having given it to her. If he does not acknowledge this, it is returned to neither party. His acknowledgment removes the concern that the get was written but never delivered, yet we must still ask whether returning it could harm a third party. This is the foundation of the next objection.

3. 03·KushyaBava Metzia 19a

   בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַבַּעַל מוֹדֶה מִיהָא יַחְזִיר לָאִשָּׁה. וְלֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא כָּתַב לִיתֵּן בְּנִיסָן וְלֹא נָתַן לָהּ עַד תִּשְׁרֵי, וַאֲזַל בַּעַל זַבֵּין פֵּירֵי מִנִּיסָן וְעַד תִּשְׁרֵי, וּמַפְּקָא לְגִיטָּא דִּכְתִיב בְּנִיסָן, וְאָתְיָא לְמִטְרַף לָקוֹחוֹת שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר כֵּיוָן שֶׁנָּתַן עֵינָיו לְגָרְשָׁהּ שׁוּב אֵין לַבַּעַל פֵּירוֹת – שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר יֵשׁ לַבַּעַל פֵּירוֹת עַד שְׁעַת נְתִינָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

   The Gemara objects: the get may have been written in Nisan but delivered only in Tishrei, while the husband sold produce from his wife’s property in between. She could use the Nisan date to recover from purchasers produce sold before the actual divorce. The concern depends on when the husband’s right to the produce ends. According to the view that his right ends once he resolves to divorce her, this scenario does not demonstrate wrongful recovery, since he already lacked that right during the period described. According to the view that his right continues until delivery, his sales during that period were valid, so his acknowledgment of the divorce does not adequately protect the purchasers.

4. 04·TerutzBava Metzia 19a

   כִּי אָתְיָא לְמִטְרַף אָמְרִינַן לַהּ: אַיְיתַי רְאָיָה אֵימַת מְטָא גִּיטָּא לְיָדְךָ.

   The answer separates returning the get from recovering property from purchasers. When the woman seeks recovery, she will be required to prove when the get reached her possession. Its written date establishes the time of writing, but does not by itself establish delivery. The get can therefore be returned without automatically granting her financial rights from Nisan. Protection for purchasers is located here in the later examination of her claim, rather than in withholding the document.

5. 05·KushyaBava Metzia 19a

   וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִשְּׁטָרֵי חוֹב? דִּתְנַן: מָצָא שְׁטָרֵי חוֹב, אִם יֵשׁ בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים – לֹא יַחְזִיר. וְאוֹקֵימְנָא כְּשֶׁחַיָּיב מוֹדֶה, וּמִשּׁוּם שֶׁמָּא כָּתַב לִלְווֹת בְּנִיסָן וְלֹא לָוָה עַד תִּשְׁרֵי וְקָא טָרֵיף לָקוֹחוֹת שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין. הָתָם נָמֵי לִיהְדַּר, וְכִי אָתֵי לְמִטְרַף נֵימָא לֵיהּ: אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה אֵימַת מְטָא שְׁטַר חוֹב לְיָדָךְ!

   The Gemara compares this answer with the Mishnah concerning debt documents that provide recourse against property. Under the interpretation cited here, they are not returned even when the borrower acknowledges the debt, because they may have been written in Nisan while the loan was made only in Tishrei. The lender could use the earlier date to recover property from purchasers who bought before the lien arose. If requiring proof of delivery protects purchasers in the case of a get, why not return the debt document and require the same proof at collection? This challenges the consistency of the safeguard and reconnects us to Bava Metzia’s earlier discussions of documents.

6. 06·TerutzBava Metzia 19a

   אָמְרִי, הָכָא גַּבֵּי גֵּט אִשָּׁה אָתֵי לוֹקֵחַ וְתָבַעה, אָמַר: הַאי דְּ[אַ]הְדְּרוּהּ נִיהֲלַהּ רַבָּנַן לְגִיטָּא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא תִּעֲגִין וְתֵיתִיב. הַשְׁתָּא דְּקָא אָתְיָא לְמִטְרַף – תֵּיזִל וְתַיְתֵי רְאָיָה אֵימַת מְטָא גִּיטָּא לִידַהּ. הָכָא גַּבֵּי שְׁטַר חוֹב לָא אָתֵי לוֹקֵחַ וְתָבַע, [אָמַר] מִדְּאַהְדְּרוּהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לִשְׁטַר חוֹב, פְּשִׁיטָא לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אַהְדְּרוּהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ – לְמִטְרַף הוּא, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ קָמוּ רַבָּנַן בְּמִילְּתָא, וּמִקַּמֵּי דִּידִי מְטָא שְׁטָרָא לִידֵיהּ.

   The answer examines not only what the court can require, but also how the purchaser will interpret the act of return. With a get, the purchaser knows that there is an independent reason for returning it: preventing the woman from remaining unable to remarry because she lacks the document. He therefore does not treat its return as confirmation of her rights to the produce and will insist on establishing the delivery date. With a debt document, however, the purchaser will assume that it was returned to enable collection and that the court already established that it reached the lender before his purchase. He may not contest the claim at all, so a later inquiry cannot provide an equally reliable safeguard. This distinction explains why the evidentiary barrier works for a get but does not justify returning a debt document.

7. 07·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 19a

   שִׁחְרוּרֵי עֲבָדִים וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מָצָא שְׁטַר שִׁחְרוּר בְּשׁוּק, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָרַב מוֹדֶה – יַחְזִיר לָעֶבֶד, אֵין הָרַב מוֹדֶה – לֹא יַחְזִיר לֹא לָזֶה וְלֹא לָזֶה.

   The Gemara turns to emancipation documents and cites a baraita parallel to the rule for a get. If the master acknowledges having delivered the emancipation document, it is returned to the slave. If he does not acknowledge this, it is returned to neither party. Here too, acknowledgment establishes that delivery occurred, but does not by itself establish when. The parallel structure invites us to test whether purchasers could also be harmed in this case.

8. 08·KushyaBava Metzia 19a

   בִּזְמַן שֶׁהָרַב מוֹדֶה מִיהָא יַחְזִיר לָעֶבֶד, וְאַמַּאי? נֵיחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא כָּתַב לִיתֵּן לוֹ בְּנִיסָן וְלֹא נָתַן לוֹ עַד תִּשְׁרֵי, וַאֲזַל עַבְדָּא וּקְנָה נִכְסִין מִנִּיסָן וְעַד תִּשְׁרֵי, וַאֲזַיל הָרַב וְזַבְּנִינְהוּ וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְשִׁחְרוּר דִּכְתִב בְּנִיסָן, וְקָא טָרֵיף לָקוֹחוֹת שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין. הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר זְכוּת הוּא לָעֶבֶד שֶׁיּוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת רַבּוֹ לְחֵירוּת, וּכְאַבָּיֵי דְּאָמַר: עֵדָיו בַּחֲתוּמָיו זָכִין לֵיהּ, שַׁפִּיר. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חוֹב הוּא לָעֶבֶד שֶׁיּוֹצֵא מִתַּחַת רַבּוֹ לְחֵירוּת, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

   The concern is that the emancipation document was written in Nisan and delivered in Tishrei, while the slave acquired property in between that the master sold. If he was still enslaved when he acquired it, the property belonged to the master, and presenting emancipation dated Nisan could wrongfully remove it from the purchasers. The Gemara identifies one route that resolves the concern: emancipation is considered a benefit to the slave, together with Abaye’s principle that “the witnesses secure his right through their signatures.” Under this combination, subject to the principle’s conditions, the signatures can secure his right retroactively from signing when the document reaches him, so the master’s sale does not override that right. But if emancipation is considered a disadvantage to the slave, that mechanism cannot establish acquisition for him without his consent. The permission to return the document therefore still requires an explanation according to this view.

9. 09·TerutzBava Metzia 19a

   דְּכִי אָתֵי לְמִטְרַף אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה אֵימַת מְטָא שִׁחְרוּר לְיָדָךְ.

   The answer returns to the evidentiary barrier developed for a get. When the freed person seeks to recover property from purchasers, he must prove when the emancipation document reached him. Returning it does not establish that he was already free on its written date. This preserves the distinction between a document establishing personal status and evidence of property rights during an earlier period. The answer need not decide whether emancipation is a benefit or a disadvantage, because it also addresses the view that cannot rely on acquisition at signing.

10. 10·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 19a

    דְּיָיתֵיקֵי מַתָּנָה וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵיזוֹ הִיא דְּיָיתֵיקֵי – דָּא תְּהֵא לְמֵיקַם וְלִהְיוֹת שֶׁאִם מֵת נְכָסָיו לִפְלוֹנִי. מַתָּנָה – כֹּל שֶׁכָּתוּב בּוֹ ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״.

    The Gemara now turns to the testamentary and gift documents mentioned in the Mishnah and cites a baraita defining them. A deyatiki is a deathbed instruction that the property should belong to a specified person if its owner dies. The phrase “this shall stand and endure” explains the name as an instruction intended to remain effective. The baraita describes a gift through the wording “from today and after death,” combining a present beginning with a future outcome. This definition requires examination, because at first it sounds like a definition of every gift.

11. 11·KushyaBava Metzia 19a

    אַלְמָא אִי כְּתִיבָא ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ הוּא דְּקָנֵי, וְאִי לָא – לָא קָנֵי?!

    The Gemara challenges the implication of the definition: does a gift transfer ownership only if it says “from today and after death”? If so, an ordinary gift lacking that wording would not transfer ownership, an unacceptable conclusion. The objection assumes that a healthy person’s gift can transfer ownership in the present without any reference to death. The problem is therefore not the validity of the special wording, but its apparent presentation as a condition for every gift. The scope of the definition must be refined, rather than ordinary gift law displaced.

12. 12·TerutzBava Metzia 19a

    אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵיזוֹ הִיא מַתְּנַת בָּרִיא שֶׁהִיא כְּמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע, דְּלָא קָנֵי אֶלָּא לְאַחַר מִיתָה, כֹּל שֶׁכָּתוּב בָּהּ ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״.

    Abaye explains that the baraita is not defining every gift made by a healthy person, but one that resembles a deathbed gift. The resemblance is that the recipient’s full enjoyment becomes effective only after the giver’s death. With “from today and after death,” title to the underlying property transfers today, while the giver retains its produce during life and the recipient receives it after the giver’s death. Thus, “he acquires only after death” must not be read as denying every present acquisition. The answer narrows the baraita’s subject and distinguishes title from actual enjoyment, removing the objection from ordinary gifts.

13. 13·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 19a

    טַעְמָא דְּלָא אָמַר ״תְּנוּ״. הָא אָמַר ״תְּנוּ״ – נוֹתְנִין.

    The Gemara returns to the Mishnah’s rule and draws an inference from its concern that the writer reconsidered and never delivered the document. The reason not to return it is that he has not now said, “Give it.” This implies that if he instructs them to give it, they give the document to its intended recipient. The reasoning is that an explicit instruction removes uncertainty about the giver’s present wishes. This is an intermediate inference, not a conclusion already tested against all the sources.

14. 14·KushyaBava Metzia 19a

    וּרְמִינְהוּ: מָצָא דְּיָיתֵקָאוֹת, אַפּוֹתֵיקָאוֹת וּמַתָּנוֹת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִין – לֹא יַחְזִיר לֹא לָזֶה וְלֹא לָזֶה!

    Against this inference, a baraita is cited that forbids returning testamentary documents, designated-security documents, and gift documents even when both parties acknowledge them. Designated-security documents assign a particular property for repayment of a debt. Apparently, the parties’ acknowledgment should remove uncertainty about non-delivery, just as the instruction “Give it” removes it in the preceding discussion. Nevertheless, the baraita forbids returning the document to either party. The contradiction shows that we cannot assume every agreement between the parties suffices for return, but the decisive distinction between the sources has not yet been stated.

15. 15·TerutzBava Metzia 19a

    אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא בַּר מֶמֶל: לָא קַשְׁיָא,

    Rabbi Abba bar Memel begins an answer: “There is no difficulty.” He indicates that the sources can be reconciled and need not be treated as disagreeing. However, the page ends before the distinction underlying his answer is stated. Our precise stopping point is therefore the opening of a resolution, not a completed resolution. To continue building on the next page, we retain both elements: the permission inferred from “Give it” and the baraita’s prohibition even when both parties acknowledge the document.

1. 1What remained uncertain after the scholar’s lost get was returned? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2According to the view that the husband retains produce rights until delivery, what protects purchasers after the get is returned? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3Why can the same later inquiry used for a get not be relied upon for a debt document? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4Which combination does the Gemara offer to address the purchaser concern for an emancipation document before giving its general answer? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5How does Abaye refine the baraita’s definition of a gift? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.