Daf 10b: Four Cubits, a Minor’s Courtyard, and Agency for Transgression

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

   רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: כִּי תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת – בְּעָלְמָא, בְּשָׂדֶה דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת לָא תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן. וְאַף עַל גַּב דִּזְכָה לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בְּגַוַּהּ, כִּי זְכָה לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא – לְהַלּוֹכֵי בַּהּ וּלְנַקּוֹטֵי פֵּיאָה, לְמִיהְוֵי חֲצֵירוֹ לָא זְכָה לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.

   Rav Pappa continues the preceding page’s discussion and explains why four cubits do not acquire for a poor person in the landowner’s field. The rabbinic enactment was not made for a field belonging to someone else. The Torah permits the poor person to enter and gather pe’ah, but this specific right of use does not turn the place into his courtyard. His right to collect pe’ah therefore does not conflict with the absence of acquisition through four cubits there. This establishes an important foundation: permission to act in a place does not necessarily confer acquisition through that place.

2. 02·KushyaBava Metzia 10b

   אָמַר רָבָא, מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי נְזִיקִין: רָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה וְנָפַל לוֹ עָלֶיהָ וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ, זֶה שֶׁהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בַּהּ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם – נִקְנוֹ לֵיהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דִּידֵיהּ!

   Rava reports Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi’s objection from the Mishnah about found property. Someone sees an item and falls upon it, but another person takes possession and acquires it. If four cubits acquire everywhere, the first person should have acquired before the second took possession. The objection does not assume that falling is a valid act of acquisition. It assumes that four cubits should operate even when the person performs an action that does not itself acquire.

3. 03·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

   הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּלָא אֲמַר ״אֶקְנֵי״. וְאִי תַּקּוּן רַבָּנַן, כִּי לָא אֲמַר מַאי הָוֵי! כֵּיוָן דְּנָפַל עָלֶיהָ, גַּלִּי דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּבִנְפִילָה נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי, בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי.

   The initial proposal is that the first person did not say that he wished to acquire through his four cubits. The Gemara immediately challenges this: if the Sages instituted acquisition, why should silence alone prevent it? The answer is refined: falling is not mere silence, but an indication that he wants acquisition through falling rather than through four cubits. On this answer, his implied preference explains why the enactment does not acquire for him. Falling is not thereby validated; precisely because it does not acquire, the second person can gain ownership.

4. 04·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

   רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: כִּי תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן, בְּסִמְטָא דְּלָא דָּחֲקִי רַבִּים. בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים דְּקָא דָחֲקִי רַבִּים, לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן.

   Rav Sheshet offers an answer based on location rather than the finder’s intention. The Sages instituted four cubits in a side lane without crowded public traffic, not in a crowded public domain. The enactment assigns a person an acquisition area where space can be allocated without constant pressure from passersby. The Mishnah’s case can therefore be understood as occurring in a public domain where the enactment does not apply. This is a different line of explanation from expressed preference, and the two need not be combined into one answer.

5. 05·KushyaBava Metzia 10b

   וְהָא בְּכׇל מָקוֹם קָאָמַר!

   The Gemara challenges Rav Sheshet’s restriction from the wording of the rule itself: four cubits acquire everywhere. At first reading, this includes the public domain as well. Explaining why crowding warrants a restriction is therefore insufficient; the wording of the teaching must also be reconciled. The objection tests whether the enactment’s proposed limits fit its stated formulation.

6. 06·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

   כׇּל מָקוֹם – לְאֵתוֹיֵי צִידֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

   The Gemara explains that “everywhere” includes the sides of the public domain. It does not mean every location without distinction, but an extension beyond a side lane. The roadside belongs to public space, yet it is not the center of crowded traffic. This preserves the broader wording’s contribution without removing Rav Sheshet’s boundary.

7. 07·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 10b

   וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם אַבָּא כֹּהֵן בַּרְדְּלָא: קְטַנָּה אֵין לָהּ חָצֵר, וְאֵין לָהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יַנַּאי אָמַר: יֵשׁ לָהּ חָצֵר, וְיֵשׁ לָהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת.

   A dispute between Amoraim is presented in the names of earlier teachers; this is not a new Mishnah. Reish Lakish, citing Abba Kohen Bardela, says that a minor girl has neither courtyard acquisition nor four cubits. Rabbi Yoḥanan, citing Rabbi Yannai, says that she has both. The issue is whether these mechanisms acquire for her, not whether she can own land. Pairing four cubits with a courtyard moves the discussion from spatial limits to the legal foundation of acquisition.

8. 08·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 10b

   בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם יָדָהּ אִיתְרַבַּאי, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּאִית לַהּ יָד – חָצֵר נָמֵי אִית לַהּ. וּמָר סָבַר חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁלִיחוּת אִיתְרַבַּאי, וְכִי הֵיכִי דִּשְׁלִיחוּת לֵית לַהּ – חָצֵר נָמֵי לֵית לַהּ.

   The Gemara asks what underlies the dispute and proposes two models of a courtyard. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a courtyard is included as a hand: just as a minor girl has a hand, she has courtyard acquisition. According to Reish Lakish, it is included through agency, and a minor girl cannot appoint an agent. In the hand model, the courtyard extends a person’s means of receipt; in the agency model, it acts for the person as a separate instrument. This is a proposed explanation, which the following discussion tests against the sources.

9. 09·KushyaBava Metzia 10b

   מִי אִיכָּא מַאן דְּאָמַר חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁלִיחוּת אִיתְרַבַּאי? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״בְּיָדוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא יָדוֹ. גַּגּוֹ, חֲצֵירוֹ וְקַרְפֵּיפוֹ מִנַּיִן – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״הִמָּצֵא תִמָּצֵא״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁלִיחוּת אִיתְרַבַּאי, אִם כֵּן מָצִינוּ שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה, וְקַיְימָא לַן אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה!

   The Gemara challenges the agency model through a baraita concerning theft. The phrase “himmatze timmatze” includes a thief’s roof, courtyard, and enclosure, not only his actual hand. The source teaches that a courtyard can provide a basis for attributing theft to its owner. If it is an agent, this appears to establish agency for a transgression. That conflicts with the rule that there is no agency for transgression, seemingly favoring the hand model instead.

10. 10·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

    אָמַר רָבִינָא: הֵיכָא אָמְרִינַן דְּאֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה – הֵיכָא דְּשָׁלִיחַ בַּר חִיּוּבָא הוּא, אֲבָל בְּחָצֵר דְּלָאו בַּר חִיּוּבָא הוּא – מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ.

    Ravina limits the scope of the rule against agency for transgression. The rule applies when the agent is personally subject to liability for the relevant offense. A courtyard bears no personal liability, so this rule does not block liability for its owner through its operation. The theft baraita therefore does not force rejection of the agency model. The test concerns the agent’s status in relation to liability, not merely whether the outcome is prohibited.

11. 11·KushyaBava Metzia 10b

    אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה וְעֶבֶד: ״צְאוּ גִּנְבוּ לִי״ – דְּלָאו בְּנֵי חִיּוּבָא נִינְהוּ, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחָן?!

    The Gemara tests Ravina’s criterion with a woman and a slave sent to steal. Here the case concerns a married woman and a slave who currently lack independent resources for payment. The questioner treats them as not subject to liability and asks whether Ravina would therefore make their sender liable. The objection equates inability to pay with absence of liability. If that equation holds, the attribution allowed for a courtyard would extend to these human agents.

12. 12·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

    אָמְרַתְּ אִשָּׁה וְעֶבֶד – בְּנֵי חִיּוּבָא נִינְהוּ, וְהַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לֵית לְהוּ לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי. דִּתְנַן: נִתְגָּרְשָׁה הָאִשָּׁה, נִשְׁתַּחְרֵר הָעֶבֶד – חַיָּיבִין לְשַׁלֵּם.

    The answer distinguishes liability itself from the ability to collect payment now. A woman and a slave are subject to liability, but in their current circumstances they cannot pay. The cited Mishnah demonstrates this: after divorce or emancipation, they must pay their earlier obligation. The change of status enables payment; it does not retroactively turn an exempt act into a liable one. They therefore differ from a courtyard, which has no personal liability at all, resolving the objection to Ravina.

13. 13·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

    רַב סַמָּא אָמַר: הֵיכָא אָמְרִינַן אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה – הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי עָבֵיד וְאִי בָּעֵי לָא עָבֵיד, אֲבָל חָצֵר דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ מוֹתֵיב בַּהּ, מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ.

    Rav Sama offers another explanation for why a courtyard is not blocked by the rule against agency for transgression. His test is whether the agent can choose to act or refuse. A human agent with a choice stands between the sender and the act, so the rule blocks liability for the sender through agency. A courtyard cannot refuse an object placed within it, and its owner is therefore liable. Unlike Ravina, the focus is not the agent’s personal liability but the independence of its action.

14. 14·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 10b

    מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ כֹּהֵן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל: צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה, אִי נָמֵי אִישׁ דְּאָמַר לַהּ לְאִשָּׁה: אַקִּפִי לִי קָטָן.

    The Gemara asks what practical difference separates Ravina from Rav Sama. It proposes two cases: a priest sends an Israelite to betroth a divorcée for him, and a man sends a woman to round a boy’s sidelocks. In both, the agent can choose whether to act but is not personally subject to the particular prohibition being tested. An Israelite is not bound by the priestly prohibition on marrying a divorcée, and the woman is outside the rounding prohibition discussed here. This does not declare every aspect of their conduct permissible; the test concerns the specific liability being attributed to the sender.

15. 15·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 10b

    לְהָךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי עָבֵיד אִי בָּעֵי לָא עָבֵיד – לָא מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ. הָנֵי נָמֵי אִי בָּעֵי עָבֵיד, אִי בָּעֵי לָא עָבֵיד – לָא מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחָן. לְהָךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּשָׁלִיחַ לָאו בַּר חִיּוּבָא מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ, הָנֵי נָמֵי כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו בְּנֵי חִיּוּבָא נִינְהוּ – מִיחַיַּיב שׁוּלְחָן.

    The Gemara applies the two tests to the proposed cases. Under Rav Sama, the agents can refuse, so their sender is not liable through their agency. Under Ravina, they are not personally subject to the particular offense, so their sender is liable through their agency. The tests thus prove to be genuinely distinct, although both explain the courtyard case. This addresses attribution of the liability under discussion, not a comprehensive ruling on every condition for punishment or every accompanying prohibition.

16. 16·KushyaBava Metzia 10b

    וּמִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חָצֵר לָאו מִשּׁוּם יָדָהּ אִיתְרַבַּאי? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״יָדָהּ״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא יָדָהּ. גַּגָּהּ, חֲצֵירָהּ וְקַרְפֵּיפָהּ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן״ מִכׇּל מָקוֹם!

    The Gemara returns to the foundation of courtyard acquisition, now challenging it from divorce law. The baraita derives from “venatan” that delivery to a woman’s roof, courtyard, or enclosure counts, beyond delivery into her actual hand. In this setting, the courtyard is presented as an extension of her hand. How, then, can there be a view that a courtyard was not included as a hand? After the conflict with theft law was resolved, the agency model must now be reconciled with a positive source for the hand model.

17. 17·TerutzBava Metzia 10b

    לְעִנְיַן גֵּט כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּחָצֵר מִשּׁוּם יָדָהּ אִיתְרַבַּאי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי לְעִנְיַן מְצִיאָה. מָר סָבַר:

    The answer distinguishes two legal areas rather than forcing one foundation upon both. For a bill of divorce, everyone agrees that a courtyard was included as a hand. The dispute under discussion concerns found property, so a source about divorce does not decide it by itself. This preserves the possibility of distinguishing the courtyard’s foundations according to the legal context. The supplied text ends with “one master holds,” before the next explanation is developed, so the account of the dispute is not yet complete.

1. 1Why is the poor person’s right to enter a field and collect pe’ah insufficient according to Rav Pappa? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2How does the expressed-preference answer differ from saying that the finder merely remained silent? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3What does the Mishnah about payment after divorce or emancipation demonstrate? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4How do Ravina and Rav Sama differ when an Israelite betroths a divorcée for a priest? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What can be established at the end of the supplied text about hand and agency? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.