Daf 7a: Doubt, Consecration, and Possession: From Garment to Document

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

   אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר, עֲשִׂירִי וַדַּאי אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא עֲשִׂירִי סָפֵק. הָכָא נָמֵי: עֲשִׂירִי וַדַּאי אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא וְלֹא עֲשִׂירִי סָפֵק.

   The page opens with an answer to an argument begun on the previous page about doubtful cases in animal tithing. The Torah requires a definite tenth, not a tenth whose liability to the tithe is uncertain. Uncertainty about an animal's status therefore need not create an obligation requiring stringency; it can exclude the animal from liability. The Gemara applies the principle already needed in the comparison case to the case under discussion. This resolves the local objection, but it does not establish a general exemption for every monetary doubt.

2. 02·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 7a

   אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: מַאי סְפֵיקוֹת? אִילֵּימָא סְפֵק בְּכוֹרוֹת, ״יִהְיֶה קֹדֶשׁ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְלֹא שֶׁכְּבָר קָדוֹשׁ.

   Rav Acha of Difti asks Ravina which doubtful cases the previously discussed source includes. They cannot simply be uncertain firstborns of kosher animals. A firstborn is sacred from birth, whereas animal tithe is described as becoming sacred now, excluding what is already sacred. If the animal is a firstborn, it is already outside that framework. The question therefore requires identifying a doubt involving a monetary obligation without assuming that the sheep itself is already sacred.

3. 03·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

   אֶלָּא סְפֵק פִּדְיוֹן פֶּטֶר חֲמוֹר, וְכִדְרַב נַחְמָן. דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ עֲשָׂרָה סְפֵק פִּטְרֵי חֲמוֹר בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ – מַפְרִישׁ עֲלֵיהֶן עֲשָׂרָה שֵׂיִין, וּמְעַשְּׂרָן, וְהֵן שֶׁלּוֹ.

   The doubtful cases are sheep designated to redeem donkeys whose firstborn status is uncertain. Rav Nachman, citing Rabbah bar Avuhah, teaches that someone with ten such donkeys designates ten sheep, tithes them, and retains them. Designation addresses the possibility that a donkey requires redemption. Yet a priest cannot extract the sheep on doubt alone, because the claimant bears the burden of proof. Redemption does not make the sheep sacred, so they can enter the animal-tithe count. This separates two foundations: the need for redemption and the priest's monetary entitlement.

4. 04·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 7a

   מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ דְּמַסּוּתָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין: הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא בֵּי רַב חִסְדָּא וְרַב חִסְדָּא בֵּי רַב הוּנָא, וּפַשְׁטַהּ מֵהָא דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כׇּל מָמוֹן שֶׁאֵין יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בְּדַיָּינִין, הִקְדִּישׁוֹ – אֵינוֹ קָדוֹשׁ.

   The Gemara returns to the disputed bathhouse discussed on the previous page. It reports that the case reached Rav Chisda and Rav Huna. The solution rests on Rav Nachman's rule: property that a person cannot recover through court does not become sacred through that person's consecration. A bare ownership claim is insufficient to consecrate property that the claimant cannot legally recover. This answers the bathhouse question, but the rule's scope still requires clarification.

5. 05·KushyaBava Metzia 7a

   הָא יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בְּדַיָּינִין, הִקְדִּישׁוֹ – קָדוֹשׁ, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אַפְּקֵיהּ. וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: גָּזַל וְלֹא נִתְיָיאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם אֵינָם יְכוֹלִין לְהַקְדִּישׁוֹ. זֶה – לְפִי שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁלּוֹ, וְזֶה – לְפִי שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ.

   The Gemara infers that someone able to recover property through court can apparently consecrate it even before actual recovery. Yet Rabbi Yochanan teaches that before the owner despairs of stolen property, neither thief nor owner can consecrate it. The thief lacks ownership, while the owner lacks control of the object within their domain. The owner may have a clear right to recover it, but that right still does not suffice for consecration. The objection exposes two separate requirements: the property must be one's own and within one's legal control.

6. 06·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

   מִי סָבְרַתְּ בְּמַסּוּתָא מִטַּלְטְלִין עָסְקִינַן? בְּמַסּוּתָא מְקַרְקְעֵי עָסְקִינַן, דְּכִי יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאָה בְּדַיָּינִין, בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ קָיְימָא.

   The answer distinguishes movable property from real estate. This bathhouse is attached to land, not a movable object. When someone can recover land through court, it is regarded as remaining within that person's legal domain despite another person's actual occupation. There is therefore no contradiction to Rabbi Yochanan's rule about a stolen object outside its owner's control. The distinction does not remove the requirement of legal control; it explains why that requirement is met here.

7. 07·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 7a

   תָּנֵי רַב תַּחְלִיפָא בַּר מַעְרְבָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שְׁנַיִם אֲדוּקִים בְּטַלִּית – זֶה נוֹטֵל עַד מָקוֹם שֶׁיָּדוֹ מַגַּעַת, וְזֶה נוֹטֵל עַד מָקוֹם שֶׁיָּדוֹ מַגַּעַת, וְהַשְּׁאָר חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. מַחְוֵי לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: וּבִשְׁבוּעָה.

   Rav Tachlifa bar Maarava recites a teaching before Rabbi Abbahu about two people gripping a garment. Each takes the portion within their grasp, and they divide the remainder equally. Gripping the fabric itself creates a stronger position than the competing claims to the portion neither holds separately. Rabbi Abbahu adds that this arrangement also requires an oath. The discussion returns to the opening mishnah and maps possession more precisely before determining division.

8. 08·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

   אֶלָּא מַתְנִיתִין, דְּקָתָנֵי דְּפָלְגִי בַּהֲדָדֵי, וְלָא קָתָנֵי זֶה נוֹטֵל עַד מְקוֹם שֶׁיָּדוֹ מַגַּעַת, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: דִּתְפִיסִי בְּכַרְכְּשָׁתָא.

   The Gemara asks how our mishnah can prescribe equal division without first assigning each person the portion in their hand. The question assumes that the new teaching and the mishnah must fit together. Rav Pappa explains that the mishnah concerns people holding the garment's fringe or edge. Neither holds a distinct portion of the main fabric exclusively. The mishnah's equal division therefore accords with the source's more detailed rule.

9. 09·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 7a

   אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הַאי סוּדָרָא, כֵּיוָן דְּתָפֵיס בֵּיהּ שָׁלֹשׁ עַל שָׁלֹשׁ, קָרֵינַן בֵּיהּ ״וְנָתַן לְרֵעֵהוּ״. דִּכְמַאן דִּפְסִיק דְּמֵי, וְקָנֵי.

   Rav Mesharshiya draws a conclusion about acquisition through a cloth from the possession rule. If the recipient grips a section measuring three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, the requirement of giving to another is met even while the giver still holds the rest. This is a significant piece of fabric, and the recipient's portion is treated for this purpose as though severed from the remainder. There is therefore sufficient giving to effect the exchange acquisition. The connection to the garment case is that holding a portion can give it independent legal standing without physical separation.

10. 10·KushyaBava Metzia 7a

    וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִדְּרַב חִסְדָּא, דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: גֵּט בְּיָדָהּ וּמְשִׁיחָה בְּיָדוֹ, אִם יָכוֹל לְנַתְּקוֹ וְלַהֲבִיאוֹ אֶצְלוֹ – אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת, וְאִם לָאו – מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת!

    The Gemara objects from Rav Chisda's rule about a bill of divorce. If the document is in the woman's hand but the husband holds an attached cord, his ability to pull it back prevents the divorce. Apparently, the woman too is holding an object delivered to her. If holding a portion suffices for the cloth, why does the giver's continuing control determine the outcome for divorce? The objection initially assumes that delivery in both areas is measured by the same standard.

11. 11·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

    הָתָם כְּרִיתוּת בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא. הָכָא נְתִינָה בָּעֵינַן, וְהָא אִיכָּא.

    Divorce requires severance, not merely giving. The husband's ability to pull the document from her hand back to himself preserves control incompatible with that required severance. For acquisition through a cloth, the requirement under discussion is giving, which the recipient's grip on a significant portion fulfills. The same fact of continued holding by the giver can therefore produce different outcomes. The answer teaches us to identify each field's legal requirement before comparing similar physical acts.

12. 12·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

    אָמַר רָבָא: אִם הָיְתָה טַלִּית מוּזְהֶבֶת – חוֹלְקִין. פְּשִׁיטָא? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּקָאֵי דַּהֲבָא בֵּי מִצְעֵי. הָא נָמֵי פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא דְּמִיקְרַב לְגַבֵּי דְּחַד. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּלוֹג הָכִי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי חָזֵית דְּפָלְגַתְּ הָכִי? פְּלוֹג הָכִי.

    Rava states that a garment containing gold is also divided, and the Gemara seeks the novelty. It first places the gold in the area between the holders, then specifies that it lies closer to one of them. That person might demand a direction of division that awards him the gold because of its proximity. His opponent can respond that this direction has no priority over another that allows equal division in value. Proximity to the gold is not possession of the gold and therefore creates no superior entitlement. This preserves the boundary between an actually held portion and the remainder subject to division.

13. 13·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 7a

    תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁנַיִם אֲדוּקִין בִּשְׁטָר, מַלְוֶה אוֹמֵר: שֶׁלִּי הוּא, וְנָפַל מִמֶּנִּי וּמְצָאתִיו, וְלֹוֶה אָמַר: שֶׁלְּךָ הוּא, וּפְרַעְתִּיו לָךְ – יִתְקַיֵּים הַשְּׁטָר בְּחוֹתְמָיו, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: יַחְלוֹקוּ.

    The baraita transfers the structure of two people holding a garment to a debt document. The lender claims that it is his, that he dropped it, and that he found it; the borrower admits that it was a debt document but claims repayment. Rabbi says that the witnesses' signatures must be authenticated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says they divide, meaning that the lender collects half the disputed amount. At this stage, it remains unclear whether Rabbi rejects division itself or merely sets an evidentiary prerequisite. Unlike a garment, the significance of possession here also depends on the document's power to establish a debt.

14. 14·Mishnah / BaraitaBava Metzia 7a

    נָפַל לְיַד דַּיָּין – לֹא יוֹצִיאוֹ עוֹלָמִית. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי הוּא בְּחֶזְקָתוֹ.

    The baraita adds a case in which the document came into a judge's hands. According to the first opinion, the judge must never release it. Rabbi Yosei says that it retains its presumptive status. The text has not yet explained how the document reached the judge or which presumption is intended. We should therefore retain both formulations in the argument's blueprint without deciding now who receives the document. Detailed examination begins only after the preceding dispute is analyzed.

15. 15·KushyaBava Metzia 7a

    אָמַר מָר: יִתְקַיֵּים הַשְּׁטָר בְּחוֹתְמָיו. וְגָבֵי לֵיהּ מַלְוֶה כּוּלֵּיהּ. וְלֵית לֵיהּ מַתְנִיתִין? שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין כּוּ׳!

    The Gemara returns to Rabbi's statement and initially understands authentication as allowing the lender to collect the whole debt. It challenges this reading from the mishnah of two people holding a garment. The borrower also holds the document, and authenticating signatures does not prove that the debt remains unpaid. If joint possession requires division of a garment, why should it disappear here? The objection targets the inferred full collection, not the requirement of authentication itself.

16. 16·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

    אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: בִּמְקוּיָּם – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל יַחְלוֹקוּ, כִּי פְּלִיגִי בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְקוּיָּם.

    Rava, citing Rav Nachman, explains that everyone agrees to division when the document is authenticated. Authentication establishes its validity but does not decide between the debt claim and the repayment claim when both parties hold it. The dispute concerns only an unauthenticated document. Rabbi's words therefore do not promise full collection; they require establishing the document before division. The answer preserves the opening mishnah and relocates the dispute to the question of evidence.

17. 17·TerutzBava Metzia 7a

    רַבִּי סָבַר: מוֹדֶה בִּשְׁטָר שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ – צָרִיךְ לְקַיְּימוֹ. וְאִי מְקַיֵּים לֵיהּ פָּלֵיג, וְאִי לָא מְקַיֵּים לֵיהּ לָא פָּלֵיג. מַאי טַעְמָא? חַסְפָּא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא, מַאן קָא מְשַׁוֵּי לֵיהּ לְהַאי שְׁטָרָא – לֹוֶה, הָא קָאָמַר דִּפְרִיעַ.

    Rabbi holds that even when the borrower admits executing the document, the lender must authenticate it. If he does, he collects through division; if not, he does not receive half on the document's strength. Without independent authentication, the document is like a mere potsherd as evidence of the debt. The borrower is currently the one giving it standing through his admission, but that same borrower also says the debt was repaid. Collection cannot rest on his admission of authenticity while ignoring the accompanying repayment claim. This follows the structure of the principle that the mouth establishing a liability can also remove it, explaining why joint possession does not suffice before an evidentiary foundation is built.

18. 18·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 7a

    וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: מוֹדֶה בִּשְׁטָר שֶׁכְּתָבוֹ אֵין צָרִיךְ לְקַיְּימוֹ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מְקַיֵּים לֵיהּ – יַחְלוֹקוּ.

    Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the borrower's admission of execution removes the need for further authentication. On his view, the document's validity can be recognized without thereby accepting the repayment claim. Even without external authentication, there is therefore an evidentially effective document held by both parties. The result is division, not full collection by the lender. The dispute thus concerns whether the borrower's admission independently establishes the document, not the rule of division once its validity is established.

19. 19·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 7a

    נָפַל לְיַד דַּיָּין לֹא יוֹצִיאוֹ עוֹלָמִית,

    The Gemara returns to the baraita's next clause: a document that came into a judge's hands must never be released. This repetition opens a topic for examination rather than issuing a new ruling after the authentication discussion. Until now, the analysis concerned a document held by both litigants. The next issue is the significance of its presence in a judge's hands. The excerpt ends before the explicit question and answer, so it does not yet provide an explanation of the judge's role.

1. 1Why can sheep designated for doubtful firstborn-donkey redemption enter the animal tithe? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2What reconciles consecration of the bathhouse with Rabbi Yochanan's rule about stolen property? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3Why need holding the rest of a cloth not invalidate acquisition, although the ability to pull a divorce document back can prevent divorce? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4What is the status of gold closer to one holder but outside his actual grasp? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5According to Rav Nachman, what do Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel dispute? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.