Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot Chapter 9

הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִנְכָסַיִיךְ הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת וְאִם מֵתָה יוֹרְשָׁהּ. אִם כֵּן לָמָּה כָתַב לָהּ דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִנְכָסַיִיךְ שֶׁאִם מָכְרָה וְנָתְנָה קַיָים. כָּתַב לָהּ דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עָלַיִיךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ וְאִם מֵתָה יוֹרְשָׁהּ. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר לְעוֹלָם הוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת עַד שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב לָהּ דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹתֵיהֶן עַד עוֹלָם. כָּתַב לָהּ דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן וּבְפֵירֵי פֵירוֹתֵיהֶן בְּחַיַּיִךְ וּבְמוֹתֵךְ אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת בְּחַיֶּיהָ וְאִם מֵתָה אֵינוֹ יוֹרְשָׁהּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר מֵתָה יוֹרְשָׁהּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה וְכָל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. הַכּוֹתֵב לְאִשְׁתּוֹ דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִנְכָסַיִיךְ כול׳. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּשֵם רִבִּי יַנַּיי. בְּשֶׁלֹּא כָנַס. אֲבָל אִם כָּנַס אֵין אָדָם מְאַבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ בְלָשׁוֹן הַזֶּה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. מִילְתֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי חִיָיה. הָאוֹמֵר. יָדַיי מְסוּלָּקוֹת מִן הַשָּׂדֶה הַזּוֹ וְרַגְלַיי מְסוּלָּקוֹת מִן הַשָּׂדֶה הַזּוֹ. לֹא אָמַר וְלֹא כְלוּם. אָמַר רִבִּי אָבוּן בַּר חִיָיה קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעִירָא. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מְאַבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ בְלָשׁוֹן הַזֶּה. דְּתַנִינָן תַּמָּן. מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים וּמָכַר אֶת שָׂדֶהוּ וְכָתְבָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה לַלּוֹקֵחַ. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עִמָּךְ. הַשְּׁנִיָיה מוֹצִיאָה מִיַּד הַלּוֹקֵחַ. הָא הָרִאשׁוֹנָה לֹא. אָמַר לֵיהּ. כָּל גַּרְמָהּ אָמְרָה שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מְאַבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ בְלָשׁוֹן הַזֶּה. אָלָּא כָאן אֲפִילוּ הַשְּׁנִיָיה לֹא תוֹצִיא מִיַּד הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. וְלָמָּה אֵין הָרִאשׁוֹנָה מוֹצִיאָה מִיַּד הַלּוֹקֵחַ. שֶׁכֵּן הִיא כוֹתֶבֶת לוֹ. כָּל עֶרֶר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בַשָּׂדֶה זוֹ אַל יְהִי לִי עִמָּךְ כְּלוּם. כָּתַב לָהּ וְכָתַבְתָּהּ לוֹ. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְאַבֵּד זְכוּתוֹ כָּךְ אִשָּׁה אֵינָהּ מְאַבֶּדֶת זְכוּתָהּ. כָּתַב לָהּ מִן הָאֵירוּסִין וּמִן הַנִּישּׂוּאִין. פְּלוּגְתָא דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי וּבֵית הִלֵּל. עַל דַּעְתּוֹן דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי תִּמְכּוֹר. עַל דַּעְתּוֹן דְּבֵית הִלֵּל לֹא תִמְכּוֹר. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעִירָא. כָּתַב לָהּ. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִנְכָסַיִיךְ. וְנָפְלוּ לָהּ לְאַחַר מִיכֵּן. מָהוּ. וְיֵשׁ אָדָם מַתְנֶה עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ. אָמַר רִבִּי בּוּן בַּר חִיָיה קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעִירָא. מִזְּכוּתוֹ אַתְּ לָמֵד חִייוּבוֹ. אֶלָּא לֹא כָתַב לָהּ שַׁנְיָיה [הִיא] אֵין לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. הֲוֵי מִזְּכוּתוֹ אַתְּ לָמֵד חִיּוּבוֹ. רִבִּי לֵוִי בַּר חַיְיתָא בְעָא. כָּתַב לָו. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִנְכָסַיִיךְ הָעֲתִידִין לִיפּוֹל לִיךְ. מָה הֵן. וְיֵשׁ אָדָם מַתְנֶה עַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָעוֹלָם. מָכְרָה פֵירוֹת מְחוּבָּרִין לְקַרְקַע. רִבִּי אָחָא אָמַר. כְּמוֹכֶרֶת פֵּירוֹת תְּלוּשִׁין. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. בְּמוֹכֶרֶת אֶחָד מֵעֲשָׂרָה בַקַּרְקַע. רִבִּי זְעוּרָא רַב יְהוּדָה בְשֵׁם רַב. הַכּוֹתֵב שָׂדֶה מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֵינָהּ מוֹכֶרֶת פֵּירוֹת. אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן. אֵילּוּ הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. מוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת וְלוֹקֵחָ קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת. רִבִּי אִמִּי בְעָא. אִילּוּ אַחֵר כּוֹתֵב לָהּ יֵשׁ לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. הוּא שֶׁכָּתַב לָהּ לֹא כָל שֶׁכֵּן. לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא כוֹתֵב. אֲבָל מוֹכֵר לֹא. מַה בֵין כּוֹתֵב מַה בֵין מוֹכֵר. עִולָּה הָיָה רוֹצֶה לְהַבְרִיחַ מְזוֹנוֹת מִן הָאִשָּׁה. נִיחָא עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוּדָה בְּשֶׁכָּתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבַפֵּירוֹת. אֵין לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. אֲפִילוּ כָתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בְשָׂדֶה זוֹ וּבְפֵירוֹתֶיהָ. אֵין לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. נִיחָא עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּנִין בְּשֶׁכָּתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בְשָׂדֶה זוֹ וּבְפֵירוֹתֶיהָ. יֵשׁ לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. אֲפִילוּ כָתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבַפֵּירוֹתֵיהֶן. יֵשׁ לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. נִישְׁמְעִינָהּ מִן הָדָא. דָּמַר רַב זְעִירָא רַב יְהוּדָה בְשֵׁם רַב. הַכּוֹתֵב שָׂדֶה מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֵין לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. אָמַר רִבִּי זְעוּרָא. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן. וְאֵילּוּ הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. מוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת וְלוֹקֵחַ קַרְקַע וְאוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁכָּתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבַפֵּירוֹתֵיהֶן. לֹא כְּכוֹתֵב שָׂדֶה מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ הוּא. אַתְּ אָמַר. לֹא פֵירוֹת וְלֹא פֵירֵי פֵירוֹת. הֲוֵי לֹא שַׁנְיָיא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוּדָה בְּשֶׁכָּתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עַל שָׂדֶה זוֹ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן. בְּשֶׁכָּתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבַפֵּירוֹתֵיהֶן. אֵין לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. וְדִכְוָותֵיהּ לְרַבָּנִן לֹא שַׁנְיָיא. בֵּין שֶׁכָּתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בִּנְכָסַיִיךְ וּבַפֵּירוֹתֵיהֶן. בֵּין שֶׁכָּתַב. דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי בַשָּׂדֶה זוֹ וּבְפֵירוֹתֵיהֶן. יֵשׁ לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְשֵׁם רַב. הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. אֲבָל לֹא לְעִנְיָין דְּבָרִים. הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּאָמַר. אִם מֵתָה יְרוֹשְׁתָהּ. אֲבָל דְּבָרִים שֶׁהִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה. וְכָל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל הַכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. בִּתְנָאֵי גּוּף. אֲבָל בִּתְנָאֵי מָמוֹן תְּנָאוֹ קַיָים. וְזֶה תְנַאי מָמוֹן הוּא. וְלָמָּה אָמְרוּ. תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. שֶׁבְּסוֹף הוּא זָכָה בָהֶן. רִבִּי אִימִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. בְּדִין הָיָה שֶׁאִם מָכְרָה וְנָתְנָה שֶׁיְּהֵא מִכְרָהּ קַיָים. שֶׁבְּסוֹף הוּא זוֹכֶה בָהֶן. וְלָמָּה אָמְרוּ בָטֵל. שֶׁלֹּא תְהֵא אִשָּׁה מוֹכֶרֶת נְכָסִים מִשֶּׁלְּבַעֲלָהּ וְאוֹמֶרֶת. שֶׁלִּי הֵן. רִבִּי [יוֹסְטִינֵי] הֲוָה לֵיהּ עוֹבְדָא וּשְׁאִיל לְרַבָּנִין. אָמְרִין לֵיהּ. פּוּק מִנְּכָסֵיךְ. שְׁאַל לְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶן לָקִישׁ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ. עוּל בִּנְכָסֵיךְ. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעִירָא. הֵיי לוֹן רַבָּנִין. הָא רַב הָא רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָא רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ. רַבָּנִין דְּרִבִּי יוֹסְטִינֵה. בְּעוֹן קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. מֵתָה מִי יוֹרְשָׁהּ. אִלֵּין. אֲחֶיהָ יוֹרְשִׁין אוֹתָהּ. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעוּרָא. הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ אַלְמָנָה נִיזּוֹנֶת מִשֶּׁלָּהֶן. שֶׁלֹּא תֹאמַר. יֵעָשׂוּ כְּמוֹ שֶׁמָּכְרוּ וְלֹא תְהֵא נִיזּוֹנֶת מִשֶּׁלָּהֶן. פְּשִׁיטָא. מָכְרוּ שֶׁלָּהֶן מָכְרוּ. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ. כְּתִיב אִם יִהְיֶה הַיּוֹבֵל לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁהַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג הַנְחָלוֹת חוֹזְרוֹת וּבְשָׁעָה שֶׁאֵין הַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג אֵין הַנְחָלוֹת חוֹזְרוֹת. אַדְּרַבָּה. אָתָא מֵימַר לָךְ. אֲפִילוּ בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁהַיּוֹבֵל נוֹהֵג וְהַנְחָלוֹת חוֹזְרוֹת יְרוּשַׁת תּוֹרָה אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת. רִבִּי הִלֵּל בַּר פָּזִי בְּעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. מָכַר הוּא וּמֵתָה הִיא. אָמַר לוֹ. מִכְרֹה בָטֵל. לְבֵן שֶׁמָּכַר בְּחַיֵּי אָבִיו וּמֵת אָבִיו. מָכְרָה הִיא וּמֵת הוּא. אָמַר לֵיהּ. מִכְרָהּ קַיָים. לְאָב שֶׁמָּכַר בְּחַיֵּי בְנוֹ וּמֵת בְּנוֹ. רִבִּי חִיָיה בַּר מַרְיָיא בְעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹנָה. מָכְרָה לְבַעֲלָהּ מָהוּ. אָמַר לֵיהּ. מִדְּאָמַר חִזְקִיָּה. הֲלָכָה כְרִבִּי (יוּדָה). הָדָא אָמְרָה מִכְרָהּ מֶכֶר. תַּנֵּי. הָאוֹמֵר. יִינָתְנוּ נְכָסַיי לִפְלוֹנִי. מֵת פְּלוֹנִי לִפְלוֹנִי. [מֵת פְּלוֹנִי לִפְלוֹנִי.]. מֵת הָרִאשׁוֹן יִינָתְנוּ לַשֵּׁינִי. מֵת הַשֵּׁינִי יִינָתְנוּ לַשְּׁלִישִׁי. מֵת הַשֵּׁינִי בְחַיֵי הָרִאשׁוֹן. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁלֹּא זָכָה בָהֶן הַשֵּׁינִי לֹא זָכָה בָהֶן הַשְּׁלִישִׁי. אָמַר לֵיהּ. כָּךְ פִּירֵשׁ רִבִי הוֹשַׁעְיָה אֲבִי הַמִּשְׁנָה. אַחֲרָיו לִפְלוֹנִי וְאַחֲרָיו לִפְלוֹנִי. אִילּוּ אָמַר. מֵת הַשְּׁלִישִׁי בְחַיֵי שֵׁינִי. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁלֹּא זָכָה בָהֶן הַשֵּׁינִי לֹא זָכוּ הַיּוֹרְשִׁין יְאוּת אַשְׁכָּחַת אֲמַר. אַחֲרָיו לִפְלוֹנִי אַחֲרָיו לִפְלוֹנִי. תַּנֵּי. הָרִאשׁוֹן מוֹכֵר קַרְקַע וְלוֹקֵחַ פֵּירוֹת דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי. רַבָּן שִמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר. אֵין לוֹ אֶלָּא אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת בִּלְבַד. חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר. הֲלָכָה כְרִבִּי. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. מִן מַה דְּאָמַר חִזְקִיָּה. הֲלָכָה כְרִבִּי. הָדָא אָמְרָה שֶׁאֵין נוֹתְנִין לֹו כְמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע. הָכָא אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְהָדָא אִשָּׁה מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁמְּזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ עַל בַּעֲלָהּ לֹא כְמַתְּנַת שְׁכִיב מְרַע הִיא. אָמַר לֵיהּ. מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ עַל בַּעֲלָהּ בְּרָאוּי לָהּ. מַאֲכָל מְשַׁח וּמֶלַח. וְהִיא בָעְיָיא מְזַבְּנָה וּמֵיכַל תַּרְנוגֹלִין. הָדָא אָמְרָה שֶׁאִם בִּיקֵּשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן מְזַבְּנָה וּמֵיכַל תַּרְנוגֹלִין יִזְבַּן. אָמַר רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אָחָא. תַּנֵּי תַּמָן. קְבוּרָה כִמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ. כְּמַה דְאַתְּ אֲמַר תַּמָּן. מוֹכֵר קַרְקַע וְלוֹקֵחַ מְזוֹנוֹת. אַף הָכָא. מוֹכֵר קַרְקַע וְלוֹקֵחַ קְבוּרָה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְאִילֵּין דְּכָּתְבִין. אִין מִיתַת דְּלָא בְנִין יְהֵא מִדְּלָהּ חֲזַר לְבֵית אָבִיהָ. תְּנָאי מָמוֹן הוּא וּתְנָאוֹ קַיָים.

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits.” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah 111b , Sifry Num. 134. In the opinion of R. Ismael, this cannot be established from the pentateuchal law of inheritance ( Num. 27:7–11 ) but from the books of Josua, 34:33, and 1 Chr. 2:22. According to R. Aqiba, the husband’s right of inheritance follows by twisting the text of Num. 27:11 . , and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid 7:14, Baba batra 8:5 . Quoted in Peah 6:10 (Note 159 ), Giṭṭin 9:1 (50a 1.48), Qiddušin 1:2 (59c 1.40), Baba meṣiʻa 7:10 (11c 1.11); Babli 56a/b , 83b, 84a, and 7 other quotes. As far as money matters go, his opinion is that of a minority of one; cf. Chapter 5, Note 207 . He will agree that in matters of revenues, whose assignment to the husband is purely rabbinic usage, there are no restrictions in the freedom to contract. . HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions 8:1 (49b 1. 30 ff.) it is stated that the husband can deliver a bill of divorce to his wife by depositing it on her paraphernalia property only if previously he had validly renounced his rights to the income produced by that property because the right to income is an ownership right. . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field 77a ; Baba batra 43a , 49a ; Keritut 24b ) notes that even between strangers such a formula would not transfer property rights. ,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field; if he dies and there is not enough money in his estate to satisfy the claims of both wives, the wives can reclaim the field from the buyer since their lien precedes his title. and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second is not satisfied, she can repossess the field. one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you of a first wife has precedence over that of a second wife. Therefore, if the second wife recovers the field from the buyer, the first one may sue the second for the unsatisfied part of her own ketubah. Therefore, the first wife did not transfer any property rights by her statement to the buyer. . If he wrote for her and she wrote for him. Just as he did not lose his rights so she did not lose her rights . If he wrote to her “from preliminary and definitive marriage”, that is the disagreement between the Houses of Shammai and Hillel. In the opinion of the House of Shammai she shall sell; in the opinion of the House of Hillel she should not sell. 23:1. The following explanation is simply one which seems reasonable to the author. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield contract gives the husband the right to the yield of any future properties coming to his wife during their marriage, whether foreseen or not, it follows that he can deprive himself of his right to yield, whether foreseen or not. ? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? If she sold produce connected to the ground: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more! Rebbi Mattanah said, a baraita does not say so : "What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, real estate should be bought from the proceeds, and he eats its revenue." Is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more? The baraita refers to the Mishnah, regarding property which the wife inherits during her marriage. Then the question is raised why does the husband eat the yield of property coming from others but not from his own gift. But in this version, the questions of R. Mattanah and R. Immi duplicate one another. The text of Rosh seems to be a contamination of the current and the following paragraphs. The passive voice, real estate should be bought, is that of our Tosephta text, in contrast to the quotes from both Talmudim in which he buys the real estate. In that version, the investment decision is not the husband’s. He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold” 51b , also decides that the husband eats the yield of the field sold but not the one given as a gift. . What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife. It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce holds that the husband has investment power over the yield revenue which he cannot take for himself. (Cf. Note 35 , last paragraph.) , buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield. Rav 8:6 (from a different editorial team). Rav Jeremiah was a contemporary of Rav, Rebbi Jeremiah lived about 100 years later. Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words if she dies he inherits from her, but not because of his words, "since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody's condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid," in personal matters. But here we deal with money matters! Why did they say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. . Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid 1:2 (59c 1.43), Baba meṣi‘a 7:10 (11c 1.11); in the Babli accepted with reservations in the name of R. Jehudah, 57a. and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it 8:6 , the reason is given the practice follows R. Joḥanan ben Baroqa who holds that wills can be written only in favor of people who could be heirs (if a number of closer relatives had died.) Then the law of inheritance is compulsory and falls under the category of personal matters. . Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine. Rebbi Justinus had a case8:6 . The reading here is יוסטתא which is inconsistent with the second mention of the name. {Both Juste and Justine probably are provincial forms of Justus, Justinus (E.G.).} and he asked the rabbis who told him, leave you properties. He asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who told him, enter your properties. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Who are those rabbis? What about Rav, Rebbi Joḥanan (Note 48) that the basic provisions of the biblical law of inheritance are a matter of persons, not money. , and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He said to him, Rebbi Justinus’s rabbis. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Following the Sages, if she died who inherits from her? Those, her brothers, inherit from her 8:6 is more intelligible: Rebbi Joḥanan said, her father inherits from her [and after his death] her brothers inherit from her. . Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them money but to live in her deceased husband’s house and be supported by his estate. While the ketubah proper is a lien on the real estate, the widow’s (and her daughters’) support is not. This means that the brothers may divide the inheritance while their father’s widow is still living. . For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property 107a ) strongly disagrees and holds that brothers who divided an inheritance are like buyers from one another but that they are liable in common for the debts of the estate. . Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Abbahu: It is written 36:4 . The argument of the tribe of Manasseh is that if Salpaad’s five daughters (representing most of the Cisjordanian tribe) would marry outside the tribe, their territory would be inherited by their husband’s tribes and be lost to Manasseh. : “If the Jubilee will happen for the Children of Israel.” If the institution of the Jubilee exists, inheritances return; if the institution of the Jubilee does not exist, inheritances do not return1:1, Note 7 . . It is the opposite way, it comes to tell you that even if the institution of the Jubilee exists and inheritances return, inheritance by biblical law does not return! 22a ). Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah later in this paragraph. , this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated 8:4 (fragmentary), Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:9 (16c 1.19); Babli Baba batra 136b/137a (cf. R. Rabbinowicz, דקדוקי סופרים בבא בתרא. p. 374, Note ח). : “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them: to the testator’s legal heirs). .” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia 136b ), he is called “Rav Hoshaia in Babylonia”. , the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. . It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct. 8:4 (fragmentary), Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:9 (16c 1.19); Babli Baba batra 136b/137a (cf. R. Rabbinowicz, דקדוקי סופרים בבא בתרא. p. 374, Note ח). ” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will, the text reads: “R. Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. R. Joḥanan said, not even as a gift between the living.” The statement of R. Mana (I)/R. Yannai simply means that X, the first heir, cannot give the properties away in a will since the will becomes active only after X’s death and at that moment the real estate is already Y’s property (as explained in the Babli, loc. cit .). R. Joḥanan’s statement is explained by R. Eliahu Fulda, that X may sell for his own needs because he is the owner, but he cannot give away since the original will prescribes that after X it must be given to Y. . So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there. The wife may also sell some of her property and buy herself a burial plot (which, if used, becomes forbidden for all usufruct.) , he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial. Rebbi Yose said: Those who write “if she should die childless, her property should return to her father’s family” write a monetary condition which is a valid condition (cf. Chapter 5, Note 226 ), vol. 1, Chapter VE, pp. 391–418. .

מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבַעַל חוֹב וְיוֹרְשִׁין וְהָיָה לוֹ פִיקָּדוֹן אוֹ מִלְוָה בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים רִבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר יִינָּתְנוּ לַכּוֹשֵׁל שֶׁבָּהֶן. רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר אֵין מְרַחֲמִין בַּדִּין אֶלָּא יִינָּתְנוּ לַיּוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁכּוּלָּן צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה. מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ אִשָּׁה כול׳. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָה אָמַר. לַכּוֹשֶׁל שֶׁבִּרְאָיוֹתָיו. כְּגוֹן מַלְוֶה בְעֵדִים וּמַלְוֶה בִשְׁטָר יִינָּתְנוּ לְמַּלוֶה בְעֵדִים. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. לַכּוֹשֵׁל בְּגוּפוֹ. הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ הֲוָה עָתִיר. כְּגוֹן אִילֵּין דְּבַר אַנְדְּרַאי. אָמַר רִבִּי אָחָא. לַכּוֹשֵׁל בְּגוּפוֹ וְעָנִי. כְּהָדָא. קְּרֵיבָתֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר אַבָּא יְהָבוּ לֵיהּ מִשֵּׁם כּוֹשֵׁל. אַייתֵי רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ עַבְדּוֹי דְּרִבִּי יוּדָן נְשִׂיָיא וַאַפִּיק מִינֵּיהּ. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן הֲוָה מִיסְתַּמֵּיךְ עַל רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר אַבָּא. אָמַר לֵיהּ. מַה נַעֲשֶׂה בְּאוֹתָהּ הָעֲנִיָיה. אָמַר לֵיהּ. אַייתֵי רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ עַבְדּוֹי דְּרִבִּי יוּדָן נְשִׂיָיא וַאַפִּיק מִינָּהּ. וְיָפֶה נַעֲשֶׂה. אָמַר רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה קוֹמֵי רִבִּי זְעִירָא. אִי נֹאמַר. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן כְּדַעְתֵּיהּ וְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן כְּדַעְתֵּיהּ. דְּאִיתְפַּלְּגוֹן. הַכֹּל מוֹדִין שֶׁאִם טָעוּ בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת שֶׁאֵין מַחֲזִירִין. מִדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה מַחֲזִירִין. מַה פְלִיגִין. בְּטָעוּת מִשְׁנָה. שֶׁרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. בְּטָעוּת מִשְׁנָה שִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר. טָעוּת מִשְׁנָה דְּבַר תּוֹרָה. הִיא טָעוּת מִשְׁנָה הִיא טָעוּת זְקֵינִים. הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁפְּטוּרִין מִן הַשְּׁבוּעָה. זוֹ תוֹרָה וְזוֹ אֵינָהּ תּוֹרָה.

MISHNAH: If somebody died and left his wife, a creditor, and heirs, and he was owed a deposit or a debt by a third party, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, these should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But these should be given to the heirs for all others have to swear in cash (instead of being supported by the heirs for the rest of her life) has to swear that she did not receive anything during her husband’s lifetime. The creditor has to swear that his claim was not satisfied. , only the heirs do not have to swear. HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim. For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body. . Think about it, if he is rich, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest (cf. Note 102 ), the Gaonic decree that all ketubot have to be satisfied by movables changed practice in the Mishnah from R. Aqiba to R. Ṭarphon.] . Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince of the Patriarch to seize what he considered assigned by an erring court. and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah 6b . . What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders, Rav Pappa accepts as non-reversible error only a judicial argument rejected by the appeals court but which does not contradict existing precedents. . Think of it, if they were exempt from swearing Ha-iṭṭur I, 23b (Note 16), followed by Rosh 9:2, the reading is הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁפְטָרוּם מִן הַשְּׁבוּעָה “Think of it, if he exempted them from swearing”, i. e., the debtor agreed to a clause in the mortgage contract which exempted the creditor from swearing to his heirs. In the version of the ms., there are additional cases when the creditor is by law exempted from swearing; for example, if the due date is later than the debtor’s death (then the debt certainly was not paid) or if the debtor before his death acknowledged the debt. ? One is biblical, the other is not biblical.

הִנִּיחַ פֵּירוֹת הַתְּלוּשִׁין מִן הַקַּרְקַע כָּל הַקּוֹדֵם בָּהֶן זָכָה. זָכְתָה הָאִשָּׁה יוֹתֵר מִכְּתוּבָּתָהּ וּבַעַל חוֹב יוֹתֵר עַל חוֹבוֹ. הַמּוֹתָר רִבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר יִינָּתְנוּ לַכּוֹשֵׁל שֶׁבָּהֶן. רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה אוֹמֵר אֵין מְרַחֲמִין בַּדִּין אֶלָּא יִינָּתְנוּ לַיּוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁכּוּלָּן צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה. הִנִּיחַ פֵּירוֹת תְּלוּשִׁין כול׳. רַב וְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ תְּרֵיהוֹן אָמְרִין. בִּצְבוּרִין בְּסוּרְקִי. אֲבָל אִם צְבָרָן בְּבֵיתוֹ זָכָה לוֹ בֵיתוֹ. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. וַאֲפִילוּ צְבוּרִין בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ לֹא זָכָה לוֹ בֵיתוֹ. דַּהֲוָה סְבַר דְּאִינּוּן דִּידֵּהּ וְלֵית אִינּוּן דִּידֵּהּ. וַאֲתֵי בַעַל הַבַּיִת זָכָה בְּפֵירוֹתָיו בַּשְּׁבִיעִית. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה סְבַר מֵימַר. מִשֶּׁיִּתְּנֵם לְתוֹךְ כֵּילָיו. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲפִילוּ נְתָנָן לְתוֹךְ כֵּלָיו לֹא זָכָה בָהֶן. דַּהֲוָה סְבַר מֵימַר דְּאִינּוּן דִּידֵּיהּ וְלֵית אִינּוּן דִּידֵּהּ. הִיא אַרְמָלְתָא תְּפָסָת אַמְהָתָא. אָתָא עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יִצְחָק. אָמַר. תְּפָסָת תְּפָסָת. רִבִּי אִימִּי מַפִּיק מִינָּהּ. דְּהִיא סָבְרָה דִידָּהּ וְלֵית אִינּוּן דִּידָּהּ. כְּהָדָא. אִילֵּין בְּנֵי שַׁמַּי דִּדְמָךְ אֲבוּהוֹן שְׁבַק לָהוֹן אֲבוּהוֹן עֵז. אָתָא מָרִי חוֹבָה וּנְסָתָהּ. אָתָא עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ וְאָמַר. דִּידֵּהּ נְסַב. לֹא כֵן תַּנֵּי. יוֹרֵשׁ וּבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקָּדַם אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְתָפַס [אֵין] מוֹצִיאין מִיָּדוֹ. דַּהֲווֹן סָבְרִין דְּאִינּוּן דִּידְּהוֹן וְלֵית אִינּוּן דִּידְּהוֹן. אָמַר רִבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר זַבְדִּי. מוֹדֶה רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ שֶׁאִם מְכָרוּהָ אוֹ מַשְׁכְּנוּהָ אוֹ טִילְטְלוּהָ מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בַּעַל חוֹב וְתָפַס מוֹצִיאִין מִיָּדוֹ. הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁפְּטוּרִין מִן הַשְּׁבוּעָה. זוֹ תוֹרָה וְזוֹ אֵינָהּ תּוֹרָה.

MISHNAH: If he left produce taken from the ground, the one who takes them first acquires them. If the widow acquired more than her ketubah sum, or the creditor more than his claim, the remainder, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, should be given to the weakest among them 86 (1979/1980), 136–148. . Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But it should be given to the heirs since all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear. HALAKHAH: “If he left produce taken,” etc. Both Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, if they were collected at a trading place 10b). For R. Joḥanan, “a person’s courtyard acquires for him only by a conscious act.” Therefore, in a situation where an unlearned person could think that anything in a private domain to which the owner has a claim is automatically his, we may assume that the conscious act of acquisition is missing. This argument assumes that the first part of the Mishnah is everybody’s opinion and the difference between R. Ṭarphon and R. Aqiba refers only to the excess. In the Babli, the entire first part of the Mishnah is considered R. Ṭarphon’s and everybody agrees that “a person’s courtyard acquires for him automatically”; cf. Note 106 . . But if somebody collected it in his house, his house acquired for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he collected it in his house, his house did not acquire for him. For he thinks that they are his but they are not his. Does from this follow how the owner acquires his produce in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put them into his vessel. Rebbi Yose said, even if he put them into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that they are his but they are not his. That widow took a slave girl. The case is also quoted in Qiddušin 1:3 in the discussion whether slaves are acquired under the rules of movables or of real estate. . The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not]. But the partial quote in Halakhah 8:10 proves that the original text was correct. remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession. Think of it, if they were exempt from swearing Ha-iṭṭur I, 23b (Note 16), followed by Rosh 9:2, the reading is הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ שֶׁפְטָדוּם מִן הַשְּׁבוּעָה “Think of it, if he exempted them from swearing”, i. e., the debtor agreed to a clause in the mortgage contract which exempted the creditor from swearing to his heirs. In the version of the ms., there are additional cases when the creditor is by law exempted from swearing; for example, if the due date is later than the debtor’s death (then the debt certainly was not paid) or if the debtor before his death acknowledged the debt. ? One is biblical, the other is not biblical.

הַמּוֹשִׁיב אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ חֶנְוָונִית אוֹ שֶׁמִּינָּהּ אֶפִּיטְרוֹפְּיָא הֲרֵי זֶה מַשְׁבִּיעָהּ כָּל זְמָן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה. רִבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר אֲפִילוּ עַל פִּילְכָּהּ וְעַל עִיסָּתָהּ. הַמּוֹשִׁיב אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ חֶנְוָונִית כול׳. יְאוּת אָמַר רִבִּי לִיעֶזֶר. מַה טַעֲמוֹן דְּרַבָּנִין. אִם אוֹמֵר אַתְּ כֵּן אֵין שָׁלוֹם בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ לְעוֹלָם. שִׁיבְּרָה אֶת הַכֵּלִים מֵה אַתְּ עֲבַד לָהּ. כְּשׁוֹמֶרֶת חִנָּם אוֹ כְשׁוֹמֶרֶת שָׂכָר. מִסְתַּבְּרָא מֵיעַבְדִּינָהּ כְּשׁוֹמֶרֶת שָׂכָר. אָמְרִין. אֲפִילוּ כְשׁוֹמֶרֶת חִנָּם אֵינָהּ. אִם אוֹמֵר אַתְּ כֵּן אֵין שָׁלוֹם בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתוֹ לְעוֹלָם.

MISHNAH: If somebody engages his wife as grocer or appoints her as steward 1:5 . , he can make her swear any time he wants. Rebbi Eliezer says, even about her distaff and her dough. HALAKHAH: “If somebody engages his wife as grocer,” etc. Is Rebbi Eliezer not correct? What is the rabbis’ reason? If you say so, there never would be peace in his house. If she broke vessels, is she responsible as an unpaid or a paid trustee 7:8, Šebuot 8:1: “There are four kinds of responsible people: Unpaid and paid watchmen, the borrower and the lessee. The unpaid watchman swears about everything (which is missing or broken, that it is not by his fault); the borrower pays for everything; the paid trustee and the lessee swear about broken, robbed, or dead (animals) and pay for what was lost or stolen (for if an animal is lost or stolen it is their fault since it was not guarded correctly.)” If the wife were an unpaid trustee, she would have to pay for the damage unless she can swear that it was not her fault. The same holds for the paid trustee except that she would have to pay for inattention. ? It would be reasonable to consider her a paid trustee. They said, she is not even an unpaid trustee, for if you say so, there never would be peace in his house.

כָּתַב לָהּ נֶדֶר וּשְׁבוּעָה אֵין לִי עָלַיִיךְ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהַשְׁבִּיעָהּ אֲבָל מַשְׁבִּיעַ הוּא אֶת הַיּוֹרְשִׁין וְאֵת הַבָּאִין בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ. שְׁבוּעָה אֵין לִי עָלַיִיךְ וְעַל יוֹרְשַׁיִיךְ וְעַל הַבָּאִין בִּרְשׁוּתֵיךְ הוּא אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהַשְׁבִּיעָהּ לֹא אוֹתָהּ וְלֹא אֶת יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ וְלֹא אֶת הַבָּאִין בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ אֲבָל יוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ וְאֶת יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ וְאֵת הַבָּאִין בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ. כָּתַב לָהּ. נֶדֶר וּשְׁבוּעָה אֵין לִי עָלַיִיךְ כול׳. רִבִּי יוֹנָה וְרִבִּי יוֹסֵה תְּרֵיהוֹן אָמְרִין. לֹא סוֹף דָּבָר בִּנְכָסִים שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּלְּטָה בָהֶן בְּחַיֵּי בַעֲלָהּ. אֶלָּא אֲפִילוּ בִּנְכָסִין שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּלְּטָה בָהֶן לְאַחַר מִיתַת הַבַּעַל אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. תַּמָּן תַּנִּינָן. הַשּׂוֹכֵר פָּרָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְהִשְׁאִילָהּ לְאַחֵר וּמֵתָה כְדַרְכָּהּ יִשְׁבַּע הַשּׂוֹכֵר שֶׁמֵּתָה כְדַרְכָּהּ וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל יְשַׁלֵּם לַשּׂוֹכֵר. רִבִּי הִילָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. וְהוּא שֶׁנָּתַן לֹו רְשׁוּת לְהַשְׁאִיל לָאֲחֵרִים. וְתַנֵּי רִבִּי חִיָיה כֵן. אֵין הַשּׁוֹאֵל רַשַּׁאי לְהַשְׁאִיל וְלֹא הַשּׂוֹכֵר רַשַּׁאי לְהַשְׂכִּיר וְלֹא הַשּׁוֹאֵל רַשַּׁאי לְהַשְׂכִּיר וְלֹא הַשּׂוֹכֵר רַשַּׁאי לְהַשְׁאִיל. וְלֹא מִי שֶׁהוֹפְקַד אֶצְלוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְהַפְקִיד אֶצֶל אַחֵר אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נָטְלוּ רְשׁוּת מֵהַבְּעָלִים. וְכוּלָּם שֶׁשִּׁינּוּ אֶת שְׁמוֹתֵיהֶן שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת הַבְּעָלִים חַיָיבִין. וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל לֹא אֲפִילוּ לֹא שִׁינָּה חַיָיב. אֶלָּא בְּגִין דְּתַנִּינָן. מַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִן הַשְּׁבוּעָה וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. וְאָתָא מֵימַר לָךְ שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהִיתְנָה עִמּוֹ שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר שֶׁהוּא חַיָיב. בִּיקֵּשׁ לְהַשְׁבִּיעַ אֶת הַשּׁוֹאֵל. נִישְׁמְעִינָהּ מִן הָדָא. כָּתַב לָהּ. נֶדֶר וּשְׁבוּעָה אֵין לִי עָלַיִיךְ. אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהַשְׁבִּיעָהּ אֲבָל מַשְׁבִּיעַ הוּא אֶת יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ וְאֵת הַבָּאִים בִּרְשׁוּתָהּ. הָדָא אָמְרָה שֶׁאִם בִּיקְּשׁוּ לְהַשְׁבִּיעַ אֶת הַשּׁוֹאֵל הוּא מַשְׁבִּיעוֹ. הַָדָא יָלְפָה מִן הַהִיא וְהַהִיא יָלְפָה מִן הָדָא. הָדָא יָלְפָה מִן הַהִיא. שֶׁאִם בִּיקֵּשׁ לְהַשְׁבִּיעַ אֶת הַשּׁוֹאֵל מַשְׁבִּיעוֹ. וְהַהִיא יָלְפָה מִן הָדָא. שֶׁאִם בִּיקֵּשׁ לְהַשְׁבִּיעַ אֶת הַאִשָּׁה (שֶׁלֹּא) מַשְׁבִּיעָהּ. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. לָא צוֹרְכַת מֵילַף הָדָא מִן הַהִיא. וּמַה צוֹרְכָה תֵּילַף הַהִיא מִן הָדָא. כַּיי דָּמַר רִבִּי הִילָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. וְהוּא שֶׁנָּתַן לוֹ רְשׁוּת לְהַשְׁאִיל. וְהָכָא. וְהוּא שֶׁנָּתַן לָהּ רְשׁוּת שֶׁיְּהוּ בָנֶיהָ אֶפִּיטְרוֹפִּים. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. צָרִיךְ לְהַעֲלוֹת לוֹ שָׂכָר כָּל זְמָן שֶׁהִיא שְׂכוּרָה אֶצְלוֹ. רִבִּי זְעוּרָה שָׁאַל לְרִבִּי אֲבוּנָא. שְׁאָלוּהָ הַבְּעָלִים וָמֵתָה. אָמַר לֵיהּ. כֵּן אֲנָן אָמְרִין. אֲכָלוּהָ. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר אָבוּן. אָכְלוּ שֶׁלָּהֶן אָכְלוּ. רִבִּי זְעוּרָה בְעָא קוֹמֵי רַבִּי יָסָא. הֵיךְ עָבְדִין עוֹבְדָא. אָמַר לֵיהּ. תְּרֵיי כָּלקֳבֵל אַרְבָּעָה וְלָא עָבְדִין עוֹבְדָא כְסוּגְיָיא. אָמַר לֵיהּ. תְּרֵיי כָּל קֳבֵל תְּרֵיי אִינּוּן. רַבִּי לָעְזָר תַּלְמִידֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי חִיָיה רוֹבָה. רִבִי יוֹחָנָן תַּלְמִידֵיהּ דְּרִבִּי יַנַּאי.

MISHNAH: If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs( Mishnah 4:10 ) or eventually her family if she was childless ( Note 87 ). This “oath of heirs” is “that our mother did not tell us that the ketubah was paid, or that money of hers was due to others, etc.” or her business associates. “I have no oath against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates, but the heirs can ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. HALAKHAH: “If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about properties over which she exercised control during her husband’s lifetime but even about properties over which she exercised control after her husband’s death are the heirs prevented from making her swear. 1:4, fol. 60b. Since at the end it treats a question from there which was not introduced here, it is clear that the text here is secondary. There 3:3. , we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.29b. In 96b, this is a matter of dispute; the Tanna R. Yose holds there that the borrower pays the original owners. ” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others 36a, this is a matter of dispute which is decided (36b) in conformity with the Yerushalmi. . Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus 3:1 (the first sentence only), also quoted in Baba meṣi‘a 3:3 (9a 1.51). : “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated 7:13. : “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first 9:5 and the second Baba Meṣi‘a 3:3 with its Tosephta can be combined. . The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear reads here “that he cannot make her swear.” But the text is very clear, the fact that the husband freed his wife from having to swear about her fiduciary duties does not absolve her from responsibility and having to swear if she deviated from the framework of these duties. . Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. v . נדר; Sefer Ha‘iṭṭur 23a, Note ג.) . Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him 3:1. Even if the original owner gave permission to the lessee to lend out his cow, the lessee is responsible for paying his lease the whole time the cow is in the hands of the non-paying borrower. . Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act 60b 1. 48: Rav Jehudah sent to R. Eleazar: A person having responsibility who handed it over to another (and something happened, who is responsible)? He said to him, the first one has to pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second one has to pay; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second one has to pay. (The following argument shows that one has to read that R. Joḥanan holds the first one has to pay.) In Qiddušin there follows the discussion of this paragraph, which shows that R. Yannai and R. Ḥiyya (the Elder) both agree with R. Eleazar and R. Joḥanan. The Babli, Baba qama 11b, attributes to R. Eleazar the opinion that the first one is free from paying if he did not have to pay under the original arrangement; in practice it is decided that the first one always has to pay unless the original owner agreed to the new arrangements. ? He said to him, there are two 115a.) against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

נֶדֶר וּשְׁבוּעָה אֵין לִי לֹא לִי וְלֹא לְיוֹרְשַׁיי וְלֹא לַבָּאִים בִּרְשׁוּתִי עָלַיִךְ וְעַל יוֹרְשַׁיִךְ וְעַל הַבָּאִין בִּרְשׁוּתֵיךְ הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהַשְׁבִּיעָהּ לֹא הוּא וְלֹא יוֹרְשִׁין וְלֹא הַבָּאִין בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ לֹא אוֹתָהּ וְלֹא אֶת יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ וְלֹא אֶת הַבָּאִים לִרְשׁוּתָהּ הָלְכָה מִקֶּבֶר בַּעֲלָהּ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ אוֹ שֶׁחָזְרָה לְבֵית חָמִיהָ וְלֹא נַעֲשֵׂית אֶפִּיטְרוֹפָּא אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. וְאִם נַעֲשֵׂית אֶפִּיטְרוֹפָּא הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ לְעָתִיד לָבוֹא וְאֵין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ לְשֶׁעָבַר. נֶדֶר וּשְׁבוּעָה אֵין לִי וּלְיוֹרְשַׁיי כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹנָה. וְהִיא שֶׁעָשָׂת אֶפִּיטְרוֹפָּא בְּחַיֵּי בַעֲלָהּ. אֲבָל אִם עָשָׂת אֶפִּיטְרוֹפָּא לְאַחַר מִיתַת הַבַּעַל אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. דּוּ מַתְנִיתָא. לֹא עָשָׂת אֶפִּיטְרוֹפָּא אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מִַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. אִם עָשָׂת אֶפִּיטְרוֹפָּא הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ לְעָתִיד לָבוֹא. וְאֵין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ לְשֶׁעָבַר. אֵיזֶהוּ לְשֶׁעָבַר. מִשְּׂעַת מִיתָה עַד שְׁעַת קְבוּרָה. וְאָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲפִיוּלוּ עֲשָׂאָהּ אֶפִּטְרָפּוֹס לְאַחַר מִיתַת בַּעֲלָהּ אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. וְהָא תַנִּינָן לֹא עָשְׂתָהּ אֶפִּטְרָפּוֹס אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. אִם עָשָׂת אֶפִּיטְרוֹפָּא הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ לְעָתִיד לָבֹא וְאֵין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ לְשֶׁעָבַר. פָּתַר לָהּ עַל רֹאשָׁהּ. וְאִין עַל רֹאשָׁהּ כְּהָדָא. רִבִּי יוֹנָה וְרִבִּי יוֹסֵי תְּרֵיהוֹן אָמְרִין. לֹא סוֹף דָּבָר בִּנְכָסִים שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּלְּטָה בָהֶן בְּחַיֵּי בַעֲלָהּ אֶלָּא אֲפִילוּ נְכָסִים שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּלְּטָה בָהֶן לְאַחַר מִיתַת הַבַּעַל אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. פָּתַר לָהּ מִשְּׂעַת מִיתָה עַד שְׁעַת קְבוּרָה. דָּמַר רִבִּי אַבָהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. מִשְּׂעַת מִיתָה עַד שְׁעַת קְבוּרָה אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. תַּנֵּי בַּר קַפָּרָא. שֶׁלֹּא תְהֵא מַנִיחָתוֹ וְהוֹלֶכֶת לְבֵית אָבִיהָ.

MISHNAH: “I have no vow or oath against you, neither I, nor my heirs, nor my business associates, against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, neither he, nor the heirs, nor the business associates, from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. If she went from her husband’s grave to her family be paid to her immediately on the basis of the ketubah document which is as good as a mortgage coming due. , or she remained in her in-law’s family but to be supported by her husband’s family for the foreseeable future; cf. Mishnaiot 12:3–4 . but was not appointed as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. But if she was appointed as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

הַפּוֹגֶמֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לֹא תִיפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. עֵד אֶחָד מֵעִידָהּ שֶׁהִיא פְרוּעָה לֹא תִיפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. מִנִּיכְסֵי יְתוֹמִים וּמִנְּכָסִים מְשׁוּעְבָּדִין וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו לֹא תִיפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. הָלְכָה מִקֶּבֶר בַּעֲלָהּ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי זְעוּרָה. כְּעֵין שְׁבוּעַת תּוֹרָה יָרְדָה לָהֶן. כְּתוּבָּה הוּחְזְקָה בְיָדָהּ לְגַבּוֹת. כְּמִי שֶׁגָּבָה. וְהוּא כָתוּב עִם הַשְּׁטָר שֶׁלְּמָאתַיִם פָּרוּעַ. וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת מְנָה. לֹא תִיפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. תַּנֵּי הַפּוֹגֶמֶת. לֹא הַפּוֹחֶתֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. כֵּיצַד. הָיְתָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מָאתַיִם וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת מְנָה. נִפְרַעַת שֶׁלֹּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. מַה בֵין פּוֹגֶמֶת מָה בֵין פּוֹחֶתֶת. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. פּוֹגֶמֶת בָּא מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן בֵּנְתַיִים. פּוֹחֶתֶת לֹא בָא מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן בֵּנְתַיִים. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְעָא. כְּמַה דְאַתְּ אֲמַר תַּמָן. עֵד אֶחָד מֵעִידָהּ שֶׁהִיא פְרוּעָה לֹא תִיפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. וְדִכְוָותָהּ. וְעֵד אֶחָד מֵעִידָהּ שֶׁהִיא פְחוּתָה לֹא תִפְחוֹת אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁעֵד אֶחָד מֵעִידָהּ שֶׁהִיא פְחוּתָה בְעֵד אֶחָד מַכְחִישׁ אֶת שְׁנַיִם. וְאֵין עֵד אֶחָד מַכְחִישׁ אֶת שְׁנַיִם. תַּנֵּי. יוֹרֵשׁ שֶׁפָּגַם אָבִיו שְׁטָר חוֹבוֹ הַבֶּן גּוֹבֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. בְּזֶה יָפֶה כֹחַ הַבֶּן מִכֹּחַ הָאָב. שֶׁהַבֶּן גּוֹבֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. וְאָב אֵינוֹ גוֹבֶה אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. אָמַר רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. וְנִשְׁבַּע שְׁבוּעַת יוֹרֵשׁ. שֶׁלֹּא פִּיקְּדָנוּ אַבָּא. שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר לָנוּ אַבָּא. שֶׁלֹּא מָצִינוּ שְׁטָר בֵּין שִׁטְרוֹתָיו שֶׁלָּאַבָּא שֶׁשְּׁטָר זֶה פָרוּעַ. רִבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָה בְעָא. מַתְנִיתָא דְבֵית שַׁמַּי. דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי אוֹמְרִים. נוֹטֶלֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְלֹא שוֹתָה. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. תַּמָּן טָעֲמוֹן דְּבֵית שַׁמַּי. הָבִיאוּ בַעֲלִי וַאֲנִי שׁוֹתָה. בְּרַם הָכָא. בְּדִין הָיָה אֲפִילוּ אָבִיו לֹא יִשְׁבַּע. תַּקָּנָה תִיקְּנוּ בוֹ שֶׁיִּשְׁבַּע. בּוֹ תִיקְּנוּ. בִּבְנוֹ לֹא תִיקְּנוּ. כֵּיוָן שֶׁמֵּת הֶעֱמַדְתָּה אֶת בְּנוֹ עַל דִּין תּוֹרָה. נִתְחַיֵיב אָבִיו שְׁבוּעָה בְּבֵית דִּין וּמֵת אֵין בְּנוֹ גוֹבֶה. דִּלֹ כֶן מָה אֲנָן אָמְרִין. וְיֵשׁ אָדָם מוֹרִישׁ שְׁבוּעָתוֹ לִבְנוֹ. אָמַר רִבִּי אָבִין. אַתְּ אָמַרְתְּ. פָּגַם אָבִיו שְׁטָרוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין אֵין בְּנוֹ גוֹבֶה. רַב חִסְדָּא בְּעָא. בְּגִין דַּהֲלַךְ אִילֵּין תַּרְתֵּי פְסִיעָתָא הוּא מַפְסִיד. אִילּוּ פְגָמוֹ חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין אַתְּ אֲמַר. גּוֹבֶה. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁפְּגָמוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין אַתְּ אֲמַר. אֵינוֹ גוֹבֶה. הַפּוֹגֶמֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לֹא תִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה כול. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָָנָן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יַנַּאי. אֵין פּוֹרְעִין מִנִּיכְסֵי יְתוֹמִים אֶלָּא בִשְׁטָר שֶׁהָרִיבִּית אוֹכֶלֶת בּוֹ. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים. אַף לִכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה. אָמַר רִבִּי יַנַּאי. מִפְּנֵי מְזוֹנוֹת. אָמַר רִבִּי מַתַּנְיָה. מָאן חָשׁ לִמְזוֹנוֹת. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. דְּרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. בְּמִגְבָּה הַדָּבָר תָּלוּי. מַאי כְדוֹן. מִפְּנֵי חִינָה. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיְּהוּ הַכֹּל קוֹפְצִין עְלֶיהָ לִישָּׂאֶנָּה. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים. אַף לִגְזֵילָה וְלִנְזִיקִין. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אַף אֲנָן נַמֵּי תַנִּינָן תַּרְתֵּיהוֹן. לִגְזֵילָה מִן הָדָא. אִם הָיָה דָבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ אַחֵרָיוּת חַיָיב לְשַׁלֵּם. לִנְזִיקִין מִן הָדָא. אֵין נִפְרָעִין מִנִּיכְסֵי יְתוֹמִין אֶלָּא מִן הַזִּיבּוֹרִית. כֵּינִי מַתְנִיתָא. אֵין נִפְרָעִין מִנִּיכְסֵי יְתוֹמִין לִנְזִיקִין אֶלָּא מִן הַזִּיבּוֹרִית. וְהָא תַנֵּי. עָמַד הַבֶּן תַּחַת הָאָב הַנִיזָּקִין שָׁמִין בַּעִדִּית וּבַעֲלֵי הַחוֹב בַּבֵּינוֹנִית וּכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה בַּזִיבּוֹרִית. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. כָּאן בְּיָתוֹם גָּדוֹל. כָּאן בְּיָתוֹם קָטוֹן.

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah , as explained in the next Mishnah. , she shall not be able to collect without an oath only in a court proceeding in which she will have to swear to the amount of the ketubah which still is unpaid. . If one witness. 19:15 ). That rule is stated for criminal proceedings. In money matters, it is a rabbinic institution that the testimony of a single witness creates a presumption that he testified truthfully. The opposing party therefore either has to produce a witness who contradicts the first, or she can swear that her claim is not satisfied. testifies that [the ketubah ] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property , or from encumbered property lien on the property. If the ketubah cannot be paid by the estate, the widow has regress on the buyer. Clearly, the buyer can require the widow to swear for the same reason the heirs of the estate can. , in his had been paid before overseeing the payment of the ketubah. The Mishnah is repeated in Šebuot 7:7. absence she shall not be able to collect without an oath. HALAKHAH: “If she went from her husband’s grave to her family,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ura said, this came down in the manner of a biblical oath. The ketubah is acknowledged in her hand for collection; it is as if collected. But since with the document of 200 there is an acknowledment of payment and she says, one mina [is due to her], she cannot be paid without an oath by signing a receipt for partial payment without specifying the amount. The basic biblical text is Ex. 22:8 : “About any guilty behavior, about an ox, or a sheep, or a garment, or anything lost, if he agrees that this is it, the case of the two parties shall come before Elohim. ” This is explained as follows ( Mekhilta dR. Ismael, ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 301; Mekhilta dR. Simeon bar Ioḥai ed. Epstein-Melamed p. 203; Babli Baba Qama 107a , Baba Me ṣ i‘a 5a, 98a ): The paragraph speaks in vv. 6–7 about a person who holds another’s property without being paid for his services, who will not have to pay if the property is stolen and the holder never used it for his own purposes. Then v. 8 continues about any behavior implying monetary obligation, i. e., any monetary claim of one person against another, and requires first that the object of the claim be well defined (an ox, a sheep, etc.) and that the defendant of the suit agree that “this is it”, i. e., that there is a case, then there shall be a trial before a judge acting as Elohim, as a representative of God as judge. In praxi this means that if the claimant cannot prove his case by witnesses or documents, the defendant can free himself from paying by swearing while holding a copy of the Torah and being subject to all the rules of judicial oaths. But if the claim is for one thing (e. g., an ox) and the defendant agrees only that something else is owed to the claimant (e. g., a sheep), or if the defendant disputes the entire claim, he cannot be forced to swear and the claimant loses his case. R. Ze‘ura notes that the case of the damaged ketubah has most of the features of a case requiring an oath by biblical standards, even though it seems otherwise since the divorced wife claims the remainder of the ketubah but the husband claims that all was paid. For that he argues that everybody knows that a ketubah becomes payable at the moment of divorce. Therefore, the husband is considered to have paid the ketubah sum and now he requests to get his money back, and the ex-wife disputes part of his claim. (In the opinion of the Babli, Šebuot 48b , 81a, this is held only by the House of Shammai; cf. Note 178 .) There are two points why the case does not fit the framework of Ex. 22:8 : The person who swears a biblical oath does not have to pay, but in the case under discussion the wife swears in order to collect money. This is by rabbinic tradition. Second, since the ketubah is a mortgage lien (or: in talmudic times was a mortgage lien), the suit is about real estate and real estate claims cannot be settled by oaths (Mishnah Šebuot 6:5). This argument is explicit in the Babli, 87b , where the place of R. Ze‘ura is taken by (the slightly younger) Rami bar Ḥama. . It was stated “compromised”. Not that she reduced her ketubah 7:7 (38a 1. 25), Sanhedrin 8:6 (26b 1. 49); Babli 87b . . If her ketubah was 200 but she claims a mina, she is paid without an oath was 1000 zuz, the husband claims that it was paid but he has no receipt, the divorced wife states that she received nothing but that her claim was only a mina, this is not conceding part of the husband’s claim (cf. Note 166 ) and she collects without an oath. It seems that the Yerushalmi would agree to that interpretation. On documents which show that 200 zuz written in the ketubah might mean 100 zuz in actual money (and the standards by which the value of a zuz is determined), cf. M. A. Friedman, loc. cit. Note 87. . What is the difference between one who compromises and one who claims less? Rebbi Ḥanina said, if she compromises there was a transaction between them; if she claims less there was no transaction between them during her marriage. Therefore, anybody claiming that there was such a transaction in order to impose an oath on the widow would have to prove his case in court. . Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since we stated there: “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah ] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” should it be similar that if one witness testifies that [the ketubah ] was reduced, she shall not be able to collect the reduced sum without an oath? Rebbi Yose said, at the moment that one witness testifies that the amount should be reduced, he is like a single witness who contradicts the testimony of two [witnesses] document. but no single witness can contradict the testimony of two since the preceding paragraph dealt with the case of no witnesses and there can be no oath if there are two witnesses. . It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said 48a . It is in the heirs’ power to swear that according to their best knowledge the claim is justified. , nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid. 7:7. ” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” 4:3 , about a woman whose husband, having no witnesses, formally accused her of adultery but died before he could bring her to the Temple for the cleansing ceremony. Since the verse requires the presence of the husband at the Temple ceremony (Yerushalmi Soṭah, p. 180, Note 14), the woman is prevented from clearing her name. The House of Hillel hold that she cannot collect her ketubah since she cannot prove her innocence to the heirs ( loc. cit. p. 185, Note 38) based on the general principle that “the burden of proof is on the claimant.” Since the House of Shammai also agree to that principle, it must follow that for them the ketubah is as good as paid and the heirs are the claimants who want to have the money back but who cannot prove their case. This shows that for the House of Shammai the ketubah is the widow’s property from the moment of the husband’s death. Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink is the widow’s property from the moment of the husband’s death, but they hold that if the woman was ready to clear her name, any impediment which is not her fault cannot be held against her. The House of Hillel hold that the heirs do not have to pay her ketubah; since she brought the problem on herself by being seen with another man after having been duly warned by her husband in front of two witnesses; she cannot collect except by successfully clearing her name. The problem is discussed in similar terms in Soṭah 4:1, Notes 13–16 . ! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted that for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule. If a father became obligated to swear in court and died, his son cannot collect. If it were otherwise, what could we say? Can a man let his son inherit an obligation to swear 48a , this is a common formal statement by Rav and Samuel, not an obvious fact. ? Rebbi Avin said, you mean, if a man compromised his document in court, his son cannot collect. Rav Ḥisda asked: Because he walked those two steps, he loses? If he compromised it outside the court, he collects. Because he compromised it in court, he cannot collect 48a , R. Eleazar holds (with Rav Ḥisda here) that the heirs swear the heir’s oath ( Note 177 ) in any case. R. Abin’s statement is rejected. ? “If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. 5:3 , Šebuot 7:9. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due 22a, this opinion is ascribed to Rav Assi. , and some say 7:9, this is attributed to R. Nathan [who is called “some say” in the Babli ( Horaiot 13b )]; in the Babli ( loc. cit. ) it, together with R. Yannai’s explanation, appears in R. Joḥanan’s name. , also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection was not paid. R. Simeon grants this right only to the definitively married woman and the wife who becomes a widow after definitive marriage, but not to the preliminarily married who cannot claim support but only ketubah if widowed or divorced. Mishnah 11:1 gives the estate the right to the widow’s earnings in exchange for the support; it is held that R. Simeon thinks that, in general, the amount needed for her support is greater than her prospective earnings (Babli loc. cit. ). . What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her as dowry to attract a new husband. . Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay. 10:1 : “If somebody robbed and used the proceeds to feed his children, [if the father died] they do not have to pay. But if it was mortgageable [real estate], they have to pay.” ” For torts from the following 5:2 . : “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable 5:1 , Babli 48b–50a ; Baba meṣi‘a 9:14, 12b 1. 11) rabbinic practice demands that tort judgments have to be satisfied by best quality, financial debts by medium quality, and ketubah by lowest quality. In the opinion of most authorities, biblical law requires only minimal quality for the settlement of financial obligations. The rabbinic upgrading was a necessity to make it easier for people to get a loan. Since this argument is irrelevant for orphans, one does not need the Mishnah to know that mortgage debts paid by an estate are settled by low quality real estate. Where the Mishnah is really needed is payment for torts for which ( Ex. 22:4 ) “the best of his fields or the best of his vineyards” are required. The statement therefore should be read: One pays even for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable; cf. Tosaphot 84a, s. v. לכתובת אשה . . But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.

הַפּוֹגֶמֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ כֵּיצַד. הָיְתָה כְתוּבָּתָהּ אֶלֶף זוּז וְאָמַר לָהּ הִתְקַבַּלְתְּ כְּתוּבָּתֵיךְ וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי אֶלָּא מְנָה לֹא תִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. עֵד אֶחָד מֵעִידָהּ שֶׁהִיא פְרוּעָה כֵיצַד. הָיְְתָה כְתוּבָּתָהּ אֶלֶף זוּז וְאָמַר לָהּ הִתְקַבַּלְתְּ כְּתוּבָּתֵיךְ וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת לֹא הִתְקַבַּלְתִּי וְעֵד אֶחָד מֵעִידָהּ שֶׁהִיא פְרוּעָה לֹא תִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. מִנְּכָסִים הַמְשׁוּעְבָּדִים כֵּיצַד. מָכַר נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים וְהִיא נִפְרַעַת מִן הָלָקוֹחוֹת לֹא תִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִים כֵּיצַד. מֵת וְהִנִּיחַ נְכָסָיו לִיתוֹמִים וְהִיא נִפְרַעַת מִן הַיְּתוֹמִים לֹא תִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו כֵּיצַד. הָלַךְ לוֹ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וְהִיא נִפְרַעַת שֶׁלֹּא בְפָנָיו לֹא תִיפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר כָּל זְמַן שֶׁתּוֹבַעַת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. אֵינָהּ תּוֹבַעַת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ אֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין מַשְׁבִּיעִין אוֹתָהּ. הַפּוֹגֶמֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ כֵּיצַד. הָיְתָה כְתוּבָּתָהּ אֶלֶף זוּז כול׳. וְעֵד אֶחָד מֵעִידָהּ שֶׁהִיא פְרוּעָה כול׳. כֵּינִי מַתְנִיתָא. וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו לֹא תִיפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. וְהַנִּפְרַעַת שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו לֹא תִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. וְנִפְרָעִין מֵאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְפָנָיו. אָמַר רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה. תִּיפְתָּר בִּשְׁטָר שֶׁהָרִיבִּית אוֹכֶלֶת בּוֹ. וּבֵית דִּין גּוֹבִין רִבִּית. תִּיפְתָּר שֶׁעָרַב לוֹ מִן הַגּוֹי. כְּהָדָא אַלֶכְסָא. אֲמַר לוֹ רִבִּי מָנָא. אֲנָן עָבְדִין טָבוֹת סַגִיא מִינְּכוֹן. אֲנָן כָתְבִין דִּין מוּגְמָרִין. אִין אֲתָא טַבָּאוֹת. וְאִין לָא אֲנָן מַחְלִטִין נִיכְסַיָיא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ. אַף אֲנָן עָבְדִין כֵן. אֲנָן מְשַׁלְּחִין בַּתְרֵיהּ תְּלָת אִיגְרִין. אִין אֲתָא הָא טַבָּאוֹת. וְאִין לָא אֲנָן מַחְלִטִין נִיכְסַיָיא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ. הַגַּע עַצְמָךְ דַּהֲוָה בַאֲתָר רְחִיק. אֲנָן מְשַׁלְּחִין בַּתְרֵיהּ תְּלָת אִיגְרִין. חָדָא גַוְא תַּלְתִין וְחָדָא גַוְ תַּלְתִין וְחָדָא גַוְ תַּלְתִין. אִין אֲתָא הָא טַבָּאוֹת. וְאִילָא אֲנָן מַחְלִטִין נִיכְסַיָיא. אָמַר רִבִּי מַתַּנְיָה. וְהוּא שֶׁעָמַד בַּדִין וּבָרַח. אֲבָל אִם לֹא עָמַד בַּדִין וּבָרַח לֵית כָּאן מַחְלִטִין אֶלָּא מַכְרִזִין. אַשְׁכָּחַת אֲמַר. חָנָן וְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אָמְרוּ דָבָר אֶחָד. כְּמַה דָמַר (רִבִּי) חָנָן. לֹא תִשְׁבַּע אֶלָּא בְסוֹף. כֵּן רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אָמַר. לֹא תִשְׁבַּע אֶלָּא בְסוֹף. כְּמָא דְאַתְּ אֲמַר. הֲלָכָה כְחָנָן. וְהָכָא הֲלָכָה כְרִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah ] was paid, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received nothing, and one witness testifies that [the ketubah ] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, how is that? If he sold his real estate to others and she collects from the buyers, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, how is that? If he died and left his estate to the orphans, if she is paid out by the orphans she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Not in his presence, how is that? If he went overseas had been paid before overseeing the payment of the ketubah. The Mishnah is repeated in Šebuot 7:7. and she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Rebbi Simeon says, any time she asks for her ketubah, the heirs can require an oath from her. If she does not ask for her ketubah , the heirs cannot require an oath from her (which would disqualify her from being supported) during her husband’s lifetime. But if she asks for her ketubah, they do not have to pay unless she swears, even if her husband had freed her from any obligation to swear. R. Simeon disagrees with Mishnaiot 5 , 6 . . HALAKHAH: “If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was l‘000 zuz,” etc. “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah ] was paid,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath.” “If she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. 7:7; it seems to be closer to the original form. That text for the main section is given here in smaller type; it is taken as basis of the translation, with the deviations from the text in Ketubot noted in the Commentary. The quote from the Mishnah is not in Šebuot since the Mishnah there deals with creditors in general, not only the divorcee or widow. Since the text from Šebuot has all the characteristics of being the original, the discussion of the Halakhah refers to contracts in general, not only to ketubot. ” Can one collect from a person in his absence 1:6 . Since a ketubah, and also a loan document in general, is executed as a lien on all of the debtor’s properties, not on a specified piece of real estate, it cannot be foreclosed without court proceedings in the presence of the debtor or his representative. ? Rebbi Jeremiah says, explain it about a contract for which interest is due. Would the court collect interest? Explain it that it was guaranteed for a Gentile. Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do text, R. Mana speaks to the Gentile Alexis. In that text it is not always clear who is the speaker. . We send edicts text, if it is not simply a corruption, means “judgment that cannot be appealed.” Since the prefect also was the chief judge of the province, there is really no difference between the Roman administrative edict and the Jewish court’s letter of summons. . If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days New York 1944, p. 383. In Jewish Babylonia, the person who did not obey the first summons was put in the ban ( Babli, 88a ; against Tosafot s. v . ורבא ). . If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina: R. Mattaniah. said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we: “they” (third person). cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce. You find that one may say that Ḥanan and Rebbi Simeon said the same thing The Babli, 88b , rejects this statement and finds other cases to which R. Simeon may refer. It therefore also rejects the conclusion ( Note 216 ) reached here. . Just as Ḥanan said, she shall swear only at the end, so Rebbi Simeon says, she shall swear only at the end. Just as you say, practice follows Ḥanan, so here practice follows Rebbi Simeon.

הוֹצִיאָה גֵט וְאֵין עִמּוֹ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ גּוֹבָה כְתוּבָּתָהּ. כְּתוּבָּה וְאֵין עִמָּהּ גֵּט הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת אָבַד גִּיטִּי וְהוּא אוֹמֵר אָבַד שׁוֹבָרִי וְכֵן בַּעַל חוֹב שֶׁהוֹצִיא שְׁטָר חוֹב וְאֵין עִמּוֹ פְּרוֹזְבּוֹל הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ לֹא יִפָּרֵעוּ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר מִן הַסַּכָּנָה וָאֵילָךְ אִשָּׁה גוֹבָה בְלֹא גֵט וּבַעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִפְרוֹזְבּוֹל. מִנְּכָסִים הַמְשׁוּעְבָּדִים כֵּיצַד. רִבִּי חִיָיה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. הַקּוֹרֵא עֶרֶר עֵל מַעֲשֶׂה בֵית דִּין לֹא הַכֹּל הֵימֶינּוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רִבִּי חִיָיה בַּר אַבָּא. וְלֹא מַתְנִיתָא הִיא. הוֹצִיאָה גֵט וְאֵין עִמּוֹ כְּתוּבָּה גּוֹבָה כְתוּבָּתָהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. בִּבְלָיָיא. מִן דִּגְלִית לָךְ חַסְפָּא מִן מַרְגָלִיתָא אַתְּ אֲמַר לִי. וְלֹא מַתְנִיתָא הִיא. רַב אָמַר. בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָר כְּתוּבָּה. אֲבָל בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁכּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָר כְּתוּבָּה מַה דְהִיא מַפְקָה הִיא גוֹבָה. חָזַר וְאָמַר. אֲפִילוּ בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁכּוֹתְבִין כְתוּבָּה גּוֹבָה הִיא. מָן רַב חֵיילֵהּ מִתְבָה יְתִיב. הָתִיב רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְהָא תַנֵּי. גּוֹבָה גִיטָּהּ וּמַטְמֶנֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וְחוֹזֶרֶת וְגוֹבָה. אֵין שָׁם בֵּית דִּין. בְּאִינּוּן רמֵתוֹן. וְאֵין שָׁם עֵדִים. הָבוּ. בְּשֶׁהָלְכוּ לָהֶם לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם. אֵין שָׁם אוֹמוֹלוֹגִיָיה. וְלֵית רַב אוֹלוֹמוֹלוֹגִיָיא. אִית רַב אוֹמוֹלוֹגִיָיא. כָּהֵן דָּמַר. אבר ברטסין עֲבַד חוֹרָן. אִית לֵיהּ כְּהַהִיא דַּאֲמַר. אִי אֲבַד פֶרְונֵא עֲבַד חוֹרָן. הָתִיב רִבִּי בָּא. דְּהָא תַנֵּי. גּוֹבָה בְגִיטָּהּ וּמַטְמֶנֶת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ וּמַמְתֶּנֶת עַד שֵׁיָּמוּת וְחוֹזָרֶת וְגוֹבָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רִבִּי יוֹסֵה בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. וְלֹא עָלֵיהָ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָיה שֶׁהָיְתָה מְשַׁמְּשָׁתוֹ עַד שֶׁמֵּת. רִבִּי זְעִירָא רִבִּי אַבּוּנָה בְשֵׁם רַב. בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁכּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָר כְּתוּבָּה. הוּא אוֹמֵר. כָּתַבְתִּי. וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת. לֹא כָתַבְתָּ. עָלֶיהָ לְהָבִיא רְאָיָיה שֶׁלֹּא כָתַב. וּבְמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין כּוֹתְבִין שְׁטָר כְּתוּבָּה וְהוּא אוֹמֵר. כָּתַבְתִּי. וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת. לֹא כָתַבְתָּ. עָלָיו לְהָבִיא רְאָיָיה שֶׁכָּתַב. רִבִּי חִיָיה בַּר אַבָּא אַשְׁכָּח פְּרוֹזְבּוֹלָא דְּרִבִּי יוֹנָתָן וַהֲוָה פָרִי מִיתַּן לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ. לֵית אֲנָא צְרִיךְ לֵיהּ. וְתַנֵּי כֵן. נֶאֱמָן הַמַּלְוֶה לוֹמַר. שְׁטָר זֶה פְרַעְתִּיו וּקְרַעְתִּיו. רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְשֵׁם רִבִּי חִיָיה. מַתְנִיתָא אָמְרָה כֵן. מִן הַסַּכָּנָה וָאֵילָךְ הָאִשָּׁה גּוֹבָה שֶׁלֹּא בְּגֵט וּבַעַל חוֹב גּוֹבֶה שֶׁלֹּא בִפְרוֹזְבּוֹל. וְאֶיפְשַׁר כֵן. לֹא פְרַעְתִּיו וּקְרַעְתִּיו. וְהָכָא פְרַעְתִּיו וּקְרַעְתִּיו.

MISHNAH: If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah due the divorcee. She has to sign a receipt or the bill of divorce has to be torn up to prevent her from collecting again in another court. . A ketubah without the bill of divorce when she says, I lost my bill of divorce but he says, I lost my receipt; similarly, the holder of an instrument of debt not accompanied by a prozbol ; cf. Ševi‘it 10:3 ff., pp. 650 ff. ; these shall not be paid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, since the times of the persecution and the distinctively Jewish bill of divorce had to be torn up as soon as they had been delivered. After the decrees were lifted in the reign of Antoninus Pius, the status quo ante was not restored. The fact of a divorce could be established by witnesses; the existence of a prozbol was assumed. , a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol . HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah a private one, the court document which proves her status as a divorcee is enough to have another court direct that she be paid the divorce settlement. If divorce and payment were handled by the same court, she would not have to present anything. ”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects if the amount stipulated in it did not exceed the legal minimum. Since legally required terms do not have to be written in the ketubah ( Mishnaiot 4:7–12 ), the amount itself does not have to be written (4:7) for the marriage to be legal. . He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah was written; R. Joḥanan’s opinion there is attributed to Samuel. ; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time which explains the precautions necessary to prevent that the same claim could be presented in different jurisdictions. ? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died? Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rav: At a place where one writes ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on her to prove that he did not write. But at a place where one does not write ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on him to prove that he wrote evidence in questions of existence of documents. . Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba found Rebbi Jonathan’s prozbol and ran to give it to him. He said to him, I do not need it 37b , this is a statement of Rav Naḥman, that Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s elimination of the requirement to produce a bill of divorce or prozbol is permanent. , as it was stated: The creditor can be believed if he says, I discarded this document and tore it up. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya: The Mishnah says so: “Since the times of the persecution, a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol. ” Is that not impossible? I tore it without discarding to discard. ? Here, I discarded and tore it was in existence when needed. .

שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין וּשְׁנֵי כְתוּבּוֹת גּוֹבָה שְׁתֵּי כֻתוּבּוֹת. שְׁתֵּי כְתוּבּוֹת וְגֵט אֶחָד אוֹ כְתוּבָּה וּשְׁנֵי גִיטִּין אוֹ כְתוּבָּה וְגֵט וּמִיתָה אֵינָהּ גּוֹבָה אֶלָּא כְתוּבָּה אַחַת שֶׁהַמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וּמַחֲזִירָהּ עַל מְנָת כְּתוּבָּה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה הֶחֱזִירָהּ. קָטָן שֶׁהִשִּׂיאוֹ אָבִיו כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶימֶת שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן קִיְימָהּ. גֵּר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵיר וְאִשְׁתּוֹ עִמּוֹ כְּתוּבָּתָהּ קַיֶימֶת שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן קִיְימָהּ. הוֹצִיאָה גֵט וְאֵין עִמּוֹ כְּתוּבָה גּוֹבָה כְתוּבָּתָהּ כול׳. שְׁנֵי גִיטִּין וּשְׁתֵּי כְּתוּבּוֹת כול׳. וְהוּא שֶׁיְּהֵא הַגֵּט יוֹצֵא מִכְּתוּבָּה לִכְתוּבָּה. עַד כְּדוֹן בְּשָׁווֹת. הָיָה בְזוֹ מְנָה וּבְזוֹ מָאתַיִם. רַב הוּנָא וְרַב יִרְמְיָה וְרַב חִסְדָּא. חַד אָמַר. גּוֹבָה בָרִאשׁוֹנָה. וָחָרָנָה אָמַר. גּוֹבָה בִשְׁנִיָיה. וְהַתּוֹסֶפֶת גּוֹבָה מִן זְמַנָּהּ שֶׁלַּשְּׁנִיָיה. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנַנְיָה קוֹמֵי רִבִּי מָנָא. לֵית הָדָא אָמְרָה. הָהֵן דְּיָזִיף מִן חַבְרֵיהּ וְחָזַר וְיָזִיף מִינֵיהּ צָרִיךְ מֵימַר. לְבַד מִן כַּרְטִּוסָה קָדֳמַיָיא דְּאִית לִי גַבָּךְ. אוֹרְחָא דְאִיתְּתָא מֵימַר. אֲבַד פֶורְנֵה עֲבִיד חוֹרָן. אֶלָּא כִי אוֹרְחָא דְבַר נַשָּׁא מֵימַר. אֲבַד כַּרְטִיסוֹ עֲבַד חוֹרָן. אֶלָּא כִי אֶיפְשָׁר יוֹדֵי לֵיהּ. רִבִּי יוּדָן בַר שִׂיקִלִי אֲעִיל עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. לֹא כֵן אָמַר רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. שְׁטָר שֶׁלָּוָוה בוֹ וּפְרָעוֹ אַל יִלְוֶה בוֹ בְאוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם. אָמַר לֵיהּ. כָּאן בְּשֶׁפְּרָעוֹ. כָּאן בְּשֶׁלֹּא פְרָעוֹ. תַּנֵּי רִבִּי חָנִן קוֹמֵי רִבִּי הִילָא. תְּרֵין אֲמוֹרִין. חַד אָמַר. לִכְתוּבָּה אֲבָל לֹא לִתְנָאִין. וֶחָרָנָה אָמַר. בִּין בִּכְתוּבָה בֵין לִתְנָאִין. נִיחָא גֵּר. קָטָן. וְקָטָן מְגָרֵשׁ. אָמַר רִבִּי חַגַּיי. קִיַימְתִיהָ כַּיי דָמַר רִבִּי לָעְזָר בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. וְהוּא שֶׁבָּא עָלֶיהָ מִשֶּׁנִּתְפַּקֵּחַ וּמִשֶּׁנִּשְׁתַּפֶּה. וָכָא הוּא שֶׁבָּא עָלֶיהָ מִשֶּׁהִגְדִּיל.

MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot , she collects two ketubot When he married her the second time, he wrote her a new ketubah (which he did not have to do, as explained in the Mishnah.) Then the new ketubah is a new obligation, additional to the old one, not superseding it. . Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah . If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding becomes only valid at the moment the minor becomes an adult and stays married to his wife. . If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding. HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah ,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot ” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot was only intended to replace the first which was thought to be lost; a similar argument is in the Babli, 90a . . So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [ zuz ] and one bill of divorce. If the amounts are equal, the second bill replaces the first. If they are unequal, they cannot replace one another. ? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess should be larger, it now is a lien on the husband’s real estate only from the date of the second. Any real estate sold between the dates of the two ketubot cannot be taken by the divorcee. In the Babli, 43b , Rav Huna states that if she only claims the smaller amount she collects from the date of the first ketubah, otherwise from the time of the second. she collects from the date of the second. Rebbi Ḥanaiah said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not mean that if a person borrows from another, and then he borrows again, he has to declare “in addition to the first paper you have on me”? ? It is frequent that a woman says, my ketubah is lost, write me another. Is it frequent that a man say, my paper is lost, write me another? But it is possible that he should declare for him. Rebbi Yudan from Sicily brought this case before Rebbi Yose: Did not Rebbi Abbahuṣ i‘a 17a, R. Assi (Yasa) in the name of R. Joḥanan. say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Nobody should use a paper on which he borrowed and paid the loan back to take out another loan on the same day? He said to him, here if he had paid back, there if he did not pay back was paid after the divorce, at the remarriage the husband has to execute a new ketubah. The Mishnah refers only to the case that the husband prefers to remarry instead of paying up. . 6:3, Notes 88–89 . It refers to the validity of the ketubah for the remarried divorcee. From the Babli, 90a , one might be led to read this statement as belonging to the next paragraph, about the ketubah of a minor’s wife, but this does not fit the interpretation given the statement in Demay. Rebbi Ḥanin stated before Rebbi Hila: Two Amoraïm, one said for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, the other said, both for ketubah and for individual stipulations. One understands a proselyte. A minor? Can a minor divorce cannot become due. ? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained it following what Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Only if he slept with her when he regained sight or became sane mentally only if for some period she lived with him while he was legally competent. At that time, their marital relations validate the contract. . And here, if he slept with her after he reached adulthood.