Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot Chapter 10

מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים וָמֵת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָיה. יוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הַשְּׁנִיָיה. נָשָׂא אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וָמֵתָה נָשָׂה אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָיה וּמֵת הוּא. שְׁנִיָיה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים כול׳. מַתְנִיתָא לְעִנְיָין כְּתוּבָּה. אֲבָל לְעִנְיָין מְזוֹנוֹת שְׁתֵיהֶן שָׁווֹת. כְּתוּבָּה וּקְבוּרָה מִי קוֹדֵם. כְּתוּבָּה וּמִלְוָה בְעֵדִים מִי קוֹדֵם. כְּתוּבָּה וּפַרְנָסַת בָּנוֹת מִי קוֹדֵם. מָאן דְּאָמַר. גּוֹבִין פָּרנָסָה מִן מְשׁוּעְבָּדִין. פַּרְנָסַת בָּנוֹת קוֹדֶמֶת. וּמָאן דָּמַר. אֵין גּוֹבִין פָּרנָסָה מִן מְשׁוּעְבָּדִין. אֵין פַּרְנָסַת בָּנוֹת קוֹדֶמֶת. לֹא אָמַר אֶלָּא מֵתָה. הָא נִתְגָּרְשָׁה כְּבַעַל חוֹב הִיא. כְּהָדָא דְתַנֵּי. נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה וְכָתַב לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. גֵּירְשָׁהּ וְלֹא נָתַן לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. נָשָׂא אֲחֶרֶת וְכָתַב לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה. הֶחֱזִיר אֶת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְכָתַב לָהּ כְּתוּבָּה עַל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. שֶׁלָּרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָיה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ. וְהַשְּׁנִיָיה וְיוֹרְשֶׁיהָ קוֹדְמִין לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. אָמַר בֶּן עַזַּאי. יוֹרְשֵׁי הָרִאשׁוֹנָה אוֹמְרִים לְיוֹרְשֵׁי הַשְּׁנִיָיה. אִם כְּבַעַל חוֹב אַתֶּם טְלוּ אֶת שֶׁלָּכֶם וּצְאוּ. וְאִם לָאו אָנוּ וְאַתֶּם נַחֲלוֹק בְּשָׁוֶה. אָמַר לוֹ רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. בְּנֵי שְׁנִיָיה קָפְצָה עֲלֵיהֶן יְרוּשַׁת תּוֹרָה וְנוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן וְחוֹזְרִין וְחוֹלְקִין. רִבִּי מָנָא אָמַר. בְּשֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁם דֵּינָר יֶתֶר נֶחְלְקוּ. אֲבָל אִם אֵין שָׁם דֵּינָר יֶתֶר אַף רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה יוֹדֶה לְבֶן נַנָּס שֶׁאֵילּוּ וָאֵילּוּ חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. אָמַר לֵיהּ רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. הַךְ דְּלָא תַנִּיתָא פְלִיגָא אַתְּ עֲבַד לֵיהּ פְּלִיגָא. אֶלָּא בְּשֶׁאֵין שָׁם יֶתֶר דֵּינָר נֶחְלְקוּ. אֲבָל אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם יֶתֶר דֵּינָר אַף בֶּן נַנָּס יוֹדֵי לְרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה. בְּנֵי הַשְּׁנִיָּיה קָפְצָה עֲלֵיהֶן יְרוּשַׁת תּוֹרָה וְנוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן וְחוֹזְרִין וְחוֹלְקִין. וְהַחוֹב מְמָעֵט. וְדִכְוָותָהּ. וְהַחוֹב מַרְבֶּה. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָה. הָיָה שָׁם שָׂדֶה וְהִיא עֲתִידָה לַחֲזוֹר בַּיּוֹבֶל אַתְ רוֹאֶה אוֹתָן כְּאִילּוּ. הֵיךְ עֲבִידָא. קִידֵּשׁ רָחֵל וְכָנַס לֵאָה וְחָזַר וְכָנַס רָחֵל. עַל דַּעְתִּין דְּרַבָּנִין רָחֵל קוֹדֶמֶת. וְעַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה לֹא קוֹדֶמֶת. אוֹמְרִים. אַף רִבִּי לָעְזָר מוֹדֵי. מֵאַחַר שֶׁחָזַר וְכָנַס רָחֵל רָחֵל קוֹדֶמֶת. לְמַה זֶה דוֹמֶה. לְאֶחָד שֶׁלָּוָוה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ. אִם לֹא הֶחֱזַרְתִּי לָךְ מִיכָּן עַד שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֵשׁ יִהְיוּ כָל נְכָסַיי מְשׁוּעְבָּדִין לָךְ. הִגִּיעַ שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֵשׁ וְלֹא הֵחֱזִיר נִשְׁתַּעְבְּדוּ הַנְכָסִים מִיכָּן וְלָבֹא. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לוֹ. לֹא יְהוּ נְכָסַיי מְשׁוּעְבָּדִין לָךְ אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֵשׁ. לֹא נִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חוֹדֵשׁ. יָמִים שֶׁבֵּנְתַיִים תַּפְלוּגְתָא דְרִבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבָּנִין. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי מֵאִיר בִּשְׁטָר נִתְחַיְיבוּ הַנְּכָסִים. עַל דַּעְתִין דְּרַבָּנִין בַּכֶּסֶף נִתְחַיְיבוּ.

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women when he died, the first one is dated earlier. precedes the second is a mortgage lien, the holder of the earlier mortgage has the right to foreclose any real estate before the holder of the later mortgage may foreclose. The rules of this Chapter are in essence rules of privileged creditors in bankruptcy proceedings since they become irrelevant if the estate is large enough to satisfy everybody. , and the heirs of the first precede the heirs of the second the heirs collect these from the estate ( Mishnah 4:10 ). . If the first one he had married died as inheritance. , then he married the second one and he himself died, the second and her heirs precede the heirs of the first. HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal but to be sustained by the estate, they have to be treated equally. The statement is also in Tosephta 10:1 . . Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence The question is not answered, maybe because it never arose in practice. Since the deceased has to be buried before questions about payment are asked, it seems that the burial is charged to public welfare. ? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence ? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence. It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah . The [second ketubah ] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first. of the first [wife] has precedence over the second and her heirs; the second and her heirs have precedence over the second ketubah of the first.” Any prior document has precedence over any later one. ” Ben Azay and all ms. sources of the Babli, 90b . However, in the Constantinople edition with the commentary of Joshua Benvenist, the name is Ben Azay in both occurrences. Ben Nanas is mentioned in Mishnah 5 . says only by rabbinic institution, cf. Mishnah 4:10 , whereas the widow (or her children in her stead) has a contractual claim on the estate. If the estate is larger than the sum of the two ketubot by at least “one excess denar”, there is no problem. All children can inherit their mother’s ketubah and part of the remainder. But if the estate is not sufficient and payment of the “ ketubah of male children” instituted in 4:10 would eliminate biblical inheritance rules, the question is whether rabbinic inheritance can or cannot supersede biblical inheritance (which would treat all children equally except that a male firstborn counts for two.) , the heirs of the first say to the heirs of the second: If you are creditors, take what is yours and leave of male children” eliminates the biblical laws of inheritance. The sons of the second wife take their mother’s ketubah as inheritance from their mother, not their father; what remains of the estate is taken by the sons of the first wife as “ ketubah of male children”. In Tosephta 10:1 , this is presented as anonymous rule: “If there is an excess denar, both parties take their mothers’ ketubot and the remainder is split evenly; if there is no excess denar, the second wife or her heirs take her ketubah and the remainder is divided evenly. ; otherwise let us split evenly between yourselves and us of male children”, they lose their own ketubah and everybody becomes an heir in biblical law. Since this would be to the detriment of the sons of the second wife, the first alternative is operative. . Rebbi Aqiba said to him: Biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split under the rules of creditors and the remainder is biblical inheritance split among all sons since rabbinic inheritance decrees cannot eliminate biblical rules if the estate is too small. . Rebbi Mana said, they disagree if there is an excess denar of male children” of the first marriage. . But if there is no excess denar, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Ben Nanas and all ms. sources of the Babli, 90b . However, in the Constantinople edition with the commentary of Joshua Benvenist, the name is Ben Azay in both occurrences. Ben Nanas is mentioned in Mishnah 5 . that both parties split evenly of the second has the status of a creditor’s claim only for the widow but not for their heirs. Since the argument of R. Yose ben R. Abun is reasonable, there seems to be no possibility to claim a copyist’s corruption. . Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, a situation which was stated without disagreement you turn into a disagreement. They must disagree if there is no excess denar. But if there is an excess denar even Ben Nanas and all ms. sources of the Babli, 90b . However, in the Constantinople edition with the commentary of Joshua Benvenist, the name is Ben Azay in both occurrences. Ben Nanas is mentioned in Mishnah 5 . agrees with Rebbi Aqiba that biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split under the rules of creditors and the remainder is biblical inheritance split among all sons since rabbinic inheritance decrees cannot eliminate biblical rules if the estate is too small. . Debts diminish and, equally, debts add due, one deducts debts payable by the estate and adds debts due to it. The Babli agrees, 90b . . How is this? If there was a field which in the future would return in the jubilee year, you consider it virtual of male children” is due even if the estate reaches the required size only by counting contracts far into the future. [property]. How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence becomes executable only after definitive marriage; therefore, Leah’s ketubah in effect should predate Rachel’s even though Rachel’s was executed earlier, at the time of her preliminary wedding. For the rabbis, the date of the contract is the determining factor. . They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis quoted in the Babli Baba meṣi‘a 13b, in which R. Meïr states that a loan contract allows regress on alienated property only if this was stated in the contract; but the rabbis hold that such regress is a matter of law and does not have to be stated explicitly. . In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי לִשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים וָמֵתוּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת הוּא וְהַיְתוֹמִים מְבַקְשִׁים כְּתוּבַּת אִמּוֹתֵיהֶן וְאֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא כְדֵי שְׁתֵּי כְתוּבּוֹת חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. הָיָה שָׁם מוֹתָר דֵּינָר אֵילּוּ נוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן וְאֵילּוּ נוֹטְלִין כְּתוּבַּת אִמָּן. וְאִם אָמְרוּ הַיְתוֹמִים אֲנַחְנוּ מַעֲלִים עַל נִכְסֵי אָבִינוּ יְפֵה דֵינָר כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּטְּלוּ כְתוּבַּת אִמָּן אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לָהֶן אֶלָּא שָׁמִין אֶת הַנְּכָסִים בְּבֵית דִּין. מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי לִשְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים כול׳. הָדָא הִיא דָמַר רִבִּי אִימִּי. כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּהֵא אָדָם מָצוּי לִיתֵּן לְבִתּוֹ בְעַיִן יָפָה. מֵעַתָּה אֲפִילוּ אֵין שָׁם יֶתֶר דֵּינָר. אָמַר רִבִּי אָבוּן. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁאַתְּ יָכוֹל לְקַיֵים דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה אַתְּ מְקַיֵים דִּבְרֵיהֶן וְדִבְרֵי תוֹרָה. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁאַתְּ אֵין יָכוֹל לְקַיֵים דִּבְרֵיהֶן וּלְקַיֵים דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה אַתְּ מְבַטֵּל דִּבְרֵיהֶן וּמְקַיֵים דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה. רִבִּי יוּדָה בַּר פָּזִי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֶּן חֲנִינָה. מֵת אֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין כּוּלְּהֹן חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא. לָכֵן צְרִיכָא בְּשֶׁלֹּא חִלְּקוּ. שֶׁלֹּא תֹאמַר. יֵעָשֶׂה כְמִי שְׁאֵינוֹ כָן וְתִירָשֶׁנּוּ בֵתוֹ. הָיָה שָׁם בְּכוֹר. אַתְּ אָמַר. הַבְּכוֹר נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. מָהוּ נוֹטֵל. פִּי שְׁנַיִם בְּבֵתוֹ אוֹ פִּי שְׁנַיִם בְּכָל הָאַחִים. תַּנֵּי רִבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָה. הָיוּ שָׁם שְׁתֵּי כִיתֵּי בָנוֹת כּוּלְּהֹן חוֹלְקוֹת בְּשָׁוֶה. הָיָה שָׁם בְּכוֹר אַתְּ אָמַר. הַבְּכוֹר נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. מָהוּ נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם בְּבֵתוֹ אוֹ פִּי שְׁנַיִם בְּכָל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. מֵאֵימָתַי שָׁמִין לָהֶן. תַּלְמִידוֹי דְּרִבִּי מָנָא אָמְרִין. בְּסוֹף. אָמַר לוֹן רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן. לָא אַתּוּן דְּאָמְרִין בְּשֵׁם רבנין. לְכוֹן צְרִיכָא בְּשֶׁלֹּא חִלְּקוּ. אֲבָל מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה שניים לָהֶן.

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women who both died, and then he died, and the orphans demand their mothers’ ketubot , if [the estate] is sufficient only for both ketubot they split evenly sons, the estate is divided into n equal parts. If one of the children is a male firstborn, the estate is divided into n +1 parts and the firstborn takes two. If there are no sons, only n daughters, the estate is divided into n equal parts. . If there was an excess denar, these take their mother’s ketubah and those take their mother’s ketubah . If the orphans say were unequal, the sons of the mother with the larger ketubah would be interested to receive the ketubah rather than the inheritance. Similarly, if the ketubot were equal but one wife had few sons, the other many, the few sons would gain if they could split their mother’s ketubah between them and not have to share with their many halfbrothers. These are willing to take some property at an inflated value in order to receive more than the other woman’s sons. , we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah ; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court. HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. That refers to what Rebbi Immi said, that a man should be induced to give generously to his daughter. If that is so, then even if there is no excess denar of male children” was instituted so that people would increase their daughters’ dowries in the knowledge that the money will be transferred to their grandchildren, it does not seem reasonable to restrict the rules to sufficiently large estates. ? Rebbi Abun said, in case you can uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you uphold their words with the words of the Torah of male children” and still have an estate which is distributed according to biblical law ( Num. 27:6–11 ). Cf. M. A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine , Tel Aviv 1980, vol. I, pp. 381 ff. . But in case you cannot uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you disregard their words and uphold the words of the Torah. Rebbi Judah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If one of the brothers died, they all split evenly. Rebbi Mana said, that is necessary if they did not yet divide the estate. You should not say that he should be considered nonexistent and his house should inherit from him of male children”, in the second case, only the maternal brothers share his part, while in the first they all share. R. Mana states here that an inheritance is acquired at the time of death of the bequeather. In the Babli, Baba batra 107a , this latter opinion is attributed to Rav; Samuel holds that “brothers at the distribution of the estate have the status of buyers from one another”, i. e., their status is determined only at the time of distribution. Since the Babli follows Samuel in money matters, it will deny R. Mana’s assertion. . If there was a (male) firstborn, you say the firstborn takes a double portion 21:16–17 . In that example, the firstborn takes / 3 since there are only two sons. . What does he take? A double portion among his house or among all brothers of male children” of the other wife exempt from the biblical rule of the firstborn? ? Rebbi Hoshaia stated: If there were two groups of daughters, they all split evenly. If there was a firstborn, you say the firstborn takes a double portion. What does he take? A double portion among his house or among all ketubot ? At which point in time does one appraise? The students of Rebbi Mana say, at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to them, are you not those who speak in the name of your teacher, “that is necessary if they did not yet divide the estate” of male sons” is determined at the moment of their father’s death, the value of the estate must be determined at that moment since the “ ketubah of male sons” depends on that value. ? But one assesses from the first moment!

הָיוּ שָׁם נְכָסִים בָּרָאוּי אֵינָן כְּבַמּוּחְזַק. רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁם נְכָסִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶן אַחֵרָיוּת אֵינוֹ כְלוּם עַד שֶׁיִּהְיוּ שָׁם נְכָסִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן אַחֵרָיוּת יוֹתֵר עַל שְׁתֵּי כְתוּבּוֹת דֵּינָר. הָיוּ שָׁם נְכָסִים בָּרָאוּי כול׳. רִבִּי מָנָא אָמַר. בְּעִיקַּר שְׁתֵּי כְתוּבּוֹת פְּלִיגִין. רִבִּי שִמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. קַרְקַע. וְרַבָּנִין אָמְרִין. מְטַלְטְלִין. בְּאוֹתָהּ הַדֵּינָר כָּל עַמָּא מוֹדֵיי שֶׁהוּא מְטַלְטֵל. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בֵּירִבִּי בּוּן אָמַר. כָּל עַמָּא מוֹדֵיי בְּעִיקַּר שְׁתֵּי כְתוּבּוֹת שֶׁהֵן קַרְקַע. מַה פְלִיגִין. בְּאוֹתוֹ הַדֵּינָר. רִבִּי שִמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר. קַרְקַע. וְרַבָּנִין אָמְרִין. מְטַלְטְלִין. רִבִּי בָּא בַּר זַבְדָּא בְשֵׁם רַב. בְּרַם נָהֲגוּ בְסוּרְיָא לִהְיוֹת גּוֹבִין מִן הַנְּחוֹשֶׁת וּמִן הַצּוּעוֹת. רִבִּי אַבָּהוּ בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. וּבִלְבַד מִן הַצּוּעוֹת שֶׁבְּאוֹתוֹ הַלַּיְלָה. רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹנָתָן. נָהֲגוּ הָעָם בַּעֲרַבְיָיא לִהְיוֹת גּוֹבֶה מִן הַבּוֹשֶׂם וּמִן הַגְּמָלִים. וְדִכְוָותָהּ. בִּלְבַד מִן הַבּוֹשֶׂם שֶׁבְּאוֹתוֹ הַלַּיְלָה. אַרְמַלְתָּא דְּרִבִּי חוּנָה גָבִי לָהּ מִן הַמְטַלְטְלִין כְּמִנְהַג מְקוֹמָהּ.

MISHNAH: If the estate contained expected property, it does not have the status of property in actual possession of male sons”, it cannot be counted until it becomes due. Similarly, the double portion of a male firstborn is restricted to “all that is present with him” at his father’s death ( Deut. 21:17 ); the firstborn has no special rights to any inheritance from other members of their family coming to the sons after the father’s death. . Rebbi Simeon says, even if there was no mortgageable property, it does not count unless there is mortgageable property is a mortgage lien and, therefore, cannot be satisfied by movable property. in the value of at least a denar more than the two ketubot. HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot ” means. Is it only the required 100/200 zuz or is it that amount plus any dowry which became the husband’s property, to exclude any sum the husband wrote into the ketubah in excess of minimum and dowry? The second version is preferred by the classical commentators. . Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night to the articles of the dowry brought by the bride. . Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom be paid from movables is nothing but an application of the Yerushalmi rule that local conditions overrule general statements. .

מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שָׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים וָמֵת כְּתוּבָּתָהּ שֶׁלָּזוֹ מְנָה וְשֶׁלָּזוֹ מָאתַיִם וְשֶׁלָּזוֹ שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת וְאֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא מְנָה חוֹלְקוֹת בְּשָׁוֶה. הָיוּ שֶׁם מָאתַיִם שֶׁלִּמְנָה נוֹטֶלֶת חֲמִשִּׁים שֶׁלְּמָתַיִם וְשֶׁלִּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת שְׁלֹשָׁה שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁלְּזָהָב. הָיוּ שָׁם שְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת שֶׁלִּמְנָה נוֹטֶלֶת חֲמִשִּׁים וְשֶׁלְּמָתַיִם מְנָה וְשֶׁלִּשְׁלֹשׁ מֵאוֹת שִשָּׁה שֶׁלְּזָהָב. וְכֵן שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁהִיטִּילוּ לַכִּיס פָּחֲתוּ אוֹ הוֹתִירוּ כָּךְ הֵן חוֹלְקִין. מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שָׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים כול׳. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר שׁוּחָדָא דְדַיָינֵי. לִשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁיָּצְאוּ עַל שָׂדֶה אַחַת אֵי זֶה מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצוּ בֵּית דִּין לְהַחֲלִיט מַחֲלִיטִין. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל שְׁמוּאֵל. אֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא מְנָה חוֹלְקוֹת בְּשָׁוֶה. לֹא שׁוּחָדָא דְדַיָינֵי אִתְאֲמָרַת. וְהָא תַנֵּי. הַיּוֹרְשִין שֶׁיָּרְשׁוּ שְׁטַר חוֹב הַבְּכוֹר נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. עוֹד יָצָא עֲלֵיהֶן שְׁטַר חוֹב הַבְּכוֹר נוֹתֵן פִּי שְׁנַיִם. עוֹד הִיא לְשׁוּחָדָא דְדַיָינֵי אִתְאֲמָרַת. רִבִּי אָבִין בְשֵׁם שְׁמוּאֵל. לֹא שַׁנְיָיא. בֵּין שְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁיָּצְאוּ עַל שָׂדֶה אַחַת בֵּין שְׁטָר אֶחָד שֶׁיָּצָא עַל שְׁנֵי שָׂדוֹת אֵי זֶה מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצוּ בֵּית דִּין מַחֲלִיטִין. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. בְּמַרְשׁוֹת זֶה אֶת זוֹ. בְּשֶׁהִרְשְׁתָ הַשְּׁלִישִׁית אֶת הַשְּׁנִיָיה לָדוּן עִם הָרִאשׁוֹנָה. אָמְרָה לָהּ. לֹא מְנָה אִית לָךְ. סַב חַמְשִׁין וְאֵיזַל לָךְ. וְכֵן שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁהֵטִילוּ לַכִּיס וְהוֹתִירוּ אוֹ פָּחֲתוּ כָּךְ הָיוּ חוֹלְקִין. אָמַר רִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. הָדָא דְאַתְּ אָמַר בְּשֶׁהָיְתָה הַסֶּלַע חֲסֵירָה אוֹ יְתֵירָה. אֲבָל לְשָׂכָר וּלְהֶפְסֵד כּוּלְּהֹן חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. וְקַשְׁיָא. הָהֵן יְהַב מֵאָה דֵינָרִין וְהָהֵן יְהִיב עֲשָׂרָה. וְאַתְּ אָמַר אָכֵן. חֲבֵרַיָיא אָמְרִין. יָכוֹל הוּא מֵימַר לֵיהּ. עַל יְדֵי מִנַּיי סְלִקַת פְּרַגְמַטַּיָּא. עַד כְּדוֹן רְהַטַּת פְּרַגְמַטַּיָיא זְעִירָה. הֲוָות פְּרַגְמַטַּיָּא רוֹבָה. אָמַר רִבִּי אָבִין בַּר חִיָיה. יָכוֹל הוּא מֵימַר לֵיהּ. עַד דְּאַתְּ מַזְבִּין חַד זְמָן אֲנָא מַזְבִּין עֲשָׂרָה זְמָנִים. עַד כְּדוֹן בְּמָקוֹם קָרוֹב. בְּמָקוֹם רָחוֹק. אָמַר רִבִּי הִילָא. יָכוֹל הוּא מֵימַר לֵיהּ. עַד דְּאַתְּ אֲזִיל וַאֲתִי חַד זְמָן אֲנָא אֲזִיל וַאֲתִי עֲשָׂרָה זְמָנִים. תַּמָּן תַּנִּינָן. חָזַר וְנָגַח שׁוֹר אֶחָד שָׁוֶה מָאתַיִם הָאַחֲרוֹן נוֹטֵל מְנָה וְשֶׁלְּפָנָיו חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז וּשְׁנַיִם הָרִאשׁוֹנִים דֵּינָר זָהָב. רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בְּשֶׁם רִבִּי [זְעִירָא]. וְכֵן לְשָׂכָר. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. דְּרִבִּי זְעִירָא פְלִיגָא עַל דְּרִבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. רִבִּי מָנָא אָמַר קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוּדָן. לֹא מוֹדֵי רִבִּי לָעְזָר שֶׁאִם הִתְנוּ בֵינֵיהֶן שֶׁזֶּה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִיסוֹ וְזֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִיסוֹ. שְׁוָורִים כְּמוּתָנִים הֵן. חָזַר וְאָמְרָהּ קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמַר לֵיהּ. בְּפֵירוּשׁ פְּלִיגִין. רִבִּי לָעְזָר אָמַר. סְתַמָּן חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. רִבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר. סְתַמָּן זֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִיסוֹ וְזֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִיסוֹ.

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to three women when he died, the ketubah of one was a mina , of the other one 200, and of the other one 300. If the estate is only 100, they divide equally. If it was 200, the one who claims a mina takes 50, and those who claim 200 and 300 each take three gold denars, 6 gold denars 150 zuz. . If it was 300, the one who claims a mina takes 50, the one who claims 200 takes a mina , and the one who claims 300 takes six gold denars, 6 gold denars 150 zuz. . Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner. which precedes in time has to be satisfied from the estate before the later ketubah can be claimed. Therefore, the case of the Mishnah presupposes that the husband married three woman simultaneously. While this is possible in theory, it is excluded in practice. The problem is a practical one if applied to the case that the amount available in bankruptcy proceedings is not sufficient to cover all claims of equal rank. At first glance, it seems that the Mishnah is inconsistent, applying three different rules to three different cases. Since the Mishnah must guide the judge to correctly apportion payment of claims c 1 , c 2 , c 3 if the available amount a < c 1 + c 2 + c 3 , for all a between 0 and c 1 + c 2 + c 3 , it is obvious that the Mishnah has to be explained by one single consistent formula or algorithm. In addition, the algorithm must be applicable to any number n of claims. In the tenth Century, Saadya Gaon suceeded in reducing the number of different rules employed in the Mishnah to two ( Oṣar Hageonim Ketubot p. 310). A complete discussion of the Geonic treatment of the Mishnah was given by I. Francus, שיטת הגאונים בפירוש משנה וברייתא, סיני פכו-פכז (תשס-תשסא) קצה-ריב (M. H. Katzenellenbogen Memorial Volume). The first complete solution of the problem of finding a uniform rule for all three cases was given by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler, Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, J. Econom. Theory 36 (1985) 195–213. In the framework of the theory of cooperative games, the authors show that the distribution of the Mishnah corresponds to the nucleolus strategy in game theory. Using only elementary mathematics, a single distribution formula covering all cases was given by M. Balinski in: Quelle équité, Pour la science 311 (September 2003) 82–87; What is Just? Am. Math. MONTHLY 112 (2005), 502–511. While these authors succeed in explaining the Mishnah in itself, they do not explain the interpretation given to the Mishnah by the Talmudim. Nor do they explain why in both Talmudim the Mishnah is rejected out of hand. The explanation of the Babli is in language close to the Yerushalmi but translated into mathematical formulas the results are quite different; in both Talmudim the proposed explanation results in a procedure which is not monotone; i. e., it is possible that if the available amount a is increased, the payouts for some claimants are decreased. The solutions both of Aumann/Maschler and Balinski are monotone, increasing with a. Balinski shows that the Mishnah can be understood in terms of a different distribution problem in Mishnah Baba meṣiʻa 1:1, as indicated by Alfasi ( Ketubot 10, 51b in the Wilna ed.). Since this problem is also the basis of the arguments in both Talmudim, Balinski’s method is explained first. In Baba meṣiʻa there are two claimants for an amount of 1. The first claims it all, the second claims ½. Both claims are of the same status. Then the first is awarded 3 / 4 , the second 1 / 4 . While the claims are in ratio 2:1, the awards are in ratio 3:1. The reason given is the rule ascribed to Symmachos, a student of R. Meïr, that “money in doubt is split evenly” [Babli Baba meṣiʻa 2b, Baba qama 35b ; Yerushalmi Baba meṣiʻa 8:5 (11d 1. 18); cf. Chapter 2, Notes 9 ff.]. Since the second claimant asks only for ½, the other half is awarded to the first claimant. The first half is in doubt; therefore it is split evenly between the two parties, resulting in the awards mentioned. In order to arrive at a mathematical formulation, assume that n claims c i are advanced, c 1 < c 2 < … < c n . If several claims were identical they would be consolidated into a single claim and the award split evenly between the participants. For any amount a available for distribution, the payout for claimant i is p i ( a ) , p 1 ( a ) + p 2 ( a ) + … + p n ( a ) = a. We also introduce the sum of the claims, S = c 1 + c 2 + … + c n and M= S/2. For n = 2, Symmachos’s argument determines the payouts uniquely: If a ≤ c 1 , the entire sum is in dispute, p 1 ( a ) = p 2 ( a ) = a /2 . Therefore, p 1 ( c 1 ) = p 2 ( c 1 ) = c 1 /2 . If c 1 < a ≤ c 2 , the amount a - c 1 belongs to claimant 2 and p 1 ( a ) = c 1 /2, p 2 ( a ) = a-c 1 +c 1 /2 = a-c 1 /2, and p 1 (c 2 ) = c 1 /2, p 2 ( c 2 ) = c 2 -c 1 /2 . If c 2 < a , both claimants have equal rights to the excess over c 2 , p 1 ( a ) = c 1 /2 + ( a - c 2 )/2 p 2 ( a ) = c 2 -c 1 /2 + ( a-c 2 )/2 = ( a+c 2 -c 1 )/2 . If a = c 2 +c 1 = S, all claims are satisfied in full. Using the function min( x,y ) = smaller of x or y , Balinski did express the formulas given above by (1) p i ( a ) = min( c i /2, λ) where λ is chosen so that p 1 ( a ) + p 2 ( a ) = a ; i = 1,2. An inspection of the formulas shows that the distribution is symmetric about the middle value of the claims: (2) p i ( M-x ) + p i ( M+x ) = c i . This means that the distribution for M ≤ a ≤ S is determined if it is determined for 0 ≤ a ≤ M. In the Mishnah here, it should be sufficient to indicate the distribution up to an estate of 300 if the sum of claims is 600. But the generalization of the procedure for n = 2 to n > 2 is not trivial. As Balinski points out, an arbitrary distribution function which yields the given values for a = c i and satisfies (2) is compatible with the Mishnah. His own solution is to postulate (1) for i = 1, … n. Then (2) is satisfied and the distribution is monotone. For example, { p 1 (400), p 2 (400), p 3 (400)} = {100- p 1 (200),200- p 2 (200),300- p 3 (200)} = {50,125,225}. The problem with this solution, as with most other solutions proposed in the last 1000 years, is that the Talmudim take another view. The solution of the Babli is easily described as a recursive computational procedure. We assume that p 1 ( a ),…, p i- 1 ( a ) have been determined; leaving an amount a i to be distributed. We determine p i ( a i ). If c i ≥ a i , p j ( a i ) = a i /( n-i ) for j = i , … n . Otherwise, all claims larger than c i are consolidated into one claim C i = c i +1 + … + c n and p i ( a i ) is the payout assigned to claimant # i in the two-person distribution problem for claims c i , C i and amount a i . The fictitious second claimant then receives P i ( a i ) = a i +1 and the process continues. In the example of the Mishnah, c 1 = 100, c 2 = 200, c 3 = 300. For a = 100, by the first alternative p j (100) = 100/3 for all j . For a = 200, c 1 = 100, C 1 = 400. Therefore, 100 is assigned to the second party and 100 is split evenly. This yields p 1 (200) = 50, P 1 (200) = 150. Since 200 > 150, the latter amount is split evenly, resulting in p 2 (200) = p 3 (200) = 75. For a = 300, one sees that p 1 (300) = 50, P 1 (300) = 250; p 2 (300) = 100 = 200/2, p 3 (300) = 50 + 200/2 = 150. This explains the numbers stated in the Mishnah, but what about a = 101? In that case, p 1 (101) = 50, P 1 (101) = 51; p 2 (101) = p 3 (101) = 51/2 = 25.5. This clearly is unacceptable; the procedure of the Mishnah has to be rejected. The explanation of the Yerushalmi (cf. Note 69 ) is not so clearly stated but it seems to be the following: The procedure also is recursive. If c i ≥ a i , p j ( a i ) = a i /( n-i ) for j = i , … n . Otherwise, one considers all two-person problems between claimants i and i +1,…, n . In praxi , this means that one has only to split between c i and c n . If c i < a i < c n then p i (a i ) = c i /2. If c n < a i then write a i = c n + δ. Claims n and i overlap to the amount c i - δ. This means that p i ( a i ) = δ + ( c i - δ)/2 = ( c i + δ)/2. For a ≤ M , the numbers obtained for Babli and Yerushalmi coincide; the Yerushalmi’s method also is not monotone. The results for a > M disagree. For example, for the data of Mishnah 4 , the Yerushalmi gives p 1 (400)=100, p 2 (400)=100, p 3 (400)=200 while the Babli gives p 1 (400)=50, P 1 (400)=350; p 2 (400)=100, p 3 (400)=250. HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to three women,” etc. Samuel said, sharpness of the judges. As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom the court wants to hand it over in possession they hand it over. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If the estate is only 100, they divide equally.” Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? And did we not state: If the heirs inherited an instrument of indebtedness, the male firstborn takes a double portion 124a and in Tosephta Bekhorot 6:17 the firstborn is given the right to refuse a double portion of secured future claims and then not pay double part of future secured claims against the estate. ; and if an instrument of indebtedness was presented to them, the male firstborn pays a double portion. Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on one field or one mortgage was written on two fields, on whom the court decide they hand it over in possession. Samuel said, if they empower one another. If the third empowered the second to deal with the first. She said to her, is not a mina due to you? Take 50 and leave! “Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” 4:1 (by a different editorial team) which explains the somewhat cryptic wording here: תַּמָּן תְּנִינָן. הָאַחֲרוֹן נוֹטֵל מְנָה וְשֶׁלְּפָנָיו חֲמִשִּׁים זוּז וּשְׁנַיִם הָרִאשׁוֹנִים דִּינָרֵי זָהָב. רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי זְעֵירָא, וְכֵן לְשָׂכָר. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי. הָדָא דְּרִבִּי זֵירָא פְּלִיגָא עַל דְּרַבִּי לָעָזָר. אָמַר רַבִּי מַנִּי. קַשְׁיָתָהּ קוֹמֵי רְבִּי יוּדָן. אָמַר לִי. לֹא מוֹדֶה רְבִּי לָעָזָר שֶׁאִם הִתְנוּ בֵּינֵיהֶן שֶׁזֶּה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ וְזֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ. שְׁוָרִים כְּמֻתָּנִים הֵן. חָזַר וְאָמְרָה קוֹמֵי רְבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָמַר לֵיהּ. בְּפִירוּשׁ פְּלִיגֵי. רִבִּי לָעָזָר אָמַר. סְתַמָּן חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. רְבִּי זְעֵירָא אָמַר, סְתַמָּן זֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ וְזֶה נוֹטֵל לְפִי כִּיסוֹ. וְכֵן שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁהִיטִּילוּ לַכִּיס פָּחֲתוּ אוֹ הוֹתִירוּ כָּךְ הֵן חוֹלְקִין. אָמַר רִבִּי בּוּן. נִרְאִין דְּבָרִים אִם נָֽטְלוּ מַרְגָּלִית. דְּיָכוֹל מֵימַר לֵיהּ אִילּוּלֵי עֲשַׂרְתָּא דֵינָרַיי לֹא הֲוִיתָה מְזַבִּין כְּלוּן. אֲבָל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֵחָלֵק מֵבִיאִין לָאֶמְצָע וְחוֹלְקִין. אָמַר רִבִּי לָֽעְזָר וַאֲפִילוּ דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֵחָלֵק. דְּיָכִיל מֵימַר לֵיהּ אַתְּ פְּרַגְמָטַּיָּא דִידָךְ סַגִּין וְאַתְּ מַנְעָא מַזְבִּנְתָּא. אֲנָא פְּרַגְמָטַּיָּא דִידִי קָלִיל וַאֲנַא הֲפַךְ וּמִתְהַפֵּךְ בְּדִידִי וּמַטִּי בָךְ. עַד כְּדוֹן בְּשֶׁהָייְתָה פְּרַגְמָטַּייוֹ נְתוּנָה כָאן. תָֽיְתָה פְּרַגְמָטַּייוֹ נְתוּנָה בְּרוֹמֵי. דְּיָכִיל מֵימַר לֵיהּ. עַד דְּאַתְּ סְלִיק לְרוֹמֵי אֲנַא הֲפַךְ וּמִתְהַפֵּךְ בְּדִידִי וּמַטִּי בָךְ. "Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner." Rebbi Abun said, the statement looks reasonable if they bought a precious stone because he can say to him, without my ten denars you could not have bought anything. But anything that usually is split {smaller units that can be bought with less capital) one adds together and splits (proportionally to the capital invested). Rebbi Eleazar says, even things that usually are split [are divided evenly], because he can say to him, you have a lot of merchandise and you have difficulty selling it. 1 have little merchandise and turn it over rapidly and make as much as you do. So far if his merchandise was here. What if his merchandise was in Rome? He can say to him, by the time you went to Rome, I turn mine over rapidly and make as much as you do. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mani said, I asked this before Rebbi Yudan. He said to me: does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said this before Rebbi Yose, who answered him , they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution. {This paragraph is a direct quote from Ketubot since the quote from “there” refers to here, Baba qama 4:1 }. Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly pro aequa parte of Justinian’s legislation. . That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There 4:1 . Ex . 21:35 decrees that if an ox kills another ox, the owner of the attacking animal and the owner of the victim become co-owners of both the living and the dead animal. If the attacking ox attacks another one before it can be slaughtered, its co-owners now become co-owners with the owner of the second victim. The case quoted in the Mishnah is about an ox worth 200 zuz which attacks three oxen, each of which was worth 200 zuz but whose carcasses are not worth anything after the attack. Then the owner of the ox which was killed last takes half the combined value of the attacker and its victim as prescribed in the verse, 100 zuz . The owner of the second ox has a claim of 50% of the value of the combined value of the attacker and its victim. But since only 100 zuz remain of the value of the attacker and the victim is not worth anything, the second owner gets only 50 zuz . By the same argument, the owner of the first ox gets 25 zuz , the same amount as the owner of the attacker retains. , we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings that in the company created by the attacking ox, the owner of the third victim contributed 200, the owner of the second 100, the owners of the first and of the attacker 50 each, and 50% of the value was lost as prescribed in the verse. Therefore, the Mishnah precribes proportional appropriations for a case which is not a financial operation; the Mishnah in Ketubot can be interpreted that in a company, all gains and losses have to be distributed in proportion to the capital invested. . Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.

מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי אַרְבַּע נָשִׁים וָמֵת הָרִאשׁוֹנָה קוֹדֶמֶת לַשְּׁנִיָיה וּשְׁנִיָיה לַשְּׁלִישִׁית וּשְׁלִישִׁית לָרְבִיעִית. הָרִאשׁוֹנָה נִשְׁבַּעַת לַשְּׁנִיָיה וּשְׁנִיָיה לַשְּׁלִישִׁית וּשְׁלִישִׁית לָרְבִיעִית וְהָרְבִיעִית נִפְרַעַת שֶׁלֹּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. אָמַר בַּן נַנָּס וְכִי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא אַחֲרוֹנָה נִשְׂכֶּרֶת אַף הִיא לֹא תִפָּרַע אֶלָּא בִשְׁבוּעָה. הָיוּ כוּלָּן יוֹצְאוֹת בְּיוֹם אֶחָד כָל הַקּוֹדֶמֶת לַחֲבֵירָתָהּ אֲפִילוּ שָׁעָה אַחַת זָכְתָה. וְכָךְ הָיוּ כוֹתְבִין בִּירוּשָׁלֵם שָׁעוֹת. הָיוּ כוּלָּן יוֹצְאוֹת בְּשָׁעָה אַחַת וְאֵין שָׁם אֶלָּא מְנָה חוֹלְקוֹת בְּשָׁוֶה. מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי אַרְבַּע נָשִׁים כול׳. רִבִּי אֲבוּנָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל. כְּדִבְרֵי בֶּן נַנָּס לִשְׁטָר אֶחָד שֶׁיָּצָא עַל (הָאִשָּׁה) לְקוּחוֹת כּוּלְּהֹן חוֹלְקִין בְּשָׁוֶה. אָמַר רִבִּי עֲקִיבָה קוֹמֵי רִבִּי מָנָא. לֵית הָדָא פְלִיגָא עַל רִבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל. דִּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר שׁוּחָדָא דְדַיָינֵי. לִשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁיָּצְאוּ עַל שָׂדֶה אַחַת. לְאֵי זֶה מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה לְהַחֲלִיט מַחֲלִיטִין. וָכָא הוּא אָמַר אָכֵין. אָמַר לֵיהּ. לֹא בִשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת דִּילְמָא בִשְׁטָר אֶחָד. וָכָא בִשְׁטָר אֶחָד אֲנָן קַיָימִין. וְלָא שְׁמִיעַ דָּמַר רִבִּי אָבִין בְשֵׁם שְׁמוּאֵל. לֹא שַׁנְיָיא. בֵּין שְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁיָּצְאוּ עַל שְׁנֵי שָׂדוֹת וּבֵין שְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת שֶׁיָּצֶאוּ עַל שָׂדֶה אַחַת. אֵי זֶה מֵהֶן שֶׁיִּרְצוּ בֵּית דִּין לְהַחֲלִיט מַחֲלִיטִין. הִנְהִיג רִבִּי בְּאַרְנוֹנָא וּבַגּוּלְגּוֹלֶת וּבַאֲנָפֹרוֹת כְּהָדָא דְבֶן נַנָּס. כְּהָדָא. קְרֵיבִין דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי זְבָנִין חַקְלְוָון מִן אִילֵּין דְּבַר תַּפְקָן. אָזְלוֹן אִילֵּין דְּבַר תַּפְקָן וְנׇסְבִין לְהוֹן נָשִׁין. אַעֲלוֹן לְהוֹן שְׁקִיעִין. אֲתוֹן בָּעֵיי מִתְגָּרַיָיא בִקְרִיבֵי דְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲמַר לוֹן רִבִּי מָנָא. אֲנָא יְדַע כַּד זְבַנְתּוֹן אִילֵּין חַקְלְוָותָא לֹא הֲווֹ אִילֵּין שְׁקִיעַיָּא קֳדָמֵיכוֹן.

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one is dated earlier. precedes the second is a mortgage lien, the holder of the earlier mortgage has the right to foreclose any real estate before the holder of the later mortgage may foreclose. The rules of this Chapter are in essence rules of privileged creditors in bankruptcy proceedings since they become irrelevant if the estate is large enough to satisfy everybody. , the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, so that she is fully entitled to the sum she is receiving from the executors of the estate. The second wife can demand this oath because every penny the first one receives dimishes her chances of being fully paid by the remaining estate. , the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath was satisfied by transfer of title of a field that turned out to be mortgaged and was repossessed by the lender, that wife then has regress on the remainder of the estate and, therefore, has a vital interest that the fourth wife not be paid too much. The Babli, 94a , has some additional reasons for Ben Nanas’s opinion. . If all [ ketubot ] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly. HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to four women when he died,” etc. Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Following Ben Nanas, if one document was produced against (the wife) buyers, they all divide evenly were satisfied, they all have to contribute equally to the satisfaction of the mortgage. Clearly, the title “Rebbi” given to Samuel here is misplaced. A similar statement is attributed to Samuel in the Babli, 94a . . Rebbi Aqiba said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Samuel, since Samuel said, sharpness of the judges? As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom they want to hand it over in possession they hand it over. And here, he says so? Not with two mortgages, what about one? He did not hear what Rebbi Abin said in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on two fields or two mortgages were written on one field, to whom the court decide they hand it over in possession. Rebbi instituted that one follows Ben Nanas in matters of annona , the prestations in kind required by the Roman army in the provinces; cf. Peah 1, Note 85 . It is not clear what the relationship is between the statement of Ben Nanas and the collection of taxes. Since the tax was imposed on the community to be repartitioned by the local person responsible, the latter could impose an oath on the tax payer that he declared his situation honestly. , head taxes, and real estate taxes. As the following. Relatives of Rebbi Yose bought fields from the family of Bar Tapqan. Those from the family of Bar Tapqan went and married women, and gave them šeqi‘in 67b, 110a ; Baba batra 35b , 38a ), and corresponds, in the interest-charging Gentile environment, to the ἀντίχρησις of the Digests (20,1,11,1) and the Egyptian papyri (P. Gron. 11), “substitution of usufruct for interest”. It seems that the men gave their brides documents on the fields they had sold which were predated before the date of the sale. . They came and wanted to attack the relatives of Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Mana said to them: I know that at the moment at which you bought these fields, these šeqi‘in were not before you.

מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים וּמָכַר אֶת שָׂדֵהוּ וְכָתְבָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה לַלּוֹקֵחַ דִּין וּדְבָרִים אֵין לִי עִמָּךְ הַשְּׁנִיָיה מוֹצִיאָה מִן הַלּוֹקֵחַ וְהָרִאשׁוֹנָה מִן הַשְּׁנִיָּה וְהַלּוֹקֵחַ מִן הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְחוֹזְרוֹת חָלִילָה עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשׂוּ פְשָׁרָה בֵינֵיהֶן. וְכֵן בַעַל חוֹב וְכֵן אִשָּׁה בַעֲלַת חוֹב. מִי שֶׁהָיָה נָשׂוּי שְׁתֵּי נָשִׁים כול׳. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. הָדָא אָמְרָה. הָהֵן דִּיזִיף מִן תְּרֵין בְּנֵי נַשׁ. אֲתָא תִנְיָינָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ. קוֹמִי פוֹשְׁרִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ. וְלֵית סוֹפֵיהּ דְּקַדְמַיָיא מִשְׁמַע וּמֵיתֵי מִיטְרוֹף. יְכִיל מֵימַר לֵיהּ. פּוֹשְׁרִין. וְאִין טְרַף טְרַף. פִּישֵּׁר מִן. חֲזָקָה שֶׁהָרִאשׁוֹן בָּא וְטוֹרֵף. פִּישֵּׁר מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן. אָמַר רִבִּי פִינְחָס. אָתָא עוֹבְדָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר. פִּישֵּׁר. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְלֹא כָתַב. דְּאִיקְנִי. לֹא אַתְיָיא אֶלָּא בְיוֹרֵשׁ. אָמַר רִבִּי חֲנִינָה. אֲפִילוּ בְבַעַל חוֹב. אַתְיָיא הִיא בְּהַהִיא דְּלָא כְתִיב. כָּל דְּאִיקְנִי. אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ. אַל יְהֵא לָךְ פֵּירָעוֹן אֶלָּא מִזֶּה. אָמַר רַב מַתַּנְיָיה. אַתְיָיא כְּמָאן דָּמַר. לִכְתוּבָּה אֲבָל לֹא לִתְנָיִין. בְּרַם כְּמָאן דָּמַר. בֵּין לִכְתוּבָּה בֵין לִתְנָיִין. הָא חֲזִירָה.

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two wives when he sold his field and the first wife wrote to the buyers “I have no claims against you”, the second takes from the buyer, the first from the second, and the buyer from the first, she can have regress on the field since she did not sign away her rights. Since the first wife’s ketubah has to be satisfied before the second wife has any claim, the first can take the field which by the action of the second was no longer the buyer’s property but becomes part of the estate. But since the first had given up any claim to that field, the buyer can claim it back from the first. Therefore, all three claimants are forced to agree to a compromise to have any use of the property. ; they go on in circles until they compromise between them. The same holds for a creditor and a woman who is a creditor was secured by two fields which were sold by her husband, and who wrote to the second buyer that she would not exercise her claim against him. In the last two cases it is necessary that the renunciation be for the second buyer since if it were for the first, the second would have no regress on the first. . HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations as enumerated in Chapter 4, in particular the “ ketubah of male sons”. Whether this stipulation can be satisfied by foreclosure is discussed in the Babli, 55a , and the Yerushalmi, Baba batra 8:6 (16b 1.23). The answer is positive in the Yerushalmi, negative in the Babli. For the Yerushalmi, the renunciation by the mother of her claim against the buyer is not valid for her heirs; they are free to foreclose in any case. . But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?