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Shevuot 30b

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Babylonian Talmud · folio map

Shevuot 30b

Shevuot 30b. The full printed text of this folio side — 15 numbered segments, about 445 words — with the classic commentaries printed on the page.

Original text

Segment 1

אִי נָמֵי לְשׁוּדָא דְּדַיָּינֵי.

Alternatively, Rav Yosef informed me that Rav Ulla is a Torah scholar with regard to circumstances where the ruling is not clear-cut and the decision is rendered based on the discretion of the judges, that is, when the court is unable to rule solely based on the testimony presented in court and the judges arrive at their ruling based on their sense of the matter. Rav Yosef informed Rav Naḥman that if the case is decided based on judicial discretion, Rav Ulla is worthy of having the decision ruled in his favor.

Segment 2

אָמַר עוּלָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּבַעֲלֵי דִינִין; אֲבָל בְּעֵדִים – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בַּעֲמִידָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים״. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁעַת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן; אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר דִּין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל דַּיָּינִין בִּישִׁיבָה וּבַעֲלֵי דִינִין בַּעֲמִידָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיָּשֶׁב מֹשֶׁה לִשְׁפֹּט אֶת הָעָם וַיַּעֲמֹד הָעָם״.

§ Ulla says: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the obligation to stand in court is only with regard to the litigants; but with regard to the witnesses, everyone agrees that they testify while standing, as it is written: “Then the two men shall stand” (Deuteronomy 19:17). Rav Huna says: The dispute whether the litigants are required to stand is only at the time of the deliberation, but at the time of the verdict, everyone agrees that the judges issue the verdict while sitting and the litigants receive the verdict while standing, as it is written: “And Moses sat to judge the people and the people stood” (Exodus 18:13).

Segment 3

לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁעַת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן, אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר דִּין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל דַּיָּינִין בִּישִׁיבָה וּבַעֲלֵי דִינִין בַּעֲמִידָה; דְּהָא עֵדִים כִּגְמַר דִּין דָּמוּ, וּכְתִיב בְּהוּ: ״וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים״.

The Gemara presents an alternative version of the statement of Rav Huna: The dispute whether the litigants are required to stand is only at the time of the deliberation, but at the time of the verdict, everyone agrees that the judges issue the verdict while sitting and the litigants receive the verdict while standing, as concerning the witnesses, the status of the stage of their testimony is like that of the stage of the verdict, and it is written concerning them: “Then the two men shall stand.”

Segment 4

דְּבֵיתְהוּ דְּרַב הוּנָא הֲוָה לַהּ דִּינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אֲמַר: הֵיכִי נַעֲבֵיד? אִי אֵיקוּם מִקַּמַּהּ – מִסְתַּתְּמָן טַעֲנָתֵיהּ דְּבַעַל דִּינָא. לָא אֵיקוּם מִקַּמַּהּ – אֵשֶׁת חָבֵר הֲרֵי הִיא כְּחָבֵר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְשַׁמָּעֵיהּ: צֵא וְאַפְרַח עֲלַי בַּר אֲוָוזָא וּשְׁדִי עִלָּוַואי, וְאֵיקוּם.

The Gemara relates: The wife of Rav Huna had a trial pending before Rav Naḥman. Rav Naḥman said: What should we do? If I will arise before her in deference to her status as the wife of a Torah scholar, the claims of the other litigant will be suppressed, as it will be mistaken as a display of preference for the wife of Rav Huna, since not everyone is aware that one is required to show deference to the wife of a Torah scholar. If I will not arise before her, that would run counter to the principle that in terms of deference, the status of the wife of a ḥaver is like that of a ḥaver , who is devoted to the meticulous observance of mitzvot. Rav Naḥman said to his attendant: Go outside and cause a duck to fly and cast it onto me, and in that way I will be forced to arise in a manner that will fulfill the obligation to rise, without intimidating the other litigant.

Segment 5

וְהָאָמַר מָר: מַחְלוֹקֶת בִּשְׁעַת מַשָּׂא וּמַתָּן, אֲבָל בִּשְׁעַת גְּמַר דִּין – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל דַּיָּינִים בִּישִׁיבָה וּבַעֲלֵי דִינִין בַּעֲמִידָה! דְּיָתֵיב כְּמַאן דְּשָׁרֵי מְסָאנֵיהּ, וְאָמַר: ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה זַכַּאי״, ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי אַתָּה חַיָּיב״.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the Master, Rav Huna, say: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis whether the litigants are required to stand is only at the time of the deliberation, but at the time of the verdict, everyone agrees that the judges issue the verdict while sitting and the litigants receive the verdict while standing? How, then, can Rav Naḥman rise? The Gemara responds: One may fulfill both requirements in a case where he sits like one who unties his shoe, neither completely standing nor completely sitting, and says his verdict: So-and-so, you are innocent, and so-and-so, you are guilty.

Segment 6

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: הַאי צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן וְעַם הָאָרֶץ דְּאִית לְהוּ דִּינָא בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי – מוֹתְבִינַן לֵיהּ לְצוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן, וּלְעַם הָאָרֶץ נָמֵי אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ ״תִּיב״; וְאִי קָאֵי – לֵית לַן בַּהּ.

§ Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In this situation where a Torah scholar [ tzurva merabbanan ] and an am ha’aretz have a court case with one another, we seat the Torah scholar, and to the am ha’aretz we also say: Sit. And if he chooses to stand due to deference, we have no problem with it.

Segment 7

רַב בַּר שֵׁרֵבְיָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ דִּינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא, אוֹתְבֵיהּ וְאוֹתֵיב נָמֵי לְבַעַל דִּינֵיהּ. אֲתָא שְׁלִיחָא דְּבֵי דִינָא, בְּטַשׁ בֵּיהּ וְאוֹקְמֵיהּ לְעַם הָאָרֶץ, וְלָא אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא ״תִּיב״. הֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָא מִסְתַּתְּמָן טַעֲנָתֵיהּ! אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מֵימָר אָמַר, אִיהוּ הָא אוֹתְבַן, שְׁלִיחָא הוּא דְּלָא מִפַּיַּיס מִינַּאי.

The Gemara relates: Rav bar Sherevya had a trial pending before Rav Pappa. Rav Pappa seated him and also seated his litigant counterpart, who was an am ha’aretz . An agent of the court came and kicked and stood the am ha’aretz on his feet to show deference to the Torah scholars there, and Rav Pappa did not say to him: Sit. The Gemara asks: How did Rav Pappa act in that manner by not instructing the am ha’aretz to sit again? But aren’t the claims of the am ha’aretz suppressed by Rav Pappa’s perceived preferential treatment of Rav bar Sherevya? The Gemara responds: Rav Pappa said to himself that the litigant will not perceive bias, as he says: The judge seated me; it is the agent of the court who is displeased with me and compelled me to stand.

Segment 8

וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: הַאי צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן וְעַם הָאָרֶץ דְּאִית לְהוּ דִּינָא בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, לָא לִיקְדּוֹם צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן וְלִיתֵּיב, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּמַאן דְּסָדַר לֵיהּ לְדִינֵיהּ. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא דְּלָא קְבִיעַ לֵיהּ עִידָּנֵיהּ, אֲבָל קְבִיעַ לֵיהּ עִידָּנֵיהּ – לֵית לַן בַּהּ; מֵימָר אָמַר: בְּעִידָּנֵיהּ טְרִיד.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In this situation where a Torah scholar and an am ha’aretz have a court case with one another, let the Torah scholar not come to court early and sit with the judge in order to learn from him, due to the fact that by doing so he appears as one who is consulting the judge to arrange his legal claims, and that is prohibited. And we said this only in a case where there is not a fixed time for the Torah scholar to study with the judge at that hour; but if there is a fixed time for him to study with the judge at that hour, we have no problem with it, as the other litigant will say: He is occupied with his fixed study time, and the fact that he sat before the judge is unrelated to the case.

Segment 9

וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: הַאי צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן דְּיָדַע בְּסָהֲדוּתָא, וְזִילָא בֵּיהּ מִילְּתָא לְמֵיזַל לְבֵי דַיָּינָא דְּזוּטַר מִינֵּיהּ לְאַסְהוֹדֵי קַמֵּיהּ – לָא לֵיזִיל. אָמַר רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: מָצָא שַׂק אוֹ קוּפָּה וְאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לִיטּוֹל – הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִטּוֹל.

§ And Rabba bar Rav Huna says: In the case of a certain Torah scholar who knows testimony relevant to a certain individual, but it is a demeaning matter for him to go to the court consisting of a judge who is less prominent than he in order to testify before him, let him not go and testify. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: We learn that halakha in a mishna ( Bava Metzia 29b) as well: If one found a sack or a basket, and it is not his typical manner to take it, he shall not take it in order to return it to its owner. Evidently, a Torah scholar may refrain from performing the mitzva to return a lost item (see Deuteronomy 22:1–3) if it is not in keeping with his stature.

Segment 10

הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּמָמוֹנָא, אֲבָל בְּאִיסּוּרָא – ״אֵין חׇכְמָה וְאֵין תְּבוּנָה וְאֵין עֵצָה לְנֶגֶד ה׳״; כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ חִלּוּל ה׳ – אֵין חוֹלְקִין כָּבוֹד לְרַב.

The Gemara notes: This matter applies only with regard to cases involving monetary matters; but in cases involving ritual matters, the dignity of the Torah scholar is not a consideration, as it is written: “There is neither wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord” (Proverbs 21:30), from which it is derived: Wherever there is desecration of the name of the Lord, one does not show deference to the teacher. Rather, the Torah scholar forgoes the honor due him in order to avoid violation of any prohibition that would desecrate the name of God.

Segment 11

רַב יֵימַר הֲוָה יָדַע לֵיהּ סָהֲדוּתָא לְמָר זוּטְרָא. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּאַמֵּימָר, אוֹתְבִינְהוּ לְכוּלְּהוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר, וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּבַעֲלֵי דִינִין, אֲבָל בְּעֵדִים – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל בַּעֲמִידָה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַאי עֲשֵׂה וְהַאי עֲשֵׂה, וַעֲשֵׂה דִּכְבוֹד תּוֹרָה עָדִיף.

The Gemara relates: Rav Yeimar knew testimony relevant to the case of Mar Zutra. He came before Ameimar, who seated all the witnesses in deference to Rav Yeimar. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: But doesn’t Ulla say that the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to the obligation to stand in court is only with regard to the litigants, but with regard to the witnesses, everyone agrees that they testify while standing? Ameimar said to him: This, i.e., witnesses standing during testimony, is a positive mitzva, and that, i.e., treating Torah scholars with deference and allowing Rav Yeimar to sit, is a positive mitzva, and the positive mitzva of deference to the Torah takes precedence. Ameimar seated Rav Yeimar in deference to the Torah. In order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, he seated all the witnesses.

Segment 12

(סִימָן: סָנֵיגָרוֹן, בּוּר, גְּזֵלַת, מִרְמָה)

§ The Gemara provides a mnemonic for the ensuing discussion: Advocacy, ignoramus, robbery, fraud.

Segment 13

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁלֹּא יַעֲשֶׂה סָנִיגָרוֹן לִדְבָרָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״. וּמִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁלֹּא יֵשֵׁב תַּלְמִיד בּוּר לְפָנָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

The Sages taught: From where is it derived that a judge should not engage in advocacy [ saneigeron ] for his own statements and devise various pretexts to justify his erroneous rulings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter” (Exodus 23:7). And from where is it derived with regard to a judge that a student who is an ignoramus should not sit before him to discuss the proceedings? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.” When an ignorant student engages in the proceedings, he is apt to cause the judge to err in judgment.

Segment 14

מִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לַחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁהוּא גַּזְלָן, וְכֵן עֵד שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ בַּחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁהוּא גַּזְלָן – מִנַּיִן שֶׁלֹּא יִצְטָרֵף עִמּוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מִדְּבַר שֶׁקֶר תִּרְחָק״.

From where is it derived that a judge who knows that another judge is a robber and is disqualified from serving as a judge; and likewise, a witness who knows that another witness is a robber and is disqualified from serving as a witness; from where is it derived that he should not join him in judgment or testimony? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”

Segment 15

מִנַּיִן לַדַּיָּין שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ בַּדִּין שֶׁהוּא מְרוּמֶּה, שֶׁלֹּא יֹאמַר: הוֹאִיל וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִין – אֶחְתְּכֶנּוּ, וִיהֵא

From where is it derived that in a case where a judge who knows that the witnesses testifying before him are lying even though he is unable to prove it through their cross-examination and with regard to the verdict the result will be that it is fraudulent, that he should not say: Since the witnesses are testifying and I cannot prove their deceit, I will decide the case based on their testimony, and let

Shevuot 30b

Shevuot 30b

Rashi

Tosafot

Rabbeinu Chananel

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Meiri

Maharsha (Chidushei Halachot)

Ben Yehoyada

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