Sanhedrin 24a

בְּעֵדִים פְּסוּלִין וְדַיָּינִין כְּשֵׁרִין, מִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי עֵידֵי – פָּסְלִי נָמֵי דַּיָּינֵי. סֵיפָא: בְּדַיָּינִין פְּסוּלִין וְעֵדִים כְּשֵׁרִין, דְּמִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי דַּיָּינֵי – פָּסְלִי נָמֵי עֵידֵי.

is stated with regard to a case of disqualified witnesses and fit judges, i.e., the litigant claims that both the witnesses and the judges are disqualified and proves his claim only with regard to the witnesses. Rabbi Meir holds that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as the litigant’s entire claim is deemed credible. The latter clause, where Rabbi Meir rules that a litigant can disqualify witnesses, is stated with regard to a case of disqualified judges and fit witnesses, i.e., the litigant proves his claim only with regard to the judges. Since the judges are disqualified the witnesses were also disqualified.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: בִּשְׁלָמָא, מִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי עֵדֵי פָּסְלִי נָמֵי דַּיָּינֵי, אִיכָּא בֵּי דִינָא אַחֲרִינָא. אֶלָּא מִיגּוֹ דְּפָסְלִי דַּיָּינֵי פָּסְלִי נָמֵי עֵדֵי? וְהָא עֵדִים תּוּ לֵיכָּא!

Rava objects to this interpretation: Granted, in the former clause, it is reasonable that since the witnesses are disqualified the judges are also disqualified, as, since there is the option of going to another court, disqualifying these specific judges has no irreversible effect on the outcome of the case. But in the latter case, how can Rabbi Meir hold that since the judges are disqualified, the witnesses are also disqualified without proof? This disqualification nullifies the entire case, as there are no more witnesses.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא כַּת אַחֶרֶת.

The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is not referring to a case where there are no other witnesses. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is necessary only in a case where there is another set of witnesses, which the litigant did not disqualify. Since disqualifying this set will not predetermine the outcome, the litigant’s claim that these witnesses are disqualified is accepted.

הָא לֵיכָּא כַּת אַחֶרֶת, מַאי? הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא מָצֵי פָּסְלִי? הַיְינוּ דְּרַב דִּימִי!

The Gemara asks: But if there is no other set of witnesses, what is the halakha ? Is it indeed true that the litigant cannot disqualify them? If so, this is identical to Rav Dimi’s interpretation that the mishna is referring to a case where there are two sets of witnesses.

אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מִיגּוֹ, דְּמָר סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן מִיגּוֹ.

The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the principle that since [ miggo ] one of the litigant’s claims is found to be correct, it can be assumed that other claims of his are correct as well. As one Sage, Ravin, holds that according to Rabbi Meir, we say miggo , i.e., this principle should be followed, and one Sage, Rav Dimi, holds that we do not say miggo , but rather the litigant is required to prove every claim he makes.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: פֶּה קָדוֹשׁ יֹאמַר דָּבָר זֶה? תְּנִי: ״עֵדוֹ״.

§ The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself: Reish Lakish says: Would a holy mouth, i.e., that of Rabbi Meir, say this strange statement, that a litigant can prevent a witness from testifying against him? Rather, emend the text of the mishna and teach: His witness, in the singular, meaning that a litigant can disqualify only a witness who testifies alone.

אִינִי? וְהָאָמַר עוּלָּא: הָרוֹאֶה אֶת רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, כְּאִילּוּ עוֹקֵר הָרִים וְטוֹחֲנָן זֶה בָּזֶה.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? Was it in character for Reish Lakish to speak of Rabbi Meir with such reverence when disagreeing with his ruling? But doesn’t Ulla say: When one sees Reish Lakish studying Torah in the study hall it is as though he is uprooting mountains and grinding them into each other? Reish Lakish was evidently very sharp in his analyses.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: וַהֲלֹא כׇּל הָרוֹאֶה רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, כְּאִילּוּ עוֹקֵר הָרֵי הָרִים וְטוֹחֲנָן זֶה בָּזֶה!

Ravina said in response: What is the difficulty? But is it not so that when anyone sees Rabbi Meir studying Torah in the study hall, it is as though he is uprooting the highest of mountains and grinding them into each other? Rabbi Meir was a greater scholar than Reish Lakish, so it was fitting for Reish Lakish to speak of him with reverence.

הָכִי קָאָמַר: בָּא וּרְאֵה כַּמָּה מְחַבְּבִין זֶה אֶת זֶה.

The Gemara answers: The question: Is that so, was not stated to raise a difficulty; rather, this is what he is saying, i.e., this is what the Gemara was noting: Come and see how much the Sages love each other. Although Reish Lakish was himself very sharp and a great Torah scholar, he spoke of Rabbi Meir with reverence.

כִּי הָא דְּיָתֵיב רַבִּי וְקָאָמַר: אָסוּר לְהַטְמִין אֶת הַצּוֹנֵן. אָמַר לְפָנָיו רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אַבָּא הִתִּיר לְהַטְמִין אֶת הַצּוֹנֵן. אָמַר לָהֶם: כְּבָר הוֹרָה זָקֵן.

The Gemara cites another example of Torah scholars who spoke of each other with reverence. It is like that incident where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi sat and said: It is prohibited to insulate cold food on Shabbat to keep it cold, as this may lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat to keep it hot. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said before him: My father ruled that it is permitted to insulate cold food on Shabbat. There is no concern that this will lead one to insulate hot food on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi subsequently said to those who asked him about this issue: I retract my previous statement; the elder, Rabbi Yosei, has already issued a ruling on this topic, and I defer to his ruling.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בֹּא וּרְאֵה כַּמָּה מְחַבְּבִין זֶה אֶת זֶה, דְּאִילּוּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי קַיָּים הָיָה, כָּפוּף וְיוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבִּי. דְּהָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי מְמַלֵּא מְקוֹם אֲבוֹתָיו הֲוָה, וְהָיָה כָּפוּף וְיוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵי רַבִּי, וְקָא אָמַר: כְּבָר הוֹרָה זָקֵן.

Rav Pappa says: Come and see how much they loved each other. As, had Rabbi Yosei still been alive, he would have been subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student, as Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was his fathers’ replacement, i.e., he was as great a Torah scholar as his forebears, and he was subordinate to and sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi as his student. And, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The elder has already issued a ruling on this topic, and he deferred to Rabbi Yosei’s ruling.

אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: מַאי דִּכְתִיב ״וָאֶקַּח לִי אֶת שְׁנֵי מַקְלוֹת לְאַחַד קָרָאתִי נוֹעַם וּלְאַחַד קָרָאתִי חוֹבְלִים״? ״נוֹעַם״ – אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁמַּנְעִימִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה. ״חוֹבְלִים״ – אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּבָבֶל, שֶׁמְּחַבְּלִים זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה.

This demonstrates what Rabbi Oshaya says: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And I took for myself two staves; the one I called Graciousness, and the other I called Binders” (Zechariah 11:7)? “Graciousness”; these are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are gracious to one another in discussions of halakha . They treat each other with honor and love, as demonstrated in the statements of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. “Binders [ ḥovelim ]”; these are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who injure [ shemeḥabbelim ] each other in discussions of halakha , i.e., they speak harshly to each other when they disagree.

״וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלַי אֵלֶּה [שְׁנֵי] בְנֵי הַיִּצְהָר הָעֹמְדִים וְגוֹ׳ וּשְׁנַיִם זֵיתִים עָלֶיהָ״. ״יִצְהָר״ – אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנּוֹחִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה כְּשֶׁמֶן זַיִת. ״וּשְׁנַיִם זֵיתִים עָלֶיהָ״ – אֵלּוּ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁבְּבָבֶל, שֶׁמְּרוֹרִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּהֲלָכָה כְּזַיִת.

Similarly, it is stated: “Then he said to me: These are the two anointed ones, that stand by the Lord of the whole earth” (Zechariah 4:14), and it is stated: “And two olive trees by it, one upon the right side of the bowl, and the other upon its left side” (Zechariah 4:3). With regard to the expression “anointed ones,” Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These are the Torah scholars in Eretz Yisrael, who are pleasant to each other in discussions of halakha like olive oil, which is not bitter. The verse “and two olive trees by it” should be interpreted as follows: These are the Torah scholars in Babylonia, who are bitter to each other in discussions of halakha like an olive.

״וָאֶשָּׂא עֵינַי וָאֵרֶא וְהִנֵּה שְׁתַּיִם נָשִׁים יוֹצְאוֹת וְרוּחַ בְּכַנְפֵיהֶם וְלָהֵנָּה כְנָפַיִם כְּכַנְפֵי הַחֲסִידָה וַתִּשֶּׂאנָה הָאֵיפָה בֵּין הַשָּׁמַיִם וּבֵין הָאָרֶץ. וָאֹמַר אֶל הַמַּלְאָךְ הַדֹּבֵר בִּי אָנָה הֵמָּה מוֹלִכוֹת אֶת הָאֵיפָה. וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלַי לִבְנוֹת לָה בַיִת בְּאֶרֶץ שִׁנְעָר״. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יוֹחַאי: זוֹ חֲנוּפָּה וְגַסּוּת הָרוּחַ שֶׁיָּרְדוּ לְבָבֶל.

The Gemara interprets another verse in Zechariah: “Then I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: To where do they take the measure? And he said to me: To build her a house in the land of Shinar” (Zechariah 5:9–11). Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: This measure refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia, i.e., Shinar.

וְגַסּוּת הָרוּחַ לְבָבֶל נְחִית? וְהָאָמַר מָר: עֲשָׂרָה קַבִּין גַּסּוּת יָרְדוּ לְעוֹלָם, תִּשְׁעָה נָטְלָה עֵילָם וְאַחַת כׇּל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ!

The Gemara asks: And did arrogance descend to Babylonia? But doesn’t the Master say: Ten kav of arrogance descended to the world; Eilam took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one?

אִין, לְבָבֶל נְחִית, וְאִישְׁתַּרְבּוֹבֵי [הוּא] דְּאִישְׁתַּרְבַּב לְעֵילָם. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״לִבְנוֹת לָה בַיִת בְּאֶרֶץ שִׁנְעָר״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara answers: Yes, it descended to Babylonia, and it made its way to Eilam. The language of the verse is also precise, as it is written: “To build her a house in the land of Shinar,” which indicates that the original intention was to build a house in Babylonia, but it was not built there. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that arrogance did not remain in Babylonia.

וְהָאָמַר מָר: סִימָן לְגַסּוּת הָרוּחַ – עֲנִיּוּת, וַעֲנִיּוּת לְבָבֶל נְחִית! מַאי עֲנִיּוּת? עֲנִיּוּת תּוֹרָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״אָחוֹת לָנוּ קְטַנָּה וְשָׁדַיִם אֵין לָהּ״. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זוֹ עֵילָם, שֶׁזָּכְתָה לִלְמוֹד וְלֹא זָכְתָה לְלַמֵּד.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the Master say: A sign of arrogance is poverty? And poverty descended to Babylonia, not to Eilam. The Gemara answers: To what kind of poverty is this referring? It is poverty with regard to Torah, which was characteristic of Eilam. As it is written: “We have a little sister, and she has no breasts” (Song of Songs 8:8), and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This refers to Eilam, whose inhabitants merited to learn Torah but did not merit to teach it. They did not produce Torah scholars capable of imparting their wisdom to others.

מַאי בָּבֶל? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּלוּלָה בַּמִּקְרָא, בְּלוּלָה בַּמִּשְׁנָה, בְּלוּלָה בַּתַּלְמוּד. ״בְּמַחֲשַׁכִּים הוֹשִׁיבַנִי כְּמֵתֵי עוֹלָם״ – אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: זֶה תַּלְמוּדָהּ שֶׁל בָּבֶל.

The Gemara asks: What is the homiletic interpretation of the word Babylonia? Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as a tribute to the Jewish community of Babylonia and its Torah scholars: It means mixed with Bible, mixed with Mishna, and mixed with Talmud. Other Sages had a different opinion of the Torah in Babylonia: With regard to the verse: “He has made me dwell in dark places, as those that have been long dead” (Lamentations 3:6), Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is the Talmud of Babylonia, which is not as clear as the Talmud of Eretz Yisrael.

מַתְנִי׳ אָמַר לוֹ: ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אַבָּא״, ״נֶאֱמָן עָלַי אָבִיךָ״, ״נֶאֱמָנִים עָלַי שְׁלֹשָׁה רוֹעֵי בָּקָר״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.

MISHNA: If one litigant says to the other: My father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Your father is trusted to adjudicate for me, or: Three cattle herders, who are not proficient in halakha , are trusted to adjudicate for me, all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it, but must accept their verdict.

הָיָה חַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״דּוֹר לִי בְּחַיֵּי רֹאשֶׁךָ״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.

Similarly, one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, which is done while grasping a sacred object, and the latter said to him: Instead of taking an oath, merely vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it, and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב דִּימִי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: כְּגוֹן דְּקַבְּלֵיהּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּחַד.

GEMARA: Rav Dimi, son of Rav Naḥman, son of Rav Yosef, says: The case of a litigant who accepts his father or the father of the other litigant as a judge is referring to where the litigant accepted this relative upon himself as one of the judges in a court of three, where the other two judges are fit. It is not referring to where he accepted him as the sole judge.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״, אֲבָל בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת.

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the claimant had said to the defendant: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you if my father or your father rules as judge to that effect, and the claimant subsequently wishes to retract his offer. But in a case where it is the defendant who said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge, everyone agrees that he can retract his offer. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant said: I will give you what you claim if that is the ruling of this judge.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ? אוֹ דִילְמָא: בֵּין בָּזוֹ וּבֵין בָּזוֹ מַחְלוֹקֶת?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is the dispute only with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer? Or perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case?

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״, אֲבָל בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from that which Rava says: The dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer.

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּ״אֶתֵּן לָךְ״ – מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל בְּ״מָחוּל לָךְ״ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, רָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בֵּין בָּזוֹ וּבֵין בָּזוֹ מַחְלוֹקֶת, רָבָא דְּאָמַר כְּמַאן?

Granted, this makes sense if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan too, the dispute is with regard to a case where the defendant says: I will give you, but in a case where the claimant says: The money I claim you owe me is forgiven you, everyone agrees that he cannot retract his offer; this means that Rava is stating the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. But if you say that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the dispute is both with regard to this case and with regard to that case, then in accordance with whose opinion is Rava stating the halakha ? His statement is in accordance with neither Shmuel’s opinion nor Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion.

רָבָא טַעְמָא דְנַפְשֵׁיהּ קָאָמַר.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps Rava is stating his own explanation of the dispute.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא לְרָבָא: הָיָה חַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, וְאָמַר לוֹ: ״דּוֹר לִי בְּחַיֵּי רֹאשֶׁךָ״. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר בּוֹ.

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥlifa raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from the latter clause in the mishna: With regard to one who was obligated by Torah law to take an oath to another, and the latter said to him: Vow to me by the life of your head that what you claim is true, Rabbi Meir says: The one who made the offer can retract it; and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract his offer.