Sanhedrin 10a

״פְּלוֹנִי בָּא עַל אִשְׁתִּי״, הוּא וְאַחֵר מִצְטָרְפִין לְהוֹרְגוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא לְהוֹרְגָהּ.

If someone testifies: So-and-so engaged in intercourse with my wife, he and another may combine to execute him, the accused man, with his testimony, but the woman’s husband is not accepted as a witness to execute her. A person cannot testify concerning his wife or any other close relative.

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? דִּמְפַלְּגִינַן בְּדִיבּוּרָא? הַיְינוּ הָךְ! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אָדָם קָרוֹב אֵצֶל עַצְמוֹ – אָמְרִינַן, אֵצֶל אִשְׁתּוֹ – לָא אָמְרִינַן. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: What is this last scenario teaching us? Is it that we divide the statement of the witness in order to accept part of the testimony while rejecting the inadmissible part? This cannot be, as the principle in this case is identical to that case, in which the witness is not accepted to incriminate himself. The Gemara answers: The second case is necessary, lest you say: With regard to his own self, since a person is his own relative, we say that we divide the testimony. But with regard to his wife, one might think we do not say so, and the entire testimony must be either accepted or rejected. Therefore, the second case teaches us that even with regard to one’s wife, the statement is divided, and the testimony concerning his wife is disregarded.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: ״פְּלוֹנִי בָּא עַל נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה״, וְהוּזַּמּוּ – נֶהֱרָגִין, וְאֵין מְשַׁלְּמִין מָמוֹן. ״בִּתּוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי״, וְהוּזַּמּוּ – נֶהֱרָגִין וּמְשַׁלְּמִין מָמוֹן. מָמוֹן לָזֶה וּנְפָשׁוֹת לָזֶה.

And Rava also says: If witnesses testify: So-and-so engaged in intercourse with a betrothed young woman (see Deuteronomy 22:25), without specifying the young woman in question, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, and they are not liable to pay money. Since they never specified the identity of the young woman, they were never in a position to cause anyone to lose part or all of her marriage contract. But if they specified: The young woman was the daughter of so-and-so, and they are rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, and they also pay money. Since in this case, the money is for this victim, i.e., the father of the young woman who stood to lose part or all of her marriage contract, and their lives are for that victim, i.e., the man and woman accused of adultery, they are liable to receive both punishments.

וְאָמַר רָבָא: ״פְּלוֹנִי רָבַע הַשּׁוֹר״ וְהוּזַּמּוּ – נֶהֱרָגִין, וְאֵין מְשַׁלְּמִין מָמוֹן. ״שׁוֹרוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי״ וְהוּזַּמּוּ – נֶהֱרָגִין, וּמְשַׁלְּמִין מָמוֹן. מָמוֹן לָזֶה, וּנְפָשׁוֹת לָזֶה.

And Rava also says: If they testify: So-and-so engaged in bestiality with an ox (see Leviticus 18:23), which would theoretically result in the execution of both the person and the animal, without specifying which ox, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, as their testimony would have put the accused to death, and yet they are not liable to pay money for the ox, because their testimony did not pertain to any ox in particular. But if they specify: He engaged in bestiality with so-and-so’s ox, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, they are executed, and they also pay money to the owner of the ox they sought to have killed. Since the money is for this victim, the owner whose ox would have been killed by the court, and their lives are for that victim, the man accused of engaging in bestiality with an animal, they are liable to receive both punishments.

הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? הַיְינוּ הָךְ! מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָעֵי בַּעְיָא עִילָּוֵיהּ, דְּבָעֵי רָבָא: ״פְּלוֹנִי רָבַע שׁוֹרִי״, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: אָדָם קָרוֹב אֵצֶל עַצְמוֹ, וְאֵין אָדָם קָרוֹב אֵצֶל מָמוֹנוֹ? אוֹ דִילְמָא אָמְרִינַן: אָדָם קָרוֹב אֵצֶל מָמוֹנוֹ? בָּתַר דְּבַעְיַאּ הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ: אָדָם קָרוֹב אֵצֶל עַצְמוֹ, וְאֵין אָדָם קָרוֹב אֵצֶל מָמוֹנוֹ.

The Gemara asks: It seems that the case of the ox exemplifies the same principle as the case of the betrothed young woman. Why do I also need this case? This is essentially identical to that. The Gemara answers: The second case was necessary to clarify a point, because Rava raised a dilemma about it, as Rava raised a dilemma: If someone testifies: So-and-so engaged in bestiality with my ox, what is the halakha ? Do we say: A person is his own relative concerning testimony, but a person does not have the status of a relative with regard to his property, and consequently the ox would also be executed because his testimony about his own animal is admissible? Or perhaps we say: A person has the status of a relative with regard to his property, and therefore his testimony about his ox is inadmissible? The Gemara says: After he raised the dilemma, he then resolved it: A person is his own relative, but a person does not have the status of a relative with regard to his property, so the ox is executed.

מַכּוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה כּוּ׳. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אָמַר קְרָא ״וּשְׁפָטוּם״ – שְׁנַיִם, וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין שָׁקוּל, מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶם עוֹד אֶחָד. הֲרֵי כָּאן שְׁלֹשָׁה.

§ The mishna teaches: Cases concerning one who is accused of violating a prohibition that would render him liable to receive lashes must be judged by three judges. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Huna says: The verse states: “If there will be a controversy between men, and they come to judgment, and the judges judge them, and they shall justify the just, and they shall condemn the wicked. Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face” (Deuteronomy 25:1–2). When it states: “And the judges judge them,” in the plural, this indicates a minimum of two judges. And since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, the court adds to them one more, and there are a total of three judges here.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״וְהִצְדִּיקוּ״ – שְׁנַיִם, ״וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ״ – שְׁנַיִם, הֲרֵי כָּאן שִׁבְעָה? הָהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ כִּדְעוּלָּא, דְּאָמַר עוּלָּא: רֶמֶז לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין מִן הַתּוֹרָה מִנַּיִן?

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the plural verbs in the verse each indicate two judges, the term: “And they shall justify,” indicates another two, and the term: “And they shall condemn,” indicates another two, so that there are a total of seven here. The Gemara answers: Rav Huna requires that pair of terms in accordance with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla says: From where in the Torah is there an allusion to the halakha of conspiring witnesses?

רֶמֶז לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין?! וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם״! אֶלָּא, רֶמֶז לְעֵדִים זוֹמְמִין שֶׁלּוֹקִין מִנַּיִין? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהִצְדִּיקוּ אֶת הַצַּדִּיק וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ אֶת הָרָשָׁע״.

The Gemara interrupts with a question: An allusion to the halakha of conspiring witnesses? But it is written explicitly: “Then you shall do to him as he had planned to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). Why would there be a need for an allusion? Rather, Ulla meant: From where in the Torah is there an allusion to the halakha that conspiring witnesses are flogged? Ulla answers: As it is written: “And they shall justify the just, and they shall condemn the wicked. Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face.”

מִשּׁוּם דְּ״הִצְדִּיקוּ אֶת הַצַּדִּיק וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ אֶת הָרָשָׁע״, ״וְהָיָה אִם בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע״? אֶלָּא, עֵדִים שֶׁהִרְשִׁיעוּ אֶת הַצַּדִּיק, וַאֲתוֹ עֵדֵי אַחֲרִינֵי וְהִצְדִּיקוּ אֶת הַצַּדִּיק דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא, וְשַׁוִּינְהוּ לְהָנָךְ רְשָׁעִים, ״וְהָיָה אִם בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע״.

The Gemara explains the derivation: Due to the fact that the terms in the verse: “They shall justify the just, and they shall condemn the wicked” indicate a financial dispute in which one party is vindicated and the other is required to pay, does it follow that, as the verse continues: “Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten”? Why would the verdict’s being rendered in the other party’s favor mean that the losing party is flogged? Rather, the verse must be discussing the witnesses and not the litigants. If conspiring witnesses condemned the just one, and other witnesses came and justified the one who was really the just one from the beginning and rendered these conspiring witnesses wicked, then, as the verse continues: “Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten, that the judge shall cause him to lie down, and to be beaten before his face.” This indicates that the witnesses are subject to lashes.

וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִ״לֹּא תַעֲנֶה״! מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה, וְכׇל לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה אֵין לוֹקִין עָלָיו.

The Gemara asks: Why does this halakha require a specific derivation? But since there is a principle that one is subject to lashes for violating any prohibition, why not derive this punishment from the prohibition: “You shall not testify as a false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)? The Gemara answers: That verse is insufficient, because it is a prohibition that does not involve an action, but only speech, and with regard to any prohibition that does not involve an action, one is not flogged for it.

מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אָמְרוּ: בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אָתְיָא ״רָשָׁע״ ״רָשָׁע״ מֵחַיָּיבֵי מִיתוֹת. כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״וְהָיָה אִם בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״אֲשֶׁר הוּא רָשָׁע לָמוּת״. מָה לְהַלָּן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, אַף כָּאן בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה.

§ The mishna teaches: It was stated in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: Cases concerning lashes must be adjudicated by twenty-three judges. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yishmael? Abaye said: This is derived by means of a verbal analogy between one instance of the term wicked and another instance of the term wicked, from the halakha of those liable to receive death penalties. It is written here, with regard to lashes: “Then it shall be, if the wicked man deserves to be beaten,” and it is written there, with regard to a murderer: “That is a wicked man guilty of death” (Numbers 35:31). Just as there, with regard to the trial of the murderer, the case is tried by twenty-three judges, so too here, the case of lashes must be tried by twenty-three judges.

רָבָא אָמַר: מַלְקוֹת בִּמְקוֹם מִיתָה עוֹמֶדֶת. אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אִי הָכִי, אוּמְדָּנָא לְמָה לִי? לִמְחֲיֵיהּ, וְאִי מָאֵית – לֵימוּת!

Rava says: A verbal analogy is unnecessary. Conceptually, lashes stand in place of execution. As corporal punishment is a kind of replacement for capital punishment, it must be judged in the manner of capital punishments, by a court of twenty-three. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If so, that lashes stand in place of execution, why do I need an assessment? Before administering lashes, the court consults with a physician to assess how many lashes the transgressor can withstand and adjusts the number of lashes so that the transgressor’s life will not be threatened. But if Rava is correct, why is this necessary? Let the court strike him, and if the transgressor dies, let him die.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְנִקְלָה אָחִיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ״ – כִּי מָחֵית, אַגַּבָּא דְּחָיֵי מָחֵית. אֶלָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: אֲמָדוּהוּ לְקַבֵּל עֶשְׂרִים – אֵין מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ אֶלָּא מַכּוֹת הָרְאוּיוֹת לְהִשְׁתַּלֵּשׁ. וְכַמָּה הֵן? תַּמְנֵי סְרֵי,

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava: The verse states: “Then your brother will be dishonored before your eyes” (Deuteronomy 25:3). This teaches that when you strike, you strike upon the back of a live person. After he is dead, he is not called: Your brother. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, continued to ask Rav Ashi: But with regard to that which is taught in a baraita ( Tosefta , Makkot 4:6): If they assessed him to be strong enough to absorb twenty lashes, they flog him only with a number of lashes that can be divided into threes, as lashes are administered in sets of three, two behind and one in front. And how many are they? Eighteen.