Bava Batra 64b

דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן יָפָה מוֹכֵר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן רָעָה מוֹכֵר; וּדְקָאָמַר נָמֵי בְּעָלְמָא ״רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן יָפָה מוֹכֵר״ – מֵהָכָא.

As Rabbi Akiva holds that one who sells, sells generously, so that whatever is not explicitly excluded from the sale is assumed to be sold, while the Rabbis hold that one who sells, sells sparingly, so that whatever is not explicitly included in the sale is assumed to be unsold. And perhaps that which is also stated generally: Rabbi Akiva conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says that one who sells, sells generously, is derived from here.

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: אֵין אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁיִּתֵּן מְעוֹתָיו וְיִדְרְסוּהוּ אֲחֵרִים, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁיִּטּוֹל מָעוֹת וְיִפְרַח בָּאֲוִיר!

The Gemara rejects this opinion and asks: From where do you arrive at such a conclusion? Perhaps Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis do not disagree whether, in principle, a person who sells, sells generously or sparingly, but rather their disagreement is limited to this specific case. As Rabbi Akiva holds that a person does not want to spend his money on the purchase of a house and then have others tread upon his property, and therefore he says that the seller must purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain to reach his pit. And the Rabbis hold that a person does not want to receive money for the sale of his house and then have to fly through the air in order to reach his pit, and therefore they say that the seller presumably withheld for himself a path to his pit.

וְאֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא – מְכָרָן לְאַחֵר, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִיקַּח לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: צָרִיךְ.

Rather, the proof is from the last clause of the mishna, which states: If the seller kept the house but sold the pit and the cistern to another, Rabbi Akiva says: The buyer need not purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain. But the Rabbis say: He must purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain. The tanna’im seem to disagree as to whether a person who sells, sells generously or sparingly.

דִּלְמָא בְּהַאי פְּלִיגִי – דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: בָּתַר דַּעְתָּא דְלוֹקֵחַ אָזְלִינַן; וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: בָּתַר דַּעְתָּא דְמוֹכֵר אָזְלִינַן!

The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Perhaps they disagree about the following: Rabbi Akiva holds that we follow the intention of the buyer, as we assume that he would not have bought the pit if he would have to fly through the air to get there. And the Rabbis hold that we follow the intention of the seller, as presumably he would not have sold the pit if the buyer had the right to tread upon the seller’s property to reach it.

אֶלָּא מֵהָא – לָא אֶת הַבּוֹר וְלֹא אֶת הַגַּת וְלֹא אֶת הַשּׁוֹבָךְ, בֵּין חֲרֵבִין בֵּין יְשׁוּבִין; וְצָרִיךְ לִיקַּח לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ.

Rather, the proof that these tanna’im disagree whether one who sells, sells generously or sparingly is from this mishna (71a), which teaches: One who sells a field, even if he states that he is selling everything in it to the buyer, has sold neither the cistern, nor the winepress, nor the dovecote, whether it is abandoned or utilized, as these items are not part of the field itself. And the seller must purchase for himself a path through the buyer’s domain to reach whatever remains his. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. And the Rabbis say: The seller need not purchase a path through the buyer’s domain.

הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא לָאו הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן יָפָה מוֹכֵר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן רָעָה מוֹכֵר?

The Gemara explains the proof: Why do I need this ruling as well, seeing that this case involving the sale of a field appears to be identical to that involving the sale of a house? Rather, is it not teaching us that Rabbi Akiva holds that one who sells, sells generously, and therefore the seller must purchase for himself a path to his property, while the Rabbis hold that one who sells, sells sparingly, and therefore the purchase of such a path is not necessary?

וְדִלְמָא אַשְׁמְעִינַן בַּיִת, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן שָׂדֶה; וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בַּיִת – מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי צְנִיעוּתָא, אֲבָל שָׂדֶה – אֵימָא לָא;

The Gemara rejects this opinion: Perhaps the first mishna taught us this dispute with regard to a house, and the later mishna teaches us this dispute with regard to a field. And while this may seem redundant, both rulings are necessary, as had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to a house, I would have said that the buyer is particular about people passing through his house, because he desires privacy there. And it is for this reason that Rabbi Akiva says that in the absence of an explicit stipulation, the seller must purchase for himself a path to the pit. But in the case of a field, which is exposed to all, say that the buyer is not concerned about privacy.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן שָׂדֶה – מִשּׁוּם דְּקָשֵׁי לֵיהּ דַּוְושָׁא; אֲבָל בַּיִת – אֵימָא לָא.

And, conversely, had the mishna taught us this halakha only with regard to a field, I would have said that the buyer is particular about people passing through his field, because treading upon the field is detrimental to it. And it is for this reason that Rabbi Akiva says that the seller must purchase for himself a path to the pit. But in the case of a house, which is not adversely affected by treading through it, say that the buyer is not opposed to the seller passing through.

אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא – מְכָרָן לְאַחֵר, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִיקַּח לוֹ דֶּרֶךְ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: צָרִיךְ.

Rather, the proof that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree whether one who sells, sells generously or sparingly is from the latter clause of that mishna (71a), which teaches: But if the seller kept the field but sold the cistern and winepress to another person, Rabbi Akiva says: The buyer need not purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain to reach what he has bought, since a seller sells generously. But the Rabbis say: He must purchase for himself a path through the seller’s domain.

הָא תּוּ לְמָה לִי? הַיְינוּ הָךְ! אֶלָּא לָאו הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן יָפָה מוֹכֵר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מוֹכֵר בְּעַיִן רָעָה מוֹכֵר? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara explains the proof: Why do I also need this, seeing as this case involving the sale of a pit or a winepress in a field is identical to that involving the sale of a pit or a cistern in a house? Rather, is it not teaching us that Rabbi Akiva holds that one who sells, sells generously, while the Rabbis hold that one who sells, sells sparingly? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the latter clauses of these mishnayot that this is so.

אִיתְּמַר, רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב:

It was stated that the amora’im disagree about how the halakha should be decided with regard to this issue. Rav Huna says that Rav says: