Meilah 11b

הֲרֵי תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן, שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה מִצְוָתוֹ, וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ מְעִילָה!

But there is the instance of the removal of the ashes of offerings burned on the altar, whose mitzva has been performed and nevertheless it is still subject to misuse of consecrated property.

מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן וְאֵיבְרֵי שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ שְׁנֵי כְּתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד – אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.

The Gemara answers: The removal of the ashes cannot serve as a model for other halakhot whose mitzva has been performed, because the mitzva of the removal of the ashes and the limbs of the scapegoat of Yom Kippur after it was pushed off the cliff are both subject to the prohibition of misuse even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, i.e., they are two cases that share a unique halakha not found elsewhere. And there is a principle: Any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵיבְרֵי שָׂעִיר הַמִּשְׁתַּלֵּחַ – אֵין נֶהֱנִין מֵהֶן, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר נֶהֱנִין מֵהֶן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?!

The Gemara objects: This works out well according to the one who said that one may not derive benefit from the limbs of the scapegoat, as this is a second verse indicating that an item can be subject to the halakha of misuse even after its mitzva has been performed. But according to the one who said that one may derive benefit from the limbs of the scapegoat, and they are not subject to the halakha of misuse, what can be said to explain why it is not possible to derive this halakha from the removal of the ashes? According to that opinion, this is not a case of two verses that come as one.

מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן וּבִגְדֵי כְהוּנָּה שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד – אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.

The Gemara explains: Even according to that opinion, the removal of the ashes cannot serve as a model for other halakhot whose mitzva has been performed, because the mitzva of the removal of the ashes and the priestly vestments, the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, are both subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property even after their mitzva has been performed. Consequently, they are two verses that come as one, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect.

הָנִיחָא לְרַבָּנַן דְּאָמְרִי: ״וְהִנִּיחָם שָׁם״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהֵן טְעוּנִין גְּנִיזָה, שַׁפִּיר.

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the verse: “And he shall take off the linen garments, which he wore when he went into the sacred place, and shall leave them there” (Leviticus 16:23), teaches that the four white garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are unfit for further use, and they require interment. According to their opinion, the answer given by the Gemara works out well.

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי דּוֹסָא, דְּאָמַר: מוּתָּר לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן כֹּהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

But according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who said that these priestly vestments, which are the same as those required by an ordinary priest throughout the year, are permitted for use by an ordinary priest and do not require interment, which means that misuse of consecrated property does not apply to them, what can be said to explain why it is not possible to derive the halakha from the removal of the ashes, since it is a lone instance and therefore should serve as a general source for other cases?

מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵה תְּרוּמַת הַדֶּשֶׁן וְעֶגְלָה עֲרוּפָה שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד.

The Gemara responds: Even so, the removal of the ashes cannot serve as a model for other halakhot whose mitzva has been performed, because the cases of the removal of the ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken, a ritual performed in certain cases of murder where the perpetrator is not identified, are two verses that come as one that do not teach their common aspect, as they are both subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property even after their mitzva has been performed.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין מְלַמְּדִין, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מְלַמְּדִין, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara challenges this reply: This answer works out well according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to other cases, but according to the one who said that two verses that come as one do teach their common aspect to other cases, what is there to say?

תְּרֵי מִיעוּטֵי כְּתִיבִי. כְּתִיב הָתָם: ״הָעֲרוּפָה״,

The Gemara explains: Two exclusions are written in these two cases, which indicate that this halakha applies only to them. There, with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken, it is written: “The one whose neck was broken” (Deuteronomy 21:6), and the definite article indicates that this halakha should not be extended to other cases.

וּכְתִיב הָתָם ״וְשָׂמוֹ אֵצֶל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ״, הָנֵי – אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא – לָא.

And there, with regard to the removal of ashes, it is written: “And he shall put it next to the altar” (Leviticus 6:3), indicating that it alone is subject to the prohibition of misuse despite the fact that this is after the fulfillment of its mitzva. The verse emphasizes that this halakha applies to “it,” the ashes, but not to anything else. It is derived from these exclusions that specifically in the case of these, yes, there is misuse after the fulfillment of the mitzva, but with regard to other matters there is no misuse after fulfillment of the mitzva.

נְסָכִים בַּתְּחִילָּה מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן [וְכוּ׳]. לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר רַבִּי צָדוֹק,

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to libations, at their outset, from the moment they were consecrated, one is liable for misusing them, but once they have descended to the drainpipes built into the altar one is no longer liable for their misuse. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר רַבִּי צָדוֹק אוֹמֵר: לוּל קָטָן הָיָה בֵּין כֶּבֶשׁ לַמִּזְבֵּחַ, בְּמַעֲרָבוֹ שֶׁל כֶּבֶשׁ. אַחַת לְשִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה פִּרְחֵי כְהוּנָּה יוֹרְדִין בּוֹ, וּמְבִיאִין יַיִן קָרוּשׁ, שֶׁהוּא דּוֹמֶה לְעִגּוּלֵי דְבֵילָה, וְשׂוֹרְפִין אוֹתָהּ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בַּקֹּדֶשׁ הַסֵּךְ נֶסֶךְ שֵׁכָר לַה׳״ – כְּשֵׁם שֶׁנִּיסּוּכָהּ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה, כָּךְ שְׂרֵיפָתָהּ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok says: There was a small gap between the ramp and the altar west of the ramp. Once in seventy years young priests would descend there to the drainpipes built into the altar and bring out from there the congealed wine left over from the libations that had accumulated over time, which resembled round cakes of dried and pressed figs. And they would burn it in sanctity in the Temple courtyard, as it is stated: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation of strong drink to the Lord” (Numbers 28:7). This teaches that just as its pouring is in sanctity, so too, its burning must be in sanctity.

מַאי מַשְׁמַע? וְאָמַר רָבִינָא: אַתְיָא ״קֹדֶשׁ״ ״קֹדֶשׁ״. כְּתִיב הָכָא: ״בַּקֹּדֶשׁ״, וּכְתִיב הָתָם: ״וְשָׂרַפְתָּ אֶת הַנּוֹתָר בָּאֵשׁ וְלֹא יֹאכַל כִּי קֹדֶשׁ הֵם״,

Before addressing the issue of whether or not the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, the Gemara first analyzes the derivation stated at the end of the baraita : From where is this halakha of burning inferred? After all, the verse it cites is referring to pouring, not burning. Ravina said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between an expression of sanctity written with regard to libations and sanctity written with regard to leftover offerings. It is written here, with regard to libations: “In sanctity shall you pour a libation” (Numbers 28:7), and it is written there, with regard to leftover offerings: “You shall burn the leftovers in fire; they are not to be eaten, because it is sanctified” (Exodus 29:34).

מָה נוֹתָר – שְׂרֵיפָתוֹ בִּקְדוּשָּׁה, אַף הַאי נָמֵי בִּקְדוּשָּׁה!

This teaches that just as the burning of leftover offerings must be in sanctity, so too, the burning of these congealed libations must also be in sanctity. After the Gemara has clarified the baraita itself, it returns to the issue of whether or not the mishna here is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok. It is clear from the baraita that he maintains that even after the libations descend into the drainpipes that are built into the altar, they retain their sanctity and are therefore burned, which apparently contradicts the opinion of the mishna.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר רַבִּי צָדוֹק, דְּאִי קְלַט.

The Gemara rejects this claim: You may even say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, as it can be claimed that the mishna is referring to the specific case where some of the libations were collected in the space between the ramp and the altar and did not reach the bottom of the drainpipes. In such a situation, the libations are not subject to misuse and there is no requirement of burning, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok. By contrast, the tanna of the mishna agrees that libations that reached the bottom of the drainpipes are thereby consecrated, and therefore they are subject to misuse and there is a requirement of burning.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בַּר רַבִּי צָדוֹק, דְּאִי קְלַט?

There are those who say a different version of this discussion. Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok, and it is referring to the specific case where some of the libations were collected in the space between the ramp and the altar and did not reach the bottom of the drainpipes. In such an instance the libations are not subject to misuse and there is no requirement of burning. One can infer that libations that reached the bottom of the drainpipes are thereby consecrated, and are subject to misuse and must be burned.

אָמְרִי: לָא, וּמִדְּרַבָּנַן. וְהָא קְרָא קָנָסֵיב לַהּ? אַסְמַכְתָּא.

The Gemara rejects this claim. The Sages say in response: No; this is not the correct explanation. Rather, Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Tzadok concedes that even libations that reached the bottom of the drainpipes are not subject to misuse, as by Torah law they are not consecrated. And his ruling that they must be burned applies by rabbinic law. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok cites a verse in support of this halakha that the libations are burned, which indicates that it applies by Torah law. The Gemara answers: The verse is a mere support, not an actual source for the halakha , and therefore its citation does not prove that this prohibition applies by Torah law.

מַתְנִי׳ דִּישּׁוּן מִזְבֵּחַ הַפְּנִימִי, וְהַמְּנוֹרָה – לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. הַמַּקְדִּישׁ דִּישּׁוּן בַּתְּחִלָּה – מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ. תּוֹרִין שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנָּן, וּבְנֵי יוֹנָה שֶׁעָבַר זְמַנָּן – לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין.

MISHNA: With regard to the removal of ash from the inner altar to the place where the ashes lifted from the outer altar are deposited, and similarly with regard to the wicks of the Candelabrum, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio ; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse. In the case of one who consecrates anew the ash that has been removed, he is liable for misusing it. With regard to doves whose time of fitness for sacrifice has not arrived, as they are too young, and pigeons whose time of fitness for sacrifice has passed, as they are too old, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio ; but if one derived benefit from them he is not liable for their misuse.

גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the ashes of the inner altar are not subject to misuse once they have been moved to the place where the ashes lifted from the outer altar are deposited. The Gemara asks: Granted