Keritot 11b

אִיפְּכָא אִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְמִיתְנֵי!

It should teach the opposite, i.e., it should say: They made one who engages in the initial stage of intercourse like one who completes the act, as it is obvious that one who completes the act is liable.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִיסְמְיַיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא, הָכִי קָתָנֵי: עָשׂוּ גּוֹמֵר שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ בְּשִׁפְחָה חֲרוּפָה, דְּלָא מִיחַיְּיבִי, כִּמְעָרֶה כְּדַרְכָּהּ, דְּ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״ כְּתִיב.

The tanna said to Rav Sheshet: Should I remove this baraita , as it is apparently corrupted? Rav Sheshet said to him: No; do not remove the baraita , as this is what it is teaching: The Sages rendered one who completes an atypical act of intercourse with an espoused maidservant, for which he is not liable, like one who engages in the initial stage of intercourse with her in the typical manner, for which he is also exempt. They derived this from the fact that it is written: “Lies carnally.”

מִתְכַּוֵּין שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ בְּשִׁפְחָה, דִּפְטוּרִין כְּאֵינוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּין, דְּ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״ כְּתִיב. נֵיעוֹר שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ בְּשִׁפְחָה, דִּפְטוּרִין כְּיָשֵׁן, מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּ״שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע״ כְּתִיב.

Similarly, they rendered one who engages intentionally in atypical intercourse with a maidservant, for which they are both exempt, like one who does so in a typical manner unintentionally, as it is written: “Lies carnally.” And they also rendered one who engages in intercourse in an atypical manner with an espoused maidservant while he is awake, for which they are both exempt, like one who does so while sleeping. What is the reason? They derived this from the fact that it is written: “Lies carnally.”

נִמְצָא מִתְכַּוֵּין וְהַמְעָרֶה בְּשִׁפְחָה, כְּשֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין בְּכׇל עֲרָיוֹת. יָשֵׁן כְּדַרְכָּהּ – כְּיָשֵׁן דַּעֲרָיוֹת, נִמְצָא נֵיעוֹר שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ בְּשִׁפְחָה – כְּיָשֵׁן דְּכׇל עֲרָיוֹת.

The Gemara concludes: It has been determined that one who engages in intercourse intentionally or engages in the initial stage of intercourse with an espoused maidservant is like one who does so unintentionally with all those with whom relations are forbidden, meaning that he is exempt. Similarly, one who engages in intercourse with an espoused maidservant in a typical manner while sleeping is like one who does so, while sleeping, with all those others with whom relations are forbidden, and he is likewise exempt. Furthermore, it has also been determined that one who engages in atypical intercourse with an espoused maidservant while awake is like one who does so with all those with whom relations are forbidden, while sleeping, and he is also exempt.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אַרְבָּעָה מְחוּסְּרֵי כַּפָּרָה

MISHNA: If witnesses said to a person: We saw that you ate forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a sin offering if he did so unwittingly. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and a witness says: He did not eat forbidden fat, or if a woman says: He ate forbidden fat, and a woman says: He did not eat forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a sin that requires a sin offering. If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he is exempt.

מַתְנִי׳ אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב – מֵבִיא חַטָּאת. עֵד אוֹמֵר: אָכַל, וְעֵד אוֹמֵר: לֹא אָכַל, אִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת: אָכַל, וְאִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת: לֹא אָכַל – מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי. עֵד אוֹמֵר: אָכַל, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא אָכַלְתִּי – פָּטוּר.

If two witnesses say: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, Rabbi Meir deems him liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Meir said: This conclusion can be derived a fortiori : If two witnesses could have brought him liability to receive the severe punishment of death, can they not bring him liability to sacrifice an offering, which is relatively lenient? The Rabbis said to him: Witnesses are unable to render another person liable to bring an offering contrary to his statement, as what if he wishes to say: I did so intentionally, in which case he would be exempt from bringing an offering?

שְׁנַיִם אוֹמְרִים: אָכַל, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא אָכַלְתִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב. אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִם הֱבִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם לִידֵי מִיתָה חֲמוּרָה, לֹא יְבִיאוּהוּ לִידֵי קׇרְבָּן הַקַּל? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: מָה אִם יִרְצֶה לוֹמַר ״מֵזִיד הָיִיתִי״ – פָּטוּר.

If one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, i.e., in a case where he did not discover in the interim that fat is forbidden, or that the food he is eating is forbidden fat, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. If one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul , and notar in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them. This is a stringency that applies to one who eats several types of forbidden food and does not apply to one who eats one type of forbidden food.

אָכַל חֵלֶב וְחֵלֶב בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָכַל חֵלֶב וָדָם וּפִיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר בְּהֶעְלֵם (אַחַת) [אֶחָד] – חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. זֶה חוֹמֶר בְּמִינִין הַרְבֵּה מִמִּין אֶחָד.

And a stringency that applies to one who eats one type of forbidden food and not to one who eats several types of forbidden food is that if one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half an olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, in a case where they were both from one type of forbidden food, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If they were from two types, he is exempt, because he did not eat an olive-bulk of any specific forbidden food.

וְחוֹמֶר בְּמִין אֶחָד מִמִּינִין הַרְבֵּה, שֶׁאִם אָכַל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וְחָזַר וְאָכַל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת אַחֵר בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד, מִמִּין אֶחָד – חַיָּיב, מִשְּׁנֵי מִינִין – פָּטוּר.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If witnesses said to him: You ate forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a sin offering. The Gemara analyzes the first clause of the mishna: Since the mishna employs the plural form of the word said, how many witnesses are involved in the case? There must be at least two witnesses. And what does he say to them in response? If we say that he is silent and does not contradict them, then it may be inferred that it is only when he responds with silence in response to the claim of two witnesses that he brings a sin offering, but for silence in response to the claim of one witness, he does not bring a sin offering.

גְּמָ׳ קָתָנֵי: אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב״ – מֵבִיא חַטָּאת. אָמְרוּ כְּמָה הָוְיָין? תְּרֵין. וְהוּא מָה אָמַר לְהוֹן? אִלֵּימָא דְּשָׁתֵיק וְלָא קָמַכְחֵישׁ לְהוּ, אֶלָּא שְׁתִיקָה דִּתְרֵין הוּא דְּמֵבִיא חַטָּאת, עַל שְׁתִיקָה דְּחַד – לָא.

But say the middle clause: If a witness says that he ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat it, he is exempt. The Gemara infers: The reason that he is exempt is that he contradicts him. But if he is silent, he is liable, and all the more so if he is silent when two witnesses claim that he ate forbidden fat. This contradicts the inference from the first clause that silence in response to one witness does not render one liable to bring a sin offering.

אֵימָא מְצִיעֲתָא, עֵד אוֹמֵר: אָכַל, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר: לֹא אָכַלְתִּי. טַעְמָא דְּמַכְחִישׁ לֵיהּ, אֲבָל שָׁתֵיק – מִיחַיַּיב, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן תְּרֵי!

Rather, the first clause is referring to a case where he contradicts the claim of the two witnesses. Whose opinion is this? It is that of Rabbi Meir, who says in the continuation of the mishna that the person’s contradiction of the testimony of two witnesses is not considered a contradiction, and he is liable to bring a sin offering. But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, he is exempt.

אֶלָּא: דְּקָמַכְחֵישׁ לְהוּ, מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: הַכְחָשָׁה דְּבֵי תְרֵי לָאו הַכְחָשָׁה הִיא, אֲבָל לְרַבָּנַן, פָּטוּר.

The Gemara asks: And according to this answer, what does the tanna teach us in the first clause? From the latter clause you already learn that according to Rabbi Meir, one is liable to bring a sin offering as a result of the testimony of two witnesses, even if he contradicts them. The Gemara answers: The latter clause is clarifying the first clause, and this is what it teaches us: This matter that was stated in the first clause is actually the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis, and that dispute pertains to a case where he contradicts their testimony.

וּמַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן? מִסֵּיפָא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ! הָא קָמַשְׁמַע לַן: דָּבָר זֶה מַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבָּנַן, וְהוּא דְּקָמַכְחֵישׁ לְהוּ.

Some say a different explanation of the first clause: The case is where only one witness asserts that the individual ate forbidden fat, and occasionally the plural verb form in the expression: Witnesses said to him, can also be used to refer to one witness. As we learned in a mishna ( Yevamot 87b): With regard to a woman whose husband went overseas, and witnesses came and said to her: Your husband died, and she married another man on the basis of this testimony, and afterward her husband came back, she must leave both this man, her first husband, and that one, whom she married subsequently. This mishna indicates that the plural expression can be used in the case of a single witness, as we maintain that this mishna is referring even to a case where one witness testified that her husband died.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: ״אָמְרוּ לוֹ״ נָמֵי חַד קָרֵי לֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וּבָאוּ וְאָמְרוּ לָהּ מֵת בַּעֲלִיךְ וְנִישֵּׂאת וְאַחַר כָּךְ בָּא בַּעְלָהּ – תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה, דְּקַיְימָא לַן דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּחַד.

From where is this inferred? It is inferred from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna teaches: If she married without consent and then her first husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. What does the mishna mean when it states that she remarried without consent? It means she remarried without the consent of the court, which would be granted based on the testimony of one witness. Rather, two witnesses testified that her husband had died. Since that is full-fledged halakhic testimony, she is permitted to remarry independently, even without the explicit consent of the court.

מִמַּאי? מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: נִישֵּׂאת שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת – מוּתֶּרֶת לַחְזוֹר לוֹ. מַאי שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת – שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת בֵּית דִּין וְעֵד אֶחָד,

By inference, one may conclude that the first clause is referring to a case where she married with the consent of the court and on the basis of the testimony of one witness. Evidently, that mishna teaches the plural form of the word: Said, when it is referring to one witness, and here, too, in this mishna where it teaches the phrase: Witnesses said to him, it indicates that even one witness renders one liable to bring a sin offering.

מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא, בִּרְשׁוּת בֵּית דִּין וּבְעֵד אֶחָד. אַלְמָא גַּבֵּי עֵד אֶחָד קָתָנֵי ״אָמְרוּ״, וְהָכָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי ״אָמְרוּ לוֹ״, מַשְׁמַע אֲפִילּוּ עֵד אֶחָד.

The Gemara asks: And what does he say in response to the witness? If we say that he contradicts the witness, does he bring an offering? But doesn’t the middle clause teach: If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he is exempt?

וְהוּא, מַאי קָאָמַר? אִלֵּימָא דְּקָא מַכְחֵישׁ לֵיהּ, מִי מַיְיתֵי? וְהָא קָתָנֵי מְצִיעֲתָא: עֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: אָכַל, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר לֹא אָכַלְתִּי – פָּטוּר!

Rather, if it is referring to a case where he is silent, the clause is unnecessary, as one can learn this halakha from the middle clause, which states: If a witness says: He ate forbidden fat, and the person himself says: I did not eat forbidden fat, he is exempt from bringing a sin offering. This indicates that the reason he is exempt is that he contradicts the witness, but if he was silent, he is liable to bring a sin offering.

אֶלָּא דְּשָׁתֵיק, מִמְּצִיעֲתָא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: עֵד אֶחָד אוֹמֵר: כּוּ׳. טַעְמָא דְּקָא מַכְחֵישׁ לֵיהּ, אֲבָל שָׁתֵק מִישְׁתָּק – חַיָּיב!

The Gemara rejects this reasoning: Actually, the first clause of the mishna is referring to a case where he does not contradict the witness but remains silent. And this is what the mishna is teaching: If they, i.e., even one witness, said to him: You ate forbidden fat, he is liable to bring a sin offering. The middle clause then clarifies: In what case is this statement said? It is said where he was silent in response to this accusation, but if he contradicts the witness, he is exempt.

לְעוֹלָם דְּלָא מַכְחֵישׁ לֵיהּ, וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אָמְרוּ לוֹ: אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב – מֵבִיא חַטָּאת. בַּמֶּה דְבָרִים אֲמוּרִים: דְּשָׁתֵיק, אֲבָל מַכְחֵישׁ לֵיהּ – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that by Torah law that if he does not contradict the witness, he is liable to bring a sin offering? It is as the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to a verse that deals with a sin offering: “Or if his sin is known to him” (Leviticus 4:28), that this is referring to a case where he found out himself but not a case where others informed him of his sin. One might have thought he is exempt even if he does not contradict the claim of the witness. Therefore, the verse states: “Or if his sin is known to him,” which teaches that in any case where he knows that he sinned, even if others informed him of it, he is liable. He is exempt only if he denies it.

וּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא מְנָלַן דְּלָא מַכְחֵישׁ לֵיהּ חַיָּיב? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו חַטָּאתוֹ״ – וְלֹא שֶׁיּוֹדִיעוּהוּ אֲחֵרִים. יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ אֵין מַכְחִישָׁן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו״ – מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

The Gemara asks: What are we dealing with, in the case where he is informed by others? If we say that it is referring to two witnesses who inform him, in a case where two witnesses testify and he does not contradict them does one need a verse to render him liable?

בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִלֵּימָא בִּתְרֵין, תְּרֵין וְאֵין מַכְחִישָׁן קְרָא בָּעֵי?