Daf 17a: Credibility, Established Denial, and Returning Documents

Here is the complete Gemara text of this daf, word for word, divided into the stages of the sugya: Mishnah, question, kushya, terutz, raya and conclusion. Read each stage in the source first, then the explanation.

1. 01·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   וְאָמַר ״פָּרַעְתִּי״ – נֶאֱמָן. בָּא מַלְוֶה לִכְתּוֹב – אֵין כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ. ״חַיָּיב אַתָּה לִיתֵּן לוֹ״ וְאָמַר ״פָּרַעְתִּי״ – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן. בָּא מַלְוֶה לִכְתּוֹב – כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ.

   The page opens in the middle of a teaching, continuing the case in which the defendant was told, “Go pay him.” According to this account, he is believed when he says he paid, and the lender is not given a collection document merely on the basis of the judgment. The assumption is that a decisive payment order may prompt immediate repayment. After “You are liable to pay him,” however, his repayment claim is not accepted here, and a document may be written for the lender. The defendant perceives this wording as establishing liability without yet giving a decisive instruction to execute payment. The distinction connects the court’s language with the likelihood that payment has already occurred.

2. 02·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   רַב זְבִיד מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: בֵּין ״צֵא תֵּן לוֹ״, בֵּין ״חַיָּיב אַתָּה לִיתֵּן לוֹ״, וְאָמַר ״פָּרַעְתִּי״ – נֶאֱמָן. בָּא מַלְוֶה לִכְתּוֹב – אֵין כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין לוֹ.

   Rav Zevid transmits an account in Rav Naḥman’s name that rejects the preceding distinction. With either wording, the defendant is believed when he says he paid. The difference in phrasing alone does not eliminate a real possibility of repayment. In both cases, therefore, the lender is not given a collection document that could enable a second collection. This changes the foundation of the argument: the court’s wording alone does not impair ordinary credibility.

3. 03·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   אֶלָּא אִי אִיכָּא לְפַלּוֹגֵי – הָכִי הוּא דְּאִיכָּא לְפַלּוֹגֵי: אָמְרוּ לוֹ ״צֵא תֵּן לוֹ״, וְאָמַר ״פָּרַעְתִּי״, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא פְּרָעוֹ, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״פָּרַעְתִּי״ – הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן לְאוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן. ״חַיָּיב אַתָּה לִיתֵּן לוֹ״, וְאָמַר ״פָּרַעְתִּי״, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא פָּרַע, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״פָּרַעְתִּי״ – לֹא הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן לְאוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן. מַאי טַעְמָא? אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי הוּא קָא מִשְׁתְּמִיט מִינֵּיהּ, סָבַר עַד דִּמְעַיְּינוּ בִּי רַבָּנַן בְּדִינִי.

   Rav Zevid relocates the distinction to a case in which witnesses have already contradicted the first repayment claim. After “Go pay him,” that contradiction establishes the defendant as a false denier concerning this money. He therefore cannot establish a later repayment merely by his own assertion. After “You are liable to pay him,” however, the contradiction does not create that status. The defendant may think the judges are still considering his case, so his words are understood as temporary evasion. This does not justify lying; it distinguishes the consequences for future credibility. The witnesses refute the first claim, but in the second situation they do not remove his credibility to claim a subsequent payment.

4. 04·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי כְּלוּם״, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִים אוֹתוֹ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר: ״פָּרַעְתִּי״ – הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן לְאוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן.

   Rabbah bar bar Ḥana reports another case of established false denial in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name. A person is sued for one hundred, denies the obligation, and witnesses testify that he owes it. If he subsequently claims repayment, his assertion alone is not accepted concerning that money. Here the contradiction concerns the debt itself, not merely compliance with a court instruction. The phrase “concerning that money” limits the result to this obligation; it does not establish a general disqualification of everything he says.

5. 05·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   כִּי הָא דְּשַׁבְּתַאי בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מָרִינוּס כְּתַב לַהּ לְכַלְּתֵיהּ אִיצְטְלָא דְמֵילָתָא בִּכְתוּבְּתַהּ, וְקַבְּלַהּ עֲלֵיהּ. אִירְכַס כְּתוּבְּתַהּ. אֲמַר לַהּ: ״לָא הָיוּ דְּבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם״. אֲתוֹ סָהֲדֵי וְאָמְרִי: אִין כְּתַב לַהּ. לְסוֹף אֲמַר לְהוּ: ״פְּרַעְתִּיהָ״. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הוּחְזַקְתָּ כַּפְרָן לְאוֹתָהּ אִיצְטְלָא.

   The Gemara illustrates the rule through the case of Shabbetai, son of Rabbi Marinus. He undertook to provide his daughter-in-law with a fine woolen cloak through her marriage document. After the document was lost, he denied the undertaking itself, but witnesses confirmed that it had been written. When he shifted to claiming that he had already paid, Rabbi Ḥiyya established him as a false denier concerning that cloak. Losing the document does not erase an obligation proved by witnesses, and his earlier denial undermines his later repayment claim. The narrative connects credibility rules with the broader subject of lost documents.

6. 06·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִלְעָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָיָה חַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, וְאָמַר ״נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי״, וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁבַּע, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי״ – הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן לְאוֹתָהּ שְׁבוּעָה.

   Rabbi Avin reports in the names of Rabbi Ile’a and Rabbi Yoḥanan that the same structure applies to an oath. A person owes another an oath and claims that he has already sworn. Witnesses contradict him, and he later claims again that he has sworn. He is established as a false denier concerning that oath, so the later assertion is insufficient by itself. This extension shows that the focus is credibility about fulfilling an obligation, not specifically transferring money.

7. 07·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   אַמְרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ: מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִלְּתָא דְּרַבִּי אָבִין שֶׁנִּתְחַיֵּיב שְׁבוּעָה בְּבֵית דִּין, אֲבָל חִיֵּיב עַצְמוֹ שְׁבוּעָה – [נֶאֱמָן]. עָבֵיד אִינִישׁ דְּמִקְּרֵי וְאָמַר. אַהְדְּרוּהָ קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אָבִין, אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֲנָא נָמֵי בְּבֵית דִּין אֲמַרִי.

   Rabbi Abbahu limits the teaching to an oath imposed by a court. When a person voluntarily undertook to swear, contradiction of his first assertion does not here remove his credibility for a later claim. A person may verbally undertake an oath and then try to evade it by saying he has already sworn. Without a court-imposed duty, the Gemara does not give this behavior the same significance as denial of an authoritative obligation. Rabbi Avin confirms that he too meant an oath imposed by a court. The qualification therefore clarifies the teaching’s scope rather than rejecting it.

8. 08·RayaBava Metzia 17a

   אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין אָמַר רַבִּי אִלְעָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָיָה חַיָּיב לַחֲבֵירוֹ שְׁבוּעָה בְּבֵית דִּין וְאָמַר ״נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי״ וְהָעֵדִים מְעִידִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁבַּע, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי״ – הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן לְאוֹתָהּ שְׁבוּעָה.

   The Gemara brings another transmission of the same teaching. This version explicitly states that the oath obligation arose in court. It provides textual support for Rabbi Abbahu’s qualification and Rabbi Avin’s confirmation. This is not a new rule, but reinforcement of the precise boundaries of the earlier one. In the argument map, it should be marked as support for the restricted version, not as an extension to every oath.

9. 09·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

   אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמּוֹצֵא שְׁטַר חוֹב בַּשּׁוּק, וְכָתוּב בּוֹ הֶנְפֵּק, וְכָתוּב בּוֹ זְמַנּוֹ בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם – יַחְזִירוֹ לַבְּעָלִים. אִי מִשּׁוּם כָּתַב לִלְוֹת וְלֹא לָוָה – הָא כָּתוּב בּוֹ הֶנְפֵּק. אִי מִשּׁוּם פֵּרָעוֹן – לִפְרִיעָה בַּת יוֹמָא לָא חָיְישִׁינַן.

   Rabbi Asi reports in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name that an authenticated debt document found on its date is returned to its owner, meaning the lender. The Gemara examines two concerns familiar from the discussions of returning documents. Against the possibility that it was written for a loan never made, it points to the court authentication. Within this argument, authentication provides a basis for excluding the possibility that this is merely a preparatory document. Against the possibility that the loan was already repaid, it answers that same-day repayment is not a concern. These are separate foundations for returning the document, each addressing a different risk.

10. 10·KushyaBava Metzia 17a

    אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַבִּי אַסִּי: מִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָכִי? הָא אַתְּ הוּא דְּאָמְרַתְּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שְׁטָר שֶׁלָּוָה בּוֹ וּפְרָעוֹ – אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר וְלֹוֶה בּוֹ, שֶׁכְּבָר נִמְחַל שִׁיעְבּוּדוֹ. אֵימַת? אִילֵּימָא לִמְחַר וּלְיוֹמָא חָרָא, מַאי אִרְיָא שֶׁכְּבָר נִמְחַל שִׁעְבּוּדוֹ? תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ מוּקְדָּם, וּתְנַן: שִׁטְרֵי חוֹב הַמּוּקְדָּמִין – פְּסוּלִין. אֶלָּא לָאו בְּיוֹמֵיהּ. אַלְמָא פָּרְעִי אִינָשֵׁי בְּיוֹמֵיהּ!

    Rabbi Zeira challenges the ruling from another teaching that Rabbi Asi himself transmitted in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name. A document whose loan was repaid cannot serve for a new loan because its lien has expired. If the new loan is made on a later day, another defect already applies: the document predates the new loan. The Mishnah invalidates antedated debt documents because they risk wrongful collection from purchasers. Rabbi Zeira therefore concludes that the rule about an expired lien is needed for reuse on the same day. People evidently do repay on the day of the loan, seemingly undermining the earlier basis for returning the document.

11. 11·TerutzBava Metzia 17a

    אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִי קָא אָמֵינָא דְּלָא פָּרְעִי כְּלָל, דְּלָא שְׁכִיחִי אִינָשֵׁי דְּפָרְעִי בְּיוֹמֵיהּ קָא אָמֵינָא.

    Rabbi Asi distinguishes possibility from frequency. He did not claim that same-day repayment never occurs. He claimed that it is not common enough to require concern here. The prohibition on reuse can therefore govern an uncommon event without preventing the return of a found document. The answer resolves the contradiction by separating a rule for known facts from a concern raised when the facts are unknown.

12. 12·The Gemara asksBava Metzia 17a

    רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: כְּשֶׁחַיָּיב מוֹדֶה. אִי הָכִי מַאי לְמֵימְרָא?

    Rav Kahana proposes that the return ruling concerns a debtor who admits that the debt remains outstanding. Returning the document would then not rest solely on the rarity of same-day repayment. The Gemara immediately asks what this ruling teaches. If the borrower himself confirms that he has not paid, the central concern seems removed. The question requires identifying another risk that the borrower’s admission does not automatically eliminate.

13. 13·TerutzBava Metzia 17a

    מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הַאי מִפְרָע פַּרְעֵיהּ, וְהַאי דְּקָא אָמַר לָא פְּרַעְתֵּיהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָבָעֵי מֶהְדַּר לְמֵזְפָא בֵּיהּ זִמְנָא אַחֲרִיתִי, וְלִפְשִׁיטֵי דְסָפְרָא חָיֵישׁ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּאִם כֵּן מַלְוֶה גּוּפֵיהּ לָא שָׁבֵק. סָבַר: שָׁמְעִי בֵּי רַבָּנַן וּמַפְסְדִי לִי.

    The novelty is that we do not suspect the borrower has already paid and admits the debt only to borrow again with the same document. The borrower has an incentive: saving the scribe’s fee. But the old document does not regain its force, since its lien has expired. The lender will not permit its reuse, fearing that the court will discover the problem and impair his ability to collect through it. The borrower’s incentive alone therefore does not create a practical concern about such joint reuse. The answer relies on the other party’s interest, not on an assumption that an admission is always beyond suspicion.

14. 14·KushyaBava Metzia 17a

    מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: מָצָא שִׁטְרֵי חוֹב, אִם יֵשׁ בָּהֶן אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים – לֹא יַחֲזִיר, וְאוֹקִימְנָא, כְּשֶׁחַיָּיב מוֹדֶה. וּמִשּׁוּם שֶׁמָּא כָּתַב לִלְוֹת בְּנִיסָן וְלֹא לָוָה עַד תִּשְׁרֵי, וְאָתֵי לְמִטְרַף לָקוֹחוֹת מִנִּיסָן וְעַד תִּשְׁרֵי שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין. וְלָא אָמְרִינַן דְּאִם כֵּן מַלְוֶה גּוּפֵיהּ לָא שָׁבֵיק. דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: כְּתוֹב שְׁטָרָא אַחֲרִינָא בְּתִשְׁרִי, דְּדִלְמָא שָׁמְעִי רַבָּנַן וּמַפְסְדִי לִי!

    The Gemara compares this answer with the Mishnah concerning found debt documents that include recourse to property. The earlier discussion interpreted the prohibition on returning them as applying even when the debtor admits the debt. The concern there is that the document was written in Nisan but the loan was not made until Tishrei. Returning it could enable wrongful collection from property sold between those dates. Why not say there too that the lender would avoid the risk and demand a new document dated Tishrei? The objection tests whether reliance on the lender’s caution is consistent with the protection of purchasers in the earlier discussions.

15. 15·TerutzBava Metzia 17a

    אָמְרִי: הָתָם, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִית לֵיהּ רַוְוחָא דְּקָא טָרֵיף לָקוֹחוֹת מִנִּיסָן וְעַד תִּשְׁרֵי, מֵינָח נִיחָא לֵיהּ וְלָא אָמַר וְלָא מִידֵּי. הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ רַוְוחָא, דְּסוֹף סוֹף שְׁטָרָא הָאִידָּנָא כְּתִיב, מַאי אִיכָּא – דְּקָטָרֵיף לָקוֹחוֹת? בִּשְׁטָר שֶׁנִּמְחַל שִׁיעְבּוּדוֹ לָא שָׁבֵיק.

    The Gemara answers that the lender’s incentives differ in the two cases. A document written in Nisan offers a potential gain: collection from property sold before Tishrei, despite his lack of entitlement. That gain may induce him to remain silent and accept the risk. Reusing today’s document offers no dating advantage over a new document written today. He would merely risk relying on a document whose lien has expired, so he will not allow its reuse. The distinction is therefore not whether risk exists, but whether there is a gain that could make the lender willing to accept it.

16. 16·Conclusion of the sugyaBava Metzia 17a

    אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַטּוֹעֵן אַחַר מַעֲשֵׂה בֵּית דִּין –

    Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba transmits the opening of a new teaching in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name: “One who makes a claim against an act of court.” This concerns a claim seeking to defeat collection under an obligation with the force of a court enactment or act, such as a repayment claim. The supplied text, however, ends before stating the claimant’s legal position. We should therefore not supply the teaching’s ruling as though it appeared on this page. Structurally, this is a transition from protecting a document’s force to examining the force of an act of court.

1. 1According to Rav Zevid, what happens when the court said “You are liable to pay him” and the defendant claims repayment without contradictory witnesses? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
2. 2What limitation was confirmed for the teaching about a claim of having sworn that witnesses contradicted? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
3. 3How does Rabbi Asi answer the proof that people repay on the day of the loan? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
4. 4Why might a lender accept a Nisan document for a Tishrei loan but reject reuse of a document repaid today? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.
5. 5What can be established from the final segment of the page as supplied? Answer in your own words and support your explanation with a phrase from the Gemara.